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PREFACE
In November 1967 the 320 undergraduate members of the Ordinary 
Psychology class at the University of Glasgow sat the published form and 
an alternative form of Valentine's Reasoning Tests for Higher Levels of 
Intelligence on successive Fridays and Terman's Concept Mastery Test on 
the intervening Tuesday. The purpose to be served by this programme of 
testing was twofold: to assess the adequacy of the alternative form of
the Valentine test, which the present writer had devised, and to obtain 
information about this large group of undergraduates which would make it 
possible to constitute a group of 'poor reasoners' and a group of 'good 
reasoners' matched in respect of general academic ability and attainment.
In the event the alternative form did appear to be adequate in 
the sense that the means and standard deviations of the scores on the 
two forms were reasonably close when account was taken of the order in 
which subjects had sat the two forms. Accordingly, results on both 
forms - as well as on the Terman test - were used for the second of the 
purposes mentioned above. In a subsequent, more detailed, analysis of 
the items of the two forms of the Valentine, however, certain serious 
faults of detail became apparent and these, together with some aspects 
of the scoring system which had seemed curious even on a more superficial 
acquaintance, suggested the usefulness of a more extended appraisal of 
the original.
The main part of this thesis is closely tied to Section B of 
the Valentine Reasoning Tests, the section devoted to 'deductive reason­
ing' problems and the basis of the division, referred to above, of sub­
jects into those of deductive reasoning ability commensurate with their 
superior academic attainment and ability as measured in other ways and 
those of comparable general ability whose success on deductive reasoning 
tasks was very much less. Accordingly, a familiarity with this section 
of the test (in its two forms), both in the sense of a knowledge of its 
contents and of an appreciation of its strengths and weaknesses, is, if 
not essential, at least important for the reader of this thesis. At the 
same time, the discussion which naturally grew out of the more extended 
appraisal of the test referred to above, although, I think, of some
ii
importance in its own right in view of the enthusiasm with which it has 
been received in some influential quarters, goes beyond the limits of 
what is strictly relevant to the main concern of this thesis. I have 
therefore relegated it to the first of the Appendices and the reader who 
is unfamiliar, or insufficiently familiar, with the test may find it 
useful to look at some of the points made in the first six sections of 
Appendix A as well as at the two forms of the test itself, reproduced at 
the beginning of Appendix B.
The Valentine test was intended by its author (1957, 1961) as 
a means of assessing intelligence at the highest levels and it has been 
welcomed as such by Anstey (1966, p. 231) who describes it as ’an extreme­
ly clever and promising one’. In the last section of Appendix A I have 
tried to show that there are important theoretical objections to the use 
of the test for this purpose, while insisting on those special qualities 
which commended it to me as a test of deductive reasoning ability in the 
first place. In any case I should like to think that this thesis as a 
whole will appear to make at least a minor contribution to the marriage 
of its mental testing and experimental divisions which Butcher (1968, 
p. 1 0) has seen as so pressing a need for contemporary psychology.
In the course of completing the work described in this thesis 
I have received help and advice from a very large number of people to 
whom I should like to express my sincere gratitude. These include, of 
course, my colleagues on the teaching staff in the Psychology Department 
who have borne patiently with me at all times and readily offered advice 
when this was sought; the secretarial and technical staff of this 
Department and of the Adam Smith Buiding more generally who prepared 
materials at what must often have seemed to them to be unreasonably short 
notice; former colleagues in the Logic Department, especially Mr. T. 
Greenwood, Mr. P. Shaw and Mr. E. Toms; Mr. P. Covey-Crump of the Stat­
istics Department; Miss C. Duff and technical assistants in the Comput­
ing Department; the Advisers of Studies in Arts and Science and their 
secretarial staffs for help in locating the academic records of my sub­
jects; the trustees of the William Boyd Prize Fund for a small grant to 
enable me to pay my subjects for participation in the second stage of my 
research; the subjects themselves for their patient co-operation and 
interest in the research in which they played an indispensable part; 
the publishers, Oliver and Boyd, of Edinburgh for permission to reproduce 
the published form of the Valentine test; my wife for assistance and
support throughout the period during which this thesis was being prepar­
ed; and my supervisor, Professor R. ¥. Pickford, for his ready help 
in practical matters, his encouragement and his advice, particularly in 
matters of broad strategy.
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SUMMARY
In an opening review of the literature it is shown that two of 
the factors most widely supposed to produce error in syllogistic reasoning, 
namely, the 'atmosphere' of the premises and the emotional significance of 
the content of the argument, respectively could not, and have not been 
shown to, have this effect. Other factors liable to produce such errors 
are: misunderstanding of the universal affirmative (as implying the
truth of its converse), a conflict between the truth-value of a conclusion 
and the validity of the corresponding argument as a whole, and an inad­
equate grasp of, or adherence to, the 'logical task'.
In Chapter 2 the selection, on the basis of performance on two 
Forms of Section B of Valentine's Reasoning Tests, of a (PR) group of 22
'poor reasoners' and a (GR) group of 'good reasoners', matched one to one
on a composite measure of their (superior) academic attainment and ability 
is described. Preliminary evidence relating to the difference between 
the groups is considered and the materials and procedure in the first,
'five types of statement' (5T3), experiment described. This experiment 
applies a form of Mason's 'card-turning task' to the three types of state­
ment occurring most frequently in the criterion Valentine test, namely, 
the universal affirmative in categorical form (a ), the universal negative 
(e ) and statements of the form, 'Only X's are Y's', and to two other types 
incorporating logically important connectives, the universal affirmative 
in hypothetical form (Ah) and a universal-disjunctive (Ad).
The assumption underlying the 5T3 experiment is that a differ­
ence between the groups in their grasp of any of the types of statement 
will be reflected in a difference in the success with which they tackle 
the task with respect to that statement-type. significant differences 
were found on A and F and on one aspect of the response to Ah, but not on 
E or on Ad. A progressive analysis of responses to different statement- 
types suggests the operation of other, unsuspected, factors and throws 
doubt on the validity of the use of the card-turning task as a measure of 
the relative difficulty of different statement-types.
In the later (4TS) experiment, incorporating modifications to 
the materials and procedure, it was possible to establish (l) the persist­
ence of the differences on A and F over a period of 12 to 18 months, (2) 
the superiority of the GR group in learning to make the correct response
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to A and (3) the significantly greater proneness of the PR group to a type 
of error which can only reflect a tendency to misunderstand A statements 
in the way described in the first paragraph. Other aspects of the task 
less immediately related to the difference between the groups are also 
considered. Chapter 4 closes with some examples, drawn from the history 
of psychology, of the sometimes serious practical consequences of the mis­
understanding mentioned under (3) and a discussion of possible sources of 
this error.
Chapter 5 describes the use of Mason's 'construction task' to 
investigate the possibility that PR subjects have significantly more 
difficulty than their GR counterparts with the negative particle, a very 
important element in all reasoning. The outcome is somewhat equivocal, 
there being a significant difference between the groups on the false- 
affirmative condition (which incorporates a single negative component, 
the 'semantic' notion of falsity) and when this condition is combined with 
the true-negative, but not on the false-negative which includes both 
negative components. This last result, it is suggested, may be due to 
the conspicuous instability of the response-time measure of difficulty 
in this case.
Chapter 5 also considers evidence (from scores on the E.P.I.) 
about the extraversion and emotionality of the two groups, it having been 
argued that differences in either of these dimensions of personality might 
be partly responsible for difficulties with the negative particle. Al­
though the differences are in the expected direction none is large enough 
to be significant on a two-tailed test. A small but significant correl­
ation between scores on the N scale of the E.P.I. and latency of response 
to the true-negative condition when both groups of subjects are taken 
together lends, again in the absence of corroboration from the false- 
negative condition, rather uncertain support to the Eifermann hypothesis 
of a relationship between emotionality and slowness of response to negat­
ive statements.
A concluding chapter reviews the outcomes of the above research­
es, considers an alternative interpretation of the 5TS results and indic­
ates some possible points of departure for future research in this area.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Summary The origin of the writer's interest in individual differences 
in reasoning ability is briefly described. The monograph by Wilkins 
(1928) is reviewed both for its evidence confirming the reality of the 
phenomenon under investigation and also for the suggestions it contains 
about the possible sources of the difficulties some highly intelligent 
subjects seem to have with deductive reasoning tasks. A series of papers 
relating to the 'atmosphere effect' is then considered, the conclusion 
drawn being that the nature of this phenomenon has been misconstrued and 
that it should no longer be regarded either as non-logical or, therefore, 
as tending to increase the number of errors made in syllogistic reasoning 
tasks of the kind described. Papers attempting to relate errors in syl­
logistic reasoning to the subject's attitude towards the conclusion of an 
argument are next reviewed, it being shown (a) that there is some evidence 
to suggest that the subject's assumptions about the truth or falsity of 
the conclusion may affect his view about the validity of the argument but 
(b) that none of the attempts to establish a separate role for specific­
ally emotional factors has been successful, in some cases, at least, 
because the researches involved are marred by serious methodological flaws. 
Finally, some more general discussions of the problem of error in syllog­
istic reasoning are considered and conclusions drawn about the most useful 
directions in which to conduct a search for a solution to the problem 
described at the beginning of the chapter.
1.1 Introduction During the years 1960 - 66 the writer held a post
in the Department of Logic at the University of Glasgow. At that time
every undergraduate who took the first-year course in Logic was required,
as part of the work of the class, to attend a course of lectures on 'formal
logic' in which the traditional Aristotelian logic was expounded and
applied to examples. These lectures listed the characteristics of valid
immediate inferences, syllogisms and sorites and drew the attention of
members of the class to the commonest kinds of 'formal' and 'material'
1
fallacies. The members of the class were subsequently required, in 
exercises and examinations, to apply this training in logic to various 
arguments drawn from such sources as newspapers, textbooks and so on.
They were to say whether an argument was valid or not and to show it to 
be one or the other, in the former case by setting it out in the form 
of an immediate inference, syllogism or sorites, with the distributions
1 A glossary of logical terms is provided in Appendix C .
of the terms marked; in the latter by naming the fallacy and, where 
appropriate, 'exhibiting' it by showing, for example, that the terms 
were not distributed in such a way as to justify drawing the conclusion 
from the premises.
About the usefulness of this undertaking there was a good 
deal of argument on points of interest to, and decidable only by, 
psychologists. (it was often felt, for example, that the most diffi­
cult part of the whole task was the initial translation of an argument 
in everyday terms into 'logical form' and that it was not uncommon for 
this procedure, which was supposed to make it easier to assess the 
validity of an argument, actually to make it more difficult - because 
a student who started out with a (correct) belief that an argument was 
valid was liable to find himself, through some mistake in translation, 
'proving' it to be invalid.)
What specially interested me was the discovery, in some cases, 
of a large discrepancy between a student's success in this kind of task 
and his performance in the rest of the work of the class. In partic­
ular, some of the best students in terms of the classwork as a whole 
found the formal logic task surprisingly difficult. Senior colleagues 
had long accepted this as a fact of life and were inclined, at times, 
to put it down to the unsatisfactory nature of the formal logic compon­
ent of the course (now in fact dropped). Other satisfactory explan­
ations were difficult to find but I was prevented from taking the one 
just mentioned too seriously by the discovery, in a pilot piece of 
research for the Ed. B. degree, that large differences existed in rank 
order when 45 volunteer members of the first year Logic class were
tested with Section B of Valentine's Reasoning Tests for Higher Levels 
1
of Intelligence and a test of general intelligence of a more traditional 
kind, Heim's A. H. 5.
The phenomenon seemed the more striking because, at least on
the face of it, what was involved was not simply a difference in reason­
ing ability as compared with overall ability or attainment but between
1 VRT (B) was chosen for this purpose because, of all published tests, 
it came closest to presenting a task of the kind involved in our formal 
logic exercises. Because subjects are not asked, in VRT (b ), to trans­
late arguments into logical form the explanation favoured by my colleagues 
did not seem to apply to such discrepancies between performances on the
two tests as were found.
reasoning ability as revealed by a task of the kind described above and 
aptitude for philosophy (the primary concern of the ’Logic' department). 
This made the phenomenon a particularly puzzling one because it is quite 
common nowadays to maintain that the merit of a philosophical training is 
that it teaches one to think clearly, and indeed anyone who has followed 
a philosophy course to the Honours stage or beyond will be inclined to 
agree that a philosophical training, even if it is much more, is at least 
a matter of learning to detect flaws in other people's arguments and to 
produce arguments of one's own which are without flaws.
In the research reported in this thesis, however, the focus of 
interest was not on this rather special kind of case of the good philo­
sophy student whose aptitude for syllogistic reasoning is not of a compar­
ably high order but on the more general case of the student of above 
average academic ability and attainment in general (as measured princip­
ally by his performance on Terman's Concept Mastery Test and on the 
Higher Grade of the Scottish Certificate of Education) whose performance 
on Section B of Valentine's Reasoning Tests (in the two forms discussed in 
Appendix A) was distinctly lower than one might have expected.
The reasons for the choice of the more general case were several. 
To begin with the most practical, it would have been extremely difficult 
to find a large enough pool of philosophy students in classes beyond the 
introductory stage from which to draw the requisite two groups of subjects 
of comparable, and above average, aptitude for philosophy who also possess­
ed distinctly different aptitudes for the syllogistic reasoning task. At 
the same time, and more important from a theoretical point of view, the 
more general case, though, as I have suggested, less surprising than the 
special one of the good philosophy student, is still, I think, sufficiently 
contrary to normal expectations to merit investigation - and also, of 
course, of more general interest and potential practical importance.
It is not only that, I think, one naturally expects a person of 
high academic ability and attainment to have an equally unusual ability 
to detect fallacies in arguments to which he is exposed but also that 
there exists some evidence of a less subjective kind which seems to sup­
port this expectation. Thus the main section of Valentine's Reasoning 
Tests, which are offered as a test of general academic ability, consists 
of items of the syllogistic reasoning variety. This test may be thought
to have face validity on the grounds that almost half of a sample of the
(undergraduate) population for which the Valentine test is intended regard-
1
ed it as a good test of all-round intellectual ability; but it must
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derive such theoretical support as it has from the conclusions of, for 
example, Burt (1949) about the place of deductive reasoning ability in the 
'structure of the mind'. Burt's conclusion is that this kind of ability, 
while not identifiable with intellectual aptitude in the most general 
sense, is yet of a very high order of generality - thus consolidating and 
extending a view expressed thirty years earlier (1919) that the syllogism 
test is the most satisfactory single test of general ability, at least for 
children. In the light of the later contention it seems fair to see as 
a phenomenon calling for further investigation those cases in which a 
subject's performance on a measure of deductive reasoning ability is decid­
edly poorer than one would expect on the basis of his overall attainment 
and aptitude as measured by other tests of 'intelligence' and by perform­
ance on more orthodox tests ofscholastic aptitude.
1.2 Some prefatory remarks on the relevant literature Apart from the 
paper by Wilkins (1928) to be discussed in the next section I have been 
unable to find any references in published work to the problem dealt with 
in this thesis, viz., the sources of individual differences in deductive 
reasoning ability in adult subjects of high intelligence. On the other 
hand, a rather limited amount of research has been done into the sources 
of error in syllogistic reasoning in the undergraduate population at large. 
To the extent that such sources have been identified with some certainty 
it is possible in principle to generate hypotheses as to the factors 
responsible for individual differences on the assumption that relatively 
poor reasoners will be more susceptible to the sources identified than 
relatively good reasoners. Thus, for example, if it were established 
that an 'atmosphere effect' is generally liable to make fallacious argu­
ments appear to be valid, then one might investigate the possibility that 
relatively poor reasoners are especially subject to such an effect. It 
was with this possibility in mind that I looked to the other papers review­
ed in this chapter to supplement the rather casual suggestions contained 
in the paper by Wilkins.
1 See Section A.7 in Appendix A.
2 In Section A.8 of Appendix A I shall consider the theoretical basis 
on which the Valentine test must be supposed to rest and suggest that, in 
the final analysis, it is not a satisfactory one. kvhile this conclusion 
depends on the view that the relationship between syllogistic reasoning 
ability and general ability is not a sufficiently, close one,. I. think that 
the interest of the question why it is not a closer one remains.
1.3 Wilkins on the effect of changing the material in terms of which 
a reasoning task is presented As its title implies, the long paper 
by Wilkins (1928) focuses on a problem quite different from the one 
with which this part of this thesis is concerned. At the same time 
Wilkins devotes a quite substantial amount of space to the consider­
ation of the relationship between syllogistic reasoning ability and 
general academic aptitude as measured by Thorndike’s College Entrance 
Examination. There are, as a result, at least three reasons for 
placing a discussion of this paper at the beginning of the present
review of literature. It is, to begin with, the earliest discussion
1
in English of the problem pf error in syllogistic reasoning . It
reports work arising from observations strikingly similar to those
which prompted the research described in this thesis. And, partly 
as a direct outcome of these observations, partly as a consequence of 
Wilkins's investigation of the relationship between syllogistic reason­
ing ability and general academic aptitude, it contains the only pub­
lished discussion I have been able to find of the striking kind of 
individual differences in syllogistic reasoning ability with which 
this part of this thesis is concerned.
On page 5 of her paper Wilkins remarks:
A college class in logic seems to divide itself very soon into two
groups, those who seize on the material given at once and in a few
hours understand everything that it takes weeks for the other 
group to assimilate, if it ever does assimilate them. This second 
group seems to understand principles fairly well as long as they 
are applied to facts within their experience, but seems unable to 
apply any principles as soon as the material is unfamiliar or sym­
bolic. For instance, they see clearly that if you have the prop­
osition, 'All horses are animals' you cannot logically deduce from 
that the proposition that, 'All animals are horses'; but whenever 
the proposition is, 'All x's are y’s' they feel sure that this 
necessarily implies, 'All y's are x's'. Many of the members of 
this second group stand above the median in most of their classes. 
Some of them have unusual verbal facility.
This passage is of interest not only because it shows that 
Wilkins was impressed by a failure on the part of some of her brighter 
students ,altogether comparable with the one in which my colleagues and
1 Sells (1935) refers to articles by Eidens and the two Stbrrings in 
Arch, f. d. ges. Psych, from 1908 onwards. In fact a rather super­
ficial examination of this journal over the period in question revealed 
a considerable number of papers by a variety of authors containing mat­
erial, mainly of an introspective kind, which appeared to be of relev­
ance to the issues discussed in this thesis. Unfortunately, the pres­
ent writer's German prevented, a .more thorough scrutiny of these papers.
I were interested but also because it touches on two factors which 
appear to play an important role in the production of errors in syll­
ogistic reasoning, one of them being, as I hope to show later, at 
least partly responsible for the difference between the relatively 
poor reasoner and the relatively good one. The two factors are the 
reasoner's beliefs about the truth or falsity of the conclusion and 
his understanding - or misunderstanding - of the universal affirmative 
form of statement. As to the existence of a group of undergraduates 
of superior all round ability who make an unexpectedly poor showing on 
a syllogistic reasoning task, Wilkins is able to provide more than 
simply her own impressions in support of my own. Taking her subjects 
as a whole she found correlations of about .50 between the various 
Parts of her Syllogism Test and the College Entrance Examination.
On her own submission this degree of relationship must be regarded as 
reasonably high in view of the homogeneity of her sample. At the 
same time there were some subjects whose score on the Syllogism Test 
was surprisingly high considering their scores on the C.E.E.
On the other hand, much more conspicuously out of line with the 
ge^gral trend of the correlation table is a number of cases that 
seem/form almost a separate group. These are mostly just above 
the median of the intelligence scores and very low in the syll­
ogism test. These seem to be individuals of good general intell­
igence who are able to succeed but poorly in formal syllogistic 
reasoning. One individual who on the intelligence test has only 
two individuals making a better score, on the syllogism test has 
thirty-nine individuals £out of sixty-nine-] making a better score. 
This group stands out conspicuously on all parts of the test 
except Part B [where] the scores of these individuals were not 
actually higher than in the other parts, but only relatively so.
ibid. p. 30
Reference is made in this passage to various 'Parts’ of the 
Syllogism Test used by Wilkins. Since these relate not only to the 
issue referred to in the title of her paper - the effect of changing 
the materials in terms of which a reasoning task is presented - but 
also to the first of the two sources of error mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, it now seems appropriate to say something more about them.
In the passage from page 5 quoted above Wilkins says that a 
certain category of undergraduate gets into difficulties in a logical 
reasoning task if, in an argument of a given form, 'familiar' material 
is replaced by material which is 'symbolic' or 'unfamiliar'. Other, 
more objective evidence to this effect had previously been advanced by 
Thorndike (1922) using algebraic reasoning tasks. Wilkins's Syllogism
Test was designed in such a way as to provide additional evidence on 
this point but with specific reference to syllogistic reasoning.
There were four parts to the test, the syllogisms and immed­
iate inferences in each being identical in 'form' while differing in 
’content* - in the materials of which they were composed. In Part A 
the terms of the syllogisms were familiar words and the conclusions 
were framed in such a way as to be neither obviously true or false.
(For example, all Mary's cats, rather than simply - and falsely - all 
cats, were said in the conclusion of one syllogism to be black.) In 
Part B the terms of the syllogisms were letters, as, for example, in 
'all X's are Y's'. Wilkins refers to these as syllogisms in abstract 
form. In Part C the syllogisms' terms were unfamiliar (and frequently 
rather complicated) words such as 'tuscambia' and 'tiksatopses'. 
Finally, in Part D the syllogisms were composed of what Wilkins calls 
'suggestive' materials. For the most part this means that they were 
such that the truth-value of their conclusions was at odds with the 
validity of the argument as a whole: a valid argument would have a
conclusion which was unmistakably false, an invalid argument a conclus­
ion which was unmistakably true.
On the whole, Wilkins found, as expected, that the syllog­
isms of Part A were easier than those of any other Part. That is to 
say, she seems to have shown that syllogisms are harder to judge if 
they are presented in abstract terms, in unfamiliar and complicated 
words, or if the truth-value of their conclusions is at variance with 
the validity of the syllogisms as a whole.^
As we have seen, in the quotation from page 30, Wilkins found 
a conspicuous tendency for one group of subjects to do much less well 
than their scores on the College Entrance Examination would have led 
one to expect. This was true for all Parts of the test except B where 
they seem to have acquired a kind of anonymity by virtue of the fact 
that all subjects did less well on this Part than on the others and so 
were bunched together more. In the circumstances these results seem
1 In the quotation from page 5 Wilkins seems to be confusing the sec­
ond and third of these effects. The conclusion, 'All animals are 
horses' is obviously false (which helps the subject to recognise that 
it doesn't follow from 'All horses are animals'); the terms employed, 
on the other hand, are entirely familiar ones.
to suggest - in accordance with the general principle stated in 1.2 above 
- the generation of two hypotheses as to the sources of individual differ­
ences in syllogistic reasoning ability: that poor reasoners are relat­
ively more affected than good reasoners by the presentation of arguments 
in unfamiliar and complex terms, and that they are more prone to be affect­
ed by a combination of a valid argument with a false conclusion or an 
invalid argument with a true conclusion.
Since the differences in syllogistic reasoning ability with which
the research reported in this thesis is concerned relate to arguments of
the kind included in Section B of Valentine's Reasoning Tests, however, the
first of these hypotheses may, I think, be dismissed without further ado,
for the arguments of that section are not in unfamiliar or in complex
terms. The second possibility calls for closer consideration, not only
because it is not so obviously irrelevant to our criterion test but also
because, as we shall see in section 1.5, it refers to an effect which has
been established by other researchers besides Wilkins. I shall defer a
full discussion of the extent to which it does bear on performance in the
my belief
Valentine test until that section, in the meantime simply recording/that 
it is unlikely to account to account for more than a relatively small part 
of the individual differences in deductive reasoning ability with which 
this thesis concerns itself.
Wilkins found that of the two types of task involved in her 
Syllogism Test - the detection of fallacies and the recognition of valid 
inferences as valid - the former represented the better means of discrim­
inating between subjects. It was possible, moreover, to show that certain 
types of fallacy are harder to detect than others and that some (not nec­
essarily the same ones) discriminate better than others. In the Valentine 
test, Section B an important part of the discriminatory power depends on 
a third type of task not represented in Wilkins's test, the recognition 
of a statement of the flaw in an invalid argument. To the extent that the 
Valentine test does depend for its effectiveness on the subject's need to 
detect fallacies, however, it is clearly relevant to the task of this thesis 
to consider any factors which interfere with a subject's ability to carry 
out this task successfully, and especially in the case of fallacies with 
superior discriminating power.
It is in this connexion that we now return to the first of the
the possible sources of error mentioned by Wilkins in the first of the 
two quotations given above - the tendency for subjects to suppose that 
a statement of the form, ’all x's are y's* means or implies that all 
y's are x's. Wilkins's reference to it in this passage is, of course, 
a rather casual one, but she returns to it on page 72 where she offers 
it as an example of the 'simplest and commonest fallacies of thought' 
of which 'many college students' are entirely unaware. Our interest 
in this fallacy is not simply for its own sake but also for the role 
which it can be thought to play in other fallacies, including some of 
those which proved, in Wilkins's test, to be most difficult to detect 
and most effective in discriminating poor reasoners from good ones.
The fallacies in question are those of the Undistributed 
Middle Term, the Illicit Process of the Major Term, and the Illicit 
Process of the Minor Term, ranking respectively second, third and fifth 
in difficulty and first, fifth and fourth in discriminating power. Of 
the large number of syllogisms incorporating these fallacies eighteen 
of the most persuasive can be represented summarily as follows (using 
the traditional symbols for subject, predicate and middle terms)
A. Undistributed Middle
Some M is (not) P 
All S is M
Some S is (not) P
All (some) P is M 
All (some) S is M 
.'. All (some) S is P
All P is M
Some M is (not) S
.*. Some S is (not) P
B. Illicit Minor
All (no) M is P
All M is S
.*. All (no) S is P
All (no) P is M
All M is S
.*. All (no) S is P
C. Illicit Major
All (some) M is P 
No (some) S is (not) M 
.*. No (some) S is (not) P
All (some) M is P 
No (some) M is (not) S . 
.*. No (some) S is (not) P
The words in brackets in the above tabulation indicate alter­
natives and are self-explanatory except in the respect that of course 
'some' can be substituted for 'all' and 'some...not' for 'no' in only 
one premiss at a time if the syllogism is not to contain another fall­
acy in addition to the one in question, that of drawing a conclusion 
from two particular premises. Inspection of the above tabulation will
1 I owe this tabulation of the plausible forms of these fallacies to 
my former colleague, Mr Eric Toms.
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reveal that of the eighteen different forms of the syllogism there 
represented all but two are liable to go undetected by a subject who 
assumes that 'all S is P' implies that all P is S.
In the case of the fallacy of the Undistributed Middle Term 
what is wrong with the syllogism is that the premises do not assert 
anything about the whole class of things represented by the M term.
The result is that one has no right to draw any conclusion about the 
relationship existing between the classes represented by the S and P 
terms: all horses and all pigs may be animals without any pigs being
horses or, of course, vice versa. However, if, as Wilkins suggests, 
some subjects suppose that 'all S is M' implies that all M is S, then 
they would naturally read a syllogism of the above kind as asserting 
something about the whole class represented by M: if all horses are
animals, then, it is assumed by a person guilty of the above confusion, 
all animals are horses and this, together with the statement that all 
pigs are animals does imply that all pigs are horses - except that, as 
Wilkins points out, the obvious falsity of the converse of 'all horses 
are animals' is likely to prevent the occurrence of the error in this 
particular case.
Similar considerations apply in the case of the Illicit Pro­
cess of the Minor and Major Terms. In all four of the examples given, 
the fallacy disappears in the Minor case if the universal affirmative 
is assumed to mean or imply not only that all x's are y's but also that 
all y's are x's. The forms cited are fallacies because the conclusion 
asserts something about the whole class represented by the S term when 
nothing is said about this whole class in the minor premiss. Given 
the tendency to interpret a universal affirmative as asserting a sym­
metrical relationship between the two classes mentioned in the premises, 
however, the inference is readily mistaken for a valid one.
Two of the forms that the fallacy of Illicit Process of the 
Major can take are exceptions to the rule that all the fallacies repre­
sented in the above list would escape detection by a subject who thought 
that 'all x ’s are y's' implies its converse. These are the ones in 
which the major premiss is particular affirmative and the minor premiss 
universal negative. In the other four cases the conclusion asserts 
something about the whole class represented by P although nothing is 
asserted.about this, whole .class in the major premiss - at least as
long as one does not make the illicit conversion we have been talking 
about*
So much for the potential importance of this particular
error. Much of this is recognised by Chapman and Chapman (1959) who
include eleven of the sixteen cases mentioned above in their list of
errors in syllogistic reasoning which can be explained on the assumpt­
ion that subjects illicitly convert A and 0 propositions. Two quest­
ions remain: what evidence there is that such a confusion is common
amongst undergraduates, and how large a role it is likely to play in 
the individual differences in performance on Section B of the Valent­
ine Reasoning Tests with which this part of this thesis concerns itself.
As to the second of these questions, the answer is that three^ 
of the six fallacious arguments in each form of this Section would not 
appear to be fallacious to subjects supposing that the truth of ’All 
x's are y's' guarantees the truth of the statement that all y's are 
x's. The same would hold of a fourth argument (item 14) if we adopt­
ed the traditional logician's view that a statement of the form 'Only 
x's are y's' is equivalent to a statement of the form 'All y's are x's'. 
In fact, while not, of course disputing the logical equivalence of these 
two forms of statement, I doubt their psychological equivalence and will 
be presenting evidence in a later chapter in support of this view.
As to the incidence of the confusion in the undergraduate 
population, we have, of course, Wilkins's own finding that the fallacy 
of illicit conversion of an A proposition frequently goes undetected, 
especially when combined with obversion. Woodworth and Sells (1935)» 
too, take the frequency of this kind of error for granted, partly in the 
light of Wilkins's discoveries and partly following Eidens. Indeed the 
'atmosphere effect', which we shall be considering in some detail in the 
next section, was apparently originally introduced by Woodworth to 
account for the tendency to make illicit conversions of A and 0 propos­
itions. Chapman and Chapman try, in my view rather unconvincingly, to 
show that this tendency is only to be expected in view of the fact that
an A or 0 proposition and its converse are usually as a matter of exper-
2ience either both true o.r both false.
1 Items 5 , 7 and 8 in the original form, 5, 6 and 10 in 'Form W'.
2 Chapman and Chapman attribute the failure to detect two further fall­
acies to the tendency to make the illicit 0 conversion.
Wilkins's study, then, provides the only direct evidence I 
have been able to discover that undergraduates do make the kind of con­
fusion about the significance of statements of the form, 'All x's are 
yrs' which we have seen to be potentially important for errors in syllog­
istic reasoning. Even her evidence is not without its problematic 
aspects, however, She reports that 26 per cent of her subjects said 
they thought it possible to infer that all those making high grades in 
the intelligence tests are good students given that all good students 
make high grades in the intelligence tests. However, the incidence of 
the error in this case is likely to be affected by two factors - operating 
in opposite directions: in the first place, the incidence may have been
reduced by the fact that subjects would be on their guards against such a 
fallacy, and in the second place, it may have been increased by the plaus­
ibility of the conclusion. In a later chapter I shall present evidence 
of a different kind to which neither of these objections seem to apply.
I have already referred to possible confusions about the signi­
ficance of two types of statement commonly figuring in the traditional 
logic. Wilkins refers to a third, the tendency to assume that 'Some x's 
are y's' implies that some x's are not y's and, conversely, that 'Some 
x's are not y's1 implies that some are. The importance of this partic­
ular confusion is, not that it makes subjects miss a fallacy present in 
an argument, but that it leads them to suppose a fallacy present in an 
argument which is logically impeccable. In its sharpest form this would 
lead a person to deny that 'Some x's are y's' is consistent with 'All x's 
are y's' and to deny that 'Some x's are not y's' follows from 'No x's are 
y's'. As Wilkins remarks, this rather surprising kind of confusion is 
probably to be explained in terns of the fact that we do sometimes use 
'some' in such a way as to indicate that we know or suspect that what we 
say about some members of the class in question may not said about all 
members of the class. Where we seek to make our meaning on this point 
unambiguous, we may resort to the use of expressions such as 'at least 
some' or 'some if not all' on the one hand and 'only some' on the other. 
In the light of this finding of Wilkins subsequent studies involving syl­
logistic reasoning include a careful clarification of the point. There 
is no such explanation in the Valentine Reasoning Tests, but it seems 
possible to disregard this as a source of error in that test because the 
word 'some' is used only once - and then with the saving words, 'at least'. 
A complete list of the types of statement used in the Valentine test is 
given in Appendix.Bf .....................................................
1.4 The so-called 'atmosphere effect' After Wilkins the next psycho­
logists to discuss factors related to error in syllogistic reasoning were 
Woodworth and Sells (1935). They mentioned three such factors including, 
as the first of these, the confusion about the meaning of 'some' just 
discussed. The second proposed factor was 'caution', a tendency, in an 
experimental situation, to 'play safe' by preferring a particular conclus­
ion to a universal one and, more problematically, a negative to an affirm­
ative one. Their paper is chiefly remembered, however, for the third
factor they proposed, the effect of what they called the 'atmosphere' of 
the premises.
Working within the traditional fourfold classification of the 
syllogism as universal affirmative (a), universal negative (e), partic­
ular affirmative (i) and particular negative (o), they suggested that the 
atmosphere of each type of premiss is as follows:-
A statements have an all-yes atmosphere 
E statements have an all-no atmosphere 
I statements have a some-yes atmosphere 
0 statements have a some-no atmosphere
/s-ccording to Woodworth and dells (1935) this notion of an atmo­
sphere was introduced by Woodworth originally to account for the fact 
that subjects tend to assume that:-
'All x's are y's' implies 'All y's are x's'
'No x's are y's' implies 'No y's are x's'
'Some x's are y's' implies 'Some y's are x's'
'Some x's are not y's' implies 'Some y's are not x's'
Subjects who make this assumption are said to do so because the members 
of each pair are more like one another, in quantity and quality, than 
they are like any other statement - in other words, because their atmo­
spheres are as similar as possible.^
We have already had occasion to discuss the first and fourth 
of the above inferences, and, as they are illicit conversions, it is no 
doubt necessary to try to explain why undergraduates are apparently prone 
to make them. No such need appears to arise in the other two cases, 
however,for these are justified by logic. In any case, if the atmosphere 
effect explained only these phenomena, it would scarcely deserve the 
attention it has received, for there seems to be no reason to prefer the 
atmosphere hypothesis to an appeal to one other non-logical aspect of the 
pairs given above, namely their symmetry or reciprocity.
1' For all this see Woodworth and' Sells (1935) pp. 452-3 and Sells (1936) 
pp. 12-13.
In practice, however, the atmosphere effect achieved prominence 
because it seemed to make it possible to predict patterns of error not 
only when premises of the same atmosphere but when premises of different 
atmospheres were combined to produce a syllogism as opposed to an immed­
iate inference. To this end certain 'secondary hypotheses' had to be 
introduced. These were (Woodworth and Sells, 1935, p. 454):
(l) that a particular premise creates a some atmosphere, even though 
the other premise be universal, and (2) that a negative premise 
creates a negative atmosphere even though .the other, premise be affirm­
ative  In detail, the secondary hypotheses are that:
With premises AA atmosphere calls for an A conclusion 
With premises AE or EE atmosphere calls for an E conclusion 
With premises AI or II it calls for an A conclusion
With premises AO, El, EO, 10, or 00 it calls for an 0 conclusion
Sells (1936) tries to defend these secondary hypotheses. He 
had begun his paper by developing a suggestion made in the earlier paper 
with Woodworth that 'atmosphere' is a fairly, or rather very, extensive 
phenomenon, similar, in general character, to 'set' or 'Einstellung'.
As such 'the result of the atmosphere effect is that the individual makes 
a response (e.g. an inference or judgement) which is most similar in 
quality to the general trend or tone of the whole situation set up.' (p. 8) 
Proposed examples of the atmosphere effect in this broader sense include
experimental or quasi-experimental phenomena, such as the 'halo' effect
in rating, Thorndike's 'spread of effect', and so on, the common feature 
of which is, as we have been led to expect, simply that some kind of per­
ceived similarity between different stimulus situations seems to be import­
ant in determining the subject's responses, not a point of great novelty 
even in 1936.
So far as the secondary hypotheses relating to syllogistic
reasoning are concerned, Sells says (p. 15):
If one premise is A or E and the other I or 0, the atmosphere is partly 
universal and partly particular, a blend of all and some, which would 
certainly be weaker than a straight all and would thus amount to a 
some; and if one premise is A or I and the other E or 0, the atmo­
sphere is partly affirmative and partly negative, which would be 
weaker than a straight yes and would thus amount to a no.
The defence of the secondary hypotheses offered here is a very unconvinc­
ing one, particularly so far as the second of them is concerned. Obliged 
to choose simply between 'some' and 'all' (as of course one is, within 
the framework of the traditional syllogism) one might very well choose the 
former as the best blend of the two. For although it hardly seems a 
satisfactory compromise between two alternatives to opt for one of them,
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at least ’some’ can be used to refer to nearly all of a class as well as
to hardly any. On the other hand, the choice of the negative rather than
the affirmative as a compromise or blend between them seems entirely with­
out justification: it seems perfectly reasonable to turn Sells's argument
upside down and say that, as a yes plus a no is stronger than a no by
itself, it amounts to a yes.
In fact, Sells appears to be aware of the dubious nature of the
basis here proposed for the two hypotheses. He says (p. 16)
The atmosphere effect is defined as a set to complete a task with 
that one of several alternative responses which is most similar to 
the general trend or tone of the whole problem. It seems arbitrary, 
then, to say the least, to resolve the affirmative-negative and 
particular-universal cases by stating that the tone of the whole 
problem in the former case is negative and in the latter case partic­
ular. However, this procedure is neither arbitrary nor 'a poster­
iori'. It rests upon the same foundation as the rules for the val­
idity of the syllogism which state:
a) if one premise be negative, the conclusion must be negative and
b) if one premise be particular, the conclusion must be particular.
This seems to me to be a major concession because it substitutes 
an essentially logical basis for the atmosphere effect for the non-logical 
one of similarity, and it is a major concession because it seems most 
unlikely that the atmosphere effect would have received the attention it 
has if it had not been understood to represent the operation, in syllog­
istic reasoning, of some aspect of the situation - namely 'similarity' 
between premises and conclusion - totally irrelevant to the task of logical 
appraisal.^
As it is, Sells continues to talk, in his discussion of Table 1.1 
below, as if the degree of similarity between premises and conclusion were 
the factor operating to determine the subjects' choices. Commenting on 
the fourth and fifth rows, for example, which show that, presented with a 
pair of affirmative premises, one particular and one universal, Sells's 
subjects were most likely to choose an I conclusion, followed by an A and 
0 conclusion (roughly equally), followed by the E conclusion, Sells 
remarks (p.54), 'Both A and 0 propositions are more similar to I than 
the E proposition, for, since I is particular affirmative, A resembles I 
in being affirmative, 0 resembles I in being particular, while E is neither 
particular nor affirmative'.
1 For evidence about the interpretation put upon the atmosphere effect 
by later writers see p. 17 below.
TABLE 1 .1
The Effect of Atmosphere on the Acceptance of Invalid Conclusions
(From Sells (1936), p. 35) Entries indicate the average percent 
accepting each type of false conclusion. N = 65
Types of Invalid Conclusion
Premises --------------------------------
A E I 0
AA 58 14 63 17
AE 11 51 13 63
EA 8 64 12 69
AI 33 4 70 32
IA 36 15 75 36
AO 15 26 42 76
OA 13 33 28 75
EE 21 38 25 34
El 8 40 22 62
IE 11 42 22 63
EO 13 29 29 44
OE 15 31 24 48
II 27 9 72 38
10 12 19 31 64
01 11 23 33 71
00 14 16 38 52
In the application of the similarity principle in this case, 
however, Sells's procedure is arbitrary in a new sense, for he simply 
ignores one of the premises, namely the A premise. If it is taken into 
account, a proper estimate of the 'similarity' of the four alternative 
conclusions to the premises might be set out as follows:
Conclusions Premises
A I
Universal Affirm. Partic. Affirm.
A + + - +
E +
I + + +
0 -  -  +  -
Such an estimate shows that A and I agree with the premises on 
three points out of. four, E and 0 on only one. Hence we should expect, 
on the basis of similarity alone, that A and I are equally, and more often, 
preferred, E and 0 equally and less often. Estimates of this kind of 
the degree of similarity between other pairs of premises and the four 
possible conclusions reveal a comparable discrepancy between the outcomes 
predicted on the basis of similarity and the outcomes actually reported 
in the above table, and predicted on the essentially logical 'secondary
hypotheses’. Thus, for example, in the case of syllogisms with an A and 
an 0, or with an E and an I, premiss, the distribution of choices should 
approximate to a chance distribution since all four types of conclusion 
resemble the premises on two counts only. In fact, there is a pronounced 
tendency for the 0 conclusion to be preferred in both cases.
It will be obvious that the effect of atmosphere need not be 
contra-logical even if it were non-logical - as it would be if it were 
based on a perceived similarity between premises and preferred conclusion. 
On the other hand the assumption that it is contra-logical has been made 
from the very first. Sells himself says (page 40): 'The atmosphere
effect is a directive tendency which is opposed to the perception of the 
correct logical relations in these invalid problems.’ The natural con­
sequence of such a factor is, of course, error in syllogistic reasoning, 
and there is ample evidence that atmosphere has come to be regarded as 
the source of such error. (Cp Janis and Frick (1943)» Morgan and Morton 
(1944), and, most recently, Vinacke (1957) who, commenting on Sells's 
results, remarks (p. 83): 'These results are very important for every­
day reasoning where deduction is concerned, since they reveal a source 
of error apart from the facts presented in the premises.')
As I understand them, however, Woodworth and Sells thought of 
the atmosphere effect as a factor explaining why one kind of error is 
more likely to be made than any other and not why an erroneous conclusion 
is preferred to a correct one. It is true that atmosphere was held to 
explain why a subject is likely to say that an A conclusion follows from 
two a premises and deny that the corresponding E conclusion follows - 
even though both are actually invalid. In this sense the atmosphere 
effect may appear to be a source of error, but the error is a 'good' one 
because a subject who accepts an A conclusion and rejects an E one ob­
viously recognises that any conclusion which follows from two affirmative 
premises must itself be affirmative - one of the rules of the syllogism.
Similarly, subjects whose choices reflect the effects described in the
1
'secondary hypotheses' must be assumed to recognise - at some level - 
that the conclusion must be negative if one premise is negative and part­
icular '.if one premise is particular. Their failures are due to the fact 
that they do not realise that there are other rules of the syllogism - 
notably, of course, the rules of distribution.
1 Unconsciously, as one would expect and as the results pf,Sells's 
introspective study (pp. 47 ff.) tend to confirm.
If the atmosphere effect reflects an awareness of some of the
conditions which have to be met if a syllogism is to be valid, one ought
perhaps to expect that the effect will be more obvious in the case of
good reasoners than in the case of poor ones. An outcome opposite to
the one implied by the assumption that the effect of atmosphere is contra-
logical, it is clearly one which I could have tested empirically with my
two groups of subjects. At this point I have to admit, however, that
while I was planning my experimental work, I was still under the impress-
reasoning
ion that atmosphere accounts for kinds of error in syllogistic/and is 
thus unrelated to such individual differences in syllogistic reasoning 
ability as are revealed by the Valentine test. It came as a very pleas­
ant surprise, therefore, to discover that there is in Sells’s own results 
some tentative support for this conclusion.
Sells was interested in the extent to which the atmosphere effect
is related to age and intelligence. It isj?connexion with the second of
these two variables that the results germane to the present question are
presented. Sells compared the susceptibility to the atmosphere effect
of two groups of widely different intelligence as measured by the CAVD,
groups which he called ’bright' and 'dull' (N=16 in each). For present
purposes the interesting thing is that the two groups differed also in
their syllogistic reasoning ability as indicated by the number of errors
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made in Sells's test. The result was that the bright group appeared 
to be more susceptible to the atmosphere effect than the dull group.
Given Sells's view of this effect as contra-logical this out­
come naturally seemed to him something of a paradox (cp. p. 40). He 
attempted to resolve the paradox by suggesting that the strength of the 
effect in the case of the dull group was 'blanketed' by another effect - 
what he called 'gullibility' or the tendency to suppose that any conclus­
ion follows from any pair of premises. In my view, the proper explan­
ation of this result is that the dull group, unaware of the rules of the 
syllogism represented by the atmosphere effect, were liable to regard 
any conclusion as equally likely to follow from a pair of premises as 
any other. Providing, of course, that subjects unaware of these rules 
are also unaware of any of the other rules of the syllogism, we might 
expect the pattern of their responses to approximate to a random one.
In fact, inspection of the table of results in Chapman and Chapman (1959)
average , N
1 The/number of errors being, respectively, 27 and 74 (out of 180/.
2 Page 223, reproduced in Appendix D below.
suggests that there are other rules of the syllogism which are more obvious 
than those represented by the atmosphere effect.
In this table the Chapmans report on the percentage of cases 
in which subjects chose the four types of statement as following validly 
from pairs of premises from which in fact no conclusion can validly be 
inferred, as well as the percentage of cases in which subjects chose the 
correct alternative 'None of these'. A striking aspect of this table 
is the way in which this latter percentage increases in those cases where 
both premises are negative or both are particular - or, of course, both. 
This cannot, I think, be supposed to mean that it is easier to perceive 
the relationships between classes when these are expressed in negative 
terms - as they predominantly are in this second half of the Chapmans' 
table - in view of Wason's (1959 and 1961) evidence about the special 
difficulties experienced by undergraduate subjects with the processing 
of information stated in negative terms. Much more plausible, in my 
view, is the assumption that subjects recognised that the pairs of pre­
mises in this second half of the test violated the rules of the syllogism 
which state that at least one premise must be affirmative and at least 
one universal if any conclusion is to follow from them.
The rules of the syllogism may be supposed to form a hierarchy 
of obviousness, extending from the two rules just mentioned at one end,. 
through the rules reflected in the atmosphere effect to the rules of dis­
tribution. Asked to say whether a conclusion follows from a pair of
premises, a subject may be supposed to respond with an affirmative if the
syllogism does not contravene any of the rules with which he is familiar. 
This means, amongst other things, that a subject operating with an incom­
plete set of rules wiUscore some lucky hits - as well, of course, as
making some inevitable mistakes. A syllogism in the All mood may be 
accepted in the first figure (where it is valid) as well as in the second 
(where it is not) by a subject whose responses are guided only by the 
rules which are more obvious than those relating to distribution. In the 
first case he may be said, with Woodworth and Sells (p. 458), to have been 
lucky. On the other hand his success is not pure luck for he will re­
ject syllogisms in the moods AIA and AI0(each of which break one of the 
rules of which he is aware) and, of course, AIE (which breaks two).
Perhaps it is only necessary to repeat at this point that I do not sup­
pose that subjects who have not had a course, or done some reading, in 
formal logic would be able, necessarily, to formulate the rules in
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question explicitly. The assumption is, rather, that over the long
period of learning which precedes adulthood subjects acquire what looks
like a kind of intuitive understanding of the conditions which must be
met if an argument is to be deductively valid. In view of the individ- 
differences
ual/which make the subject-matter of the major part of this thesis, it 
may seem that some people learn this kind of thing better than others, 
even when allowance is made for differences in general ability and attain­
ment. To this we shall have to return later.
I have referred on a number of occasions, in this section and 
in the previous one to the paper by Chapman and Chapman (1959) in which, 
as the title tells us, the atmosphere effect is reconsidered. It seems 
appropriate, before we leave this discussion of the atmosphere effect, 
to refer to the central contention of the Chapmans' paper, which is that 
the atmosphere hypothesis explains the pattern of errors in a syllogistic 
reasoning task rather less well than its authors supposed. Instead, the 
Chapmans propose two other hypotheses which together, the authors main­
tain, explain this pattern better. With one of these hypotheses we are 
familiar from the previous section, for it is that subjects are frequently 
unaware of the invalidity of inferring 'All y's are x's' from 'All x's 
are y's' and 'Some y's are not x's' from 'Some s's are not y's'. We 
have seen how rich a source of error the first, at least, of these misap-s 
prehensions' is. likely to be, and also some of.ithe evidence that it is in 
fact a common misapprehension.
About the other hypothesis there must be a good deal less en­
thusiasm for it seems to be inadequately made out and inherently implaus­
ible. This second hypothesis is that subjects may have used 'probabil­
istic', as opposed to strictly deductive, inference since they 'had no 
way of knowing that all but strict deductive reasoning is disallowed in 
the syllogistic game' (p. 224-). To this it is difficult not to protest 
that the Chapmans' subjects ought to have had a way of knowing that the 
task they were being asked to perform was not one of assessing probabil­
ities but of saying which conclusion must be true if a particular pair 
of premises is true. No detailed information is provided about the 
instructions given to subjects, but there is at least no good evidence 
to suggest that it is impossible to make the nature of the task in the 
'syllogism game' clear. (See, for example, Wilkins (1928) p. 15 and Henle 
(1956) p. 125.)
There are other, more important, reasons for doubting the ad­
equacy of this second of the Chapmans' hypotheses. It is not simply 
that the example of a 'not unreasonable' but deductively invalid infer­
ence in the sphere of science is very unconvincing^ but also that the 
alleged predictive power of this second hypothesis is not made out.- As 
the Chapmans state it, in the kind of probabilistic inference in question 
"S reasons that things that have common qualities or effects are likely 
to be the same kinds of things, but things that lack common qualities or 
effects are not likely to be the same. In the syllogism, the available 
common characteristic is the middle term." (p. 224) It will be apparent 
that the Chapmans at least do not mention, even if they do recognise, 
that the statements of a syllogism refer, not to things, but to a part 
or to the whole of a class of things. This means that the probability 
that the things mentioned in the premises are the same kind of thing will 
vary from the case where both premises are universal and so refer to 
every thing of the kinds mentioned, through the case where one premise 
is universal to the case where neither is. Also the paradigm described 
above applies straightforwardly only to those syllogistic figures in 
which the middle term is predicate in both premises or may be made pre­
dicate by conversion.
Applying the hypothesis to a particular case, the Chapmans 
argue as follows (p. 225): "In the case of an I coupled with an 0 pre­
mise in the second figure, for example, 'Some A's are B's, some C's are 
not B's', S reasons that some A's and some C's do not share the common
quality of B and therefore some C's are not A's .... Probabilistic
reasoning yields analogous results for the case of an I with an E."
This last remark does not appear to be true for, as far as I can make out, 
a person reasoning along 'probabilistic' lines of the kind indicated 
would conclude from the premises that 'Some A's are C's and no B's are 
C's' that some B's are not A's and not that none are - whereas, in the 
the Chapmans' results, it is the latter conclusion and not the former 
which is preferred. (The percentages are 62, 59 and 48 for E in the
1 "A chemist might reason as follows: 'Yellow and powdery material
has often in the past been sulphur. Some of these test tubes have yellow 
and powdery material. Therefore some of these test tubes contain sulphur, 
(p. 22 ) Note that the first premise differs from a typical syllogistic 
premise in the respect that it says that yellow, powdery material has 
often been sulphur and not merely that it sometimes has. Even so,, the 
unqualified conclusion that some of the test tubes contain sulphur (not 
may do so) is one which no self-respecting scientist is likely to draw.
relevant three items compared with 13, 16 and 24 for 0.)
Besides, although it is difficult to he certain about this, 
it seems that the probabilistic inference sketched by the Chapmans should 
favour another, unobserved result. For if the possession of common 
characteristics makes it likely that two classes of things have some mem­
bers in common, equally, one might suppose should the non-possession of 
such characteristics. Thus, from the premises ’No A's are C's and some 
B's are not C's', one ought to conclude, on probabilistic grounds, that 
some B's are A's. The trouble with this kind of discussion is, of
course, that a difference of opinion about what is likely to be inferred
from what is capable of being settled neither by an appeal to rules of 
inference (as in deductive reasoning) nor, as far as I can see, by an 
appeal to the facts. I propose to leave Chapman and Chapman's paper, 
therefore, simply with the remark that they have not persuaded me, at 
least, that they have been able to provide a better basis for the pre­
diction of errors in the kind of syllogistic reasoning task which they 
describe than the atmosphere principles set out by Sells and Woodworth.
In concluding this section it would be appropriate to consider
the question whether there is any point in continuing to speak of an 
'atmosphere effect' in reasoning if, as I have suggested, the nature of 
this effect has been misconstrued even by its originators in such a way 
as to mislead anyone who takes the term they have chosen to describe this 
effect seriously. Relatively recently Hunter (1957a, 1957b) has spoken 
of an atmosphere effect in reasoning tasks of a non-syllogistic character. 
By this he means to refer to three different kinds of case in each of 
which the subjects' responses seem to be determined by the 'general feel' 
or 'global impression' of the problem. A similar interpretation of the 
atmosphere effect is adopted, with reference to syllogistic reasoning, 
by Gorden (1953)-
The weakness of such an interpretation is that it advances our 
understanding of the sources of failure in a reasoning task only very 
little. It does not seem possible to identify the 'general feel' or 
'global impression' of a problem independently and so establish the all­
eged relationship empirically. At most the invocation of an atmosphere 
effect in such terms seems to mean that subjects fail to solve their pro­
blems because they fail to carry out an adequate analysis of the terms of 
the problems - though even this, as a falsifiable proposition, seems open
to doubt in view of the large proportion of Hunter's undergraduate sub­
jects who said that they had 'reasoned out' their incorrect solutions.
As we have seen, although Woodworth and Sells do talk about
the atmosphere effect, so far as this is apparent in processes other than 
syllogistic reasoning, as if it depended on some kind of 'global' or gen­
eral impression which is to be contrasted with a clear and adequately 
analysed perception of the important relationships involved, they relate
ilarity between stimulus situation and response also seems to be the 
factor common to the various phenomena listed by Sells as exemplifying
premises of a syllogism differ in quantity or quality I have suggested 
that this appeal to maximum similarity is misleading, but in other cases, 
where the conclusion has the same quantity and quality as both premises, 
the existence of a very high degree of similarity is indisputable even if 
its causal effectiveness remains problematic. As it happens, very much 
the same conld be said about the problem which Hunter set for his under­
graduates (1957a): the preferred (and incorrect) solution is like both
premises in the respect that they all refer to a quantity which is sup­
posed to be held constant, and to two other quantities one of which varies 
in direct proportion to the other.
three term series problem administered to 11 and 16 year olds - no com­
parable similarity between premises and conclusion appears to exist. 
Instead, Hunter suggests that any atmosphere effect which appears to be
has called 'direct statement' or to ’inclusiveness'. It is unnecessary 
for present purposes to explain these in detail. The first seems to 
depend on a kind of perseveration: a section of the given 'rings in
the child's memory' and facilitates the emission of the appropriate re­
sponse. Inclusiveness involves the mistaken assumption that a statement 
such as 'A is darker than B' implies that A and B are dark, together with 
the further assumption that 'A is dark and fair' (which is a conclusion 
drawn by the subject from the premises) means that a is medium dark.
it explicitly to the degr xists between premises and preferred
conclusion in the syllogistic case. (As I have already remarked, sim-
the the sphere of reasoning.) In cases where the
In the other kind of problem described by Hunter (1957b) - a
operative must be ascribed to two different sources, to what Burt (1919)
In fact Hunter found little evidence to support the view that 
'atmosphere' from either of these sources plays an important role in
determining subjects' responses. My point would be that even if he had, 
it would hardly have helped to describe the result in terms of 'atmosphere' 
when it can be explained more precisely and unambiguously in terms of 
such processes as are represented by the terms 'direct statement' or 'in­
clusiveness '. With the availability of explanations of this degree of 
precision and clarity references to atmosphere can amount to little more 
than the assertion that subjects failed to 'appreciate the structure of 
the problem' (Hunter 1957b, p. 298) - and even this phrase possesses a 
clarity which makes it wholly to be preferred to the 'atmosphere' term­
inology. If this is accepted, then here, as elsewhere, nothing would 
be lost and something important would be gained if all references to an 
atmosphere effect were to cease. Perhaps it is significant that Hunter 
has not subsequently had occasion to use these terms and that quite gen­
erally, references to 'atmosphere' in the literature all tend to be of 
a quasi-historical character referring back to the pioneering studies 
of Woodworth and Sells where, as I have tried to show, they represent a 
misunderstanding, at least so far as the 'secondary principles' are con­
cerned.
1 .5 The importance of attitudes towards the conclusion of a syllogistic 
argument. We have already seen, in the monograph by Wilkins, that more 
errors are made, on the whole, when the truth-value of the conclusion of 
a syllogism is at variance with the validity of the argument as a whole, 
than when truth-value and validity are in agreement. Additional support 
for this contention is to be found in the paper by Janis and Frick (1943) 
which is noteworthy, in view of some of the papers to be considered later 
in this section, for the following characteristics: (l) the syllog­
isms really are syllogisms; they are set out in terms of statements 
which are easily identifiable as A, E, I or 0 in the traditional sense;
(2) the subjects' attitudes towards the conclusions (in this case sim­
ply whether they thought them true or false) were established empirically 
at the time of the test, and (3) in a way which reduced the risk of these 
views contaminating, or being contaminated by, the subjects' views about 
the validity or otherwise of the arguments; (4) there is no reason 
to doubt the comparability of syllogisms which were supposed to differ 
only in the truth-value of their conclusions. In these maximally fav­
ourable conditions Janis and Frick found that subjects made significantly 
more errors in judging the validity of valid syllogisms whose conclusions 
they believed to be false and of invalid syllogisms whose conclusions
they believed to be true than they did in judging syllogisms whose val­
idity agreed with the perceived truth-value of their conclusions. We 
may with some confidence, therefore, take this to be a well-established 
fact about syllogistic reasoning.
In the remainder of this section we shall be considering the 
question whether there is, in addition to this effect, a tendency for 
errors to be increased by emotional commitments on the subject's part 
vis-a-vis the content of a syllogistic argument, and in particular by 
an emotional attitude of acceptance or rejection towards the conclusion. 
That there is such an effect is something we tend to take for granted; 
it is also something which is likely to occur in times of national emerg­
ency when attempts to develop a reasoned approach to a problem are likely 
to appear to be defeated by the prevailing atmosphere of emotionality. 
This is why the two best known papers on the effect of attitudes on the 
ability to reason syllogistically stem from the period of the Second 
World War. Both appear to provide evidence for the view that emotion­
ally toned material has a distorting effect on a subject's reasoning 
processes.
The earlier of the two papers is that by Morgan and Morton 
(1944). It seems to me to suffer from a number of faults of which the 
most important are the following. As Henle and Michael (1956) point 
out, Morgan and Morton failed to establish empirically what their sub­
jects' attitudes towards the conclusions of the various 'emotionally- 
toned' arguirlents were. This enabled them, in their interpretations of 
the shifts which occurred in the conclusions preferred in these arguments 
as compared with emotionally neutral ones, to 'bend' the evidence to fit 
their hypothesis, sometimes in a highly unplausible fashion. A second 
weakness is that the comparability of the neutral and emotionally-toned 
arguments is far from being clear in a number of respects. Henle and 
Michael point out, for example, that the emotionally-toned arguments are 
very much more prolix than their neutral counterparts. More important, 
Wilkins's (1928) research ought to have made it clear that a proper com­
parison between emotionally-toned and emotionally neutral arguments can 
not be made if the latter are represented, as they are in Morgan and 
Morton's study, by arguments in 'abstract' form. For Wilkins showed 
that arguments in this form are generally more difficult than ones couch­
ed in 'familiar' terms and that^i^is/^inCtifficulty is associated with 
differences in the kinds of errors made ( see p. 7 above).
Most important of all, in my view, so far as the comparability 
of the two kinds of argument is concerned, the emotionally-toned arguments 
are presented in terms which encourage a change in the subject’s view of 
the task. Quite generally, these arguments are set out in such a way 
as to make their relationship to anything which might be called a syllog­
ism highly problematic. The quantity of the premises and conclusions 
are by no means always clear and in some instances their component state­
ments simply do not state relationships of inclusion between three classes 
of thing (cp syllogism 7, for example). In these circumstances it is 
very doubtful if the 'atmosphere' hypotheses of Woodworth and Sells can 
meaningfully be applied to predict subjects' choices (as Morgan and Morton 
assume). In any case the authors certainly appear to be mistaken about 
the 'atmosphere' of the premises of syllogisms 9 and 10 and they intro­
duce a new category of atmosphere to take account of the special charact­
eristics of syllogism 8 which they say 'contains a combination of univ­
ersal-affirmative and particular-negative atmospheres'.
For these reasons alone one woul^fmore surprised than otherwise 
if there were no shifts in the choice of conclusion from abstract syllog­
ism to its emotionally-toned counterpart. There is, however, more to 
come. Part of the change in the character of the syllogisms from the 
one half of the test to the other is the inclusion in the premises of the 
second half of terms such as 'most' and 'usually' which are characteristic 
of situations in which the subject's task is to assess the probability 
that the conclusion is true. In addition the conclusions which are sup­
posed to correspond to the I and 0 propositions of the traditional syl­
logism are of the form 'X's may be Y's' and 'X's may not be Y's'. This 
may have at least two different effects on the reasoner: it may rein­
force the impression that what he is supposed to do is to assess the like­
lihood that the conclusion is true, or it may encourage him to take refuge 
from a more explicit commitment - as Gorden (1953) clearly recognises.
For all of these reasons ,it is impossible to attach any clear 
significance to the shifts in preference for the various alternative con­
clusions which Morgan and Morton's research seemed to have uncovered.
In particular one cannot accept the authors' contention that these shifts 
are determined by the subjects' attitudes towards the conclusions of the 
emotionally-toned arguments.
1 This paper by Gorden embodies many of the weaknesses of the one at 
present under discussion (on which it is based). Hardly surprisingly, 
Gorden finds little evidence of bias attributable to subjects' attitudes.
Lefford (1946) was interested in two things: the extent to
which subjects succeeded in distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms
incorporating two different types of material, emotionally significant
(e ) and emotionally neutral (nE); and the extent to which 'partiality'
was shown, i. e., the extent to which subjects judged the conclusions of 
syllogisms
valid/to be true and the conclusions of invalid syllogisms to fee false. 
His most important finding must be supposed to be that scores on the 
half of his test incorporating E materials were considerably lower than 
on the other, nE half. The usual statistics are not supplied, but graphs 
show a J-shaped curve in the case of the E syllogisms, with a piling up 
of scores at the low end of the distribution, and something approaching 
a normal curve in the case of the nE items. It seems that 74 per cent 
of subjects scored less than 10 points out of a possible 100 on the E
items whereas less than 10 per cent scored as little as this on the nE
part of the test. If it were possible to assume that no other differ­
ence exists between the items of the two halves, this would represent 
very strong evidence for the view that a subject's ability to distinguish 
valid from invalid syllogisms is impaired when he is dealing with syllog­
isms involving emotionally significant material.
Unfortunately for Lefford's case it is not possible to make 
this assumption: the two types of item do not differ only in the ex­
tent to which they embody emotionally significant material. The fault 
is not any of the kinds noted in the Morgan and Morton study. Lefford's 
emotionally neutral items are composed of 'familiar', and not of -'-.ab-
stract' materials (to use Wilkins's terminology), and, as far as one can
judge, they are of the same logical form as their emotionally signific­
ant counterparts. The difference lies rather in the proportion of items
in the two halves of the test in which the truth-value of the conclusion
'agrees with' the validity of the argument.
As we have seen, Wilkins and Janis and Frick have shown that 
more errors are made when subjects are asked to judge the validity of 
arguments whose conclusions are true when the arguments themselves are 
invalid or whose conclusions are false when the arguments themselves 
are valid. The assumption is that subjects tend to use the truth-value 
of the conclusion as a guide to the validity of the argument. Lefford's 
'partiality' scores are consistent with this assumption, for he found 
that 50 per cent of his subjects showed complete partiality, said in 
every case that the conclusion of an argument was true if and only if
they had already judged the argument to be valid, and that a conclusion 
was false if and only if they had judged the corresponding argument to 
be invalid. This was so, clearly to Lefford's surprise, in both halves
of the test. If, then, as I have suggested, there are, in the nE half
of the test, more valid arguments with true conclusions and inylid argu­
ments with false conclusions than there are in the E half of the test, 
this by itself would account for the higher scores obtained in the former 
half.
It is difficult to prove conclusively that this is so. To 
do so we should really need to know which conclusions the subjects of 
1941 believed to be true and which they believed to be false, and 
Lefford does not include this information in his paper. So far as the 
nE items are concerned it is possible to be reasonably confident about 
the views of American undergraduates even of thirty years ago, at least 
in the majority of cases. The same is not true of the E items, however, 
for these depend very much on American attitudes to the events and fig­
ures of the Second World War. Conscious of the difficulties, however,
I have gone over all forty items trying to decide what Lefford's subjects 
would have been likely to say about the truth or falsity of the conclus­
ions and I believe that this reveals a distinct tendency for truth-value 
of conclusions to agree with validity of arguments more often in the nE 
than in the E set of items.
Of the nE items (nos. 1-20 in Appendix D ) three (nos. 1, 4, 
and 6) seem to be of such a nature as to render it nonsensical to ask 
whether they are true or false. Of the remaining seventeen there are 
four (nos. 7, 10, 11, and 17) about which I find it very difficult even 
to guess what the consensus, if any, would have been. Of the remaining 
thirteen it seems to me virtually certain of twelve and probable of the 
other one (no. 13) that their truth or falsity would have been judged in 
the way which makes it agree with the validity of the corresponding argu­
ments. There are, in addition, no items in the nE half of the test 
which would have been likely to produce errors in subjects influenced in 
their judgements of validity by their views on the truth-value of con­
clusions.
In the E half of the test, in contrast, there are six items 
(nos. 21, 23, 29, 35, 39 and 40) of which it seems to me certain, and 
five (nos. 24, 25, 31, 32 and 37) of which it seems to me probable that
this effect is operative, and only four (nos. 22, 30, 36 and 38) in which 
the opposite effect may be supposed, with some degree of probability, to 
have occurred (the remaining five being conclusions about which I found 
it impossible to reach a decision). If this is correct, then, as I have
already remarked, the relative difficulty of the E items in the test need
not be supposed to depend on the emotionally significant material which 
they incorporate, as Lefford suggests, but simply on the widely differing 
degrees to which truth and validity, falsity and invalidity, are assoc­
iated in the two halves of the test.
In reaching this conclusion I was conscious of the possibility 
of bias on my part and I therefore asked two young American women to go 
over the conclusions indicating whether they believed that American under­
graduates would have regarded them as true or false in 1941. Needless 
to say, they were not told about the issue involved until after they had 
completed the task. There proved to be a difference between the two 
women in the respect that one felt much more confident than the other of 
her ability to tell how Lefford's subjects would have regarded the con­
clusions. Considering only those twelve conclusions in the nE half of 
the test on which the two reached a verdict and agreed on it, ten were 
thought certainly, and one was thought probably, to be of a truth-value 
which would have encouraged a correct judgement about the validity of 
the arguments involved. The remaining conclusion was judged to have a 
truth-value tending to have the opposite effect.
In the second half of the test their conclusions agree less
well with my own - perhaps inevitably in view of the greater difficulties
involved,the diffidence of one of my assistants was such that she could
not tell how Lefford's subjects would have viewed eight of the twenty E
conclusions. Of the remaining twelve only three seemed to both women
likely to be viewed in such a way as to encourage the correct view about
the validity of the corresponding arguments, whereas three seemed certain
and six seemed likely to have the opposite effect. These scores are
increased to five, four and eleven respectively if we consider only the
1
views of the more confident of my two assistants. In sum, there is a 
clear tendency for the nE items to have conclusions which help subjects 
to reach the right verdict about the validity of the arguments and for 
the E items to have conclusions which operate in the opposite direction.
In these circumstances we must regard Lefford's contention that emotion­
ally significant materials tend to distort a subject's judgement of the
1 Full information about their judgements is given in Appendix D.
validity of arguments of a syllogistic character as not proven.
A similar sort of weakness appears to he present in the study by 
Thistlethwaite (1950) which is otherwise notable for its methodological 
and theoretical sophistication. Thistlethwaite1s strategy was similar in 
some respects to Lefford1s. Once again, performance on emotionally 
neutral arguments - incidentally not of the usual syllogistic variety - 
was compared with performance on emotionally significant items, the differ­
ence between them giving a measure of distortion presumably due to the 
emotional content of the second set of arguments. An important difference 
between the studies is that Thistlethwaite worked with two categories of 
subject, those for whom the emotional arguments really could be assumed to 
have this character and those for whom this was much less likely to be true.
A further difference between the studies is that the confounding 
of attitudes towards conclusions (in the sense of beliefs about their truth 
or falsity) and specifically emotional factors is deliberately built into 
Thistlethwaite1s design: Emotional commitments are supposed to be express­
ed via beliefs about the truth-values of conclusions. Although only two 
out of the seventy-two arguments used by Thistlethwaite are reproduced in 
his paper, the whole test, together with introduction, instructions to sub­
jects and key, proved to be available from the Library of Congress Photo­
copying Service. In his introduction the author explains that the emot­
ionally significant items have been so constructed that their conclusions 
will appear to be true to ethnocentric individuals in cases where the 
argument is actually invalid and false where it is valid. Inspection of 
the anti-Negro items (Appendix D) will serve to confirm that this is indeed 
the case. Thistlethwaite found that subjects from Southern states where 
ethnocentrism and, in particular, anti-Negro sentiments, are apparently 
prevalent showed much greater distortion than subjects from Northern states 
where this is not the case. The difficulty is, as I see it, to separate 
the established effects of beliefs about the truth-value of conclusions 
from the effects, on one's ability to tell a valid argument from an invalid 
on IfWSSoftonal commitments.
We come finally, and rather briefly, to a paper in which a claim 
is made to show that, at least in one particular case, emotional commitment 
did not interfere to any perceptible extent with the ability of subjects to 
distinguish valid from invalid arguments. This is the paper by Henle and
Michael (1956) already referred to in this section. Once again the evid­
ence is equivocal. Two groups differing in their attitudes towards 
Russia showed nc^ignificant differences in their views as to which con­
clusions could he inferred from premises 'concerned with communism, Russia 
or related matters'. On the other hand, as Henle and Michael admit, the 
differences between the two groups in attitude were relatively small: 
too few subjects declared themselves to be pro-Russian for statistical 
treatment of the results to be possible, so that the comparison was 
between subjects who declared themselves to be anti-Russian and subjects 
who professed to have no strong feelings, one way or the other, about 
Russia. Henle and Michael add one other point from their results which 
seems to them to be inconsistent with the view that arguments with emot­
ionally significant contents are harder to judge correctly than arguments 
without such contents. This is that subjects scored higher on the Russ­
ian syllogisms than on the 'abstract' syllogisms which were supposed to 
act as a point of comparison. They comment: 'We do not have strong
attitudes to X's and Y's and Z's ' The point appears to me to be
a debatable one, but even if it were allowed to be true, it would not 
serve to support the conclusion which Henle and Michael wish to draw in 
the absence of any proof that emotional significance is the only relev­
ant respect in which the two sets of syllogisms differ.
In this section we have reviewed evidence which seems to lend 
unequivocal support to the view that attitudes towards the conclusion of 
an argument play an important part in determining the success with which 
a person evaluates its validity. However, this is true only if by 'at­
titudes' we mean to refer to the subject's views about the truth or fals­
ity of the conclusion. None of the attempts to establish a separate 
role for emotional factors which we have reviewed, can be regarded as 
successful, although the objections to the study by Thistlethwaite must 
be regarded as tentative in character.
If the conclusions of Section B of the Valentine test were such
as to be clearly true or clearly false, it would be necessary to consider
the possibility that such individual differences as we have found between 
subjects of equally high ability and attainment are due to a greater 
proneness, on the part of the poor reasoners, to be affected by this fact­
or, and we should then, as a first step, have had to establish of how 
many arguments in this test it was true that the validity of the argument 
'disagreed'with the truth-value of the conclusion. It is a point which
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one might hope to establish in a relatively straightforward empirical
fashion. In actual fact an examination of the conclusions of the argu-
1
ments in the two forms of Section B of the Valentine test makes it clear 
that, at least as they stand, many of these are not such that one can very 
sensibly ask whether they are true or false. Generally speaking, these 
are the items in which the conclusion refers to some particular thing or 
class of things with which the subject could not be expected to be familiar 
- if only because they are imaginary (the people of Tutland or Abasiland 
in items 15A and B) or unspecified (the prisoners of W9) or indefinite 
(the John Smith of V5). In one or two cases it seemed possible to trans­
late the conclusion, without drastically altering the point at issue, into 
a form in which it did make sense to ask whether it was true or false.
Thus the conclusion, 'This (seditious) pamphlet must be suppressed' was 
presented in the form, 'Seditious pamphlets must be suppressed' - though 
even here it might be suggested that the original conclusion commits one 
to no more than the view that some seditious pamphlets should be treated 
in this way.
Putting these considerations into practice, a sheet was prepared 
on which thirteen of the original twenty-four conclusions were set out 
together with the following instructions:
The following are statements appearing as conclusions of arguments 
in Valentine's Reasoning Tests. Because an important factor in determin­
ing whether a person reasons correctly or not appears to be the truth or 
falsity of the conclusions of the arguments he is considering, it is very 
important to know whether the following statements appear to most students 
(for whom the Valentine test is intended) to be true or not.
Look at each statement carefully and try to decide whether it is 
true or false. In some cases you may not be able to make up your mind 
one way or the other. In such cases just write a question-mark in the 
left-hand margin. If you think the statement is definitely true or defin­
itely false, write T or F respectively. If you think it is probably true 
or probably false, write T? or F? respectively.
Sixty members of a first year psychology class subsequent to the 
one involved in the testing sessions referred to in Appendix A of this 
thesis were asked to complete the task described in the above instructions 
(which were also read out to them). The frequency with which each of the 
thirteen conclusions was ascribed to the five categories of truth and
1 See Appendix B where the two forms, V and W, are reproduced.
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falsity is shown in Table 1.2 below.
TABLE 1 .2
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH CONCLUSIONS OF ARGUMENTS IN SECTION B OF THE VALENT-
INE TEST WERE SAID TO BE TRUE OR FALSE (N = 60) 
Conclusion
tern No. T T? ? F? F predominantly: Argument:
V6 22 18 1 3 16 T(?) Valid
V7 — 1 10 11 38 p Invalid
V8 11 19 1 6 23 *? Invalid
V10 4 8 4 9 35 F Invalid
V12 5 2 1 3 49 F Valid
V13 4 2 2 5 47 F Valid
V14 10 10 2 10 28 F(?) Invalid
W6 1 1 — 7 51 F Invalid
W7 3 57 . F Valid
W10 4 12 1 6 37 F(?) Invalid
W12 10 11 — 8 31 F(?) Valid
W13 5 13 — 7 35 F Invalid
W14 2 1 5 7 45 F Valid
To the right of the table I have tried to indicate whether the 
conclusions were on the whole deemed by these sixty subjects to be true 
or false. It will be seen that all but two were regarded, with varying 
degrees of unanimity, to be false. More important, a comparison of the 
truth-values of the conclusions, as thus determined, with the validity of 
the arguments suggests that there are five items in which a subject who 
is influenced in his judgedment of the latter by his view about the former 
may be more likely to make a mistake than a subject not influenced in 
this way. These are items V12, V13, W7, W12 and W14. In fact, as will 
be seen in the next chapter, there were large differences in the extent 
to which 'good reasoners' and 'poor reasoners' responded correctly to 
some of these items, and it may be held likely, therefore, that the diff­
erences in reasoning ability in which I am interested are to be explained 
at least partly in terms of the operation of this factor. How large a 
part of the explanation is to be found here it is, of course, difficult 
to say with any certainty. If it is correct to assume, however, that a 
subject's views about the truth-value of the conclusions of the arguments
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is likely to militate against success in the logical reasoning task only 
in five out of the twenty-four items of the two forms, it is very likely, 
at least, that other factors are operative.
1.6 Some more general considerations To establish that an argument 
is likely to be regarded as valid if its conclusion is true and invalid 
if its conclusion is false is not, of course, to explain how this happens. 
Perhaps the most likely explanation (Richter, 1957) is that the subject 
confuses the task of saying whether an argument is valid with that of 
saying whether the conclusion is true, fails to notice that the latter 
is not identical with the former or, more likely, fails to realise that 
the truth of the conclusion does not entail the validity of the argument 
or, except in the special case where the premises are true, the falsity 
of the conclusion the invalidity of the argument. Henle and Michael 
(1956) and Henle (1962) offer evidence in support of the view that, in at 
least some cases, subjects 'do not accept the logical task1, do not, that 
is, maintain a clear distinction between questions about the validity of 
arguments and questions about the truth-value of conclusions.
In the first experiment described in the 1956 paper Henle and 
Michael replicated, more or less, the Morgan and Morton study described 
in the previous section. The outcome was very much in line with that 
reported by Morgan and Morton. In a second experiment an attempt was 
made to retain the 'emotionally significant' character of the non-symbolic 
syllogisms while simplifiying them and making them less cumbersome - by 
using statement forms more like the orthodox A, E, I and 0 ones and by 
using terms which consisted mostly of one or two words instead of the 
long phrases of Morgan and Morton. The result, with a different group 
of subjects, was an increase in the percentage of correct responses from 
37 (using the Morgan and Morton material in the first experiment) to 56 
(using the simplified, but still 'emotionally significant' arguments) and 
rather surprisingly, though not discussed by the authors, an increase 
from 26 to 56 percent in the symbolic syllogisms.
The main purpose of this second experiment was, as we have seen 
in the previous section, to throw doubt on the contention that emotional 
subject-matter presents special difficulties in a logical reasoning task. 
At the same time Henle and Michael represent it .as first step in the 'pro­
gressive clarification' of the logical task. In view of this the follow­
ing comments would appear to be in order. In the first place, the fact
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that there was, as we have just noted, a large improvement in performance 
on the syllogisms in symbolic form, from the first to the second experi­
ment, suggests that other factors were operative in addition to any 'clari 
fication of the task' achieved by the simplification of the contents and 
the regularisation of the form of the ’emotionally significant' syllogisms 
In particular, in view of Wilkins’s contention that it is easier to recog­
nise valid syllogisms as such rather than invalid ones, it is important 
to note that 12 of Henle and Michael’s 20 syllogisms were valid whereas 
those used by Morgan and Morton were predominantly invalid. Secondly, 
though the authors say that instructions in the experiment were minimal, 
some clarification of the task probably occurred as a result of the fact 
that the task was more readily identified as one calling for deductive 
reasoning: the form of Morgan and Morton's arguments, as we saw in the
previous section, encouraged the belief that the task was one of assessing
probabilities. Thirdly, the changes in the content of the ’emotionally-
their
toned’ syllogisms may have made/subjects' task easier but cannot reason­
ably be said to have done so by 'clarifying the task': it is much more
plausible to represent the difference between the syllogisms of the first 
and second experiments as being of the same general kind as the differ­
ence between the Wilkins syllogisms couched in 'familiar' terms and those 
couched in terms of 'tiksatopses' and other linguistically unassimilable 
terms.
In their third experiment Henle and Michael tried to achieve a 
further 'clarification of the task'. 'This experiment employed rather 
full oral instructions on how to solve syllogisms. Subjects were shown 
how to use diagrams in solving syllogisms, and several examples were 
worked through. When the experimenter had finished her exposition, sub­
jects were allowed to ask questions; and not until the task was entirely 
clear did the experiment proceedI' (Henle and Michael, p. 125) The 
result, with a third, and much smaller, group of subjects, was that the 
proportion of correct solutions went up from 56 per cent in Experiment II 
to 82 per cent in Experiment III on syllogisms incorporating emotionally 
significant material and from 49 to 83 per cent on syllogisms in symbolic 
form.
Unfortunately, it is still not clear how far the procedure 
described can really be said to have 'clarified the task' and to have 
done no more than that, or how it relates to the view that subjects fail 
to understand the task in the sense that they 'do not distinguish between
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a conclusion that is logically valid and one that is factually correct or 
one with which the subject agrees' (Henle, 1962, p. 370). Henle and 
Michael's 'clarification of the task' as described above seems to have 
included the demonstration of techniques for establishing the validity or 
invalidity of an argument and also some actual or vicarious practice in 
using these, and perhaps some other, less formal, techniques. Of course 
subjects may have acquired an understanding of the task as a more or less 
accidental by-product of the demonstration and practice, but the under­
standing of the task is separate from, and strictly speaking, presupposed 
by an ability to use the techniques referred to. Euler's circles and 
Venn's diagrams were originally introduced to make it easier to complete 
a task whose character was assumed already to be clear, and in so far as 
it was the use of such devices which accounted for the improved perform­
ance in Henle and Michael's third experiment it is not obvious that this
1represents a greater understanding of the task itself.
Henle's later paper (1962) is supposed to show that the gap 
between the thought processes required by logic and those which normally 
occur - the way we ought to think and the way we actually do think - is 
less than research of the kind reviewed in the previous section might 
lead one to suppose. Errors in syllogistic reasoning tasks, Henle sug­
gests, are due less to illogical reasoning strictly so-called than to 
factors of which 'failure to accept the logical task' is one. The others 
she mentions are the re-statement of a premise or conclusion so that 
the intended meaning is changed, the omission of a premise, and the slip­
ping in of additional premises.
No quantitative results are offered for 'as many authors have 
shown, the incidence of error in deductive reasoning depends on the form 
of the syllogism and its contents as well as on instructions to subjects. 
Quantitative results would have relevance to the particular conditions 
studied here, whereas an inquiry into the nature of the errors obtained 
might be of more general interest' (ibid., p. 370). In fact the argu­
ments used are so different in form from the recognisably syllogistic 
character of the arguments used in the study described in the 1956 paper
1 There must be a serious doubt, also, as to the comparability of the 
samples used in the second and third experiments. In the former the sub­
jects were two classes from New School (66 in all) plus one class from 
Hunter College (34 subjects); in the latter there were only 15 subjects, 
all of them graduates enrolled in a class on public speaking.
37
that it is difficult to be sure whether Henle thinks - or is right to 
think - that the errors obtained with the latter type of material are 
also likely to occur in the other, more formal, kind.
An example will make the difference clear. ’Syllogism 6* reads
as follows:
A group of women were discussing their household problems. Mrs 
Shivers broke the ice by saying: ’I'm so glad we're talking about these
problems. It's so important to talk about things that are in our minds. 
We spend so much ofy our time in the kitchen that of course household 
problems are in our minds. So it is important to talk about them.'
(Does it follow that it is important to talk about them? Give your reas­
oning. )
The trouble with such an informal presentation of the task is that it 
positively invites subjects to consider the broader question whether the 
conclusion is established by the argument rather than the question whether 
the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. The former quest­
ion is the one we may have to decide in everyday situations, when someone 
is trying to convince us of the truth of some statement, but it is not 
the question posed by normal deductive reasoning tasks of the kind dis­
cussed in this chapter. The point is an important one because a conclus­
ion can be said to be established by an argument only if the argument is 
valid and the premises are true. Hence one can normally refuse to accept 
the conclusion of an argument either on the grounds that the argument is 
invalid or on the grounds that one or more of the premises are false.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some of the examples Henle offers 
of responses which show the subject 'failing to accept the logical task' 
are cases where the subject questions the truth of a premise. Examples 
which do not fall into this category seem to consist of (a) an acceptance 
of the argument and (b) the suggestion of additional reasons for suppos­
ing the conclusion to be true.
In most deductive reasoning tasks, as I have just been implying, 
the subject is clearly required to consider the validity of the argument 
and simply to assume the truth of the premises. In the Valentine test 
the instructions of Section B include the following points:
You must assume first that the given premises (i.e. the statements 
underlined) are true. The problem is, in each case this: granted that
these statements are true, is the other statement (the conclusion of the 
argument) necessarily true?
REMEMBER THAT YOU MUST ASSUME THAT THE UNDERLINED STATEMENTS ARE TRUE
The underlining and the capitals are, of course, in the original. It is 
possible, obviously, that despite the heavy emphasis thereby laid on the 
relevant distinction between the questions of validity and proof, subjects 
proceed to ignore it or, more likely, eventually to lose sight of it.
Some evidence relating to the point will be presented in the next chapter. 
In the meantime it is clear that the examples presented by Henle can 
scarcely be said to establish the likelihood of such an eventuality since, 
in strong contrast to the Valentine, her test seems to have gone to no 
trouble to make the relevant distinction clear. In general, as she her­
self admits, in the quotation from page 370 and elsewhere, the kinds of 
mistake made by her subjects are to be ascribed, to an unknown extent, to 
special characteristics of the 'syllogisms' they were asked to judge.
Thus, 'the informal manner in which the premises were set out' made it 
possible for subjects to omit premises, consciously or otherwise.
Equally, it is sometimes difficult to be sure how to quantify the premises 
of the sample syllogisms she presents and it would therefore be relatively 
easy for subjects to 'restate' them without their being aware that they 
were doing so. In general, then, though mistakes of the kinds Henle 
describes do occur in circumstances which favour them, it is far from 
certain that they will occur with any considerable frequency in the rather 
formal kind of deductive reasoning task with which this chapter, and 
indeed this thesis, is concerned.
1 .7 Summary of the main points This chapter has attempted an evalu­
ation of the literature relevant to the problem of this thesis which may 
appear to the reader to be too long, and critical in the strong sense of 
finding much to complain about. The only defence that can be offered 
is that the positions allegedly established in the papers reviewed are 
mostly so well entrenched in psychology that nothing less than a major 
effort seemed adequate to expose the inadequacy of the methodological 
and/or theoretical basis on which they rest.
Contributions which largely escaped criticism were the monograph 
by Wilkins (1928) and the short paper by Janis and Frick (1943)9 both of 
which seem to me to have established that it is more difficult to judge the 
validity of an argument if the truth-value of the conclusion 'disagrees 
with' - or is believed by the subject to disagree with - the validity of 
the argument. The probable effect of this factor on performance on the 
Valentine test, Section B, was considered at the end of section 1.5 and 
was thought to be real but minor. Wilkins's monograph was also welcomed
for its evidence that some undergraduates of above average ability do have 
serious difficulties with deductive reasoning tasks and that subjects 
frequently illicitly 'convert' an A proposition, and for its points about 
the relative difficulty and discriminating power of different formal fall­
acies, reference once again being made, in the light of these, to the 
arguments of the Valentine test.
The discussion of the 'atmosphere effect' (Woodworth and Sells, 
1935, Sells, 1936) attempted to demolish the, by now traditional, assumpt- 
ionjthat this effect accounts for errors in syllogistic reasoning in terms 
of a factor which is at least non-logical and perhaps actually contra- 
logical. It was argued that the effect in question is of small importance 
as an explanatory device where it seems best to apply - in accounting for 
the tendency of subjects to convert A, E, I and 0 propositions. In its 
later role of explaining why subjects tend to prefer one invalid conclusion 
of a syllogism to other invalid conclusions it was criticised, not for 
failing to do this on the basis of its 'secondary hypotheses' - on the 
contrary, and despite Chapman and Chapman (1959), it seems to be rather 
successful in this respect - but for its misidentification of the factors 
probably involved. In particular, it was shown that only an arbitrary 
criterion of the 'similarity' of premises to conclusion could make this 
seem the operative factor and that the important considerations are prob- 
ably^logical ones: subjects susceptible to the atmosphere effect (i.e.,
who show the preferences, as between invalid conclusions, predicted by it) 
are being guided in their choice of conclusion by some, but not all, of 
the 'rules of the syllogism'. (Sells's own 'paradoxical' finding that 
'bright' subjects are more susceptible to the effect than 'dull' ones lends 
credence to this interpretation.) More generally, it was suggested that 
no good grounds have been presented for the retention of references to 
'atmosphere' in attempts to account for failures in a problem-solving task.
I tried to show that there is no good evidence to support the 
widely held view that the subject's attitude towards the conclusion of a 
syllogism - other than his belief that it is true or that it is false - 
is partly responsible for the adequacy or otherwise with which he judges 
its validity. All attempts to establish that a subject's judgement is 
distorted by his emotional reactions to the subject-matter of the argu­
ments he is called upon to evaluate were shown to have failed to control 
for some other variable, notably the 'agreement' or 'disagreement' of the 
validity of the argument with the truth-value of its conclusion. On the
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other hand, the attempt by Henle and Michael (1956) to establish that 
attitudes towards the conclusion have no effect on a subject’s ability 
to distinguish valid from invalid arguments is also methodologically weak.
Other possible sources of error in syllogistic reasoning tasks 
were finally considered, including what is probably the most plausible, 
a failure to understand, or to adhere to, the requirements of the task. 
Here, too, serious doubts were expressed about methodology or about the 
relevance of the conditions described in papers purporting to establish 
the operation of such factors to those obtaining in the criterion 
Valentine reasoning test.
CHAPTER TWO
SELECTION OF SUBJECTS, PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE, AND THE 'FIVE TYPES OF 
STATEMENT1 TASK, PART ONE: DESCRIPTION OF THE MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Summary The procedure used to establish two groups of undergraduates 
of comparable academic ability and attainment but of widely different 
deductive reasoning ability is described. Evidence about differences 
between members of the two groups which might bear on the difference in 
deductive reasoning ability was drawn from patterns of error in the 
criterion test and from answers to a questionnaire and is reviewed in 
this chapter as a preliminary to the more extended, experimental study 
of differences between the groups which is the subject of the remainder 
of this thesis. Finally, the details of the materials and procedure 
used in the first experimental task, the 'Five Types of Statement' task, 
are set out.
2.1 Selection of subjects I have referred on several occasions in the 
previous chapter to Section B of Valentine's Reasoning Tests as the crit­
erion by which I proposed to judge the syllogistic reasoning ability of my 
subjects. The nature of this Section and the fact that there were two 
forms of it at my disposal (one of them devised by myself^) will have 
become apparent. I have also remarked that it comes closer than any other 
published test to the kind of task used in the Logic Department of Glasgow
University for the teaching and assessment of the ability to distinguish
2
valid from invalid arguments. In November 1966 the entire membership 
of the Ordinary Psychology class at Glasgow sat both forms of the test on 
succeeding Fridays and Terman's concept Mastery Test on the intervening 
Tuesday. The results of this testing programme not only made it possible 
to carry out the technical evaluation of the published form of the Valentine 
test presented in Appendix A but also, along with information about per­
formances on the Higher Grade of the Scottish Certificate of Education, 
furnished me with data which could be used to select subjects for the 
experimental study which is the concern of the remainder of this thesis.
To this end a composite academic ability and attainment ('AAA')
1 See Appendix A, Sections A.2 and A.3, and Appendix B, where both forms 
of the test are reproduced.
2 I have also mentioned various weaknesses of this test which became 
apparent only after its use for the present purpose. These are described 
in Appendix A, Sections A.4 - A.6, it being suggested, at the end of that 
Appendix, that these weaknesses do not seriously affect their usefulness 
as a selection instrument for present purposes.
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score was calculated for each subject, based on his scores in Section A
of the Valentine test, in the Concept Mastery Test (adjusted to allow for
2
a pronounced inter-faculty difference in favour of Arts students ) and on
3
the bcottish Certificate of Education, Higher Grade - 'scores' in the 
last case being found by awarding 3 points for an A pass, 2 for a B and 
1 for a C, a procedure also adopted by Nisbet and Napier (1970). The 
resulting distributions are presented in Appendix E. Scores from these 
three sources were weighted, respectively, in the proportions 1 : 3 • 4, 
the heavy weighting on the S.C.E. component being intended to reflect the 
amount of information about the subjects' educational attainments, as 
opposed to ability, represented by these scores. Finally, for convenience 
of comparison, the AAA scores and the scores on the two forms of the Val­
entine test, Section B, were transformed into T-scale equivalents with, of
4
course, a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10.
Using these T-scale scores on the two measures I constituted my 
two experimental groups as follows. Members of the 'poor reasoners' (PR) 
group had to be at least average on the AAA measure but below average on 
the Valentine, Section B: in fact I set an arbitrary minimum difference
between the two scores of 10 T-scale points, equivalent, of course, to one 
S.D. on either measure. For each student who satisfied these criteria 
I tried to find a person of the same faculty and sex with the same AAA 
score but with a Valentine score within a point or two of his AAA score, 
in other words, of the same, at least average, academic ability but without 
the relative weakness in deductive reasoning ability. The outcome was, of 
course, that the difference between the Valentine, Section B scores of any 
pair of subjects was in no case less than 10 T-scale points. I regarded 
identity of sex and faculty of lesser importance so long as the difference 
between members of a pair was confined to only one of these factors.
1 Of the 320 members of the class 286 had scores on all three measures, 
the main source of loss being students whose entrance qualifications were 
in G.C.E. or were otherwise difficult to compare with S.C.E. Higher passes.
2 The adjustment took the form of finding standard scores for students 
from the two faculties based, of course, on the relevant means and S.D.s.
3 Counting passes gained in the fifth year at school only: to have 
included sixth year passes as well would have been to introduce an impond­
erable, for although every Scottish school child who proceeds to University 
has a fifth year at Secondary School, some do not stay for a sixth year 
and, of those who do, some try to improve their grades on subjects already 
passed, others try to pass on a subject for the first time and, of course, 
others regard their sixth year as an opportunity for engaging in activities 
of an altogether different kind.
4 See Guilford (1965) p. 518ff.
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Altogether there were 26 pairs of students meeting these crit­
eria. Of these, however, only 22 pairs actually completed the tasks
included in the first stage of my research. Means and standard deviat­
ions (in T-scale units) for the two groups, poor reasoners (PR) and good 
reasoners (GR), are given in Table 2.1, individual scores being relegated 
to Appendix E . The mean and standard deviation for the original pool
of 286 were, respectively, 50 and 10 for both AAA and V.R.T. Section B.
TABLE 2.1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF AAA AND V.R.T. SECTION B SCORES FOR THE 
TWO EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS: POOR REASONERS (PR) AND GOOD REASONERS (GR)
A A A  V.R.T. SECT. B
N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
GR group 22 59.36 5.17 60.00 4.50
PR group 22 60.18 5.60 42.82 4.79
As we shall see, the overwhelming trend of the experimental 
data is to confirm the belief that the large difference in mean V.R.T 
Section B scores between the two groups reflects a real difference in 
their ability to cope with tasks calling for deductive reasoning ability 
or its components; in none of the experimental measures did the PR 
group as a whole excel over the GR group - though the differences between 
the groups reached statistical significance on only a few occasions.
So far as the adequacy of the AAA score as a means of securing 
equivalence of the two groups in academic ability and attainment is con­
cerned, the only subsequent check on this was their scores in the two 
class exams in psychology, the inadequacy of this as anything more than 
a rough guide being fully acknowledged. Table 2.2 presents data for 
both groups and for the Ordinary Psychology Class as a whole. It shows 
that the PR group was, if anything, superior to the GR group on both ex­
aminations. On the other hand, the mean score of the GR group is not 
only lower than that of the PR group but obviously not significantly 
higher than that of the class as a whole - so that this evidence, for 
what it is worth, provides only partial support for the contention that 
the two groups are of equal and above average academic ability and attain­
ment.
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TABLE 2.2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE PR AND GR GROUPS AND OF THE TOOLE 
ORDINARY PSYCHOLOGY CLASS IN TWO CLASS EXAMINATIONS
1st Class Exam 2nd Class Exam
N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
PR group 21* 60.95 11.57 55.29 8.27
GR group 21* 54.33 9.15 51.62 9.58
Whole class 311 55.97 10.75 49.65 10.60
* One member of each group failed to sit the exams.
2.2 Some preliminary evidence Having established my two experimental 
groups it seemed appropriate to begin by reviewing the evidence already at 
my disposal about the differences between them. In particular it seemed 
appropriate and worthwhile to study their answers to the questionnaires 
which all members of the class had completed at the end of the testing 
programme and to look for differences in the patterns of errors of the 
two groups in the criterion test of deductive reasoning ability.
The questionnaires offered evidence about a number of things of 
potential relevance to the point at issue - not only about the compar­
ability of the two groups on age, level of academic aspiration and logical 
training and interest, but also about their reactions to the Valentine 
test and their views about their competence in the kind of task under 
consideration. ^ome of this information might suggest additional points 
of departure in the search for factors underlying individual differences 
in this ability, others could only provide interesting information, for 
example, about the extent to which the PR group's relative inferiority in 
this area made itself felt. The relevant questionnaire items and the 
distributions of answers for the two groups are given in detail in Append­
ix E.
For most of the items the distributions are obviously not signi­
ficantly different for the two groups. This is true of sex, age, faculty 
(Arts or Science), year of study, and whether or not aspiring to an Honours 
degree. It is also true of answers to questions about attendance at 
classes on logic, on logic books read, and on the use of logical aids in 
the completion of Section B of Valentine's test. Roughly the same pro­
portion of each group said the task in Section B was clear or very clear,
and that they had had to resort to guessing or to looking at the reasons 
offered before deciding whether the argument was valid. Just about as 
many from each group found the Concept Mastery Test more enjoyable than 
the Valentine, found the second form of the Valentine they did easier - 
and for the same natural reason, viz., practice. Similarly, 9 subjects 
in each group mentioned a factor which might have accounted for their 
doing less well on a test (not always specified) than they might other­
wise have done.
Noticeable but not significant differences in trend were appar­
ent in answers to the questions whether the Valentine test seemed a good 
test of all-round ability (the good reasoners, surprisingly, being less 
well disposed towards it), whether the subject thought he was good at 
spotting weaknesses in other people's arguments, and whether the mere 
existence of a time-limit prevented him from concentrating on the task 
in hand. The one significant difference (X, = 9.715, p< 0.005) was on 
the question whether the subject thought he could have done better on 
the Valentine test if he had had more time. As one might have expected, 
the poor reasoners were significantly more liable to answer this question 
in the affirmative, estimates of the amount of extra time required being 
mostly of the order of 15 minutes (as with the GR subjects who said they 
could have done better with more time) though three PR subjects thought 
they could have used 30 minutes more, and one subject said he would have 
needed another hour to do himself justice. Of the 17 PR subjects who 
said they needed more time 3 said they would have spent it on Section A,
5 on Section B and 9 on both. The corresponding figures for the GR 
group are 2, 3 and 1.
Extreme slowness was a feature of some of the PR subjects in 
my previous, pilot study. Its significance is a little difficult to 
interpret if we do not simply identify slowness with incomprehension - 
as, of course, one might in this kind of task. Latency of response 
has commonly been taken as a measure of difficulty - as it was, indeed, 
in one of the tasks included in the first stage of the experimental work 
described in this thesis. In the previous research referred to, on 
the other hand, PR subjects were able to achieve very high scores on 
the Advanced Matrices Test (Raven, 1965) provided they were given an 
unlimited amount of time, spread over two sessions (Wallace, 1965).
This is hardly consistent with the 'incomprehension' hypothesis except,
perhaps, stated in terms of speed of comprehension.
With respect to the other source of information about my subjects 
already at my disposal, namely, their patterns of error in the two forms 
(V and W) of Section B of the Valentine test, it seemed at least possible 
that an inspection of the items in which the largest discrepancies occurred 
might suggest where the sources of the differences between the groups lay 
or tentatively support the possibilities suggested by the literature.
To this end I tabulated them as in Table 2.3 below, in which a distinction 
is made between success on both tasks (identifying an invalid argument as 
invalid and also a statement of the flaw in such an argument) and success 
on only the first. Where an argument is valid, there is only the first.
TABLE 2.3
NUMBER OF SUCCESSES ACHIEVED BY PR AND GR GROUPS IN VALENTINE B ITEMS
Items: V5* V6 YJ V8 V9 V10 V11 V12
Level of Success PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR
Both tasks 18 22   11 17 13 18 ------16 20 13 20-----
First task only 0 0 8 19 8 3 4 4 16 20 2 1 3 1
Neither 4 0 14 3 3 2 5 0 6 2 4 1 6 1
V13 V14 V1 5A V15B W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W1 0 W1 1
PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR
---- 5 9 4 8 2 10 21 22 7 14 — — 15 20 — — 13 22 5 15
17 21 5 1 3 4 15 8 0 0 12 7 9 14 4 2 20 22 6 0 9 4
5 1 12 12 15 10 5 4 1 0 3 1 13 8 3 0 2 0 3 0 8 3
W12 W13 W14 W15A W1 5B
PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR PR GR
---- 4 12 — — 6 12 5 17
14 20 3 2 11 20 1 3 8 3
8 2 15 8 11 2 15 7 9 2
* I.e., Form V, item 5*
I began by testing the distribution of scores for the two groups 
for each item to see which differences, if any, were significant. In 
fact, only four were: V6 (X = 9.586, with Yates correction, p<.0l),
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V12 (X- = 3.931> Yates correction, p^,05), ¥14 (X. = 6.972, Yates, cor- 
recti on, p-^.01), and W15B X- = 13-273» p^.01). Undoubtedly the most 
interesting aspects of this outcome are (l) that all the arguments involved 
were valid and (2) that the second and third are alternative forms of a 
single argument. The fact that W15B is a member of this group may reason­
ably be taken to reflect or confirm the PR group's need for greater time, 
for, of course, this is the last item in form W. Responses to 15A and 15B 
are also difficult to interpret because of a change in the nature of the 
task which occurs in these items. (On this point see Appendix A, Sect. A.4.)
Items V12 and ¥ 4 are of the form: "No X's are Y's. Only X's
are Z's. Therefore no Z's are Y's." Corresponding reasons for supposing
the two arguments to be invalid were selected by a majority of PR subjects
(the same reason favoured by members of the Ordinary Psychology class as 
a whole), viz., (i) in V12 and (iii) in ¥14 (the numbers choosing the four 
reasons being, in order from (i) to (iv), 6, 2, 0 and 1 (with one blank) 
in V12 and 0, 2, 6 and 2 (with one blank) in ¥14). The reason in question 
offers a counterargument purporting to show that some Z's are Y's. A 
variety of comments and interpretations are possible. Henle (1962) would 
no doubt say that subjects who choose this reason 'fail to accept the 
logical task', do not, that is, restrict themselves to the question whether 
the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. More positively, 
one might suggest that these subjects confuse this 'logical' task with the 
task of saying whether the conclusion is established or proved. The 
conclusions of both arguments are in fact believed by a majority of stud­
ents (see p. 33 above) to be false and one can imagine a subject who makes 
the response in question arguing that there must be something wrong with 
the premises since they appear to prove something which is manifestly not 
true. In doing so, of course, such subjects would indeed be failing to
accept, or to adhere to, the terms of the task as set out in the instruct­
ions, and inasmuch as this happens more often with PR subjects than with 
their GR counterparts, it does perhaps lend some support to the view that 
the difference between these two groups is at least partly due to a tend­
ency on the part of the former to lose sight of the 'logical task'.
In some ways the situation with regard to V6 is easier to inter­
pret. I'his item is of the form: "Everything is either an X or else
aY. No Y's are Z's. Therefore only X's are Z's." Considering the four
reasons offered, the numbers of PR subjects choosing each were, again 
in order from (i) to (iv), 1, 1, 1, and 8 (with three blanks), the cor­
responding figures for the original group being 17, 14, 9, and 46.
Reason (iv) purports to detect an inconsistency in the argument, contend­
ing that some X's are Y's (as, indeed, the first premise allows) and, 
therefore, according to the second premise, not Z's. What gives the 
selection of this reason its special interest is the fact that this is 
a competent objection if, and only if, the conclusion is taken to mean 
or imply that all X's are Z's, a misunderstanding of the 'Only X's are 
Y's’ form of statement which is the mirror-image of the confusion about 
the meaning of the universal affirmative the importance of which we saw 
in the last chapter Wilkins had stressed. Finally, it ought perhaps to 
be mentioned that the corresponding reason is favoured by a majority of 
the PR subjects who get the corresponding W item 7 wrong. In this case, 
however, the difference between the two groups fails to reach signific­
ance on the X 2 test, largely because so many of the GR group took the 
same view of the argument - six of the eight who thought the argument in­
valid selected the same reason.
It is, of course, possible to cast one's net rather wider in 
the search for clues as to the sources of the differences between the 
two groups - for example, by ranking the 24 items in terms of the size 
of the discrepancy between the success rates of the two groups on each 
and then scrutinising those items in which the discrepancies are greatest. 
If, for example, one adds the number of successes in any item on the . 
first task only (determining the argument's validity) to twice the number 
of successes on both tasks (in items where there are two tasks) and then 
calculates the ratio of PR to GR 'scores' obtained in this way, the 
result is as set out in Table 2.4 below.
TABLE 2.4
RATIO OF PR TO GR SCORES ON THE TWENTY-FOUR ITEMS OF VALENTINE'S TEST,
SECTION B, FORMS V AND W
Item V6 W13 W15A W15B V15A W14 W11 V12 ¥7 V15B W12 V11
pr/gr .42 .42 .48 .49 .55 .55 .56 .63 .64 .68 .70 .71
W10 W6 V8 V14 V9 V13 W8 V7 V5 V10 W9 W5
.73 .74 .75 .79 .80 .81 .81 .81 .82 .83 .91 .95
1 Almost literally since in logic 'Only S is P' is taken to mean 'All
P .is S’.
The difficulty, of course, is to decide which of these differ­
ences are large enough for it to be worth while examining them for clues. 
There is, to my knowledge, no non-arbitrary way of doing this. It is, 
however, noteworthy that the first ten include the four items whose dis­
tributions proved to be significantly different for the two groups on the 
X- test, together with their alternative forms (W7 and V15B). Also in­
cluded are the pair VI5A and W15A and two 'odd' items, W11 and W13. The 
presence of the 15A's as well as the 15B's must be taken to confirm the 
relative slowness of the PR group - 4 of them, as compared with 0 of the 
GR group made no response at all to at least one of these items, and 7, 
as compared with 2, failed to mark one of the reasons. The special 
character of these four items must also, of course, be borne in mind.
As to ¥11 and ¥13, the fallacy in the former of these is that of 
supposing the contradictory of a universal affirmative to be the corres­
ponding universal negative. 14 PR subjects recognised that the argument 
was fallacious; of these, however, only 5 selected the correct reason,
8 of the remaining 9 selecting a reason which casts doubt on one of the 
premises. Inspection of the 'correct reason' shows it to be rather un­
satisfactory in the sense that it fails to make the exact weakness in the 
argument clear. With this possible complication in mind, however, res­
ponses of the PR subjects to W11 may be construed as additional evidence 
that these subjects are more prone than their GR counterparts to lose 
hold of 'the logical task' and to substitute for it the question whether 
the conclusion is proved by the premises - for in order for that to be 
achieved the premises have to be true as well as the argument valid. In 
W13 the argument would appear to be valid to anyone who supposed (as in 
V6 and W7) that 'only X's are Y's' means or implies that all X's are Y's. 
(The argument is of the form: "Only X's are Y's. (All) Z's are X's.
Therefore (all) Z's are Y's." This is a syllogism in Barbara if the 
first premise is read as 'all X's are Y's'.) Only 7 of the PR group 
realised that the argument was fallacious and of these only 4 selected the 
reason which clearly states the mistaken reading referred to above. In 
contrast 12 of the 14 GR subjects who said the argument was invalid select­
ed this reason. This appears to me to be additional evidence for the 
view that PR subjects have a poorer grasp of the meaning of statements of 
the form 'Only X's are Y's' than their GR counterparts and, in particular, 
are more likely to assume that it implies that all X's are Y's.
Taking all the evidence at my disposal - that is to say, from
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previous work on syllogistic reasoning, as well as the data presented 
in this chapter - it seemed possible that PR subjects differed from 
their GR counterparts in any or all of the following respects:
(1) they have a less secure grasp of the meaning of statements of 
certain logically important types, notably statements of the forms 
'All S is P' and 'Only S is P', both of which play an important role 
in the arguments of Section B of the Valentine Reasoning Tests;
(2) they have a less secure grasp of the requirements of what Henle 
calls 'the logical task';
(3) they are (perhaps for that reason) more likely to be influenced 
in their judgement of the validity of the arguments by their beliefs 
about the truth or falsity of the conclusions;
(4) perhaps because of the uncertainties implied in all of the 
above they appear to need more time to complete a logical reasoning 
task than their GR counterparts.
The remainder of this thesis will describe some experiments 
intended to throw further light on the first of these possibilities.
2.3 The 'five types of statement task': rationale and procedure
Having raised the question whether there may be some difference between 
PR and GR subjects in the completeness of their understanding of cert­
ain types of statement, one is immediately faced with the problem of 
how to determine, with a sufficient degree of sensitivity, whether a 
person does fully understand a particular type of statement. Philo­
sophers as well as psychologists have spent a considerable amount of
1
time debating this question or, more usually, at least as far as philo­
sophers are concerned, the intimately related question of the criteria 
we should employ in deciding exactly what a statement of a certain type 
means. Out of all this discussion one thing at least seems to emerge 
- namely that a person who understands a statement can draw certain 
inferences from it if it is true - or, to reformulate this in the pre­
ferred terms of statement-meaning, a statement's meaning can be explain­
ed - at least partly - in terms of the other statements which it imp­
lies. In the case of statements whose distinguishing characteristics 
are logical ones, one special kind of inference would, of course, be 
the immediate inference of the traditional logic. It is possible to
1 See, for example, Cohen (1962) and Osgood (1957)•
regard the purpose of sections in logic textbooks on immediate infer­
ence as being partly to extend the student's understanding of the types 
of statement involved. In this case a criterion of his understanding 
of these types of statement would be the ease and certainty with which 
he makes the appropriate inferences.
At first sight, then, this would be one way of establishing 
whether indeed PR subjects generally have a poorer grasp of different 
types of logically important statement than GR subjects. Its chief 
weakness as an experimental method is that it puts the subject too much 
on his guard: faced with the question whether 'All A's are B's' im­
plies that all B's are A's, for example, a subject is likely to return 
the correct negative answer if only because the question would hardly 
be worth asking otherwise. And even if this difficulty could be over­
come - perhaps by asking other questions which seemed even simpler or, 
as Wilkins did, by including such items in an extended 'syllogism test' 
t there remains the possibility that a subject might on other occasions 
make implicitly an inference which he would not make explicitly and 
after due consideration. Since the processes which are responsible
for failures in syllogistic reasoning are likely to be implicit rather 
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than explicit, this seems to be a good reason to prefer an approach 
in which the subject is able to make the relevant inferences without 
having his attention drawn clearly to them.
Such an approach was suggested to me by a paper read by P. C. 
Wason at the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society in 
1968 in which he described in greater detail experiments already referr­
ed to in his contribution to Foss (1966). The materials Wason used 
were sets of cards, each with a letter on one side and a number on the 
other. Subjects were presented with a statement about each set of 
cards - laid out with some letters and some numbers face upwards - in 
which some generalisation about the relationship between the symbols 
on the two sides of the cards was made, for example, 'If a card has a 
vowel on one side then it has an even number on the other.' The sub­
ject' s task was to say which of the cards in the set he needed to turn 
over in order to establish whether the statement was false.
1 See, for example, the points made in the previous section about the 
nature of the mistakes PR subjects may be supposed to have made in mis­
judging the validity of items V6, W11 and W13.
Wason found that at the outset subjects tended to make two 
kinds of error: (l) they turned over some cards which had no obvious
bearing on the question whether the statement was true or not (in the 
above example, cards with an even number on the exposed side); (2) 
they failed to turn over some cards which they needed to turn over in 
order to be certain about the statement's truth-value (in the above 
example, cards with an odd number on the exposed side). Errors of 
the second kind tended to drop out with practice but errors of the 
other kind were remarkably persistent.
Wason was interested primarily in this important and rather 
puzzling behaviour as an indication of the assumptions subjects made 
about the verification procedures relevant in such a case, I shall 
have some comments to make later on about the hypotheses which he of­
fers in an attempt to explain this behaviour. In the meantime I think 
it is possible to interpret the errors made by Wason's subjects as 
evidence of an inadequate grasp of the meaning of the kind of statement 
involved - in the above example, the universal affirmative couched in 
the hypothetical form preferred by modem logic.
Anyone who has a complete understanding of such a statement 
ought to be able to carry out certain operations with it, including 
the rather special kind of operation described by Wason. Amongst 
other things, he ought to realise (in the above example) that a card 
with an even number on the exposed side cannot be an exception to the 
proposed generalisation and so cannot prove the statement false. To 
fail to appreciate this is to fail to understand that the statement 
neither says or implies anything about what cards with even numbers 
have on their other sides. In other words, such a person confuses 
the statement given with another, stronger statement in which the re­
lationship between having a vowel on one side and having an even number 
on the other is said to be reciprocal - that is, the statement: 'A
card has a vowel on one side if and only if it has an even number on 
the other'. To put it another way and to bring the potential relev­
ance of this kind of task to the forefront of this discussion, Wason's 
subjects seem to have been guilty of the assumption that 'All S is P' 
implies that all P is S. More generally, then, we appear to have in 
Wason's card-turning task a material which makes it possible for sub­
jects to make illicit inferences at an implicit level, and inferences 
which can be plausibly construed as reflecting an incomplete understand-
ing of the statement form in question.
I decided, therefore, to use this task to investigate differ-
1
ences in the extent to which PR and GR subjects understand various 
types of statement involved in Section B of the Valentine test. All 
the forms of statement are given in Appendix B . The most important, 
in terms of frequency, are ’All S is P 1, 'Only S is P' and 'No S is P'. 
These appear respectively 12, 10 and 7 times in each form of the test - 
although not always in a straightforward form. The remaining forms of 
statement occur only once or twice and it would be hard to justify the 
choice of some of these rather than others on grounds of possible import­
ance in determining the outcome of the test. On grounds of general log­
ical importance, however, two seemed to merit special consideration - 
those in hypothetical and those in disjunctive form. Given the nature 
of the task these could not be presented in their simplest, propositional 
calculus form but were inevitably complicated by having the subject term 
quantified. It seemed most appropriate to use the universal quantifier 
and the result was two forms of statement corresponding to those used 
by Wason in the papers mentioned above and in a more recent paper (1969). 
Needless to say, this makes it possible to relate my own findings to his.
The five types of statement thus selected were presented in the 
following form:
(Ah) 'If a card has a cross on one side, it always has a vowel on the 
other.'
(Ad) 'Every card has a capital letter on one side or else an even number 
on the other.'
(a ) 'All the cards with a square on one side have a Greek letter on the 
other.'
(e ) 'No cards with a vowel on one side have an odd number on the other.'
(f ) 'Only cards with a small letter on one side have an even number on
the other.'
The letters in brackets on the left were the symbols I used to refer to 
the different statement types. The 'A' and *E' are, of course, letters 
used in the traditional formal logic to refer to the universal affirmat­
ive and universal negative. The small 'h' and 'd' refer to the hypo­
thetical and disjunctive forms these statements are given in these cases.
(As already explained, the Ah form really is simply a universal affirm­
ative in the form preferred in modem logic; the Ad form of statement 
is essentially different from these two.) 'F' was a letter chosen at
random in the absence of a more appropriate symbol - as, for example, a
reversed ’A ’. The ’content1 of the examples given above is illustrative 
only: as we shall see, no particular type of content was associated with
any particular type of statement.
The next task was to prepare five sets of cards for each type 
of statement, twenty-five sets in all. In actual fact subjects worked, 
not with real cards, but with diagrammatic representations of the exposed 
sides of cards of the kind reproduced, in greatly reduced form, in Figure
2.1 below. Each 'set of cards' was presented on a strip of paper eight 
inches long and two inches high.
FIGURE 2.1
A 'SET OF CARDS' OF THE KIND USED IN THE 'FIVE TYPES OF STATEMENT' TASK
R 4-
All the cards with a capital letter on one side have an even 
number on the other.
The purposes to be served by the substitution of diagrams for 
actual cards were several. It seemed that the purely practical problems 
involved in presenting twenty-five sets of eight cards to forty-four sep­
arate subjects would be very considerable since of course the cards would 
have to be presented in a certain order and with the correct side upper­
most. Not only was this likely to take up a considerable amount of valu-
1
able time but rapport with subjects was likely to be lost in the process. 
Moreover the use of separate strips of paper for each subject appeared to 
offer an easy and reliable way of keeping a permanent record of subjects' 
responses: subjects placed a tick below the cards they thought they
needed to turn over.
I decided to vary the symbols on the cards to reduce any inter­
ference effect between trials, and to vary the number of cards which . 
needed to be turned over for a correct solution in different trials to
1 A year later a way of coping with the practical problems was devised 
- under the pressure of the need to use actual cards in order to carry 
the investigation one stage further.
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discourage any tendency towards a mechanical or inflexible approach to 
the five successive presentations of any one statement type. The 
twenty-five 'sets of cards' were then arranged in blocks of five, with 
each statement type being represented in each block and with the order 
of types of statement within each block being varied in random fashion 
from subject to subject within each of the two groups (order within a 
group itself being determined by contingencies such as convenience of 
time given the other commitments of subject and experimenter.) As an 
example of the set up, the first subject in each group was presented with 
sets of cards in the following order: A, Ah, E, F, Ad, E, A, Ad, Ah, F,
E, Ad, A, Ah, F, E, Ah, A, F, Ad, Ah, Ad, A, E, F. In this way, of 
course, I hoped to eliminate any constant errors due to facilitation or 
interference effects as between one statement type and another.
In addition I prepared two simple sets of actual cards and a 
'dummy' strip of diagrammatic cards of the kind subjects were going to 
have to deal with but with a statement of a type not included in the set 
of five. These additional materials were designed to help me to explain 
to subjects the nature of the task and to eliminate any misunderstandings 
which might arise from the use of representations of cards as opposed to 
real cards. I also prepared sets of actual cards corresponding to the 
diagrams on the final five strips in the hope that these might be used to 
throw some light on the question whether subjects could draw the right 
conclusions about the truth or falsity of the statements if they were 
allowed the information they thought they needed - and would get by turn­
ing the cards over. I shall say more about this fifth series and the 
subsequent development of the idea which underlies it later.
It will be apparent to those familiar at least with the earli­
est stages of Wason's work with the present task that the: materials which 
I have described above differ from those used by him not only in the sub­
stitution of diagrams for real cards but also in the use of eight instead 
of four cards. Originally at least, Wason's four cards represented the 
four possibilities corresponding to the four possible truth combinations 
of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical: pTqT, pTqF, pFqT and
pFqF, where 'p' stands for the antecedent, 'q' for the consequent, 'T' 
for 'true' and 'F' for 'false'. In the statement: 'If a card has a
vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other' the above 
considerations would call for a set of cards showing, respectively, a 
vowel, a consonant, an even number and an odd number (with an even number,
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an odd nmber, a consonant and a vowel on the reverse). With a set of 
cards of this minimal kind the correct choice of cards is always of the 
same size, not only for the above Ah type of statement but also for the 
other four types I considered. I have said that I thought it important, 
or at least useful, to avoid such a situation and using the larger set 
of cards, where any of the four possibilities can be represented by one, 
two or three cards in any particular set, enables one to do this. More 
important, perhaps, the larger set makes it possible for a subject to 
treat cards of the same kind (all 'pTqF' cards, for example) differently. 
This is in fact a rather primitive kind of response, at least so far as 
one can see, and it might seem unlikely that highly intelligent adults, 
such as my subjects were, would make it. Still, I did not think that 
one could overlook this possibility and, as it turned out, two subjects, 
one from each group did turn over less than all of the cards of any given 
type - I mean regularly and not just on occasion, as might happen purely 
as a consequence of a perceptual failure. In fact the risk of percept­
ual failure - failure to notice all the cards of a particular kind - 
seems to be the only disadvantage of a non-practical kind attaching to 
the more elaborate set-up which I used. It should be of some interest 
to use such materials with less able and with younger subjects with a 
view to establishing at what age or level of intelligence (if any) the 
primitive kind of response described above commonly appears.
Subjects were tested individually in sessions which usually 
lasted for about an hour but which in two cases ran on for considerably 
longer. Only the first part of this period was given over to the task 
presently under consideration (this part lasting, generally, between 30 
and 40 minutes). Any subject who appeared to be tired or distracted or 
otherwise unlikely to do himself justice was encouraged to give up and 
return at a later date. (in fact two subjects were lost permanently in 
this way since neither returned.)
In the course of establishing the necessary degree of rapport 
between subject and experimenter subjects were told that the aim of the 
experiment was to identify some of the sources of difficulty which we all 
experience at times in distinguishing valid from invalid arguments.
They were not told of the division of subjects into 'poor reasoners’ and 
'good reasoners' in case a subject's assumptions about the category into 
which he fell would affect his responses and so introduce an additional 
source of uncontrolled variation. Instead, subjects were simply told
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that they belonged to a single group chosen with great care to represent 
all levels of ability in this kind of task - as indicated by performance 
on Section B of Valentine's test - in the Ordinary Psychology Class as 
a whole.
Subjects were told that in the past psychologists interested 
in errors in deductive reasoning had assumed that the difficulty must 
arise from the failure to perceive relationships between the component 
parts of an argument. In contrast the experiment in which they were 
taking part was intended to probe the possibility that the difficulty 
arose at an earlier, or logically prior, point in the process - in the 
understanding of the statements which were the component parts. A few 
words were said about the problems involved in measuring understanding 
and the experimenter did not claim to be certain that the tasks presented 
did in fact measure this. It was suggested, however, that these tasks 
were the best means at present available for this purpose. Finally, by 
way of preamble to the explanation of the task itself, the relationship 
between the five types of statement to be presented and the Valentine 
test's Section B was explained: that is to say, subjects were told that
these were the five most important types of statement involved in that 
test.
The explanation of the task proper was begun by showing the 
subject the first of the simple sets of cards - a set of three cards with 
the numbers 2, 4 and 5 respectively on their exposed sides and a strip of 
card on which was printed the sentence: 'The cards with an even number
on one side have a vowel on the other'. The subject was asked to say 
what he would do in order to discover whether the sentence was true or 
not as applied to the set of three cards in front of him. The simple 
answer looked for was: 'Turn the cards over' or, of course; 'Turn the
cards with even numbers over'. To my surprise some subjects proposed an 
incorrect procedure even in this very simple case (for example, they sug­
gested turning the card with the odd number over) but the mistake was not 
pointed out to them as a mistake; instead the experimenter said some­
thing non-committal such as: 'Yes, you would turn some or all of them
over' - so long as the elementary idea of turning the cards over seemed 
to have been grasped.
Next the subject was presented with a set of four cards bearing 
the following symbols on their upturned faces and in the following order:
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Crf, t, + , Q,. The accompanying sentence read: 'Every card with a Greek
letter on one side has a square on the other'.
This set of cards carried a great deal of the weight in the 
business of explaining the terms of the problems the subject would be 
asked to solve. One or two sources of irrelevant difficulty were cleared 
out of the way for a staft. The subject's attention was drawn, for ex­
ample, to a display card on which all the Greek letters to be used in the 
entire series of cards were written. (These were<*,y6, S, andTT.) He 
was told that, if in doubt, he was to regard any other letter as not-Greek 
or Roman. It was emphasised that difficulties arising from typography, 
as it were, were unintentional and irrelevant and that the subject should 
always remove any uncertainties arising from this source at once by ask­
ing what a particular symbol was supposed to be. (As it turned out, 
difficulties of this kind hardly ever occurred.)
The main burden of the explanation was as follows. The sets 
of cards the subject would have to deal with would normally have eight 
cards instead of four (as in the set in front of him) but they would be 
divided, as the present set was, into two equal groups laid out to left 
and right. The cards in the left hand group would be showing their 
'face', as it were, and the cards on the right their reverse. The imp­
ortance of this was that the subject knew what kind of symbols were on
the unseen sides of the cards in either group: they were the kind of
symbol appearing on the exposed sides of the other group. Heavy emphas­
is was placed on the fact that it was not possible to infer exactly what 
would be on the other side of any particular card: in the four-card set
in front of him one could infer that the two cards on the left had geo­
metrical figures on their unseen sides but not, for example, that one 
would have a cross and the other a square. Similarly, the cards on the 
right would have letters on their unseen sides but one or both or neither 
of them might be Greek letters. It was also emphasised that no one-to- 
one correspondence between 'face' and 'reverse' could be assumed - so 
that, for example, of two cards with even numbers on the exposed sides 
one might have a vowel and the other a consonant on the unseen side.
The subject was then asked to decide which of the cards in the 
set of four he needed to turn over to discover whether the statement pre­
sented was true or not of that set of cards. Once again, no clear indie-
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ation was given as to the correctness or otherwise of his selection, pro­
vided, of course, as was always in fact the case, that the idea of turn­
ing cards over had been grasped.
Finally, the subject was shown the 'dummy' strip of cards in 
diagrammatic form and the terms of the problem were run over again. The 
subject was told that the statement shown on this strip was not one of 
the types he would be asked to deal with but in fact a more difficult one. 
He would be asked to imagine that these were cards with symbols on the 
back and to indicate which ones he needed to turn over in order to dis­
cover the truth or falsity of the statement by placing a tick underneath 
them. He was reminded of the division of the set into two half-sets of 
four and of the inferences he might, and might not, draw from this about 
the symbols on the unseen sides. It was pointed out that the number he
needed to turn over might in principle be anything from nought to eight
but that the experimenter had tried to arrange that the number would vary 
in an unpredictable way from set to set, so that no assumptions could 
legitimately be made as to the number required for any particular type 
of statement. He was also to try to cover all possibilities at one 
attempt - so that strictly speaking the question was: 'Which cards
would it be relevant to turn over? Which cards might affect the issue? 
(This to meet the natural objection that with a set of real cards one 
would turn them over one at a time and could stop with the first one 
which proved the statement false.)
The subject was told that his responses would be timed but that 
the object of this was to compare, not his times with those of other in­
dividuals, but the average times, for the group as a whole, on the five
types of statement. Consequently, it would suit my purpose best if he 
took enough time to ensure that his response was correct but no more. 
Providing everyone applied this principle consistently, differences bet­
ween individuals would be of no account. Finally, in this connexion, I 
described an 'emergency' procedure which had suggested itself during pre­
liminary trials with the material. Sometimes, it was suggested, due to 
fatigue or distraction, the subject might find himself completely unable 
to decide, on rational grounds, which cards needed to be turned over.
In the event of a ’mental block' of this kind, the subject was to bring 
that trial to an end by placing a tick under all eight cards and so avoid 
a latency of response which bore no relation to the difficulty of the 
task. (in the event this 'emegency procedure' was used extremely rarely
i
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- as, of course, was anticipated.)
In the experiment itself subjects were not told whether they 
were getting the right solution to the various problems, but signs of 
anxiety were met with reassuring noises on the part of the experimenter
- who would remark, for example, that everyone experienced some degree 
of difficulty with this kind of task. Because of the absence of ’feed­
back’ about the subject's success or failure little improvement was ex­
pected over the five trials (although, as we shall see, some did in fact 
occur). The point of the fivefold replication was said to be - as it 
was in fact - the provision of a relatively stable estimate of the relat­
ive difficulties of the different types of statement.
At the end of the fourth series of five sets subjects were told 
that the final series would involve an additional element. After they 
had dealt with a set of diagra.mma.tic cards, a set of actual cards bearing 
the same symbols on their exposed sides would be presented. Subjects 
would then be asked to turn over the cards they had ticked on the corres­
ponding strip of paper and say whether the statement was true or not.
In the event, some subjects found themselves wanting to turn 
over cards they had not ticked, or else no longer convinced that they 
needed to turn over all the cards they had ticked. To avoid any loss of 
rapport, and because this seemed a useful source of additional information, 
I permitted subjects in the first of these situations to turn over addit­
ional cards, requiring them, however, to signal the fact by placing a 
tick with a plus' sign in front of it under the appropriate diagram or 
diagrams on the test strip.
Finally all subjects were asked to indicate their conclusions 
about the truth or falsity of the statements in the fifth series by writ­
ing 'true' or 'false' on the appropriate test strip.
One final point about the general conditions of the experiment
should perhaps be made. Aware of the dangers of distorting the outcome
1
in the expected direction I deliberately tried to avoid getting to know 
which subjects belonged to which group - to such an extent that even in 
the second phase of the experiment I was still unable to guess with any 
degree of certainty which were GR subjects and which PR - at least at the 
outset'.
1 See, for example, Friedmann (1967).
CHAPTER THREE
THE 'FIVE TYPES OF STATEMENT' TASK, PART TWO:
RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Summary In view of the large numbers of errors made by members of both 
groups, the time taken to complete the card-turning task is presented as 
a measure of the perceived, as opposed to the actual, difficulty of the 
different types of statement. There were no significant differences 
between the groups in this respect. Significant differences were found, 
however, between the statement-types within each group: in the PR group
the Ad and F types of statement were significantly more difficult than 
the other three, while the same was true of the GR group except that the 
difference between Ad and Ah was not significant. The question whether 
the apparent discrepancy between the perceived and actual difficulty of 
the Ad statement-type might be due to the ambiguity of the disjunctive is 
discussed.
In section 3.2 the performance of the two groups is compared in 
terms of right and wrong responses, four methods of assessment of differ­
ent degrees of specificity - and, it is argued, validity - being employed. 
The outcome of this central part of the analysis, though not entirely 
unequivocal, suggests that the PR group, as predicted, understand the A 
and F types of statement less well than the GR group. The view that the 
misunderstanding involved takes the predicted form of supposing that the 
relationship between the 'terms' of these statement-types is reciprocal 
rather than one-way is strengthened by the discovery of significant diff­
erences between the groups in the success with which they deal with the 
right hand half-set of Ah and the left hand half-set of F. Attempts to 
find additional support for this conclusion in terms of the kinds of error 
made in the relevant half-sets and in the extent to which the two groups 
treated A and F statements as if they were equivalent both failed to re­
veal significant differences.
In section 3.3 the two groups are shown to be extremely similar 
in the extent to which their responses varied over the five trials. The 
PR group is shown to make 'matching responses' significantly more often 
than the GR group in the four statement-types other than E (where the cor­
rect response is identical with a matching response). Different inter­
pretations of this result are considered.
In section 3.4 evidence is presented bearing on the assumption, 
on which the present experiment was based, that the 'five types of state­
ment task' is a measure of the extent to which subjects understand the 
statement-types involved. Drawing on the results of Wason and Johnson- 
Laird, as well as those obtained in the present study, it is suggested 
that the assumption is a dubious one when comparisons are made between 
statement-types. Fortunately, there appears to be less difficulty in 
accepting the assumption when it is used as a basis for comparisons only 
within statement-types. Finally, in this section, a comparison is made 
between my results and those of Wason and Johnson-Laird in terms of pat­
tern of response and location and type of error. A very large measure
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of agreement is revealed. A hypothesis is developed to account for cert­
ain peculiarities in the distribution of errors and types of error, and
the 'over-determination' of responses which this new hypothesis appears to
imply is taken to suggest the need for some other method of determining 
which of the various possible agencies is actually responsible for produc­
ing the results obtained. Such a method, it is suggested, is offered by 
the task included in the fifth series of the present experiment and elab­
orated in the experiment described in the following chapter.
In section 3*5 the additional features embodied in the fifth 
series of trials are described and some results presented which suggest 
that the misinterpretation of the F type of statement as implying the 
corresponding:A statement may indeed be important in producing the errors 
in the selection of cards discussed in previous sections. An unexpected 
but, it is suggested, unimportant confusion seems to have been responsible 
for errors in the Ad case. There also appear to be tentative grounds, 
from the Ad as well as the A case, for suspecting the operation, in the 
verification task, of a directional effect similar, at a perceptual level, 
to the effect described by Wason (1969)- Finally, some evidence is pre­
sented bearing on the question whether the nature of the task is affected 
when real cards are substituted for the diagrammatic ones used in the 
main part of the experiment. Various points are made about the potent­
ialities of this fifth series task as a device for answering some of the 
questions posed by the results obtained elsewhere in the experiment.
3.1 Differences in the time taken to complete the task Time taken was 
one of the two variables in terms of which it was hoped to detect differ­
ences between the GR and PR groups. It was difficult to be sure in 
advance whether this or the error score would be the better measure, or 
whether, indeed, some index incorporating both might have to be devised.
It is true that the work reported by Wason (1966) would have suggested the 
error score, but Wason had at that time used the material with only one 
type of statement - the Ah one - and it seemed wise to cover all eventual­
ities. As it happened, few subjects achieved a level of success in which 
so few errors were made that the time taken might have been deemed to be 
the appropriate measure of difficulty.
The stop-watch was started as the paper strip bearing the card 
diagrams was placed in front of the subject and stopped when the subject 
indicated that he was finished - by saying something such as 'All right' 
or simply raising his head, as previously arranged. It would be idle to 
pretend that the accuracy of measurement obtained in this way was of the 
order suggested by the tenth parts of a second in terms of which the time 
taken was recorded. On the other hand, the error would have been a relat­
ively constant one and unlikely to be of great importance for two reasons. 
In the first place, the times involved were relatively long ones and the 
error proportionately small: Table 3.1 below shows that the average
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time for both groups of subjects over all five types of statement was in 
excess of 20 seconds. In the second place, our concern is with the 
relative, and not with the absolute, times taken to complete the task 
with different kinds of statement, so that an error which is likely to 
be the same for all types of statement and for both groups is of no 
practical consequence. And finally, the general adequacy of the time- 
measurement seems to be confirmed by the mean times for all types of 
statement taken together: in both groups these decrease progressively
from one trial to the next.
I have said that the number of errors made by my subjects was 
generally too great to justify the use of time as the means of comparing 
the difficulty presented for members of the two groups by the different 
types of statement. It is indeed obvious enough that a subject who com­
pletes a task quickly but not correctly cannot seriously be said to have 
had less difficulty with the task than another subject who takes longer 
but makes fewer errors. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to sug­
gest that the time taken to complete a variety of tasks, none of which 
is completed without error, and all of which involve essentially the same 
components, reflects the subject's perception of the difficulty of the 
various tasks: he will take longer to complete those tasks which seem
to him the more difficult or about which he feels less confident. And 
inasmuch as this seems of some interest in an area about which as yet 
so little is known, I present the mean times taken for the five types of 
statement on successive trials and as a whole in Table 3.1 below.
TABLE 3.1
AVERAGE TIMES (IN SECONDS) FOR THE FIVE TYPES OF STATEMENT, SEPARATELY 
AND TOGETHER, ON FIVE SUBSEQUENT TRIALS
GR group
Trials 1 st 2nd 3rd 4 th 5th All
Ah 24.3 21.9 22.7 17.4 16.8 20.6
Ad 28.2 28.7 23.2 18.2 17.5 23.3
A 21.6 23.0 18.3 17.4 15.7 19.2
E 23.7 22.8 15*6 17.8 17.0 19.4
F 35.5 25.7 23.7 20.4 23.4 25.7
All 26.7 24.4 20.7 18.2 18.1 21.6
Continued overleaf
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PR group
Trials 1 st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th All
Ah 29.6 18.4 21.0 16.6 18.0 20.7
Ad 36.8 23.4 25.2 22.6 24.4 26.4
A 24.5 21.0 18.8 21.6 16.1 20.4
E 23.7 22.5 20.6 17.9 17.5 20.4
F 29.5 25.1 22.3 25.7 23.6 25.2
All 28.8 22.1 21.5 20.8 19.9 22.6
It will be apparent that in both groups the statements which 
took longest were the Ad and F types, and we may conclude that these were 
perceived by the subjects as presenting most difficulty. Non-parametric 
tests of the significance of the differences between the various state­
ment types were made and the relevant p values are given in Table 3*2 
below. My procedure was to apply the simple, and not very powerful,
Sign Test (Siegel, 1959) in the first instance and to go on to apply the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test, with its greater power, only in those cases 
where the result with the Sign Test was not significant. Inter-group 
differences were tested in the same way: none were significant.
TABLE 3.2
P VALUES FOR DIFFERENCES IN MEAN TIMES TAKEN WITH DIFFERENT TYPES OF
STATEMENT
GR group PR group
Ad A E F
Ah N.S. N.S. N.S. p=.004
Ad p=.016 p=.016 N.Sv
A N.S. p<.002
E p<T.002
*Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test:
*
Ad A E F
p<.002 N.S. N.S. p<.02
p<:.002 p<.002 N.S.
N.S. p<.01* 
P<,02*
all other p values on Sign Test
It is hardly surprising that the F type of statement should 
appear to subjects to be relatively difficult since, as we shall see, it 
was the type of statement which produced most errors and was, in that 
sense, actually most difficult. The case is otherwise with the Ad type 
of statement which proved to be, in terms of error, less difficult than 
either Ah or A. Particularly striking, perhaps, is the very long mean
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time for the first Ad trial taken by members of the PR group. It would 
appear that the disjunctive type of statement struck these subjects as 
of quite exceptional difficulty, at least at first sight.
It is perhaps possible to explain the special position occupied 
by this type of statement, however, in terms of its ambiguity. Logic­
ians customarily distinguish two senses of ’or', the inclusive sense, in 
which the truth of the statement that an object has one quality or another 
is consistent with its having both, and the exclusive sense, in which 
this possibility is excluded. Subjects in the experiment now under dis­
cussion were not told in advance which sense of the disjunctive they were 
expected to assume - if only because they were not told this in the Val­
entine test either. The long initial time, especially in the case of 
the PR group, may reflect this uncertainty and the attempts of at least 
some subjects to reach a decision on the point. In later trials the 
question may have continued to make itself felt, either consciously or 
otherwise.
It is not possible to be sure whether this is the true explan­
ation of the discrepancy between the time taken by both groups on disjunct­
ives and their success with them as measured in terms of errors - between, 
as I have suggested the real and perceived difficulty of this type of 
statement. Only two subjects actually voiced a doubt about the sense in 
which they were to take the words 'either...or else' (and in these cases, 
incidentally, I gave no clear guidance). Subjects to whom the question 
did explicitly occur may have answered it either in terms of the natur­
alness of the two possibilities (the inclusive sense being, I think, the 
more natural) or else in terms of the experimental task. The second 
alternative would have called for a fairly elaborate chain of reasoning 
for it involves (l) the recognition that if the disjunctive is interpret­
ed in the exclusive sense, all eight cards in a set must be turned over, 
and (2) the belief that such an outcome is inconsistent with the terms of 
the problem as set out in the instructions (the number of cards requiring 
to be turned over was to vary unpredictably from trial to trial for any 
particular type of statement) or perhaps with the arrangements likely to 
have been made by the experimenter.
Whatever the explanation the great majority of subjects do seem 
to have come to the conclusion that the appropriate sense of the disjunct­
ive was the inclusive one - as we shall see when we consider the patterns
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of choices in detail and subjects' responses in the verification part of 
the fifth series. The same was true twelve to eighteen months later 
when the same subjects did a similar task in conditions which encouraged 
them to ask questions and express doubts. Wason too has subsequently 
reported results which confirm that most subjects understand the dis­
junctive in the inclusive sense: only 3 out of his group of 10 said,
when asked, that the possibility of interpreting the disjunctive in an 
exclusive sense had occurred to them (Wason, 1969 ). It is of great 
interest to note, too, that Wason's subjects seemed to be confident but 
frequently wrong about the Ah type of statement (the universal affirmative 
in hypothetical form) and less confident but more often right about the 
disjunctive. This seems to be the clearest independent confirmation of 
the result discussed above.
3.2 Difficulty measured in terms of errors Before we consider the 
problems involved . in establishing an error score as a measure of
the difficulty of the various types of statement, it might be thought 
appropriate to say what the correct response in each of the five types 
of statement was, and to explain why the designated response was the 
correct one. In this way the nature of the task and the different poss­
ible ways of scoring responses in terms of adequacy may become apparent.
The Ah type of statement, as we have seen, took the following 
form: 'If a card has a vowel on one side then it always has a circle on
the other.' The subject in this example would have four 'cards' on his 
left with letters on the exposed side (at least one with a vowel) and he 
is asked to assume that these cards have geometrical figures on their 
unseen sides; on his right he has four cards with geometrical figures 
on their exposed sides (at least one being a circle) and of course he is 
asked to assume that these cards have letters on their other sides. The 
statement will be false if and only if there is at least one card with a 
vowel on one side and a geometrical figure other than a circle on the 
other. The only cards which could be of this kind are those on the left 
which have a vowel and those on the right which do not have a circle. 
Accordingly, it is only these two kinds of cards which it is relevant to 
turn over - and in order to be sure that he does not miss a card of the 
critical kind he must turn over all the cards of these two types.
If he fails to turn over a card of one of these two types (or 
rather - as the problem was presented - if he fails to place a tick under
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a diagrammatic card of either of these types) he makes what I came to 
call an ’error of omission’ (or 'EO' for short). If he turns over a
card which is not of either of these two types, he makes an 'error of 
commission' (or 'EC'). Wason (1966), working with statements of the Ah 
type found errors of commission common and very persistent. On the 
other hand, as I shall suggest later, they are the less serious of the 
two types, at least in terms of their implications for success in a 
situation in which subjects are set actually to detect statements which 
are false. For my research, on the other hand, they have a special 
significance in the Ah and A types of statement (the two forms of the 
universal affirmative) because they may be thought to reflect a subject's 
mistaken assumption that the relationship said to hold between the two 
classes of cards in a universal affirmative is a reciprocal one. In 
other words, it may be supposed to reflect the belief, referred to in 
previous chapters, that 'all S is P' implies that all P is S or, in terms 
of the hypothetical, that 'if a thing is an X it is also a Y' implies 
that if a thing is a Y it is an X. To be precise, this seems to be a 
possible interpretation of EC's in the right-hand half set.
Disjunctive statements (Ad) were represented by the following 
example (amongst others): 'Every card has a cross on one side or else a
vowel on the other'. We have already remarked on the possible ambiguity 
of this type of statement and on the fact that if it is interpreted in 
the exclusive sense, a correct response would call for the turning of all 
eight cards. This is because the statement in the exclusive sense will 
be false if and only if (l) there is at least one card which has neither 
a cross on one side nor a vowel on the other, or (2) there is at least 
one card which has a cross on one side and a vowel on the other. The 
first of these conditions requires one to turn over all cards with a geo­
metrical figure other than a cross on the exposed side (to check that 
they do have vowels on the other side) and all cards with a consonant on 
the exposed side (to check that they do have crosses on the other side). 
The second condition requires one to turn over all cards with a cross on 
the exposed side (to check that they do not have a vowel on the other 
side) and all cards with a vowel on the exposed side (to check that they 
do not have a cross on the reverse side). In other words, the two con­
ditions together oblige one to turn over all eight cards. If the dis­
junctive is interpreted in the inclusive sense, on the other hand, only 
the first of the above two conditions is relevant - so that the correct 
response, in the above example, would be to turn over all cards with
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geometrical figures other than crosses and all cards with letters other 
than vowels (i.e., of course, consonants). In scoring responses to this 
type of statement I took the inclusive response to be the correct one for 
reasons already mentioned: that the inclusive sense seems the more nat­
ural^ , that it makes better sense in the present experimental situation, 
and that, presumably for one or other of these reasons, few subjects, if 
any, seem to have interpreted it in the exclusive sense. (in each group 
all eight cards were marked on some twenty occasions out of the total of 
110 occasions on which such a response might have been made to a disjunct­
ive. In no case, however, did a subject say that the disjunctive of the 
fifth series was false although one of the actual cards used.in this 
series did combine the two characters mentioned.)
The universal affirmative in its plain form (a ) may be repre­
sented as follows: 'All the cards with a vowel on one side have an even
number on the other'. As this is simply another form of a statement 
which may be represented by the Ah type already discussed, the type of 
response which was appropriate in that case is also appropriate in this: 
that is to say, in terms of the present example, the cards to be turned 
are all those with a vowel and all those with an odd number on., their 
exposed sides.
The universal negative (e ) may be represented by the following
statement: 'No cards with a cross on one side have a Greek letter on
the other'. The kind of card which would make this statement false is 
does
clearly one which / have a cross on one side and a Greek letter on the 
other, and the subject must therefore indicate that he would turn over 
all cards with a cross and all those with a Greek letter on their exposed 
sides since all of these (and only these) may prove to be cards of the 
kind which would falsify the statement.
Finally, statements of the F type may be represented for just -
1 There appears to be something very unempirical about the bald state­
ment that the inclusive sense of the disjunctive 'seems the more natural'. 
*At least one needs to add the qualification that it seems the natural one 
in the present context. (On the role of context see Carney and Sheer, 
1965). Obviously there are devices which we ordinarily employ when the 
context leaves the issue in doubt and we wish to avoid such a state of 
affairs. Such, for example, would be the use of the phrases, 'or both' 
and, 'but not both' to indicate the inclusive and exclusive senses respect­
ively.
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now by the statement: 'Only cards with an even number on one side have
a vowel on the other'. This will be false if and only if there is at
least one card which has an odd number on one side and a vowel on the 
other. The correct response consists, therefore, in turning over cards 
with characters of either of these kinds on their exposed sides, since 
the former might have a vowel on the other side and the latter an odd 
number. As the F type of statement is the 'mirror-image' (not, as we 
have seen, the converse) ofthe universal affirmative, it is to be expect­
ed that subjects will have difficulties with it which are the counterpart 
of those found by Wason in the case of Ah type statements. And just as 
it seemed plausible to interpret errors of commission in the right-hand 
half set in A and Ah cases as involving a confusion about the meaning of 
the universal affirmative, so, in F type statements, we may think it ap­
propriate to interpret errors of commission in the left-hand half set as
reflecting a confusion about the meaning of these statements - and, in
particular, a mistaken assumption that a statement of the form 'Only S 
is P' means or implies that all S is P. If anything, we might expect 
this confusion to be even more prevalent, not only because there are situ­
ations in which (as Black, 1946, p. 115 remarks) it is reasonable, on 
empirical grounds, to assume that 'only' means 'all' as well, but also 
because there are closely related forms of statement in which the univer­
sal affirmative is part or all of the meaning. Thus 'Only the X's are 
Y's' implies that all the X's are Y’s (as well as that all the Y's are 
X's, the change of meaning being effected by the insertion of the defin­
ite article between 'only' and 'X's'); and 'The only X's are Y's' (with 
the definite article preceding 'only') is equivalent in meaning to 'All 
X's are Y's'.
If, in referring to such a statement as the one at the top of 
this page, we say that cards with even numbers on their exposed sides are 
'cards with the characters first named', and that cards with vowels on 
their exposed sides are 'cards with the characters named second' - the 
two categories together constituting, of course, the class of cards with 
named characters - it is possible to make certain rather general remarks 
about responses to the tasks now being described and, in particular, to 
summarise the properties of a correct response to the five types of state­
ment as follows (availing ourselves throughout of the special form of 
expression referred to above, 'only the X's', to mean all X's and only 
X's):
Statement Left hand half set Right hand half set
Type
Ah and A Turn only the cards with Turn only the cards without 
first named characters named characters
Ad Turn only the cards without named characters
E Turn only the cards with named characters
F Turn only the cards with- Turn only the cards with the
out named characters characters named second
Differences in the success of the two groups assessed by different methods 
There is no self-evidently correct way of assessing the respective degrees 
of success with which the two groups tackled the task. Reflection sug­
gested four different methods of varying degrees of adequacy, all of them 
providing interesting data about the performances Of the groups. These 
will now be described in an- order ranging from the most 'global1 (and 
least adequate) to the most detailed (and, perhaps, most adequate).
In the first method account is taken only of the numbers of 
subjects in each group who made the correct selection of cards to turn 
over on all five occasions for any one statement type. It is only such
subjects, it might be said, whose understanding of the relevant statement 
is complete and firm. Table 3.3 presents the relevant figures.
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH GROUP MAKING THE CORRECT RESPONSE IN ALL FIVE 
TRIALS FOR DIFFERENT STATEMENT TYPES
Statement Type 
Ah Ad A E F
GR group - 8 - 4 1
PR group 1 4  1 3 —
This first method of assessing the performances of the two 
groups is the only one which gives the PR group the advantage in any 
detail over the GR group. This in turn is due to the prominence it 
gives to the performance of one of the PR subjects who succeeded in mak­
ing the correct response to three of the five types of statement. This 
was in fact the best performance of any subject from either group, no 
other subject achieving success on more than two statement types. (To 
be specific, success on all five trials in both Ad and E was achieved by 
two GR subjects and one PR subject, in both A and F by one GR subject,
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all other successes being 1 singletons1).
The success of the PR subject first mentioned above is so much 
in contradiction to the expected (and, by other methods, established) 
superiority of the GR group that it seemed woithwhile to check that she 
had not been included in the PR group by mistake or, more plausibly, that 
there was not some reason to suspect that her performance on the Valentine 
was attributable to the operation of some purely temporary factor. In 
the absence of any explanation of either of these kinds for the discrep­
ancy, her exceptionally good performance on the 'five types of statement' 
task must be taken to represent strong evidence for the operation, in a 
deductive reasoning task, of factors quite different from those involved 
in the experimental task.
Reference to Appendix E will show that this subject (LD) had an 
AAA score of 65 and a Valentine Section B score of 47. As these are 
T-scale scores, the gap between them is equal almost to two standard 
deviations and as such almost twice as large as the minimum I had set 
in selecting subjects for my PR group. On the other hand, judged in 
absolute terms, hers was clearly not one of the poorest performances on 
the Valentine test, Section B. It is, of course, just below the average 
for the class as a whole, and it is just possible that there are reasons 
for believing that it would not have fallen below the average if rather 
temporary factors had not played a role in her performance.
In her answer to item 47 in the questionnaire which all subjects 
were asked to complete (as described previously in this thesis) she said 
that she was 'physically below par' and 'emotionally upset' on the occas­
ion when she did Form V of the Valentine. In answer to item 44 ('If you 
found one Form of the Valentine test easier, can you say why this was so?') 
she wrote: 'In Form V Section B the reasons for certain conclusions
being illogical did not appear to be complete; however, I had just had 
a rather unsettling afternoon and was very tired, so perhaps merely in­
ability to concentrate and reduce the problem to its basic factors was 
the reason'. This looks, perhaps, like 'prima facie' grounds for suppos­
ing that her performance on Form V was unrepresentative. On the other 
hand, however, she actually did better on Form V than on Form ¥, and since 
this is entirely consistent with the performance of the group as a whole 
(she did Form V after Form W) it did not seem to me at the time when I 
I was forming my experimental groups, and it does not seem to me now, that
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I should be justified in excluding her from the PR group. Needless to 
say, in the light of her performande on the task now being described I 
was very much looking forward to further investigation of her case and 
especially disappointed, therefore, that she should turn out to be the 
only subject unable to return for the second phase of my research twelve 
months later. By that time she was married and living in Belfast.
It will be clear that, however interesting it is to know just 
how many subjects managed to achieve an error-free performance on all 
five trials on any one statement-type, a comparison of the two groups on 
this basis is scarcely a satisfactory procedure. It is not only that, 
as we have just seen, the performance of exceptional individuals is likely 
to distort the overall picture but more generally that the error component 
in the method of assessment is likely to be unduly large. In the first 
place, the subject who takes a little time to adjust to the experimental 
situation or to 'realise' what the task requires is likely to make errors 
on the first trial and to find himself grouped, on this first method of 
assessment, with other subjects who make errors on all five trials. 
Secondly, the five types of statement task, at least in the specific form 
given it in the present research, clearly involves a perceptual component: 
subjects have to perceive and recognise the various cards as belonging to 
one category or another, and although, of course, the task would be an 
unsatisfactory one for my purposes if the perceptual task was a difficult 
one, it seems clear to me that errors (especially errors of omission) were 
occasionally to be attributed to a failure at a perceptual level. (Some 
subjects had a single error of omission in the third or fourth trial in 
an otherwise faultless series.) And although these are less easily 
identified, it seems quite likely that a few successes are to be explained 
in terms of errors of commission which were not made because the subject 
did not perceive or recognise a card which he would otherwise have (mis­
takenly) turned over.
Some of the above difficulties would be reduced, if not removed 
altogether, if we considered the performances of subjects on different 
trials separately, instead of their performances on all five trials taken 
together. In particular, it might be suggested that success on the fifth 
trial should be regarded as the best criterion of success on the task: 
by then, of course, subjects would have had time to adjust to the experi­
mental situation and to come to terms with the task, and the incidence, 
and effect, of errors with a purely perceptual source would be unlikely
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to be very large.
There appears to me, however, to be one crucial objection to 
this particular approach and it is that it conspicuously fails to utilise 
all the available evidence about the degree of confidence or certainty 
with which a subject appears to have grasped the meaning of a statement. 
Two kinds of case come to mind: a subject who has made the correct
choices in four cases out of five may plausibly be said to have a better 
understanding of the statement in question than a subject whose eventual 
success is preceded by four failures; and a subject who achieves success 
on the third and/or fourth trial but not on the fifth may be thought, at 
least, -to have had an insecure grasp of the meaning of the statement and 
its implications for the experimental task when a subject who fails on 
all five trials has, so far as one can tell, no grasp at all. In Table 
3.4, therefore, I present the number of correct responses made by each 
group as a whole, each trial being considered separately. If it is cor­
rect to regard the number of trials on which any one subject makes the 
appropriate response as an index of the certainty with which he perceives 
the relationship between the statement and the task, then the same ought 
to be true of each group as a whole.
TABLE 3.4
TOTAL NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES FOR EACH GROUP FOR 
EACH TYPE OF STATEMENT
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
GR group 14 66 15 72 22
PR group 12 44 9 53 10
The differences between the groups, as revealed on this second 
method of assessment, ..are in the expected direction but clearly still not 
large enough to be significant. Perhaps the feature of these results 
which calls most for comment is the relative ease with which subjects 
appear to have tackled the disjunctive and universal negative types of 
statement. The latter in particular seems to call for comment, but I 
defer this till I come to comment more generally on the performances of 
the two groups on this task. In the meantime, it will perhaps be appar­
ent that this second method of assessment, although undoubtedly
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an advance on the first, is still not the best available. It does take 
account of the varying degrees of certainty with which subjects handle 
the five types of statement, but it still does not utilise all the avail­
able information. In particular it takes no account of the success with 
which subjects deal with the two half-sets of cards or of the extent to 
which they make errors of both kinds (EO's and EC’s) or of only one kind, 
(it seems reasonable to suggest that a subject who deals correctly with 
one half-set does better than a subject who gets both wrong, and a subject 
who makes only one kind of error does better than a subject who makes 
errors of both kinds.)
To take account of these aspects of the problem situation I 
developed a scoring system in terms of which a subject could score a maxi­
mum of four points for each trial - therefore a maximum of twenty points 
for a complete series of five trials. From the four points awarded for 
a correct response on any one trial one point was deducted for each type 
of error in each half-set. This means, for example, that a subject who 
made one or more errors of omission or one or more errors of commission 
in only one half-set would have a score of three for that trial. A sub­
ject who made both types of error on one half-set, or one type of error 
in both half-sets, or one type of error in one half and the other type of 
error in the other would have a score of two. A score of one would be 
awarded to a subject who made both types of error in one half and one in 
the other, and, finally, of course, a subject who made both types of error 
in both half-sets would score nothing. Table 3*5 presents the average 
scores of the two groups on the five types of statement using this third 
method of assessment.
TABLE 3.5
AVERAGE SCORES OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE FIVE TYPES OF STATEMENT TAKING 
ALL FIVE TRIALS TOGETHER (MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SCORE FOR EACH TYPE = 20-)
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
GR group 15.3 14.7 13.7 17.0 12.4
PR group 12.0 12.0 11.7 16.1 9.9
Difference 1.3 2.7 2.0 0.9 2.5
Wilcoxon T 84.5 79.5 53.5 76.5 60.5
N Ranks 21 21 22 21 21
P
(two-tailed)
N.S. N.S. <.02 N.S. N.S.
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It will be seen that the statistical test used in deciding 
whether any of the differences between the groups was too large to be 
attributed to the operation of chance factors was the Wilcoxon Signed- 
Ranks test (Siegel, 1956, Hays, 1963) and that the p-value quoted is for 
a two-tailed test. It seemed clear that the appropriate statistical 
test for the data now being considered was a non-parametric one, for it 
is extremely difficult to justify any particular assumption about the 
nature of the distribution of scores in the population from which the 
present samples are drawn. In view of the experimental design, the 
appropriate test appeared undoubtedly to be the Wilcoxon, a test, accord­
ing to Hays (ibid., p. 635) of 'very high power-efficiency compared to 
other methods designed specifically for the matched-pair situation'.
The T and N Rank values were calculated in the way described by Hays r 
rather than that apparently favoured by Siegel. That is to say, zero 
differences were not dropped from the analysis but were given the average 
(lowest) rank, half the sum of their rank values then being assigned to 
the smaller set of differences (on which the T value is based). Where 
N ranks in the above table is 21 instead of the expected 22, this is 
because the number of the zero differences was odd and, in accordance 
with the procedure described by Hays, one was discarded. The p values 
were read from the Wilcoxon table reproduced in Siegel and, in extended 
form, in Guilford (1965)•
As to the question whether a one-tailed or a two-tailed test is 
the appropriate one in the present research, it is extremely difficult to 
be certain whether the experimenter's expectation that the PR group would 
do less well on at least some of the five types of statement than the GR 
group amounted to a prediction that this would be the case. Certainly, 
it would have been a major surprise if any significant differences had 
been in the opposite direction. The opinions of the authors of statist­
ical texts seem to vary in their interpretations of the conditions which 
justify the use of a one-tailed test from the rather strict (Edwards, 1968) 
through the intermediate (Diamond, 1959, Guilford, 1965, Hays, 1963) to 
the rather lenient (Siegel, 1956, McNemar, 1959). In view of this state 
of uncertainty the fact that my prediction - if such it could be called - 
would have been of the form, 'If there are any differences between the 
groups on the five types of statement, they will favour the GR group' I 
decided that a two-tailed test would be the appropriate one.
In this and in subsequent Tables I have noted p values equal to
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or less than .05, all others being regarded, of course, as not significant. 
The justification for considering differences with a p value as large as 
this to be significant is partly that it is in line with an established 
convention in psychological research. More important, perhaps, any leni­
ency implied in this decision tends, so far as the power of the test is 
concerned, in a direction opposite to the one implied by the decision to 
employ a non-parametric test and to consider both tails of the sampling 
distribution. And finally the need to take precautions against the 
possibility of a Type I error does not seem to be a particularly pressing 
one in a study which is admittedly exploratory rather than definitive in 
character. (Compare Diamond, 1959, p. 117) The intention was to follow 
up any differences which seemed to be significant rather than to accept 
them as facts complete in themselves.
Having said all this, the important point to be observed in the 
results reported in Table 3*5 is obviously that the difference between 
the groups in the success with which they tackled the A type of statement 
was large enough to be significant and that no other difference was. In 
particular it is a rather surprising fact that the other form of the uni­
versal affirmative - Ah, the hypothetical form - is so far from giving a 
significant difference that its T value is larger than for any other type 
of statement. (An advantage of the procedure for calculating T described 
by Hays is that it facilitates comparisons of this kind by reducing to two 
the number of values taken by N ranks.)
It remains to describe the fourth and most specific method of 
assessing the performances of the two groups on the five types of state­
ment. In this method account is taken not simply of the types of error 
made but of the number of errors of both types. The difference between 
the two approaches can be described by saying that whereas the third 
method focuses on the four different operations which are the components 
of a correct response (see the summary on p. 70 above) and deducts a point 
for each operation not carried out correctly, the fourth method focuses 
on the treatment of individual cards, asking of each whether it was dealt 
with in the appropriate manner or not, and counting the number of cases in 
which it was not (in which it was turned over when it should not have 
been, or not turned over when it should have been). It will perhaps be 
apparent that the results obtained by these two methods will be different 
only if subjects do not always treat all the cards of a particular type 
in the same-way, and, as we shall see, the question whether one of these
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methods is superior to the other depends on the interpretation we put on 
cases where all cards of a particular type are not treated in the same 
way. In the meantime, Table 3.6 presents the average number of errors 
per statement-type for each group.
TABLE 3.6
MEAN NUMBER OF ERRORS OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE FIVE TYPES OF STATEMENT 
TAKING ALL FIVE TRIALS TOGETHER. (MAX. POSSIBLE FOR EACH TYPE = 40)
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
GR group 11.9 9.1 11.9 4.6 13.9
PR group 14.5 14.1 14.9 6.7 18.8
Difference 2.6 5.0 5.0 2.1 4.9
Wilcoxon T 71 80.5 58.5 85 53.5
N ranks 21 21 21 22 22
P
(two-tailed)
N.S. N.S. <.05 N.S. <.02
The difference between the two groups on the A type of state­
ment remains significant on the fourth method of assessment, though with 
p <.05. At the same time, the difference on the F type of statement 
becomes significant for the first time. This makes the outcomes of the 
two methods seem to be more discrepant than perhaps they are, for the 
difference on F using the third method falls only just short of signific­
ance at the p<.05 level. (T = 60.5 when the critical value for N ranks 
= 21 is 59.)
Such discrepancy as exists is, as we have seen, to be attrib­
uted to the fact that in the fourth method of assessment different weights 
are given to cases in which all the cards of a particular kind are treated 
in the same way (turned or not turned) and cases where some are turned 
and some are not. If there were no cases of the second type, then, as 
I have remarked, there could be no difference in the relative success of 
the two groups as measured by the two methods. Table 3*7 indicates the 
extent to which such cases do occur. It shows that 15 of the 44 subjects 
always treated all the cards of a particular type in the same way. Of 
the remainder 18 almost always responded in this way and 4 almost never 
did, the balance being made up of 3 subjects who belong, if anything, to
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the former category and 4 subjects who belong, if anything, to the latter.
TABLE 3.7
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH GROUP NOT TREATING ALL CARDS OF THE SAME KIND 
IN THE SAME WAY ON DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF TRIALS (ALL STATEMENT-TYPES)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 --- 13 14 ___ 21 22 23 24 25
GR group 7 4 4 3 - - 1 2 - - - - - 1
PR group 8 4 1 2 - 1 1 1 1 2 - - 1 -
Total 15 8 5 5 - 1 2 3 1 2 - - 1 1
It is not, of course, necessary to insist on a dichotomous
classification of subjects who do not always treat all cards of a partic­
ular kind in the same way, but there are two different explanations for
this type of response which suggest themselves and one of these appears
to account rather well for cases in which an ’incomplete1 response of 
this kind occurs on a relatively small number of occasions while the other 
appears more appropriate in cases where it occurs a relatively large num­
ber of times.
The first of these explanations is that subjects fail to notice 
or recognise all the cards of a particular kind. I have referred already 
to the fact that the 'five types of statement' task involves a perceptual 
component and this first explanation amounts to the suggestion that some 
'incomplete' responses can be accounted for in terms of this component.
It is a plausible explanation only in cases where this type of response 
occurs rather infrequently: it is simply incredible that subjects of
the kind participating in the present research might repeatedly fail to 
notice one or more of the cards of a particular kind. In this latter 
kind of case it is much more plausible to assume that the subject does 
not realise that it is necessary to treat all cards of a given kind in 
the same way. The difference between the two kinds of subject can be 
stated most succinctly, perhaps, in terms of intention: the first kind
of subject intends to turn over (or not turn over) all the cards of a 
particular "type and accidentally fails to do so; the second kind of 
subject has no such intention. Finally, it has to be admitted that there 
may be 'mixed' cases where the subject starts off without the intention
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but eventually comes to have it - or, of course, begins with the intention 
and later abandons it.
The importance of all this lies in its bearing on the question 
whether the third or the fourth method of assessing the respective success 
rates of the two groups is the more appropriate. If all 'incomplete' 
responses had been of the first kind, that is, if they had all been occas­
ional rather than persistent, there might have been a case for simply 
ignoring them as representing 'noise' as opposed to 'signal' and using the
third method of assessment. Since this is not the case, however, the
fourth method has the advantage that it penalises the occasional incom­
plete response less than the third does, for it registers only one error 
in a trial where an error of this kind occurs as compared with, perhaps, 
two or three in a case where the subject intentionally treats all the 
cards of the kind in question in the wrong way. (On the third method, in 
contrast, both subjects would simply lose a point.)
On the other hand, the third method can be claimed to give a 
more accurate picture of the performance of the subject who persistently 
turns over only some of the cards of any particular kind. It may be
said of such a subject that a fundamental condition of a correct solution
has escaped him and that it is more appropriate that he should score no­
thing (as he might on the third method) than that he should receive (as 
he might on method four) as much credit as another subject who had grasped 
the fundamental point but given the wrong treatment to all the cards of a 
particular kind.
Since the 'occasional' cases are very much more common than the 
'persistent' ones, and since both methods are equally fair to the subjects 
who never made an incomplete response, it seems that on the whole the 
fourth method is the more adequate. At the same time, some account 
ought to be taken of the results obtained by the third in view of the 
clarity with which it signals the failure of the eight persistent or semi- 
persistent offenders. It is perhaps also worth mentioning at this point 
that the scoring system based simply on answers to the question: 'Are
(all) the cards of the four kinds given the appropriate treatment?' pro­
vides the basis for classifying, conveniently, if not entirely accurately, 
the responses made to the various statement-types, and this will be used 
in discussing the more general aspects of the 'five types of statement' 
task in the next section.
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Our analysis of the differences between the two groups has become 
more and more detailed and it seems natural to take this process one 
stage further by tabulating the groups' scores on the two half-sets of 
each statement-type separately. This is done in Tables 3.8 and 3*9.
TABLE 3.8
AVERAGE SCORES OF THE TWO GROUPS ON ALL FIVE TRIALS, TAKING THE TWO 
HALF-SETS SEPARATELY FOR EACH STATEMENT-TYPE (MAXIMUM = 10)
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H.
GR group 9.0 4.3 7.3 7.4 9.2 4.5 9.0 8.1 5.4 7.0
PR group 8.9 3.2 5.9 6.1 8.5 3.1 8.5 7.5 3.4 6.6
Difference 0.1 1.1 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.4 0.5 0.6 2.0 0.4
Wilcoxon T 58.5 67.0 85.5 59.5 56.0
N ranks 21 21 22 21 22
P
(2-tailed)
<.05 N.S. N.S.
TABLE 3.9
N.S. <.02
AVERAGE ERRORS FOR THE TWO GROUPS ON ALL FIVE TRIALS, TAKING THE TWO 
HALF-SETS SEPARATELY FOR EACH STATEMENT-TYPE (MAXIMUM = 20)
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H.
GR group 1.2 10.7 4.6 4.5 1.0 10.9 1.5 3.2 8.3 5.6
PR group 1.5 13.0 7.0 7.1 2.0 12.9 2.3 4.4 12.5 6.2
Difference 0.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 1.0 2.0 0.8 1.2 4.2 0.6
Wilcoxon T 69.5 73.0 89.5 72.5 47.5
N ranks 21 21 21 21 21
P
(2-tailed)
N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. < .02
Inspection of the scores and error totals of the two groups sug­
gested that any significant differences that existed would be on the 
right hand half-sets of Ah, Ad and A or the left hand half-sets of Ad and
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F. Accordingly, these were tested with the Wilcoxon. The difference 
on the left-hand half-set of F proved to be significant on both methods 
of assessment, the differences on the two half-sets of Ad and on the 
right hand half-set of A significant on neither, and the difference on 
the right hand half-set of Ah only on method three (Table 3.8). The Ah 
case was the least to be expected in view of my previous results. On
the other hand, while the T value for this case is only just below that
required for significance at the 5 per cent level, the corresponding value 
for the other form of the universal affirmative, A, is only .5 above it.
In view of the fact that these results for Ah and A occur only on 
the less reliable method of assessment little importance ought, perhaps, 
to be attached to them. On the other hand, if, as we came to expect on 
the basis of the 1928 paper by Wilkins, PR subjects are more prone than 
GR subjects to interpret the universal affirmative in such a way as to 
make it legitimate to infer its converse, and if the same is true of F 
statements, then the largest differences between the groups occur in 
exactly the half-sets we should expect. Hardly any subjects fail to 
recognise that a statement of the form, 'All cards with an X on one side 
have a Y on the other' requires the subject to turn over all cards with 
an X on their exposed sides. If he (of course mistakenly) supposes
that this statement implies that all cards with a Y on one side have an X
on the other, then he will also turn over cards with a Y on their exposed 
sides. The former response is made to cards in the left-hand half-set 
and is correct, the latter to cards in the right hand half-set and is 
wrong. Hence, if this mistaken assumption is commoner amongst PR than 
amongst GR subjects, the result should be a larger number of errors (of 
commission) for PR subjects on the right hand side and therefore, in 
terms of method three, a lower score on the right hand half-set. Finally, 
since the F type of statement is the mirror-image of a universal affirm­
ative, the outcome in this case should be exactly the reverse, with PR 
subjects more frequently interpreting 'Only X's are Y's' as implying that 
all X's are Y's and so tending more often than GR subjects to turn over 
cards with an X (in the left hand half-set) which need not be turned.
In fact, as Table 3.10 shows, the PR group did have more errors 
of commission on the right hand half-set of Ah and A, and on the left hand 
half-set of F, but only in the last case did the T value even approach 
significance on a two-tailed test. It is, in fact, in errors of omission 
(also Table 3.10) that the difference between the two groups becomes sig-
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nificant at the p <.05 level.
TABLE 3.10
MEAN ERRORS OF THE TWO KINDS ON THE RIGHT-HAND HALF-SETS OF Ah AND A, 
AND ON THE LEFT-HAND HALF-SET OF F, TYPES OF STATEMENT (MAXIMA RESPECT­
IVELY 8, 9, 12; 12, 11, 8)
Errors of Commission Errors of Omission
Ah
(R.H.)
A
(R.H.)
F
(L.H.)
Ah
(R.H.)
A
(R.H.)
F
(L.H.)
GR group 3-4 3.5 6.0 7.4 7.4 2.3
PR group 4.1 4.3 8.6 8.9 8.5 4.0
Difference 0.7 0.8 2.6 1.5 1.1 1.7
Wilcoxon1: T 90.5 95.5 62.5 85 73.5 58
N Ranks 22 21 21 21 21 21
P N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. <.05
(two-tailed)
It has to admitted that this was not an outcome that I had 
anticipated. What it means, of course, is that, faced with a statement 
of the form, ’Only cards with an X on one side have a Y on the other’ PR 
subjects are significantly more likely than GR subjects to fail to recog­
nise the need to turn over cards in the left-hand half-set which do not
have an X on the exposed side. By itself this a response which it is
difficult to interpret. What it perhaps suggests is that PR subjects 
are more likely, not merely to assume that 'Only S is P' implies that all 
3 is P but that statements of these two forms mean the same thing. For 
this interpretation to be wholly convincing there would, of course, have 
to be a corresponding tendency for PR subjects to turn over cards of the 
named variety in the left-hand half-set, and we have seen that although 
this does happen, and does happen more often with PR subjects, there is 
no significant difference between the two groups in this respect.
It may be not unreasonable to suggest that the findings of the 
previous;paragraphs may be interpreted as showing that PR subjects are 
more prone than GR subjects to confuse A and F types of statement, both, 
it seems, being read as an amalgam of A and F, equivalent, roughly, to
'All 3 is P and all P is S’. The implication of this view is that PR
subjects are more likely than GR subjects to respond to A and F statements
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in the same way. In terms of the experimental task this means that if, 
for example, a PR subject responds to the statement 'All cards with an 
X on one side have a Y on the other' by turning all cards with an X and 
all cards with a Y on their exposed sides, he will respond in the same 
way to the corresponding F statement.
The third method of assessment, as we have seen, is based on a 
consideration of the question whether each of the four types of cards has 
been given the appropriate treatment, and it is natural to record success 
and failure on each of the four card-types by writing a plus or a minus 
in the record-sheet. On the convention that the four types of card are 
considered in the order, cards with named characters in the left-hand 
half-set, cards in the left-hand half-set without named characters, cards 
with named characters in the right-hand half-set, cards in the right-hand 
half-set without named characters, it is possible to set out, as in Appen­
dix F , a complete record of the responses of all subjects on each trial 
of each statement-type. Where the same treatment is called for for each 
of the four kinds of cards (as in Ah and a ) the extent to which the sub­
jects' responses to two statement-types are the same can be assessed by 
noting the number of occasions on which a plus in a given position in one 
of the statement-types is matched by a plus in the same position in the 
other.
In the case of A and F statements exactly the opposite holds: 
every response which is correct for a given category of card in one is 
wrong for that category of card in the other. (Cards with named char­
acters in the left-hand half-set must be turned in A but must not be in 
F, for example.) This means, of course, that a plus in a given position
in A must be 'matched' by a minus in F and a minus by a plus. If we use
this as a basis for assessing the extent to which responses to A and F 
types of statement are more often alike in the PR group than in the GR 
group, there is one other complication to be borne in mind. This refers
to subjects who make 'incomplete' responses (page 78 above). On the
third method of assessment a plus is scored only if all the cards of a 
given type are treated in the appropriate way. A subject who responds 
by turning only some of the cards in the left-hand half-set with named 
characters in both A and F will, therefore, score a minus in both cases 
for in the former case he has failed to turn them all over and in the 
latter he has failed to avoid turning any over. A minus in both cases 
clearly represents identity of response in this special case and not, as
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in other cases, a difference of response. In using the procedure 
described above for assessing the extent to which a subject's responses 
to A and F types of statement were the same I adjusted the 'agreement 
scores' of the eight subjects (Table 3.7) who persistently turned over 
only some of the cards of a kind.accordingly - that is, by counting 
minuses representing incomplete responses to a given category of card in 
A and F as indicating similarity of response rather than difference. A 
less important adjustment of an opposite kind had to be made in the pro­
cess of calculating the corresponding scores for Ah and A - for in this 
case it sometimes happened that a minus in one of the statement-types 
represented an incomplete response while the corresponding minus in the 
other statement represented a complete response of the wrong kind. 
Matching minuses in such a case clearly represented different responses 
and not the identity of response otherwise indicated in these statement- 
types. Table 3.11 presents the average A-F and Ah-A 'agreement scores' 
for the two groups, the differences between them being tested, as usual, 
by means of the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test.
TABLE 3.11
AVERAGE A-F AND Ah-A AGREEMENT SCORES FOR THE TWO GROUPS (MAXIMUM=20)
Statement Types Diff. jd
Ah-A
GR group 17.4
PR group 17.2
Difference +0.2
Wilcoxon T 120
N Ranks 21
p N.S.
(two-tailed)
*Sign Test
The Ah-A agreement scores, the difference between them, and the 
difference within each group between Ah-A and A-F agreement scores were 
calculated in addition to the A-F scores and inter-group difference, in 
which, of course, we are primarily interested, because it seemed likely 
that they would assist in the interpretation of any difference found bet­
ween the A-F scores of the groups. To the extent that the PR group does 
treat the A and F types of statement as if they were equivalent to a
A-F
9.5 7.9 <.001*
12.2 5 .0 <.001*
-2.7 
73 
21
N.S.
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greater degree than the GR group does this might have been part of a quite 
general tendency to treat all five statement-types as if they were equi­
valent. Such a possibility could have been ruled out if we had found 
a significant difference between the groups on A-F and no difference, or 
of course a difference in the opposite direction, on Ah-A (which should 
be treated as if they were equivalent). In fact, however, such a clear- 
cut outcome was not forthcoming: the Ah-A difference between the groups
is not significant, though it is in the direction which is incompatible 
with the view that PR subjects tend, quite generally, to react to all 
statement-types as if they were equivalent to a greater extent than GR 
subjects do; on the other hand, the intergroup A-F difference is also 
not significant. Finally, it has to be admitted that even if this diff­
erence had been significant we should have had to conclude that the extent
to which PR subjects confuse A and F types of statement is relatively 
marginal in view of the highly significant intra-group differences in Ah-A 
as compared with A-F scores. The tendency in both groups to treat the 
Ah and A statement-types as if they were equivalent is so much more pro­
nounced than their tendency to treat the A and F statements as if they
were equivalent that it was possible to obtain a p <.001 even using the 
relatively low-powered Sign Test (Siegel, 1956).
This concludes my examination of the main body of evidence re­
lating to the question whether PR subjects understand some of the types 
of statement which play an important role in the Valentine test, Section 
B less well than their GR counterparts. Subsidiary evidence of a rather 
problematic kind drawn from the special characteristics of the fifth 
trials of each statement type will be presented in section 3-5, after the 
presentation of some other, more general differences in the performances 
of the two groups and the discussion of some of the general points arising 
about the nature of the experimental task as so far described.
The evidence presented in this section seems clearly to suggest 
that there is no difference between the groups so far as the Ad (universal- 
disjunctive) and E (universal negative) types of statement are concerned. 
The strongest evidence of a difference between the groups relates to the A 
(universal affirmative in 'categorical’ form) and F (’Only S is P’) state­
ment-types, with the difference in the former being significant on either 
the third or fourth method of assessment, and the difference in the latter 
appearing, with p <(,02 on the fourth and, for the reasons given, probably 
superior, method. Rather surprisingly, there is virtually nothing to
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suggest that the two groups differ in respect of their understanding of 
the other (hypothetical) form of the universal affirmative, the one signi­
ficant difference between them being in the success - as measured by the 
less dependable third method - with which the groups tackled the right- 
hand half-set in this statement-type. This outcome is surprising, not 
only because A and Ah are both universal affirmatives (and so logically 
equivalent) but also because, as Table 3•11 makes clear, the responses 
all subjects made to them were highly similar (and suggest psychological 
equivalence).
There was some evidence of a rather tentative kind to suggest 
that the differences between the groups were located in a way which sup­
ports the hypothesis that the PR group was more prone than their GR 
counterparts to interpret ’All S is P ’ as implying 'All P is S' and 'Only 
S is P' as implying 'Only P is S' (i.e., 'All S is P'). However, differ­
ences in the incidence, of errors of commission in the relevant half-sets 
which would have lent support to this conclusion, though in the right 
direction, were not significant. An (unpredicted) difference in errors 
o:f omission in the F case suggested that the PR subjects might be more 
prone than GR subjects simply to read an F statement as if it were the 
corresponding A statement. However, an attempt to compare the two groups 
with respect to the extent to which they responded to the two types of 
statement as if they were equivalent, though once again showing a differ­
ence in the predicted direction, failed to reach significance.
The overall picture presented by these results cannot be said 
to be unequivocal except in the sense that all differences between the 
groups, with the exception of the two noted in connexion with the clearly 
unsatisfactory first method of assessing the success of the two groups, 
were in favour of the GR group. At the same time, the significant diff­
erences, such as they were, do seem to combine to make some kind of sense 
and to suggest that there are differences between the groups which might 
be detectable using the present experimental task, perhaps presented in a 
slightly different way - as it was in a subsequent experiment with the 
same groups described in the next chapter.
3.3 Two more general points of comparison between the two groups 
Reflection on the experimental task raised two more general questions 
about the performances of the two groups. It seemed natural, in the 
first place, to ask whether they differed'1 in the extent to which they
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changed their responses from trial to trial within each statement-type.
One or two subjects were strikingly 'rigid' in their responses, not simply 
within statement-types but over the whole series of twenty-five trials.
It would obviously have been of interest if there had been grounds for 
supposing that the two groups differed in a way which could have been 
interpreted as showing a tendency towards greater rigidity amongst PR 
subjects. A difference in the opposite direction, on the other hand, 
might have been interpreted in terms of a greater instability of response 
on the part of the PR group. Of the two the latter would have been the 
more interesting outcome for the present investigation for it might reas­
onably have been seen as an indication of uncertainty, on the part of PR 
subjects, about the meanings of the statements involved - whereas, on the 
other hand, rigidity of response might have been regarded as an aspect of 
the PR group's problem-solving behaviour in general.
In order to compare the two groups in this respect I calculated 
a 'changeability score' for each subject, this being equal to the number 
of different responses to each of the five types of statement taken 
together. (Types of response, for this purpose, were represented by 
patterns of pluses and minuses, as described on a previous page.) The 
result was almost exact equality between the groups, the average (with a 
maximum possible score of 25, of course) being 11.0 and 10.9 for the GR 
and PR groups respectively. We can therefore conclude with unusual con­
fidence that there was no difference between the groups in the extent to 
which they changed their responses from trial to trial.
Consideration of the other rather general aspect of the perform­
ances of the two groups was prompted by the finding, noted earlier, that 
the universal negative (e ) was the easiest type of statement for the two 
groups. The result is a puzzling one, as I have noted already, because 
Wason (1959, for example) and others have shown that negative statements 
are more difficult to cope with than the corresponding affirmatives.
The question naturally arises, therefore, whether the present finding may 
not be an artefact of the experimental task - which in turn prompts a 
question about the aspects of the task which might make it uncharacter­
istically easy for subjects of both kinds to cope with the universal neg­
ative. In fact one possibility very readily suggests itself, namely, 
that in a state of uncertainty a subject is likely to make what Wason has 
recently (1969) called 'matching responses', i.e., turn over only the 
cards with named characters. This is, of course, precisely the kind of
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response required for success in the card-turning task with the E type 
of statement, and if it were a common response for all statement-types, 
it might account for the surprisingly high success-rate with the universal 
negative as compared with the others. In fact, the response, as we shall 
see in a moment, is not a very common one and there are other reasons for 
doubting whether the explanation of the surprising outcome in the case of 
the E statement is to be found here. I shall discuss these other reasons 
in the next section when I come to consider the experimental task as a 
whole. For the present the important point is that the number of occas­
ions on which PR subjects made matching responses was significantly great­
er than the number of occasions on which GR subjects did so.
To establish this I simply counted the number of plus-and-minus 
patterns of the appropriate kinds occurring in all statement-types except 
E. The reason for omitting E is that, as we have just seen, a matching 
response in this case is indistinguishable from a correct response, and it 
seemed important not to confuse cases in which a matching response might 
reflect undrstanding on the part of the subject with cases in which this 
possibility seems to be excluded. This distinction between the E case 
on the one hand and the other four statement-types on the other >seems to 
be corroborated by the fact that, whereas, as we have seen, matching re­
sponses occurred significantly more often with PR subjects in the four 
cases where they are not appropriate, they occurred less often in the E 
type, where they are (the averages for PR and GR subjects being 2.4 and
3.3 respectively.) Once again some account had to be taken of the ambig­
uity of the minus in the case of subjects who made 'incomplete' responses, 
especially in the Ad type of statement, where a 'four-minus' pattern might 
represent either an incomplete or a matching response, the two being 
clearly different in the respect that, of course, a subject who makes an 
incomplete response does not turn over all cards with named characters.
The average matching-response scores on the four types of state­
ment taken together (maximum possible = 20) for the GR and PR groups re­
spectively were 2.6 and 5.7. With a Wilcoxon T = 66 and N Ranks = 22 
the difference between the groups is significant on a two-tailed test 
with p 4.05. The interpretation to be placed on this outcome is not 
clear. It may be, as suggested earlier, that a subject makes a matching 
response when he is uncertain about which response to make and that PR 
subjects were simply more often in a state of uncertainty. In that case, 
the difference between the groups would amount to no more than Additional
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evidence of the overall superiority of the GR group on this task. On 
the other hand, in the case of Ah, A and F types of statement what looks 
like a matching response is likely to commend itself to subjects who 
interpret these statements as stating a reciprocal relationship between 
the two classes of cards mentioned. It has been a main part of the argu­
ment of this chapter that this is something PR subjects may be more prone 
to do - at least in the A and F cases. Further evidence in support of 
the point will be presented in the next section but one of this chapter 
and in the chapter which follows.
3.4 The nature of the experimental task: a discussion with references
to the work of Wason and others The focus of interest in the preceding 
sections has, of course, been on the extent to which the performances of 
the two groups differ, and this will continue to be the primary concern of 
succeeding sections and chapters of this thesis. In the present section, 
however, it seemed appropriate to review certain general features of the 
experimental task in the light of the performances of the two groups con­
sidered together rather than in opposition. At the same time, comparison 
will be made between my results and those obtained by Wason (1966, 1968, 
1969) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1969) and consideration given to the 
aspects of their subjects' performances which have seemed of special inter­
est to Wason and to the theories developed by him to account for these 
aspects.
The purpose of this section is primarily to arrive at some 
understanding of the 'mediating processes' involved in successful and 
unsuccessful attempts at a solution to the experimental task with a view 
to determining the validity of the assumption, on which the research re­
ported in this part of this thesis has proceeded, that a subject's degree 
of success in it reflects the extent to which he understands the various 
statement-types employed. One outcome of my own study which seems to 
have a bearing on this question has already been presented and commented 
upon. This concerns the relative difficulty of the various types of 
statement, the universal negative (e ) proving for both groups to be easiest, 
the F type most difficult, with A, Ad and Ah being very much of a muchness 
in this respect for the PR group and Ad being second easiest for the GR 
group.
Between them, Wason and Johnson-Laird have used only the Ah, Ad 
and A types of statement. All that I feel able to say with confidence
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about their subjects’ comparative success on these three types of state­
ment is that they found the disjunctive easier than either of the others. 
Of particular interest for a discussion of the nature of the experimental 
task is, I think, the finding, reported in the joint paper, that the dis­
junctive is easier, not only in the affirmative form in which I presented 
it, but also in the partially negative (and, to my mind, much more diffi­
cult) form in which it is logically equivalent to an Ah or A statement: 
’Every card has a number which isn’t Roman on one side or it has a letter 
which is capital on the other' (Wason and Johnson-Laird, p. 16). On page 
19 the authors comment as follows: "The result of this experiment, when
compared with those of Wason (1968), show that expressing implication as 
a disjunction, 'either not-p or q', makes it easier to grasp than express­
ing it as the conditional, 'if p then q'." To be specific, it is, in the 
view of the authors, easier to grasp the meaning of the above disjunctive 
than the corresponding conditional: 'If a card has a Roman number on
one side it has a capital letter on the other.' I must say this seems 
to me to be highly improbable - especially in view of the fact that the 
evidence from Wason's later study and from my own would make it appear 
to be necessary to add that the disjuctive in question is also easier to 
understand than the corresponding universal affirmative in categorical 
form: 'Every card which has a Roman number on one side has a capital
letter on the other.'
It is true that in using the above case to suggest that there 
may be something wrong with the assumption that the five types of state­
ment task is in every respect a satisfactory measure of the extent to 
which the meaning of a statement is grasped I am setting a subjective 
impression against what appears to be an empirical test of the relative 
difficulty of the two (or three) types of statement. At the same time, 
Wason's own researches on the relative difficulty of affirmative and neg­
ative statements would lead one to expect the order of difficulty of the 
disjunctive and conditional forms of the above statement to be the oppos­
ite of what they are as measured by the present experimental task and I 
think it necessary to look for features of the task which may make it 
easier to arrive at a correct solution for some statement-types than for 
others, more or less regardless of the inherent difficulty of the state­
ments themselves. In the previous section, for example, I considered 
the possibility that the surprising ease with which members of both groups 
could apparently cope with the universal negative might be explained in
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terms of the fact that the correct choice of cards to turn over in the E 
case is identical with the cards turned over in a ’matching response', 
where the subject may be assumed to turn over the cards with the charact­
ers named in the statement more or less mechanically. As it happens, it 
does not seem likely to me that this particular accident of the experi­
mental situation is likely to have played a major role in producing the 
rather unexpected relationships in the apparent difficulty of the five 
types of statement. For one thing, as I have already shown in the pre­
vious section, the average number of matching responses is quite small. 
Moreover, if subjects did tend to make matching responses on a preponder­
ating number of occasions, we should expect the Ad type of statement to 
be the one on which most failures occurred - for the correct choice of 
cards in this case is the exact opposite of that involved in a matching 
response, while in the A and Ah cases the two selections at least overlap 
- whereas it is at least no more difficult than the A and Ah statements 
for the PR group and actually easier, if anything, in the case of the GR 
group.
Finally, in this connexion, it seems appropriate to refer to 
the very peculiar phenomena which have been the focus of Wason1s research, 
and in particular the apparent inability of his subjects to apply to the 
problem of choice of card their recognition, in 'therapy sessions', that 
a card in the right-hand half-set of an A or Ah problem which does not 
have the second-named character on its exposed side may have the first- 
named character on its hidden side and so falsify the statement in quest­
ion. It is, perhaps, significant that in his 1969 paper (p. 477) Wason 
has largely abandoned his earlier (and to my mind unconvincing) theories 
about the sources of such behaviour and seems to be relating it rather to 
characteristics of the task, in particular to the need to recognise cards 
without named characters as such, and the possible failure of subjects to 
understand the reciprocal nature of the relationship referred to in the 
expressions, 'on one side....on the other'. (Though the first of these 
points is surely still problematic, since it appears to apply to cards in 
the right-hand half-set of an Ah or A problem but not to cards in the 
left-hand half-set (which, of course, subjects overwhelmingly treat in the 
appropriate manner). More important, perhaps, it is, as far as I can see,
inconsistent with the relative success subjects have with the Ad type of
statement, for here all the cards which need to be turned are ones without
the characters named in the statement.)
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It seems very likely that the anomalous results so far as the 
relative difficulty of different statement-types is concemedare to be 
attributed to the operation of a multiplicity of factors. Perhaps, in 
conclusion, I should offer one other possibility which occurs to one in 
relation to my own results. This is the importance of symmetry as be­
tween the two half-sets. In Ad and E the correct treatment for the cards 
with named characters is the same in both half-sets - respectively, leave 
unturned and turn. In the other three statement-types, in contrast, the 
cards with named characters have to be turned in one half-set and left 
unturned in the other. The consequence, as the summary of correct re­
sponses on page 70 shows, is that it is relatively easy to formulate a 
rule for the Ad and E cases as compared with the others. Obviously, this 
feature by itself cannot explain the success with which subjects deal with 
these statement-types since the rule has to be the right one if the re­
sponse is not to be totally wrong. It might be tempting to suggest that 
the matching-response hypothesis and the present one together account for 
the outcome at least in the case of GR subjects, for it is obviously 
easier to deal with cases where both rules are favourable (as in E) than 
with cases where only one is (as in Ad) while, of course, cases in which 
neither rule applies (Ah, A and F) are most difficult of all. But this 
theory, too, fails to fit all the facts, in particular the fact that the 
average number of matching responses is quite small in both groups.
Fortunately, for my purposes, the considerations presented above 
appear to cast doubt on only a part of the assumption, on which, as we 
have seen, the research reported in this part of this thesis depends, that 
the present task is a measure of the subject’s understanding of the state­
ments employed. This is that performance on the task reflects the relat­
ive difficulty of the various types of statement. Another part of the 
assumption, and the part most pertinent to the purposes of this thesis, is 
that within any one statement-type level of success is a measure of degree 
of understanding. Some of Wason's results may seem to cast doubt on this 
too: it might be argued, for example, following Wason's 1969 discussion,
that the differences between the groups principally reflects differences 
in the extent to which their members function at the level of formal oper­
ations, or else the extent to which they ’regress’ to the concrete level 
when faced with a task which is novel and abstract. The difficulty in 
maintaining the second part of the assumption about the relationship be­
tween success on the ’five types of statement’ task and the extent of the 
subject's understanding of the statements used seems, nevertheless, to be
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less than the difficulty in maintaining the first, and it will be appar­
ent from the next section of this chapter and from the later experiment 
described in the chapter which follows that failure in the task is at 
least in part to be explained in terms of certain kinds of misunderstand­
ing of the statements rather than wholly in terms of special features of 
the task. Indeed, the truth about the conditional and equivalent dis­
junctive (which appears to be more difficult to understand) may be partly, 
as I think Wason and Johnson-Laird suggest (pp. 19-20), that the complex­
ity of the latter prevents subjects from making plausible but erro neous 
assumptions about the relationship between the relevant classes of cards 
which they are prone to make when these are stated in the simpler forms 
of an Ah or an A statement - and in particular, of course, the assumption 
that the relationship is a reciprocal one.
Finally, in this section, it may be of some interest to indicate 
the extent to which my results agree with those obtained by Wason and 
Johnson-Laird. To make this possible I have for the most part translated 
their results into my own terms, this being a relatively simple matter 
because their subjects virtually never made 'incomplete' responses - even 
when, as in the studies reported in the 1969 papers, there were two of 
each type of card. I thought it useful to present my own results in a 
different form from those hitherto used. This form does not indicate 
the relative difficultyof the various statement-types or the relative 
success of the two groups on the different statement-types. It has, 
however, the advantage that it makes it possible to detect any differences 
in the type of response favoured by the two groups (Table 3-12) and in the 
type and location of errors made by them (Table 3.13)• '^he figures for 
the Wason studies always refer, of course, to the initial selections of 
his subjects and take no account of the selections they made after his 
various 'therapies'. For the Ah figures I have combined the results for 
Wason's (1968) experimental and control groups. The Ad figures are for 
the affirmative form of the disjunctive only. (The main difference bet­
ween these and the partially negative equivalent of the conditional is 
that 7 out of 48 subjects seem to have been unable to cope with the neg­
ative in the antecedent: if these are added to the number scoring a
complete success, the two patterns of choice are virtually identical, and 
either way, incidentally, the pattern of choice for this equivalent of 
the conditional is quite different from the quite distinctive pattern for 
Ah and A.)
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Down the left-hand side of Table 3*12 are listed all possible 
patterns of response in terms of success (plus) and failure (minus) on 
the four components of a correct response (corresponding to the four types 
of card in the order given in the previous section, p. 83 * and therefore 
to Wason’s P, P, Q, and Q.) Opposite them is the percentage (to the 
nearest whole number) of all responses of the group in question to that 
statement-type represented by responses of the pattern in question.
Three additional points ought to made. These are, first, that the per­
centages given for the Wason groups refer to single responses of different 
subjects whereas the percentages for the GR and PR groups refer to the 
responses of my 44 subjects on the five successive trials.^ The N's on 
which the percentages are based are, therefore, 110 for all GR and PR 
groups and 60, 48 and 32 for Wason’s Ah, Ad and A groups respectively. 
Secondly, I did not think it necessary, on this occasion, to distinguish 
cases where a minus represents an incomplete response from those in which 
it represents a complete, but incorrect, response. The incomplete re­
sponses (in which, it will be remembered, all the cards of a given type 
are not treated in the same way) will, of course, tend to appear in the 
four-minus row at the bottom of the Table or to be scattered throughout 
the predominantly minus rows immediately above. Finally, it is perhaps 
worth reiterating the point that a given pattern of pluses and minuses 
will indicate a different set of component responses in different state­
ment-types (except in Ah and A) and, conversely, a given set of component 
responses will be represented in different statement-types by different 
patterns of pluses and minuses - so that a matching response, for example, 
is represented by ++—  in Ah and A ,  in Ad, ++++ in E and — ++ in F.
Inspection of the Table prompts the following tentative remarks,
(l) On Ah and A Wason's subjects appear to have scored rather fewer com­
plete success^than even my PR group. This is, however, one respect in 
which the 'one off’ character of the Wason results is misleading, for only 
one subject out of my 44 achieved complete success on Ah and A in the
1 It might be argued that for strict comparability I should have used 
only the first trial responses of my subjects. On the other hand, my 
subjects were given no information between trials which could have encour­
aged them to change their responses, pooling their responses presumably 
makes the overall distribution more representative of the groups’ views, 
and, inasmuch as I am interested in a comparison between these groups as 
well as between them and Wason's, the pooled results are therefore to 
be preferred.
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TABLE 3.12
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSES OF GR, PR AND WASON GROUPS WHICH WERE 
OF THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE PATTERNS
Ah
S t a t e m e n t
Ad*
T y p e s
A
Pattern GR PR Wason -GR PR Wason GR PR Wason GR PR GR PR
++++ 15 11 5 60 40 75 14 9 — 66 48 20 9
+++— 37 31 26 - 1 - 42 26 50 5 2 2 1
++-+ 18 4 6 2 - - 14 4 6 9 20 6 4
+-++ 1 - - - 4 - - - - 1 1 6 4
-+++ - - - - 2 - 2 1 - 5 7 19 6
++— 17 35 50 - - 4 21 37 41 5 5 4 3
.+— + 2 6 5 - - - 1 3 - 1 — - 1
+-+- - - 5 1 8 - - 1 3 1 3 - -
—+—+ 1 1 - 18 19 - - - - 3 6 5 8
— ++ - - - 2 - - - 1 - - 3 11 26
— H— 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 4 - - - 12 15
+-- 1 3 2 1 1 - - 2 - - 2 1 1
—+—— 4 6 - 1 1 - 1- 8 - 1 1 2 2
— +- - - - 2 2 - 1 2 - 2 2 1 6
---h - - - 1 1 - 1 2 - 1 - 5 11
--- 6 4 - 12 21 19 4 1 - 3 1 8 6
* The response of one of Wason's Ad subjects is not included because its
nature is not clearly enough described to allocate it to any of the above
patterns.
first trial (compared with 3 out of Wason’s 60 Ah subjects). Otherwise,
there is clearly a large measure of agreement amongst all groups on the
most popular patterns of response, viz., +++- (what I shall call the
'half-matching' response, turning only the cards with the characters first
named - Wason’s P cards) and ++— , the matching response. There is some
evidence to suggest that the matching response occurs rather less often
with the GR group and that the ++-+ response occurs more often. This
may /reflect
latter point is of some interest in that itywhat may be an excessive caut­
ion on the part of this group, for in this pattern of response, as in the 
corresponding one in F, the difficult component of a correct response is 
dealt with appropriately and only an error 'on the safe side' remains.
(2) On Ad Wason's group achieved complete success strikingly more often 
than my PR group and noticeably more often than the GR group. Offsetting 
this, partly, is the incidence, in GR and PR groups, of responses (-+-+) 
which consist in turning over every card. I remarked in a previous sect­
ion that this is the correct response if the disjunctive is interpreted in 
the exclusive sense, and although none of my subjects adopted this inter­
pretation consistently, the incidence of -+-+ responses revealed in the
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above Table may reflect a, perhaps to be expected, oscillation between 
the two possible interpretations. Presumably, the absence of any res­
ponses of this kind in Wason's group is to be attributed simply to chance, 
for in their paper he and Johnson-Laird report (p. 18) that 'three sub­
jects gave evidence of reasoning exclusively'. Apart, perhaps, from the 
8 per cent of PR responses which consisted in turning none of the cards 
over (+-+-), the only other percentages of any size in Ad are those for
the --- , matching response (though this seems to have been somewhat less
popular with the GR group than with the others).
(3) On E the relatively high incidence of completely correct 
responses is accompanied by a very wide distribution of the remaining 
responses over the other possibilities, with only the half-matching re­
sponse (++-+) accounting for a substantial proportion of the total.
(4) Responses are also widely dispersed in F and an additional feature 
of the distribution here is that differences in the preferences of the 
two groups are more apparent than they are anywhere else. The one incor­
rect pattern in which there is a noticeable preponderance of GR, as oppos­
ed to PR, responses is -+++, the pattern referred to in the previous 
paragraph in connexion with the remark that the GR group may show a tend­
ency to excessive caution. There are substantially more matching respon­
ses (— ++) from the PR group and half-matching responses also make up a 
somewhat larger proportion of their total. The other response which 
accounts for/sizeable proportion of the responses of both groups is -++-, 
which consists in turning over all the cards in the left-hand half-set and 
the cards (in the right-hand half-set) with the characters named second.
(5) Finally, it may be as well to admit that the fact, noted under the two 
previous points, that the distribution of responses is greatest in E (the 
easiest statement, whether we consider errors or time taken) and in F (the 
most difficult, again on either criterion) is something for which I can 
think of no adequate explanation. By itself, of course, the F case pre­
sents little problem: as subjects find it the most difficult we might 
expect them to try a wide variety of incorrect responses. The same ex­
planation obviously will not do for E.
In Tables 3*13 and 3 « M  the performances of the two groups are 
analysed in terms of the location of the errors they made and the extent 
to which the errors they made in the two half-sets were errors of omission 
or (by inference) errors of commission. It is possible to present com­
parable results for Wason's groups because, of course, the division of
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my cards into two half-sets lying to right and to left of each other is 
a relatively unimportant feature of my experimental set-up: as I have
pointed out, a more or less straightforward translation of Wason's 'P,
P, Q> Q' terminology into my terms is always possible. Similarly, an 
estimate of the number of errors Wason's subjects made 'in each half-set' 
and also of the proportion of these which were 'errors of omission' can 
readily be made on the basis of the information he gives about the cards 
which his subjects turned over. Indeed, a rough approximation to the 
truth can be read off Table 3*12.
The results for my own groups are based on the error scores
found in the course of applying the fourth method of assessment. As
the intention in this section is to make comparisons between statement-
types as well as between groups, it was necessary to adjust the raw error
scores to take account of the fact that there there were not always two 
cards of each kind in each half-set and therefore not always equal arith­
metical probabilities of the two kinds of error. The procedure I adopt­
ed to effect this adjustment was to divide the actual number of errors of 
omission made by each group in each half-set on each trial in each state­
ment-type by the number possible and multiply the result by two. Total 
error scores were then adjusted by subtracting the difference between the 
raw EO score and the adjusted EO score in each half-set/trial from the 
raw total error score. As a result, the arithmetical probabilities of 
the two types of error may be assumed to be the same for all half-sets 
and all statement-types and any differences in the proportions of them 
actually found may be taken to reflect the special problems presented by 
the various statement-types.
TABLE 3.13
ADJUSTED FREQUENCY AND PRECENTAGE OF ERRORS OCCURRING IN THE LEFT-HAND
HALF-SET
S t a t e m e n t T y p e
Ah Ad A E F
GR group: % 10 52 8 30 63
N (24) (99) (19) (29) (192)
PR group: % 11 50 13 32 71
N (32) (145) (39) (44) (294)
Wason: % 8 45 2
N (7) (36) (2)
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There is clearly a very large measure of agreement between all 
three groups in the way in which errors are distributed between the half- 
sets of the various statement-types. Errors in Ah and A are overwhelm­
ingly in the right-hand half-set, a fact which may be taken to support 
or to illustrate Wason's point that the problem about these statement- 
types centres on the Q and Q cards. The even distribution of errors 
between the two half-sets of Ad is what one might expect given its 'sym­
metrical' character, already referred to. On the other hand, one of the 
surprising features of Table 3.13 is that no such even distribution of 
errors occurs in the other symmetrical statement-type, E: the two groups
agree closely in placing rather more than two-thirds of all errors in the 
right-hand half-set. It seems possible to offer an explanation for this 
outcome, and for the fact that the distribution of errors in F is not as 
extremely one-sided as in Ah and A (of which it is in other respects the 
mirror-image) in the light of the results presented in Table 3.14 where 
the division of errors into their two types is given for each half-set.
TABLE 3.14
ADJUSTED FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF ERRORS IN EACH HALF-SET 
WHICH WERE ERRORS OF OMISSION
S t a t e m e n t  T y p e
Ah Ad A E F
L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H. L.H. R.H.
GR group: % 54 64 32 35 58 65 69 57 30 58
N (13) (134) (32) (33) (11) (148) (20) (39) (57) (64)
PR group: fo 44 65 47 50 56 64 61 67 35 51
N (14) (168) (68) (71) (22) (171) (27) (62) (107) (63)
Wason: a/o 57 50 50 _ 67
N* (0) (50) (18) (22) (0) (60)
* In this table, and in the previous one, the error scores for Wason'
groups in Ad and A have been doubled, in comparison to his Ah group, to 
take account of the fact that there were two cards of each type in the 
former cases and only one in the latter.
The degree of agreement between the groups shown in Table 3.14, 
though not so large as in the previous table, is clearly still very con­
siderable. In percentage terms, the largest discrepancy is in the left- 
hand half-sets of Ah and A where about half the errors in my groups were 
EO's while none of the other group's were. In terms of frequencies, 
however, the difference is very much less and may perhaps be attributed
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to a combination of ’incomplete’ responses and to perceptual errors.
The other main discrepancy is in Ad where the GR group shows a clear pre­
ponderance of EC's in both half-sets whereas the division of errors into 
the two kinds is nearly even in the other two groups. In the absence of 
any better explanation, this result may be taken as confirming a tendency, 
noted earlier, for the GR group to err on the side of turning over too 
many, rather than too few, cards.
Comparison between the two groups apart, Table 3.14 is perhaps 
best read in conjunction with Table 3.13. It is then possible to see 
that roughly two-thirds of errors in the right-hand half-sets of Ah and A 
(where about 9 0 of errors occurred) were errors of omission, failure to 
turn over what Wason calls the Q cards, the cards in that half-set without 
the character named. Table 3.14 shows that the majority of errors in 
both half-sets of E were EO’s while more than two-thirds of the errors in 
the left-hand half-set of F were EC’s. These facts may hold the key to 
the two problems left over from Table 3.13, the uneven distribution of 
errors over the two half-sets of E, and the absence of any extremely one­
sided distribution of errors in the two half-sets of F of the kind found 
with Ah and A.
My suggestion is that subjects tend to regard all statement-types 
except Ad as being simply about the class of cards with the first named 
characters, Ad is an exception because the grammatical structure of the 
sentence in this case fails to ’attach’ either of the named characters to 
the subject-term. In A, E and F the grammatical subject is of the form, 
'cards with an X on one side' and in Ah, where the grammatical subject is 
simply 'a card', this occurs in the same subordinate clause as the express­
ion for the first named character. In Ad, in contrast, 'every card' is 
said to have ' either X, ... or Y .
Such a tendency to suppose that the statements other than Ad 
refer simply to the class of cards with the first named character (Wason's 
P cards) would, if it were real, lead subjects to neglect cards with the 
character named second (Q cards). Now this is obviously not an overrid­
ing tendency for we have already seen that subjects do tend to turn over 
Q cards in Ah and A and it runs counter to the tendency to make matching 
responses. On the other hand, it does help to explain why 'half-matching' 
responses, when they occur, tend very much to consist of 'matching' the 
first half and hardly ever;of matching the second. (Since the patterns
for 'second-half matching' are -+—  for Ah and A, h for AD, —H-+ for E
and +-+- for F, it is possible to see from Table 3.11 that the percentages 
of such responses were 4, 1, 1, 5 and 0 respectively for the GR group and 
6, 1, 8, 7 and 0 for the PR group, as compared with 'first-half matching' 
percentages of 37, 2, 42, 9 and 5 (GR) and 31, 2, 26, 20 and 11.)
In the absence of any bias emanating from this source in the 
case of Ad there would be no tendency to make errors of omission (or, 
therefore, errors of any kind, so far as one can judge) in one half-set 
rather than another. In E, on the other hand, to the extent that the 
above effect is operative EO's could be expected to fall predominantly in 
the right-hand half-set, as we have seen they do, and so upset the even 
distribution of errors as between the two halves which I have suggested 
we should expect in the 'symmetrical' statement-types. The same factor 
would help to keep down errors of omission in the left-hand half-sets of 
Ah and A but tend to raise the number of EC's in the same half-set of F, 
in this way reducing the extreme one-sidedness of the distribution of 
errors as between the two half-sets which we might otherwise have expected 
in view of the relationship between F and Ah and A. In fact, as Table 
3.14 shows, about two-thirds of the errors of both groups on the left-hand 
half-set of F are errors of commission.^
It may be apparent at this juncture that at least some of the 
responses made by subjects in the 'five types of statement' task are 
'over-determined' - probably in fact, but certainly in terms of the hypo­
theses developed in this chapter. In the case of F statements, for ex­
ample, the tendency for subjects to make errors of commission in the left- 
hand half-set has been attributed to at least three different factors: 
the tendency to turn over cards with named characters, more or less with­
out regard to the statement-type, the tendency to suppose that F state­
ments are 'about' only the class of cards with the first named characters, 
and the tendency to suppose that 'Only S is P' implies that all S is P.
1 One is naturally prompted to look for some way of manipulating this 
effect experimentally. One which suggests itself, in the case of Ah, is 
changing the order of the clauses so that the statement reads, 'A card has 
an X on one side if it has a Y on the other'. One would expect, in this 
case, to find an increase in EC's in the (former) left-hand half-set and 
of EO's in the (former) right-hand half-set (where the P cards would no 
longer benefit from the effect). Perhaps this is why Hughes (1966) is 
reported by Wason (1968, p. 281) to have found that "the logically equi­
valent expression, 'Q if P', causes, if anything, even more difficulty", 
than the normal, 'if P then Q'.
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Now in fact, as I have suggested in passing, all these factors may play 
a part in producing the patterns of errors observed, but the important 
question, for my purposes, is about the extent to which the last is real 
and important, for it alone seems able to provide us with a clue to the 
origins of error in syllogistic reasoning. To answer this question, 
however, we appear to need a slightly different experimental set-up - for 
example, of the kind described in the next chapter and anticipated, to 
some extent, in the special features of the fifth series of trials, in 
the present experiment, described in the next section.
3.5 The fifth series of trials My consideration of this series will 
be brief because, as will shortly be apparent, there were serious diffi­
culties in drawing any conclusions about certain aspects of the subjects' 
responses, and these were eliminated in the experiment to be described in 
the next chapter.
The special features of this fifth trial have already been 
described, at the end of the previous chapter. Very briefly, what hap­
pened was that, after the subject had indicated, on the strip of paper 
bearing the diagrammatic cards, which cards he thought needed to be turned 
over, the experimenter produced a set of actual cards with the appropriate 
characters on their exposed sides. Subjects were then asked to turn over 
the cards they had marked and to say whether the statement was in fact 
true or false of that set of cards. If they thought it false, then they 
were to indicate, by drawing a ring round the appropriate tick on the 
paper strip, which card or cards made it false. Figure 3.1 shows the 
characters on the cards (characters on the hidden side in brackets) as 
well as the statements which accompanied the cards
FIGURE 3.1
STATEMENTS AND CHARACTERS ON THE CARDS IN THE FIFTH SERIES OF TRIALS
Ah statement: If a card has a heart on one side, it always has a cross
on the other.
Cards: C?(+), C(+), Ofa), 4(A), +(©), Q(o), A(4), 0(4)
Ad statement: Every card has a capital letter on one side or else a
club on the other.
Cards: e (4), A(0), t(<S>), m(§), 0(E), O ( t ), 4(a ), 0(M)
102
FIGURE 3.1 (CONTD.)
A statement: All the cards with a heart on one side have an even number
on the other.
Cards: 0(2), 0(4), 0(7), C?(8), 5(0), 5(0), 7(0), B(o)
E statement: No cards which have a spade on one side have a Greek
letter on the other.
Cards: $(/&), &(t), O(a), &(e), «*(0)t afe), tfe»,
F statement: Only cards with a vowel on one side have a diamond on the
other.
Gards: afc>), e(0), o(£>), zfc>), 0(a), 0(e), C?(o), <2>(z)
In subsequent references to the cards in these sets I shall 
regard them as numbered from 1 to 8 from left to right. Thus it will be 
apparent that card 6 makes the Ah statement false and card 5 the A state­
ment false. The other three statements are, of course, true.
The original, and rather simple, aim in including this task in 
the present experiment was to answer the natural question about how many 
subjects would actually come to the right conclusions about the truth- 
values of the five statement-types, given their choice of cards. It 
seemed that a number of interesting additional possibilities would also 
be touched upon at least - amongst these being the effect of having to 
deal with real cards as opposed to diagrams of cards, the success with 
which subjects could draw the appropriate inference upon discovering what 
was on the other side of a card, and so on. In his 1966 contribution 
Wason had said that subjects 'hardly ever' thought that a card with a con­
sonant on one side and an even number on the other falsified the Ah state­
ment: 'If a card has an even number on one side, it has a vowel on the
other'. I was particularly interested in the possibility of this kind of 
error because of its relationship to the confusion, to which I have fre­
quently referred, between the A and F type of statement. It will be seen 
from Figure 3*1 that a person who thought that 'All S is P' implies that 
all P is S might be expected to say that the A statement is false, not only 
because of card 5 but also because of card 2, while a subject who supposed 
that 'Only S is P' implies that all S is P might think that the F state­
ment is false because of cards 1, 3 and 7. In fact no one turned over 
card 2 in A and I had to wait for the later experiment to get an answer to
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the question whether this particular misunderstanding showed itself in 
this way, and whether there was a difference between the two groups in 
this respect. So far as the first of these questions is concerned, how­
ever, the same did not appear to be true of F - as we shall see in a 
moment.
So far as the answer to the original, simple question is con­
cerned, the average number of correct verdicts about the truth-values of 
the five types of statements in the fifth trial proved to be 3.3 and 2.6 
for the GR and PR groups respectively, a difference in the expected and, 
by now, familiar direction - and, of course, to some extent the product 
of the GR group's superiority in the matter of choosing cards to turn 
over. The difference is not a significant one and is anyway one on which 
it would be rather unwise to place any weight since eight of the correct 
verdicts reached by either group were based on inadequate or misunderstood 
evidence: in fifteen cases subjects concluded (rightly) that a state­
ment was true although they had not turned over all the cards which might 
have proved it false, and in one case the subject declared a statement to 
be false on the basis of a card which did not in fact make it false while 
ignoring another card which really did make it false.
Of more interest, clearly, are those cases in which subjects 
drew the wrong conclusion in the face of all the relevant evidence.
There were 13 and 22 such cases in the GR and PR groups respectively, dis­
tributed amongst the statement-types as shown in Table 3.15.
TABLE 3.15
FREQUENCY OF WRONG VERDICTS ON THE TRUTH-VALUES 
OF THE FIVE TYPES OF STATEMENT
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
GR group — 6 1 2 4
PR group 1 4 1 5 11
Total 1 10 2 7 15
Since the Ah and A statements were actually false, mistakes 
about these consisted in failing to recognise that the critical card in 
each case was an exception to the rule. In view of the small number of
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such cases it may seem enough to attribute the failure to inattention on 
the subject's part or to other chance factors. On the other hand, the 
critical cards are in each case in the right-hand half-set, with the 
result that the character first named is on the reverse side, and this 
prompted the question whether something similar to the 'directional' 
effect discussed by Wason (1969) might not have been operating. The two 
effects would not be quite the same, of course, for the one referred to 
by Wason is at the level of thought and is intended to explain why sub­
jects fail to realise that there might be a P on the back of a Q card (to 
use a shorthand based on Wason's designations), whereas I am looking for 
an explanation for something much more like a perceptual failure on the 
part of the small number of subjects who failed to recognise a PQ case 
when the P was on the reverse side. As we shall see, there is some fur­
ther evidence of a casual kind in support of this possibility in connexion 
with mistakes made with the Ad statement. Experimental evidence could 
obviously be obtained by asking subjects to detect exceptions to a rule 
when these exceptions are presented in the normal and 'reverse' position, 
and although it was not regarded as an important part of the purpose of 
the experiment to be described in the next chapter, some additional evid­
ence of a rather more substantial kind on this point will be presented 
there.
Since the Ad, E and F statements of the fifth series were true, 
mistakes here consisted of wrongly supposing that one or more cards were 
exceptions to the rule stated. Table 3.16 shows, for each statement-type, 
which cards were viewed in this way and by how many subjects.
TABLE 3.16
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WRONGLY REGARDING CERTAIN CARDS AS FALSIFYING Ad, E
AND F STATEMENTS
S t a t e m e n t T y p e
A E F
Card Nos. 2 5 6
00 5 7 8 1 2 3 7
GR group 4 1 - 2 - - 1 2 1 - 1
PR group 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 7 1 7 4
Total 6 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 9 2 7 5
The F case is the clearest. Cards 1, 3 and 7, as we have seen,
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are all of a kind which would falsify the A counterpart of the F state­
ment in question, and it seems reasonable to conclude that subjects who 
thought these cards were exceptions to the rule contained in the F state­
ment suppose that 'Only S is P1 implies that all S is P. The difference 
in the frequency with which this misunderstanding occurred in the two 
groups is in the expected direction but is not, of course, significant as 
it stands, and is anyway to be attributed partly to the fact that fewer 
GR subjects turned over these cards and fewer were therefore faced with 
the question whether they were exceptions to the rule. The experimental 
set-up employed in the later experiment eliminated this source of uncert­
ainty too - although a conclusion could be drawn only in the A case, as 
we shall see.
Most of the mistakes in the Ad case can also be attributed to a 
single confusion, though this time one which was unexpected. Cards 2, 5> 
6 and 8 all bear one, but only one, of the named characters. It seems, 
therefore, that subjects who said that these cards proved the statement 
false must have been either misreading it or else misconstruing it as a 
universal affirmative. I find it hard to take the second alternative 
seriously since it involves one in the assumption that these subjects can 
not distinguish a universal-disjunctive from a universal affirmative, and 
this is a mistake which may occur at an early stage of development (Watts, 
1944) but is surely rather unlikely to occur in adults of very superior 
ability. The other possibility which suggests itself - that subjects 
misread the statement - requires us to assume that they mistook the state­
ment, 'Every card has a capital letter on one side or a club on the other' 
for the statement, 'Every card which has a capital letter on one side has 
a club on the other' (the form of the universal affirmative favoured by 
Wason in his 1969 paper). Of the two alternatives this seems to me to be 
the more plausible, especially on the reasonable assumption that subjects 
were by this stage beginning to be tired and perhaps less attentive them 
at earlier stages of the experiment.
A more alarming possibility, of course, is that Ad statements 
were consistently misread (or misconstrued) by these subjects as universal 
affirmatives. I tried to check this by noting the extent to which the 
responses of the eight subjects in question were the same for Ad and A 
types of statement over the five trials. The agreement scores (max. =20)
1 For the method of calculating these scores see above p. 83.
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for Ad and A ranged from 3 to 15 with an average of 9.9, as compared with 
a range of 9 to 20 and an average of 16.4 for the Ah and A agreement 
scores for the same small group. In seven of the eight cases the extent 
to which these subjects treated Ad and A statements as if they were equi­
valent (as measured by the agreement scores) was less than the extent to 
which they treated Ah and A statements as if they were equivalent - as, of 
course, these are - the remaining subject having a score of 9 in both 
cases. The difference between the scores on the two pairs of statements 
is, then, highly significant (p = .008, Sign Test, two-tailed) and although 
of course it is not possible to say with any confidence that the misread­
ing (or misconstruction) of the Ad statement as an A statement occurred 
only in the fifth trial, it does seem legitimate to conclude that the con­
fusion was not a frequent one.
One final comment about these mistakes on Ad concerns the fact,
revealed in Table 3*16, that card 2 (in the left-hand half-set) was recog­
nised as an exception to Ad, misread as A, as often as the other three 
cards (in the right-hand half-set) taken together. As card 2 was turned 
only 7 times by the subjects in this group, while the others were turned 
altogether twice as often (4, 6 and 4 times, respectively) this may per­
haps be taken as additional, casual (and, of course, inconclusive) grounds 
for considering further the possibility that some kind of directional 
effect makes it relatively more difficult for subjects to recognise cards 
as exceptions to a rule if the first named character is on the reverse 
side.
It is much more difficult to find a single explanation for the 
majority of mistakes on E than it has seemed to be in F and Ad. Inspect­
ion of the cards erroneously supposed to falsify the E statement suggests 
no more general possibility than that some subjects confused spades with
clubs: this would account for the three cases in which card 8 was chosen.
No explanation other than inattention suggests itself for the remaining 
four cases.
Lastly, in this section, a brief word should, perhaps, be said
about the apparent effect on subjects of having to deal with actual cards
as opposed to diagrams of cards. The most important observable way in
which any effect might be expected to show itself is in changes in sub­
jects’ views about which cards they ought to have turned. If the effect 
had been a major one, for example, subjects might have shown a dramatic
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change from failure to success, realising, when confronted with the prob­
lem in ’real’ terms, exactly which cards they ought to have turned over.
In fact, of course, Wason's 1966 paper made such an outcome extremely 
unlikely. On the other hand, some subjects did change their minds about 
the cards needing to be turned over at some point after the actual cards 
were produced, and I allowed them to turn over additional cards and record 
the fact of having done so by writing a tick with a plus in front of it 
under the appropriate card diagram. These were not, of course, taken 
into account in the comparisons between groups made in previous sections 
of this chapter but they do provide a partial indication of the extent to 
which the problem changed its character when subjects were faced with real 
cards.
The facts are as follows. Five subjects from each group turned
over at least one additional card in one statement-type; three GR sub­
jects and two PR subjects turned over at least one additional card in two 
statement-types; the remaining twenty-seven subjects made no change in 
their original choices. The number of subjects from both groups turning 
over additional cards in the five statement-types was 3» 2, 6, 3 and 6 for 
Ah, Ad, A, E and F respectively. Of the 16 and 23 additional cards turn­
ed by GR and PR subjects respectively 11 and 15 were in fact cards which 
ought to have been turned over. If we can exclude the possibility that
these changes are due simply to a ’second thought', the above figures sug­
gest some small degree of improvement in performance when actual cards are 
used. In the experiment to be described in the chapter which now follows 
subjects worked with real cards in all trials.
3.6 Review of the main points The points of central interest that 
have been established in the foregoing sections have, of course, related 
to the differences between the two groups. Stripped of any element of 
interpretation these were: (l) that PR subjects were significantly
poorer at selecting the cards which needed to be turned over in A and F 
statements; (2) that PR subjects made significantly more mistakes in 
the right-hand half-set of Ahand the left-hand half-set of F; (3) that 
PR subjects made significantly more errors of omission in the left-hand 
half-set of F; (4) that PR subjects made significantly more 'matching 
responses’ in the four types of statement other than E.
Even at this level these results are not without their problem­
atic aspects. In particular it must be regarded as something of a myst­
ery that the significant differences noted above with respect to the A 
type of statement have only one, rather dubious, counterpart in the case 
of Ah, despite the fact that the two statement-types are not only logic­
ally, but also, in terms of the similarity of the response made to them 
by both groups of subjects, psychologically equivalent. But the assumpt­
ion has been that the differences under (l) can be interpreted as meaning 
that PR subjects understand A and F statements (but not Ah, Ad or E state­
ments) less well than their GR counterparts. We have seen reason to 
doubt whether success on the card-turning task can be taken to indicate 
understanding of statements when comparisons are made within groups and 
between statements (see also a later paragraph of the present section); 
fortunately, however, the assumption crucial to this research, that diff­
erences between groups within statement-types may be taken to indicate 
differences in the extent to which statements are understood by the members 
of the groups, appears to stand.
Granted, then, that the differences noted under (l) above mean
that PR subjects on the whole understand A and F statements less well than
GR subjects, it is natural to go on to ask what kind of misunderstanding
is involved. Partly following Wilkins (1928) the hypothesis was that it
would consist in assuming that A statements imply their converses and that
F statements do the same - that is to say, that they state a reciprocal
the
and not simply a one-way relationship between/classes represented by their 
terms. The differences under (2) above might be interpreted as supporting 
this hypothesis. Unfortunately, the two groups did not differ significant­
ly in the extent to which they made the kind of errors in the two half-sets 
which one would expect on the basis of the hypothesis in question. On 
the contrary, the difference noted under (3) suggests a rather more radical 
conclusion in the case of F, namely, that PR subjects tend, to a greater 
extent than GR subjects, to read 'Only S is P' as 'All S is P'. More 
disturbing, scrutiny of the general pattern of responses suggested that 
the difference under (2) might be explained in terms of a greater tendency 
on the part of the PR group to make matching and half-matching responses. 
(See the difference under (4) above.) It seemed clear that we need some 
other way of deciding whether the difference in the adequacy with which 
the two groups respond to A and F types of statement is to be interpreted 
in the way described at the beginning of this paragraph. In section 3.5 
we have seen one way in which this might be achieved, and in the chapter 
which follows this will be used in the aase of A statements to establish 
the point beyond further doubt.
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Some of the analyses of the present chapter have made it poss­
ible to draw conclusions about the nature of the experimental task which 
have a significance and interest quite apart from their bearing on the 
particular concern of this part of this thesis. It would perhaps be 
appropriate to conclude this chapter with a summary of the two most im­
portant of these.
The first has already been touched upon in passing. It is 
that success in the card-turning task with different statement-types does 
not appear to reflec^n any straightforward fashion the relative diffi­
culty subjects have in understanding the types of statement in question. 
The relative ease with which my subjects coped with the universal negative 
and the fact, discovered by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1969)9 that a state­
ment of the form, ’Everything is either not-X or else Y 1 produces fewer 
mistakes, on the present task, than the (logically) equivalent hypothet­
ical, ’If a thing is X, then it is also Y’, represent the chief grounds 
for this conclusion. We seem forced to conclude that success as between 
statement-types is to a considerable extent due to the special features 
of the task. It is difficult to be certain what these special features 
are, but four which suggest themselves are as follows: (l) the extent
to which success depends on turning cards with named characters; (2) 
the extent to which the treatment given to the two half-sets in a correct 
selection is the same; (3) the extent to which the form of statement 
encourages the view that it is a statement only about the class of cards 
with the character first named; and (4) the extent to which the form 
of the statement alerts subjects to the difficulties of the task. The 
first two of these factors may explain why my subjects found the E type 
of statement easiest to deal with, the last two why Wason and Johnson- 
Laird’ s subjects made fewer mistakes on the negative-disjunctive than on 
the affirmative-hypothetical form of the universal. In any case it does 
seem of some importance to try to devise experimental arrangements in 
which the operation of these different factors can be studied.
The other point of general importance is that, within certain 
very broad limits, the distribution of responses (and hence the location 
of errors and the incidence of errors of the two types) amongst undergrad­
uates appears to be highly predictable. Wason has developed a number of 
hypotheses to account for the persistence of certain erroneous types of 
response, especially the very common errors of omission in the right-hand 
half-set of Ah and A. I have suggested that his latest hypothesis (1969)
according to which this type of error is due to a failure to recognise 
the 'reversible’ nature of the relationship implied by the expression 
'on the other side of the card', may have a counterpart at the perceptual 
level, my best evidence for this being due to be presented in the chapter 
which follows. 3o far as the general similarity of response between 
the undergraduates is concerned, I should expect further light to be shed 
on this if the task were presented to much younger subjects - say from 
the age of seven years upwards. It would be of particular interest to 
see if the distribution of the most popular responses varied very much 
over so wide a developmental span
CHAPTER FOUR
THE 'FOUR TYPES OF STATEMENT' EXPERIMENT
Summary All but one of the subjects in the experiment described in 
the previous chapter returned twelve to eighteen months later to take 
part in a modified version of the card-turning task. The purpose to be 
served by this subsequent experimental session was to provide answers to 
the following questions. (l) How stable are the responses of subjects 
in the card-turning task over a relatively long interval? (2) In the 
special circumstances of the later experiment what evidence is there of 
learning over a number of trials? (3) Are the differences between the 
groups which were significant in the earlier experiment still significant 
a year or more later? (4) If they are, is there also evidence of a 
fairly conclusive kind that some of these differences are to be attributed 
to a tendency for PR subjects to interpret the universal affirmative as 
if it implied the truth of its ccnverse more often than GR subjects?
(5) Is there any further evidence to support the view that exceptions to 
a rule are less easily recognised as such when they occur in the right 
hand half-set of Ah and A arrays? (6) With all the necessary evidence 
at their disposal how often do members of the two groups reach the correct 
conclusion about the truth-value of a statement?* (7) If the class to 
which the subject-term of a statement refers is empty, do subjects say 
that the statement is true, false or neither, and is there any difference 
between the groups in this respect? The answers to these questions serve 
to confirm the conclusions of the previous chapter, not only so far as the 
general superiority of the GR group in this area is concerned, but also 
with reference to more specific points. In the concluding section of the 
chapter some of the wider implications of the findings reported are con­
sidered.
4.1 Introduction Frequent references were made at the end of the pre­
vious chapter to a later experiment involving the same subjects in which 
an attempt was made to carry the investigation of the differences between 
the GR and PR groups one stage further. As the title of this chapter 
will make clear, I refer to the modified form of the card-turning task 
used in this second experiment as the 'four types of statement task' to 
distinguish it from the 'five types of statement task' described in the 
previous chapter. The number of statements involved has, in fact, no­
thing essential to do with the nature of the task; it simply provides us 
with a convenient label for the two tasks - which I shall refer to, for 
short, as the '5TS' and '4TS' tasks respectively.
The original intention in this later experiment was, of course,
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to focus attention on the two types of statement, A and F, on which signi­
ficant differences between the groups had appeared, in particular with a 
view to establishing whether or not these differences were to be understood 
in terms of the •important' mistaken assumption that A and F statements 
imply the truth of their converses rather than being attributed to some 
'unimportant' feature or features of the experimental task. The intent­
ion had been to use two other types of statement (Ah and Ad) as practice 
materials - these being chosen in preference to ,the fifth type of state­
ment used in the 5TS task, E, because of the doubts we have seen there to 
be about the extent to which the difficulties of this type of statement 
are adequately reflected in the card-turning task. Preliminary trials 
with the 4TS test material made it clear that only one of the two main 
types of statement could be dealt with within the hour at the experiment­
er's disposal. Accordingly, F appears only in truncated form.
I have already mentioned one main purpose of the 4TS experiment: 
to establish whether the differences between the experimental groups in 
their success with the card-turning task as it relates to the A type of 
statement should be interpreted as reflecting a difference in the extent 
to which GR and PR subjects suppose that an A statement implies the truth 
of its converse. Other purposes were as follows: (l) to confirm the
existence of differences between the groups in the adequacy with which 
they select cards for the A and F types of statement; (2) to throw light 
on the extent to which the responses of my subjects were stable over the 
period of twelve to eighteen months which elapsed between the 5TS and 4TS 
experiments; (j>) to provide additional evidence on the question whether 
it is more difficult to recognise cards as exceptions to a rule when the 
first named character is on the reverse side (above, p. 104); (4) to
study the extent to which the members ,of :,the two groups could learn to 
select the appropriate cards given information about the adequacy of pre­
vious selections; (5) to discover how subjects would handle the special 
case where there are no cards with the character first named (in the A 
type of statement).
It will be apparent that only the first two of the purposes de­
scribed above are such as to provide us with the efemlnls^of failure in a 
syllogistic reasoning task such as Section B of the Valentine test. The 
others relate to more general aspects of the card-turning task or of the 
reasoning processes of the subjects, but in widening the scope of the in­
vestigation in this way we are, I think, at the same time strengthening
the interpretative basis on which our conclusions rest. How the various 
purposes are to be served in the 4TS task will become apparent in later 
sections when the details of the materials and procedure are presented.
4.2 The subjects Of the 44 subjects involved in the 5TS experiment 43 
were able to return for the later task. The exception has already been 
referred to (p. 71 ); in the results presented below the number of pairs
is, consequently, 21. The elapse of time between the two sessions varied
from 12 to 18 months depending on the availability of subjects - some of 
whom were studying abroad when the others first began to report at my room 
for the second session. Needless to say, there was no systematic differ­
ence between the groups in this respect. In all cases memory for the 
events of the earlier session appeared to be extremely poor and, in any 
case, as I explained in the previous chapter, subjects were not told at 
any point in the 5T3 task what the correct solutions were.
4.3 The 4TS materials For the 4TS task I prepared sets of actual cards
and simplified the arrangements which obtained in the 5TS task (a) by
using cards with a white side and a coloured side and (b) by using only
letters and numbers for characters, there always being a letter on the 
coloured side of a card and a (single-digit) number on the white side. 
Subjects were faced, then, with an ’ array of eight cards, the four on the 
left showing their white sides, the four on the right their coloured sides. 
The cards were held upright in transparent pockets on the back and towards
the bottom of which the symbol on the reverse side of the card was written.
Subjects could therefore discover what was on the back of a card simply
by lifting it a small way out of its pocket, where it could be held by
tilting it to one side. (See Figure 4*1.)
FIGURE 4.1
SAMPLE ARRAY OF CARDS AS USED IN THE 4TS TASK
This substitute for turning the card over was primarily a time-saving
device, but it did mean (a) that a check could readily be kept on the 
cards the subject had 'turned over' and (b) that once a card had been 
'turned over' the subject could see the characters on both of its sides 
at the same time.
For .reasons briefly indicated earlier (Section 4.1) fifteen 
sets of cards were prepared, two for Ah and Ad types of statement, nine 
for A and two for F. The function of the first four sets was originally 
intended to be to ensure that the nature of the task and of the materials 
was clear. The long series of nine was to have been the first of two, of 
which the two F sets were all that could be retained of the second in view 
of the unexpectedly long time some subjects took to complete the various 
tasks.
The special purpose of the long series was to see what would 
happen when a subject was told that he had made a wrong choice of cards to 
turn over and/or that he was mistaken in his conclusion about the truth- 
value of the statement relating to a particular set of cards. The series 
was carefully arranged to expose the subject to a variety of contingencies# 
some of them designed to prompt him, some of them to test the firmness of 
his understanding of the principles involved in the correct selection.
It proved impossible to estimate in advance, even after a series of pre­
liminary trials, how many sets of cards would be necessary in order to 
ensure that all subjects would eventually learn to make the correct select­
ion: indeed since a large number never did learn to do this, this is
something to which I still do not know the answer. At the other extreme, 
some subjects made the correct selection at the first attempt, and these 
had to be encouraged to complete the whole series of nine, at first by the 
promise,and subsequently by the reality, of more interesting cases towards 
the end of the series.
The fifteen sets of cards, together with the accompanying state­
ments, are set out in Figure 4.2. I have followed Wason's practice of 
enclosing the character which appeared on the reverse of a card in brack­
ets. Other features which call for explanation are the lower case 'x's 
and exclamation marks which appear>below some of the cards. The first 
of these symbols indicates cards which are inconsistent with the truth of 
the accompanying statement; the second marks those cards which might be 
supposed to be’ inconsistent with the statement by a subject who supposes 
that the truth of the statement implies the truth of its converse.
FIGURE 4.2
THE SETS OF CARDS AND ACCOMPANYING STATEMENTS USED IN THE 4TS TASK
Ah(a
Ah(b
Ad(a
Ad(b
A(a
A(b
A(c
A(d
A(e
A(f
A(g
A(h
A(i
F(a
F(b
7(K) 6(X) 2(Z) 7(P) M(7) Q(7) x (8) R(4)
x I x x x !
If a card has a 7 on one side it has an X on the other.
4(M) 4(Y) 3(S) 4(T) Y(4) X(8) M(2) R(4)
X X  X
If a card has a 4 on one side it has a Y on the ;other.
8(A) 2(B) 7(C) 4(B) B(2) B(8) A(8) B(3)
x* *
Every card has either an 8 on one side or else a B on the other.
8(K) 2(K) 4(K) 2(K) K(4) K(7) M(2) k (2)
*
Every card has either a 2 on one side or else a K on the other. 
2(T) 3(Q) 2(T) 4(K) T(2) T(2) S(4) T(2)
All the cards with a 2 on one side have a T on the other.
4(S) 4(S) 3(T) 1(L) S(4) E(3) S(2) M(7)
f
All the cards with a 4 on one side have an S on the other.
7(P) S(p) 9(S) 8(P) A(3) P(8) K(2) P(8)
I
All the cards with an 8 on one side have a P on the other.
3(x) 2(E) 1(S) 3(x) x(3) x(3) z(3) T(4)
X
All the cards with a 3 on one side have an X on the other.
2(B) 0(f ) 0(B) 0(F) F(3) C(4) L(2) F(o )
x !
All the ca.rds with a 0 on one side have an F on the other.
3 (M) 4 W  2(p) 4(k ) K(7) mC7) K(7) K(6)
! x !
All the cards with a 7 on one side have a K on the other.
5(E) 4(E) 4(E) 4(M) S(4) T(6) b (6) a (6)
X X X
All the cards with a 6 on one side have an E on the other.
3(A) 7(B) 1(C) 8(C) E(4) K(2) L(2) S(l)
All the cards with a 5 on one side have an M on the other.
3(V) 4(E) 7(V) 8(S) V(9) V(8) V(9) V(8)
! I I f
• • • •
All the cards with a 9 on one side have a V on the other.
2(T) 3(Q) 2(T) 4(K) T(2) T(2) S(4) T(2)
Only cards with a 2 on one side have a T on the other.
7(w) 7(W) 5(E) 3(L) W(7) X(2) W(6) P(4)
X
Only cards with a 7 on one side have a W on the other.
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Needless to say, the statements accompanying sets of cards some 
of which have an’x' below them are false, all others being true. I have 
mentioned on a previous occasion the ambiguity of the universal-disjunct­
ive (Ad); those subjects who interpreted it in the exclusive sense would 
regard the cards asterisked as inconsistent with the truth of the accom­
panying statements.
It is perhaps necessary to say a little about the ways in which 
the above array of cards were expected to serve the purposes outlined sat 
the beginning of this chapter. Attention has already been drawn to what 
is perhaps the most important of these - the inclusion of the cards marked 
in Figure 4.2 by exclamation marks to test the hypothesis that the failure 
of PR subjects to deal as successfully as GR subjects with A statements is 
to be attributed to a greater tendency on their parts to assume that state­
ments of this type imply the truth of their converses. It will be noted 
that cards of this kind were also included in one of the sets relating to 
the other form of the universal affirmative, Ah.
The series of nine A sets of cards can be broken into two sub­
groups, the first five and the remaining four. In the former group the 
problem is presented in an entirely straightforward form: succeeding
sets help to draw the attention of the subject to the important features 
of the situation as opposed to testing the strength of his understanding, 
whereas the emphasis is in the opposite direction in the final four trials. 
A subject who is guilty of the confusion mentioned in the previous para­
graph, for example, is likely to come to the wrong conclusion about the 
truth-value of the A(b) statement - and ought to learn from being told 
that his conclusion is wrong. Similarly, a person who fails to make the 
correct response so far as the right hand half-set is concerned is liable 
to find himself forced to revise his view about the truth-value of A(d) in 
the light of the seventh card of that set.
In the first of the sub-group of four, on the other hand, a sub­
ject whose understanding of the principles governing a correct selection 
is weak may find it impossible to restrict his choice to the single relev­
ant card, there being no cards with the first named character on the sides 
of the cards facing him. In the following set there are no cards with 
either of the named characters on their exposed sides, and to succeed here 
the subject has to turn over all the cards in the right hand half-set - 
although, of course, these are all of the type which has been shown to
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present most difficulty. When these cards are turned, as, of course, 
they eventually are by all subjects, it is clear that there are cards 
with the first named character in the set (so that the statement about 
the set is false).
In the following sdt the subject sooner or later discovers that 
there are no cards with the character first named: the subject term of
the statement refers to a class of objects which is empty. This condit­
ion was included, not only because it appears to be a natural extension 
of the process which we have seen developing in earlier sets but also 
because it touches on a division of opinion among logicians as to the 
proper interpretation of the universal affirmative. Given my general 
interest in the way my subjects understand this, and other, types of state­
ment, it seemed natural to ask the question whether the members of one 
group or the other favoured one of the two possible interpretations. 
Orthodox modem logic requires that we interpret the universal affirmative 
as a hypothetical to the effect that if there are any objects of a certain 
kind then they all possess such and such a property. Such a statement is 
true if there are no objects of the kind in question. Opposed to this 
interpretation (adopted by Quine (1952) for example) is the view of 
Strawson (1952) according to whom a person who makes a statement of the 
universal affirmative variety is understood to imply - in some sense of 
the word - that the class referred to in the subject term is not empty.
If this proves not to be the case, one of the informal 'rules1 governing 
the use of the statement has been broken and we should say, not that the 
statement is true but that it is neither true nor false.
As I have been implying, I thought it would be of some interest 
to discover which of these views my subjects favoured, and, more partic­
ularly, whether there was a difference between the groups in this respect. 
Finally, in the series of nine A statements, subjects were faced with a 
case in which none of the cards in the left hand half-set bore the char­
acter first named on their exposed sides while all of the cards in the 
right hand half-set showed the character second named. This situation 
is related to the one I have just discussed in the respect that a subject 
who takes the Quine view of the universal affirmative should say that he 
can tell that the last statement is true without turning any cards over, 
for there is no card which could count as an exception. A subject who 
takes a Strawson view of the situation, on the other hand, should say that 
all the cards in the right hand half-set must be turned so that he can
establish whether the precondition of truth - that the subject class 
should have members - is fulfilled. In fact it is and there remains 
only the question whether, given the characters on the two sides of the 
various cards, the statement is in fact true. To anyone with a clear 
grasp of the situation this is scarcely a question at all, for, as I have 
remarked, it is clear from the outset that none of the cards can be ex­
ceptions to the rule. Nevertheless, several subjects reached the wrong 
conclusion about this last statement because they regarded the cards 
marked with an exclamation mark in Figure 4.2 as exceptions. In other 
words, they supposed that ’All X’s are Y's1 implies that all Y's are X's: 
the confusion to which we have repeatedly returned in the course of this 
thesis asserts itself to the end.
4.4 Procedure Subjects were tested individually in my room. They 
were first of all reminded, in an informal way, of the terms of the 
problem and then introduced to the changes in materials and arrangements. 
As we have seen, these included the use of actual cards instead of dia­
grams, the simplification and clarification of the cards themselves - 
every card having a white side, with a letter, and a coloured side, with 
a number - and the method of turning the cards over. Subjects were then 
given a booklet to work from, the first page of which is reproduced, 
somewhat reduced, in Figure 4.3.
FIGURE 4.3 
SAMPLE PAGE FROM 4TS BOOKLET (REDUCED)
In this set (a) if a card has a 
7 on one side it has an X on the 
other. True or false?
Cards to turn over: 
true
Statement
false
Critical card(s):
7 6 2 7 M Q X p
—
7 6 2 7 M Q X p
ALL CARDS TURNED OVER 
true 
false
Cri tical card(s):
Statement —
7 6 2 7 M Q X P
Cards to turn over: 7 6 2 7 M Q X P
(final view)
The more detailed instructions which follow were then read to 
the subject, every effort being made to ensure that all important points 
were grasped.
Instructions At the top of each page of this booklet you will find 
a statement about the set of cards which is displayed in the stand in 
front of you. As on the previous occasion, your task is to say which of 
these cards you need to turn over in order to establish whether the state­
ment is true or false. You are to indicate your choice of cards by 
putting crosses in the corresponding places on the page opposite the words 
'Cards to turn over1.
After you have done this, you are to turn over the 
cards you have crossed. (Here followed a reminder about the way in which 
cards were to be ’turned’.) When you have done this, you should be in a 
position to say whether the statement is true or false. You are to in­
dicate which by placing a cross in the appropriate box opposite 'Statement 
true/false'.
If the statement is false, this must be because at 
least one of the cards you have turned over is 'out of line', runs counter 
to the rule. These are the 'critical cards' and once again you are to 
mark them with a cross in the appropriate place(s).
Next you are to turn over any cards which you have not 
so far turned over. The point of this is to ensure that all subjects are 
in possession of the same information at this point and that all are ex­
posed to the same 'prompts' and 'trips'. You are then to say whether the 
new cards you are exposed to change your mind about the truth or falsity 
of the statement. Once again, place a tick in the appropriate box.
If you have changed to 'False', then you will have 
'critical cards' for the first time in that set and these should be indic­
ated in the appropriate way, by putting crosses in the relevant;//boxes* 
opposite the second 'critical card(s)'. Even if you do not change your 
mind at this stage,,if your view was that the statement was false, you may 
find that there are some critical cards which you had not suspected. You 
should indicate these, as well as the others, in the boxes opposite the 
second 'critical card(s)'.
If you do not change your mind either about the truth 
or falsity of the statement or about the cards which are critical, you 
will have crosses in the same boxes in the fourth and fifth lines as you 
had in the previous two.
Finally, you may in the course of all this have 
changed your view as to the cards which need to be turned over in order to 
prove the statement true or false. If you have changed your view, then 
you have a chance to indicate this in the last line on the page. If 
there is no change in your choice of cards, then, of course, you will 
place crosses in the same boxes in the last line as you did in the first.
When you have done this, I shall tell you whether the 
statement really is true or not, and also whether your choice of cards is 
the correct one or not. If I say it is not correct, this may mean a 
variety of things - that you have turned over cards you need not have 
turned, that you have not turned some cards you should have turned or, of 
course, both. I shall not tell you which of these alternative possibil­
ities obtains in your case.
The whole situation is supposed to be one in which 
subjects who make the wrong choice to begin with learn to make the correct 
choice. Now, of course, you may get it right to begin with - and in this 
case you are asked to be patient and careful not to make accidental errors. 
If, on the other hand, you get it wrong, there can be no guarantee that 
you will discover the correct solution even in the long series of nine; 
on the contrary, a large proportion of students do not get it right by the 
end of the series.
We begin with two sets of cards for each of two types 
of statement. The function of these sets is to ensure that the proced­
ure is clear. If you have any doubts on this score, please do not hesit­
ate to say so. Then there is the long series of nine sets of cards all 
involving a third type of statement, and, finally, a further two sets of 
cards relating to a fourth type of statement. Between the long series 
and the final two sets of cards I shall ask you to complete Form B of the 
personality questionnaire of which you did Form A last time. This will 
give you a break after the long series.
You will not be timed. Any questions?
In the event subjects had difficulty with only two aspects of 
the procedure as outlined above: they had to be reminded that there were
critical cards only if the statement was false (or believed to be); and 
they had to be reminded to repeat their earlier responses in cases where 
no change in their views occurred after all the cards were turned over. 
Since neither of these affects the validity of responses to the Ah and Ad 
statement-types, and since any warming-up effects that there were would 
be the same for members of the two groups (no inter-statement comparisons 
being made) I have treated performances on these first two statement-types 
as comparable in validity with responses to the A and F series.
So far as these latter are concerned, it is important to note 
that all subjects who had not discovered the correct choice of cards by 
the end of the long series were told what this was, emphasis being laid 
on the point that that other selections would generally be called for in 
the case of other statement-types. ^ince all subjects did all the sets 
of cards in the same order, performance on the F statement-type might be 
supposed to be affected by ’transfer' of a positive or negative kind: 
negative if subjects made the same choice of cards as they had discovered 
- or had been told - was correct in the case of A statements, positive 
if their understanding of the nature of the task had been increased by one 
or other of these means. To some extent it was hoped that any such 
effect would be reduced by the fact that all subjects completed Form B of 
the Eysenck Personality Inventory between the ninth set of A and the first 
set of F, the completed questionnaire also being scored and the results
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discussed. (This aspect of the present research is the subject of a 
section of the following chapter.) In any case, it seemed unrealistic 
to suppose - and events bore this out - that it would be possible to take 
subjects through this extended 'learning procedure1 and not be faced with 
the demand, at least from some subjects who failed to discover the correct 
solution, that I explain what was wrong with the solution they had offered. 
It seemed unwise to risk finding myself faced with a choice between losing 
my subject's cooperation and introducing ad hoc what would clearly be an 
important difference between subjects.
4.5 Results: (a) Stability of response from 5TS to 4TS In its simpl­
est terms the question to be answered in this section is whether subjects 
responded to the various statement-types in substantially the same way in 
the two experimental sessions, occurring, as they did, with an elapse of 
twelve to eighteen months between them. The question is of interest 
quite generally as shedding light on an aspect of the card-turning task, 
but also more specifically as indicating the extent to which the behav­
ioural patterns, and the mediating responses which are assumed to lie 
behind them, represent real or continuing differences between the members 
of the two groups.
In view of the changes in the selection of cards which are likely 
to have been produced by the 'learning' component of the 4TS task, it 
seems clear that any attempt to estimate stability of response must con­
sider only the first selection of cards for each of the four statement- 
types in the 4TS task. We can compare this selection with the selection 
made either in the first or in the fifth trial of the 5TS task, depending 
on whether we are interested in the extent to which the first reaction to 
the statement-types was the same on both occasions or in the extent to 
which changes occurred in the interval between the last trial of the 5TS, 
and the first trial of the 4TS, task. Finally, inasmuch; as our interest 
is in the stability of the responses over a relatively long period of time, 
it is clearly important to compare the changes from 5TS to 4TS with the 
degree of change occurring within the earlier task itself (in the course 
of which, as we have seen, no information was given to the subject about 
the correctness or otherwise of his responses).
A measure of correlation is, of course, what we need. Unfort­
unately, however, I have been unable to find any which will cope with the 
kind of data in question. The difficulty arises from the fact that, as
we saw in discussing the 5TS task, there are important qualitative differ­
ences in response to the card-turning task which it is impossible to 
represent unequivocally in numerical terms. There are four types of card, 
each of which may be treated appropriately or otherwise in relation to one 
particular type of statement, and while it is plausible to maintain, as I 
have done, that a subject who treats all four types correctly has respond­
ed more adequately than a subject who succeeds with only three - and so 
on through the cases where two, one and none of the types of cards receive 
the correct treatment - in a scoring system which awards 4, 2, 1 and 0
points respectively in these five cases, only the first and last of these 
scores are unambiguous in the sense that it is possible to say that a sub­
ject who has the same score on different occasions has made the same 
response on each: a subject might in principle make a different response
on each of five trials and still score two points on each.
In the absence of a more appropriate measure of correlation, 
then, I simply counted the number of changes made by each subject in his 
response to each of the four types of statement occurring in the 4TS task 
- from 5T3 trial 1 to 5TS trial 5» from 5T3 trial 1 to 4T3 trial 1, and 
from 5TS trial 5 to 4TS trial 1. The results are presented in a variety 
of ways in Tables 4.1 to 4.4. A 'change’ in these tables is a change in 
a subject's treatment of one of the four types of card involved in any 
statement-type - from turning all the cards of that type to leaving them 
all unturned, or vice versa, or from either of these 'complete' responses 
to an 'incomplete' response (in which, it will be recalled, some cards of 
a type are turned and some are not) or, again, vice versa. The maximum 
possible number of changes in any one statement-type from one trial to 
another is, of course, four.
Table 4.1 shows that for both groups the amount of change from 
the last trial of 5TS to the first trial of 4TS is very similar to the 
amount of change from the first to the last trial of the earlier experi­
ment. As between the first trials of the two experiments the amount of 
change is somewhat greater. Whether this is to be regarded as a large 
or small amount of change is not entirely clear. In theory, subjects 
might have made as many as sixteen changes from any one trial to any other 
and this might seem to suggest that the actual number of changes made is 
small. On the other hand, as we saw in the previous chapter, certain com­
ponents of the response to a particular statement-type are almost universal 
(turning over cards with the character first named in Ah and A statements,
TABLE 4.1
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND RANGES OF ’CHANGE' SCORES FROM 5T3(l) - 
5TS(5), 5TS(1) - 4TS(1) AND 5TS(5) - 4TS(l): ALL FOUR STATEMENT-TYPES
From 5TS(1) From 5TS(1) From 5TS(5)
to 5TS(5) to 4TS(1) to 4TS(l)
Mean 3.7 5.5 4.0
S.D. 2.4 2.9 3.1
Range 0 - 1 0 1 - 12 0 - 1 3
Mean 3.9 5.0 3.8
S.D. 2.7 2.4 1.7
Range 0 - 1 0 1 - 9 0 - 6
GR
group
PR
group
for example) and little change is to be expected in such cases. At the 
same time, as Table 4*1 makes clear, some subjects did make a large number 
of changes from one trial to another and more information about the incid­
ence of changes of different dimensions in different statement-types is 
presented in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS MAKING DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF CHANGES FROM 5TS(l) - 
5TS(5), 5TS(1) - 4TS(1) AND 5TS(5) - 4TS(l) IN DIFFERENT STATEMENTS
No. of
5TS(1) - 5TS(5) 5TS(1) - 4TS(1) 5TS(5) - 4TS(1)
changes Ah Ad A F Ah Ad A F Ah Ad A F
0 9 15 9 7 8 12 4 4 9 15 7 7
1 8 - 8 5 5 - 12 3 10 - 8 6
GR 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 8 - 3 4 2
group 3 1 - - 4 4 1 2 4 2 1 2 6
4 - 2 - 1 - 4 - 2 - 2 - -
Total no. changes 17 16 16 29 25 27 24 30 16 17 22 28
Ave. over group .8 .8 .8 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.9 .8 .8 1 .0 1.3
Average overall .92 1..36 .98
0 12 11 10 6 8 8 9 1 12 10 13 6
1 5 2 4 5 9 3 7 8 5 1 5 7
PR 2 4 7 5 8 3 5 2 8 4 6 2 3
group 3 - - 2 1 1 2 3 4 - 2 1 5
4 - 1 1 - 3 - - - 2 - -
Total no. changes 13 20 20 28 18 31 20 36 13 27 12 28
Ave. over group .6 1.0 1.0 1.3 .9 1.5 1.0 1.7 .6 1.3 .6 1.3
Average overall .96 1.25 .95
Table 4.2 enables one to see, not only how often the larger 
numbers of changes within statement-types occurred, but also, of course,
whether changes were more likely to occur in one statement-type rather
than another and whether the two groups differed in this respect. So far
as the last of these questions is concerned, the differences in 'change
scores' between the two groups were not significant at the 5 per cent
level on the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, whether the scores on the four 
taken
statement-types were/separately or together. As to the other points, 
the largest number of changes occurred in connexion with the F type of 
statement for all three comparisons and for both groups. This is perhaps 
to be expected in view of the striking diversity of response to this state­
ment-type noted in the previous chapter and again with reference to Table
4.5 below. And finally, in connexion with Table 4.2, it was clearly rare 
for a subject to make changes in his treatment of all four types of cards, 
somewhat less rare for him to change his treatment of three of the four 
types - though the comparison between the first and last trials of the 5TS 
experiment provides something of an exception in this respect - and in­
creasingly common to change his treatment of two, one and none - though 
there is, once again, an apparent exception to this rule in the PR group's 
performance on the first 4TS trial as compared with its performance on the 
first trial of the previous experiment.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the amount of change from the first 
to last trials in the 5TS experiment and from the last trial of 5TS to the 
first of 4TS is smaller than from the first of 5TS to the first of 4TS.
A question naturally arises about the extent to which the changes from 
5TS(l) to 5TS(5) and from 5TS(5) to 4TS(l) can be supposed to have been 
changes in a single direction - and, in particular, about the extent to 
which they represent a progressive improvement in subjects' responses to 
the various statement-types from 5TS(l) to 4TS(l). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
are intended to provide an answer to this question.
Table 4.3 presents the numbers of subjects who made the appro­
priate response to each of the four types of card in each of the four 
statement-types on the three trials presently under consideration.
Clearly, these numbers should increase from/^lrial to the next if a gradual 
improvement did occur. I have asterisked the cases in which the opposite 
occurred. There are, in fact, only two such cases out of the twenty- 
eight in which a change in rate of success occurred for the GR group; 
the corresponding figures for the PR group are six out of twenty-six. On 
the whole these results are fairly strong evidence for the view that there 
was a steady improvement in the performance of subjects over the three
TABLE 4.3
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS GIVING THE APPROPRIATE TREATMENT TO THE FOUR 
TYPES OF CARDS OVER THE THREE TRIALS, 5TS(l), 5TS(5) AND 4TS(1)
Type of Card:
5TS(1) 
5TS(5) 
4TS(l)
GR
group
S t a ■t e m e n :t T y p e
Ah Ad A F
p P Q Q P P Q Q p P Q Q P P Q Q
16 17 9 3 12 15 11 15 19 19 8 5 7 11 12 11
19 20 13 6 16 17 16 16 19 20 15 7 9 16 16 17
21 20 13 10 18 20 18 20 21 20 12* 12 15 14* 19 18
17 18 9 2 11 11 10 9 15 17 9 2 3 5 13 16
19 19 9 4 13 13 14 13 20 19 8* 2 5 16 15 11*
21 19 7* 1* 18 16 18 18 20 19 7* 3 7 16 13* 15
5TS(1)
PR 5TS(5) 
group 4TS(1)
* Asterisks denote trials on which a lower rate of success is 
achieved on that trial than in the preceding one.
trials. Hardly surprisingly, improvement is on the whole less obvious 
from the last trial of 5TS to the first of 4TS than from the first to the 
last of the former.
The same point about the overall tendency towards an improved 
performance over the three trials can be made by reference to the fact 
that on all 16 components the GR group was more successful on the first 
trial of the later experiment than on the first trial of the earlier one, 
the corresponding figure for the PR group being 11 out of 16, with one 
component in which the group's performance on the later was the same as 
on the earlier one. One other aspect of the data presented in Table 4*3 
is that the GR group made advances, over the three trials, at just those 
points where one would expect an advance, viz., where their original per­
formance was poorest. No such tendency is apparent in the case of the PR 
group.
Table 4.4 attempts to clarify the extent to which change over 
the three trials represented improvement. It will be clear from this 
Table that change was more likely to represent net improvement (a) in the 
case of GR subjects and (b) when the first and last trials of the earlier
1 For typographical convenience in this table I have used Wason's symbols 
to designate the four types of cards: 'P' for cards with the character
first named, 'P' for the other cards in the left hand half-set, 'Q' for 
cards with the character named second, and 'Q' for the other cards in the 
right hand half-set.
TABLE 4.4
PROPORTION OF CHANGES OVER THE THREE TRIALS REPRESENTING NET IMPROVEMENT
5TS(1)- 
GR 5TS(5)
group 5TS(5)_ 
4TS(1)
5TS(1)-
PR 5TS(5)
group 5TS(5)_
Ah
Statement
Ad
Type
A F
.76 .75 .63 .58
00• .64 .18 .28
• 00 .60 .30 .35
-0.23* .62 .00 .144TS(1)
*The minus sign represents net deterioration
experiment are compared - the second of these results, as already noted, 
being just what one would expect, given that the interval between these 
trials was a relatively short one and filled with practice (albeit without 
knowledge of results) of the task in hand. One other point from Table.4.4 
is that the proportion of change representing improvement is considerable, 
for the PR group, only in the case of the universal-disjunctive (Ad) type 
of statement.
Finally, in connexion with the stability of response to the 
card-turning task over the period of 12 to 18 months, it seemed useful to 
present data bearing on the extent to which the same types of response to 
the various types of statement were preferred in the three trials, and 
this is done in Table 4.5. This table may be compared with Table 3*12 
above where the preferences of my groups in the 5TS task are compared with 
the preferences of Wason’s various groups. The classification of respons­
es proceeds on the same principle - the extent to which each of the four 
types of cards in turn is treated in the appropriate way or not, so that 
a '++++' response is one in which all four types are given the appropriate 
treatment, a '+++-* response is one in which the fourth type (Q) is given 
the wrong treatment, and so on.
This approach to the question of stability of response is, of 
course, rather different, at least in principle, from the one adopted at 
the beginning of this section, since it relates to the extent to which
TABLE 4.5
FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESPONSE IN 5TS(l), 5TS(5) AND 4TS(l)
S t a t e m e n t T y P e s
A h A d A F
5TS 5TS 4TS 5TS 5TS 4TS 5TS 5TS 4TS 5TS 5TS 4TS
(1) (5) (1) (1) (5) (1) (1) (5) (1) (1) (5) (1)
++++ 2 3 7 11 16 17 1 6 7 3 6 12
+++- 7 9 6 7 8 5
++-+ 1 3 2 3 1 4 1
+-++ 1 1
2 5
++—  5 4 5 7 4 4 2 1
+ ~ +  1 1 1 
GR — h - 3 3 5
group +-+- 1
-+-+ 4 3 1
- + + -  1 1 3  1 1
+  1 1 1
- + —  2 1 1  2 1
— h-
 + 1 1
PR
--- 3 1 5 4 1 1 4 1
++++ 3 7 9 5 1 1 3 4
+++— 9 6 7 1 6 6 6
++-+ 1 1 1 1 1 1
+-++ 2 2
-+++ 2 4
++— 6 8 12 7 11 11 1 2
+— + 1 1 1
— ++ 8 3 2
+-+- 2 4 1 1
-+-+ 1 2 4 1 2 1 2
-++- 2 2 6 2
+-- 1 1 1 1 1 1
-+— 2 1 1 2 .1 2 1
— +- 1 1 1 1 1
-- + 1 1 3 1 2
--- 1 1 7 3 2 2
the responses of the group as a whole were the same, and not to the extent 
to which individuals tended to make the same response: in principle, at
least, a given type of response might be made equally often by the group 
as a whole on subsequent trials without any one member of the group ever 
making it on successive occasions. In this respect the information pre­
sented in Table 4.5 is of less immediate relevance to the question of the 
reliability of the card-turning task as an index of the subjects' grasp of 
the meaning of the various statement-types than the information presented 
in earlier tables of this section; at the same time, it does provide
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evidence relating to the more general question whether , in this type of 
task, the same responses are favoured by the same group on different occas­
ions as we have seen, in the previous chapter, they tend to be when the 
responses of different groups are considered. Inspection of the table 
suggests the following comments.
In general, the responses preferred in 4TS(l) are the same as
1
the ones preferred in the 5TS trials, matching responses in all four
1
types of statement and half-matching responses in Ah, A and F statements 
being particularly favoured. Apparent exceptions are the absence of all­
minus responses in Ad for the GR group, the increased incidence of all- 
correct responses in F for the same group, and an increase in the number 
of -H—  responses in Ah for the PR group. The first two exceptions are 
probably best seen as reflecting the general improvement in adequacy of 
response which we have noted in the case of the GR group over the three 
trials. It is less plausible to attribute the third exception to the 
same source: what it does appear to reflect is a reduction in the number
of different types of response considered appropriate in the Ah case by 
the PR group - though I suppose this might be said to be in itself evidence 
of improvement of a rather general kind. Meanwhile, the great diversity 
of response to the F type of statement noted in connexion with Table 3*12 
is continued in 4TS(l), although perhaps somewhat reduced in the case of 
the PR group.
In summary of this section, then, the responses of both groups 
to the four types of statement included in the later experiment are gener­
ally rather similar to the responses made on the previous occasion, there 
being, however, fairly clear evidence, particularly in the case of the GR 
group, of a slight improvement in response, from the one experiment to the 
other.
4.6 Results: (b) Evidence of learning over subsequent trials
Having seen that the responses of the two groups were relatively stable 
from 5TS(5) to 4TS(l) we might expect that the differences between the 
two groups reported in relation to the 5TS experiment would be confirmed 
in the results of the later one. However, all selections of cards in the 
4TS experiment after the first were liable to be affected by the subject’s 
experiences in turning over all the cards in the set, and all selections
1 These terms were introduced in the previous chapter: a matching
response is one in which the subject turns over only the cards with named 
characters, a half-matching response one in which he turns only cards with 
the character first named.
after the second by the knowledge of the correctness or otherwise of his 
choice. It seems appropriate at this point, therefore, to present evid­
ence about the extent to which learning seems to have occurred as a result 
of these particular features of the 4TS task. Figure 4.4 shows, in 
graphical form, the way in which the scores of the two groups changed over 
the four selections of Ah, Ad and F, and the first ten or twelve selections 
of A, the scores for the two half-sets in each statement-type being pre­
sented separately.
Three points call for comment in this connexion: the kind of
scoring system employed, the presentation of only 10 or 12 selections in 
the case of A, and the reduction of N to 20 in the case of F. So far as 
the first of these is concerned, the method of scoring employed throughout 
the discussion of the 4TS experiment is the third of those described in 
the previous chapter - where a subject gains a point for each type of card 
(and not, as in the fourth method, for each particular card) correctly 
dealt with. On this scoring system a person is as heavily penalised for 
an incomplete response as for a complete, but erroneous, one, and it is to 
be preferred to the fourth system, therefore, only if the number of sub­
jects making incomplete responses for reasons irrelevant to an evaluation 
of their performance on this task is small. Such reasons would include 
perceptual failures and failures due to lapses of attention. By their 
nature such failures could be supposed to occur only infrequently in any 
one subject's performance - so that we may state the conditions in which 
the third method of assessment is the appropriate one as those in which 
only a small number of subjects make infrequent incomplete responses. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, these conditions did not hold in the 5TS 
experiment; in the later experiment, on the other hand, as Table 4.6 
will make clem, this was no longer the caseJ
TABLE 4-6
SUBJECTS MAKING DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF 'INCOMPLETE' RESPONSES IN 4TS
Number of Incomplete Responses 
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 
GR group 1 8 2 - 1  - - -  - -  - -  -
PR group 1 2 3 - 2 - - - 2 - 1  - 1
1 Inspection of the results presented in Table 4.6 suggests a difference
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As to the second point, it may be recalled that both categories
of card appeared in the left-hand half-set only in the first five sets of
six.
A cards and in the right-hand half-set only in the first/ Hence the ab­
sence, in Figure 4.4, of scores for selections beyond the tenth and twelfth 
respectively, there being, of course, in every case two selections per set 
of cards, one at the beginning and one at the end of the relevant trial. 
Finally, one PR subject found the 4TS task as a whole so distasteful (no 
doubt because of her complete lack of success) that she could not be pre­
vailed upon to proceed beyond the first two selections of F. I have 
therefore been obliged to leave her, and her GR counterpart's, performance 
out of account in the case of F - though her poor performance and her 
counterpart's success make it certain that such differences as exist be­
tween the two groups will be reduced by this procedure.
Wason (1968, 1969) has already shown that one kind of error made 
in response to the universal affirmative (whether in hypothetical or cat­
egorical form) is rather resistant to various 'therapeutic' measures 
intended to remove it. Since this error is also a very important one in 
the responses of my own subjects (it consists, essentially, in failing to 
see the relevance of Q cards - cards in the right hand half-set which do 
not have the character named second) and since the 'therapy' represented 
by the procedure adopted in the 4TS experiment is minimal in character 
(disclosing the truth-value of the statement and the correctness or other­
wise of the subject's selection) little evidence of learning might be ex­
pected.
So far as the Ah, Ad and F types of statement are concerned, it 
seems from Figure 4.4 that such learning as took place occurred in the PR 
group's treatment of the right hand half-set of F, in the GR group's treat­
ment of the left hand half-set of the same statement-type, and less cert­
ainly, in the same group's treatment of the other half-set of this statement 
type. In view of the very limited opportunity which subjects had to make
changes in their responses to these statement-types the most one can con­
clude is that the mistakes subjects were making were not of the kind which 
they could correct as soon as they were told that they were making a mis­
take. As for the F case, the fact that improvements do seem to have been
between the groups in the extent to which they were likely to make incom­
plete responses. However, a dichotomous division of the groups into those 
who did and those who did not make such responses gives aOC (corrected for 
continuity) of 2.93, which is not significant at the 5 per cent level.
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FIGURE 4.4-
GROUP SCORES IN SUCCESSIVE SELECTIONS IN THE FOUR TYPES OF STATEMENT 
(HALF-SET SCORES PRESENTED SEPARATELY; MAXIM: F = 40, OTHERS = 42)
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made here must presumably be explained, not in terms of any special char­
acteristics of this statement-type, but in terms of its position in the 
experiment as a whole. To be specific, the learning which seems to have 
occurred over the successive trials of the A type of statement may be sup­
posed to have produced an improvement in subjects’ ability to cope with 
problems of this type in general, a 'learning set', as it has been called, 
(Harlow, 1949) which facilitates the acquisition of adequate responses to 
subsequent problems of the same general kind.
In the case of the universal affirmative in its categorical form 
(a ) there is once again little evidence of learning over the first four 
trials. This is hardly surprising so far as the left hand half-set is 
concerned, for neither group has much room for improvement. In the right- 
hand half-set the PR group shows a momentary improvement after the second 
selection which may presumably be attributed to the experimenter's comments 
on the adequacy of the subjects' responses so far. The same effect seems 
to be apparent after the fourth selection (at the end of the second trial). 
The gradual improvement in the PR group's performance on this half-set 
shows only one other spurt - between the first and second selections of 
cards in the fourth trial, where the first false statement, and the first 
critical card of this statement-type, is encountered. The gain is not 
consolidated, however.
The progress of the GR group in dealing with this half-set is 
also gradual - with the notable exception of the steep rise in score after 
the fourth selection, when, of course, subjects would be responding to the 
experimenter's second verdict on the adequacy of the solutions offered, 
Since, as we have seen, this comment consisted solely of a remark to the 
effect that the subject's selection of cards was right or wrong (and that 
the statement was true), it is necessary to assume, I think, that GR sub­
jects had rapidly come to identify the probable locus of any errors they 
were making. Occasionally, a subject made this achievement explicit by 
asking the question (not, of course, answered), "Does 'All the X cards are 
Y cards' mean that all the Y cards are X cards?"
The gradualness of the improvement which we have seen to be
represented, on the whole, in the curves of Figure 4.4 suggests that such 
learning as took place was of the trial-and-error variety (Thorndike, 1911). 
Subjects had been asked not to adopt the mechanical exploration of all 
possible selections of cards but to make changes in their selections only
when they thought they could see why a different selection might be the
correct one. It seemed clear from the observation of the behaviour of 
individual subjects that a conscientious attempt was made to obey this 
instruction. At the same time, it seems likely that an uncertain amount 
of trial and error did take place - uncertain because of the difficulty, 
even for subjects themselves, of knowing in exactly what circumstances 
subjects could claim to ’see’ why a change was justified. In a few cases, 
by contrast, something which could only be called 'insight* did seem to 
occur: the subject remarked, usually with an expression of relief and
pleasure that he or she could now see what had been wrong with previous 
selections - and proceed to demonstrate this by making the correct response 
even in the later trials in the series where an adequate grasp of principle 
seemed to be a precondition of success. (On the importance of this aspect 
of problem-solving behaviour which deserves to be called 'insightful' see 
Woodworth and Schlosberg, 1954.) But finally, the curves of Figure 4.4 
not only fail to reflect the differences between individuals who achieved 
a secure grasp of the principle underlying an adequate solution and those 
whose progress was more gradual and less certain, but also the difference 
between subjects of either of these categories and those who made no pro­
gress at all, and who revealed, not only by their continuing failure to 
make the appropriate changes in their selections but also by their remarks, 
that they had absolutely no idea how their responses should be changed to 
make them more satisfactory.
It may be of some interest to report, at this point, on one kind 
of failure to profit from the experiences provided by the 4TS task. It 
will be recalled that subjects were asked to say, when they had turned 
over all the cards in a set, which of them were 'critical' - which were 
incompatible with the truth of the relevant statement. They were then 
asked, in thp light of this, to say which cards they ought to have turned 
over in order to establish the truth-value of the statement. A rather 
primitive type of response is to say only those cards which were actually 
critical - leaving out of account other cards belonging to the same cate­
gory: for example, saying cards 5 and 6 in Ah(a) but not card 8, or card
8 in the following set but not cards 6 and 7. Such a response is primit­
ive, I think, because the subject apparently fails to realise that what 
was in fact true of the cards he has marked might also have been true of 
any other cards of the same type. A failure of this type appears to be 
a failure to think in hypothetical terms, and, as such, a failure to think 
at the level of what Piaget (1950) calls 'formal operations'. (Wason has 
made a similar point in his 1968 paper.)
But if the failure just described is a primitive one, what is
one to say of subjects who do not even draw the conclusion that cards
which are actually incompatible with the truth of the statement in question 
should have been turned? Taking all subjects and all statement-types 
together there were respectively 19 and 37 occasions on which members of 
the GR and PR groups marked at least one card as critical and then failed 
to conclude that it ought to have been turned over. There were eight 
false statements in all, so that the total number of occasions on which 
such a failure could have occurred is 168 for each group. It is most 
unlikely that purely perceptual failures would have played an important 
role in this connexion for the arrangement of the information on the page 
from which subjects were working would be likely, if anything, to encour­
age a mechanical endorsement of cards ticked as critical. 13 of the 19 
GR cases and 23 of the 37 PR cases occurred in the two Ah sets, both the
relevant statements being, of course, false. Since these were the first
two sets in the experiment, the failure under consideration may perhaps be 
attributed, in these cases, to the novelty of the situation - though it is 
not clear whether we should say that the failure is one which the subject 
learns very quickly to avoid, or whether it should be attributed to the 
non-specific factors in a problem-solving situation with which a 'warming- 
up1 period is designed to cope. In any case, 6 PR and 5 GR subjects made 
a mistake of this kind on at least one subsequent occasion. Given the 
very high level of ability of my subjects and the elementary nature of the 
mistake, even this relatively small incidence of failure must be regarded 
as somewhat surprising.
4.7 Results: (c) The relative success of the two groups Figure 4.4
leads us to expect significant differences between the groups in perform­
ance on xhe right hand half-sets of Ah and A and (less certainly) on the 
left hand half-set of F. There appears to be no significant difference 
between the groups on the remaining statement-type, Ad, the universal dis­
junctive. Since the curves of the two groups are more or less parallel in 
Ah, Ad and A, it appears to be in order to sum the scores on successive 
selections and base our conclusions about differences between the groups 
on these. In the case of the left-hand half-set of F, where the curves 
for the two groups diverge rather sharply from the parallel, such a pro­
cedure would be justified, for present purposes, only on the assumption 
that differences in the extent to which the two groups of subjects under­
stand the task is reflected in the speed with which they learn to make the 
correct selection of cards. This is not, in my view, an entirely improb­
able assumption; on the other hand, I suggested, in the previous section, 
that another factor, viz., the ability to benefit from previous learning 
experiences in the same kind of task, may be operative in the case of P 
and I have therefore tested the differences between the groups on P (both 
half-sets together and the lefthand half-set by itself) on separate select­
ions as well as on all four taken together. Table 4.7 presents the mean 
scores of the two groups per selection of cards, there having been, of 
course, two selections for every set of cards.
TABLE 4.7
MEAN SCORE PER SELECTION OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE FOUR TYPES OF STATEMENT
Ah Ad A
L.H. R.H. Both L.H. R.H. Both L.H. R.H. Both
GR group 39.8 23.8 63.5 39.6I 39.8 79.5 40.1 30.6 70.7
PR group 38.0 8.5 46.5 35.Ci 36.8 71.8 39.6 16.1 55.7
Difference 1.8 15.3 17.0 4.6i 3.0 7.7 0.5 14.5 15.0
N subjects 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Wilcoxon T 104.0 18.0 23.0 89.5i 164.0 91.0 91 .0 14.0 23.5
N ranks 21 21 20 21 21 21 20 21 20
P N.S. <.01 <.01 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. <.01 <.01
(2-tailed)
F F
(4 selections) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
L.H. R.H. Both L.H. Both L.H. Both L.H. Both L.H. Both
32.5 36.3 68.8 28.0 31.5 29.0 32.5 38.0 36.5 35.0 37.0
20.0 29.0 49.0 21.0 24.0 19.0 23.5 20.0 24.0 20.0 26.5
12.5 7.3 19.8 7.0 7.5 10.0 9.0 18.0 12.5 15.0 10.5
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 i20
37.0 47.0 34.0 70.5 45.5 56.5 48.5 20.5 21.0 32.5 37 .5
20 19 20 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 19
<.01 N.S. <.01 N.S. <.05 N.S. <.05 <.01 C .01 <.01 <.01
It will be clear from an inspection of the above Table that the 
differences between the groups which were found to be significant in the 
5TS experiment (on A and F as a whole, on the right hand half-set of Ah 
and A and on the left hand half-set of F) are also significant in the 4TS 
experiment, the level of significance being in every case higher in the 
later of the two. In addition to these the difference between the groups 
on Ah when the two half-rsets are takfen, together is highly significant in 
4TS whereas it failed to reach significance in 5TS. The later outcome is 
in fact the one which we should expect in view of the logical equivalence 
of Ah and A - and, as I have suggested in the previous chapter, the psycho­
logical equivalence of these statement-types as judged by the similarity
of response elicited by them. The fact that this difference between the 
groups failed to reach significant proportions in the earlier task must, 
therefore, be regarded as something of an anomaly. Finally, the results 
of the 5TS experiment are also confirmed in the case of the remaining 
statement-type, Ad, where the GR group once again did better than the PR 
group though not significantly so.
In making this summary of the results presented in Table 4.7 I 
have not thought it necessary to make a distinction between the outcome 
for F when all four selections are taken together and that obtained when 
they are considered individually. It is true that the difference between 
the groups on the left hand half-set alone is not significant when the 
first two selections are taken singly, but I think this may be attributed 
partly to a loss in the power of the Wilcoxon statistic when the range of 
possible scores is restricted, as it is in these cases, to three (0 - 2).
In any case, in view of the uncertain effect on subjects of doing the F 
task after the long series of trials on A a certain amount of caution 
seems to be justified in interpreting these results as running counter to 
those obtained in 5TS.
4.8 Results (d) Interpretation of the difference between the groups 
on A and Ah The results reported in the previous section are important 
in the respect that they confirm the general conclusions drawn from the 
5TS experiment. On the other hand, they do not enable us to answer the 
question, posed in the previous chapter, how these results should be ex­
plained. In particular, they do not enable us to decide whether the 
differences between the groups is to be attributed to a difference in the 
extent to which the two groups make matching or half-matching responses, or 
tend to regard statements of the types in question as referring solely to 
the class of cards referred to in the subject term of the statement, or, 
finally, misunderstand the statement in the sense that they interpret it 
as implying the truth of its converse. (See page 109 above.) In the 4TS 
experiment, however, evidence on this point is available, at least for the 
two forms of the universal affirmative. (Not, unfortunately, for the F 
type of statement because, in truncating the F series to make it possible 
to complete the 4TS task in the time at my disposal I failed to make pro­
vision for this aspect.)
If a person interprets a statement of the form ’All X's are Y's' 
as implying that all Y's are X's, or a statement of the form 'If anything
is an X it is a Y', then he will regard as inconsistent with such a state­
ment, not only X's which are not Y's hut also Y's which are not X's. In 
the first set of Ah, then, as previously pointed out, he will mark as 
critical, not only cards 1, 4, 5 and 6 but also cards 2 and 7. Similarly 
with all the cards in Figure 4.2 underneath which I have placed an exclam­
ation mark. In attempting to establish whether there existed any differ­
ence between the groups in respect of the tendency to make the illicit
statement
assumption that an A or Ah/implies the truth of its converse I found a 
'Converse Score' for each subject by counting the number of cards of the 
kind just referred to which that subject had marked as 'critical', award­
ing one half point in those rare cases where a card was marked as critical 
at one place in the relevant record sheet but not at the other. The 
results are presented in Table 4.8.
TABLE 4.8
TOTAL 'CONVERSE SCORES' OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE AH AND A TYPES OF 
STATEMENT (MAXIMA = 42 AND 231 RESPECTIVELY)
Statement Type
Ah A Both
GR group 13.0 19.5 52.5
PR group 27.0 68.0 95.0
Difference 14.0 48.5 62.5
Wilcoxon T 51 52 52
N Ranks 20 20 20
P
(two-tailed)
<•05 <.01 <.01
It seems possible to conclude that the PR subjects were on the 
whole significantly more likely to make the illicit assumption that an Ah 
or A statement implies the truth of its converse - whether we consider these 
hypothetical and categorical forms of the universal affirmative separately 
or together. (The fact that the p value is higher in the Ah case may 
be attributed perhaps - once again to the restriction of possible scores on 
this statement-type to the 0 - 2  range.) It is, I think, worth stressing 
the point that the interpretation to be put upon the differences between the 
groups in 'converse scores' seems to be certain in a sense that does not 
apply to other differences between them: a person who says that a Y
which is not an X is inconsistent with the statement that all X's are Y's 
can only (accidental errors apart) be interpreting this statement as im­
plying that all Y's are X's.
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It seems, therefore, that we can say with complete confidence 
that the difference between the groups in the adequacy of their selections 
of cards in the card-turning task is at least partly to be explained in 
terms of the different degrees to which they are guilty of this misunder­
standing. At the same time, it is not possible to say how much of the 
difference is to be explained in this way, and it is not, of course, poss­
ible to maintain that every PR subject is guilty of this misunderstanding 
or that no GR subject is. On both these last points some light is shed
by the incidence of this type of mistake in each group as recorded in 
Table 4.8; more interesting, perhaps, are the numbers of subjects in 
each group who made no ’converse' errors. These are presented in Table 
4.9.
TABLE 4.9
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH GROUP WHO MADE NO ’CONVERSE' ERRORS
Statement Type
Ah A Either
GR group 13 • 12 10
PR group 5 6 4
Table 4.9 confirms the superiority of the GR subject in this 
respect while serving to remind one, if reminding is necessary, that the 
misunderstanding underlying the converse error is not something which 
exclusively or exhaustively defines the failure of the PR subject in a 
deductive reasoning task.
It is, of course, to be regretted that no comparable evidence is 
available with respect to the F type of statement. We have already seen, 
from the fifth series in the 5TS experiment, that 'converse errors' were 
made by members of both groups in connexion with F. My own view is that 
they1*^likely to be made more often by PR subjects - mainly in view of the 
close logical and psychological relationship between this type of state­
ment and the universal affirmative - but we must, of course, wait for the 
results of further research for definitive evidence on the point.
4.9 Results: (e) The relative difficulty of detecting 'critical cards’
when the first named character is on the reverse side In the fifth 
series of the 5TS task one or two subjects failed to recognise the except­
ions to the rule in Ah and A sets of cards. In the light of this and
other evidence relating to the Ad type of statement it was suggested that 
there might be some kind of 'directional set' which makes it more diffi­
cult to recognise an exception .to a rule when it is in the right hand half 
set of an Ah or A statement and so has the character first named on the 
side of the card which is originally hidden from the subject. In the pre 
sent experiment the critical cards were distributed in the left and right 
hand half-sets as follows: Ah, 4 and 3, A, 1 and 5. Taking both groups
of subjects together the total number of critical cards missed in the two 
half-sets respectively were: Ah, 4 and 39; A, 0 and 25. In view of
the equivalence of these types of statement it seems in order to combine 
these frequencies - in which case the ratio of undetected critical cards
in left and right hand half-sets is 4 • 64, as compared with an expected
* 2
ratio of 5 : 8. This gives a a . value (corrected for continuity) of
30.1 which, with 1df, has a p <C .001.
Critical cards bearing the character first named on the side 
originally hidden from the subject do, then, seem to be very much less 
likely to be detected than critical cards with the character first named 
on the 'front' side. It seems possible to explain this phenomenon in 
terms of a directional set either at a conceptual level (of the kind we 
have seen Wason,1968, invokes) or, as I have suggested, at the perceptual 
level. The latter offers the more direct and simple explanation since it 
would postulate simply a failure to recognise a critical card presented in 
'reverse' order for reasons similar to those which account for failure to 
recognise familiar objects seen from unusual angles. On the 'conceptual' 
hypothesis, as I understand it, the subject's failure would be explained 
in terms of a preconception or misunderstanding to the effect that 'the 
other side' in the present situation means 'the side not at first exposed' 
Other explanations are no doubt possible, of which one obvious one might 
be that the subject's vigilance slackens as he moves from left to right 
in a set of cards. This explanation, if it were the correct one, would 
take most of the interest from the phenomenon. It would suggest that the 
different degrees of certainty with which critical cards in left and right 
hand half-sets are detected are simply fuiictions of the layout, and not of 
the 'originally-exposed-originally-hidden'^dimension. This hypothesis 
would be more difficult to put to an empirical test than might at first 
appear because, of course, the fundamental factor is the order in which 
the cards are inspected and this would not necessarily be reversed by a 
mere reversal of the spatial arrangement of the cards. One final point, 
in connexion with the exact conditions obtaining in the 4TS experiment, is
that the equivalence of front and reverse sides of the cards ought to have
been particularly hard to miss in a situation in which the characters on
both sides were simultaneously in view at the end of a trial.
4.10 Results: (f) Ultimate success or failure in the verification
task In the fifth series of the earlier experiment subjects were asked 
not only to indicate the cards they needed to turn over in order to est­
ablish the truth-value of the accompanying statement but also to turn over 
these cards and to say whether the statement was actually true or false.
It proved impossible to say anything very definite about the relative 
success of the two groups in this 'verification1 task because so many of 
them had less than all the information they needed in order to carry the 
task to a satisfactory conclusion - because, of course, their choice of 
cards had been faulty. In the 4TS experiment, however, this particular 
experimental defect was removed since, as we have seen, all subjects 
turned over all cards in the course of a trial and all had, therefore, all 
the infromation required. In this section I accordingly present data 
bearing on the question of success in the verification task. Table 4.10 
states the frequencies with which the truth-values of the four types of 
statement were correctly identified. Since the maximum possible frequency 
in each case is equal to the number of statements of that type included in 
4TS multiplied by the number of subjects involved (20 in F, 21 in the other- 
statement-types), this is 42 for Ah and Ad, 168 for A (omitting the debat­
able eighth case) and 40 for F.
TABLE 4.10
FREOUENCIiiiS WITH WHICH MEMBERS OF THE TWO GROUPS REACHED CORRECT 
VERDICTS ABOUT THE TRUTH-VALUES OF THE FOUR TYPES OF STATEMENT
Statement Type
Ah Ad A F
GR group 41 41 157 40
PR group 41 39 138 38
The differences are all in the expected direction (that is, they 
all favour the GR group) and the difference on A is significant on the 
Wilcoxon test with T = 41.5, N ranks = 21 and p (two-tailed) <C .01. In 
fact, of course, the outcome is largely a function of differences noted 
in previous sections and, in particular, of the significantly greater
tendency for PR subjects to suppose, for example, that a card with a 5 on 
one side and a P on the other is inconsistent with a statement to the 
effect that all cards with a 4 on one side have a P on the other. Of the 
30 erroneous conclusions drawn by PR subjects and the 11 drawn by GR sub­
jects 23 and 8, respectively, are attributable to this confusion. Of the 
remainder, 3 and 2, respectively, may be supposed to be due to a failure 
to recognise a critical card in the right hand half-set as an exception 
to the rule.
4.11 Results: (g) Views about the truth-value of an A statement where
the subject-class is empty. In the eighth set of A cards the statement 
ran as follows: ’All cards with a 5 on one side have an M on the other'.
There were, however, no cards in the set with a 5 on one side. In view 
of the controversy amongst logicians already referred to (see above, page 
117) it seemed of some interest to discover what subjects would say about 
the truth-value of such a statement. Two views, corresponding to the two 
logicians' camps seem admissible - that the statement is true (because 
there is no card which makes it false: the view is most plausible if the
universal affirmative is to^e
efSin°jlypothetical
terms, as the logicians 
who support it would generally maintain), or that the statement is neither 
true nor false (because it is neither confirmed nor refuted by the cards 
in the set). Subjects who take the third (and unacceptable) view that 
the statement is false may be confusing the truth-value of the statement 
with the truth-value of its apparent 'implication' (that there is at least 
one card with a 5 on one side) or they may simply be using the term 
'false' in a logically primitive way to indicate their belief that there 
is something wrong with the statement (meaning, perhaps, that it implies 
something which does not hold). Table 4.11 presents the frequencies with 
which the three views were taken, the 'Neither' category including a range 
of responses including all those in which the subject felt unable to opt for 
either of the other alternatives. If the 'True' and 'Neither' categories 
are summed, on the ground that either is defensible, a "A test (with a 
correction for continuity) gives a value of 4.01 which, with 1df, is signi­
ficant with p <(.05. In other words it seems that PR subjects were signi­
1 If this were an implication in the full sense of the word, then of 
course the falsity of the implication would entail the falsity of the 
statement, for if p implies q and q is false, then p is false too. How­
ever, it does not appear to be correct to regard the implication in quest- 
in this way. (On different senses of 'imply' see Strawson, 1952.) Perhaps 
it might be maintained that PR subjects are simply less able to distinguish 
the different senses in which one thing may be said to imply another!
ficantly more likely to opt for the view which is not defensible. In the 
absence of any clear link between this difference and the relative success 
with which the two groups of subjects tackled a deductive reasoning task, 
this last result must be taken simply as one further indication of the 
superiority of the GR group in this general area.
TABLE 4.11
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH VARIOUS VIEWS WERE TAKEN ABOUT THE TRUTH-VALUE
OF THE EIGHTH A STATEMENT
Truth-value
True False Neither
GR group 10 3 8
PR group 4 10 7
Finally, in this section, it may be of some interest to report 
on the extent to which subjects who said the eighth A statement was true 
made the appropriate response to the ninth set of cards (where it was 
apparent, without turning over any cards, that there were no exceptions to 
the rule and where, therefore, subjects who said the eighth statement was 
true should have said that the ninth could be seen to be true without 
turning any cards over). In fact none of the 4 PR subjects and only 5 of 
the 10 GR subjects who fell into the relevant category passed what I came 
to regard as the ultimate test of logical perspicacity.
4.12 Review and discussion The results of the 4TS experiment have 
served, in some cases to consolidate, in others to extend, the conclusions 
reached in the previous chapter. They have shown that the responses of 
subjects to the card-turning task are fairly stable over a period of 12 to 
18 months and (as a consequence) that differences between the groups which 
were significant in the earlier experiment were also significant (in every 
case at a higher level) in the later. One change in this respect was that 
the difference between the groups on the universal affirmative in hypothet­
ical form (Ah) when both half-sets are taken together reached significance 
in the 4*^ experiment, It was suggested, in view of the results for the 
other form of the universal affirmative (a ) and the apparent psychological, 
as well as logical, equivalence of the two types of statement, that the 
later result was likely to come closer to representing the true state of 
affairs.
The main advance over the 5TS experiment consisted in showing 
that there was a significant difference between the groups in the frequency 
with which the two groups made 'converse errors', i*e., errors which could 
have been due only to the assumption, on the part of the subjects concerned, 
that a universal affirmative implies the truth of its converse. No evid­
ence bearing on the corresponding assumption about the meaning of the F 
type of statement was available, though it was suggested that a similar 
difference between the groups was likely to exist in this respect.
In the 4TS experiment subjects were supplied with information 
about the correctness of their selections and exposed to a variety of 
combinations of cards, some of which might be expected to promote learning 
of the correct responses. No immediate improvement occurred in the case 
of the first three types of statement presented, viz., Ah, Ad and A, a 
fact which confirmed what Vason's researches have also demonstrated, that 
the errors made in the card-turning task are not easily recognised as such 
and corrected. In the long series of trials with the A type of statement 
a gradual improvement did eventually occur in the case of the PR group as 
a whole, and the GR group also improved rather gradually - except that, at 
one point, progress was unusually rapid. Large individual differences in 
learning were apparent within groups, perhaps the most interesting cases 
being those in which subjects appeared to achieve 'insight' into the source 
of their difficulties, realising explicitly that a universal affirmative 
does not imply the truth of its converse. Some fairly early improvement 
was apparent in the case of the remaining type of statement, F, but this 
was taken to be a function of its late position in the experimental series 
as a whole, and not of any intrinsic characteristics of the statement-type.
An aspect of performance on the card-turning task, as it relates 
to the universal affirmative (in either form), which was not referred to 
differences between the groups was the significantly greater frequency 
with which subjects failed to identify critical cards in the right hand 
half-set. The operation of a 'directional set', at perceptual or con­
ceptual level, was mentioned as a possible cause of this phenomenon, though 
at least one other, less interesting, possibility had to be admitted.
The GR group's 'ultimate success' in establishing the truth- 
values of the statements included in the 4TS task was greater than the PR 
group's, and significantly greater in the case of the A type of statement, 
although this latter result is to be explained largely in terms of the
greater proneness of PR subjects to the 'converse error'. One final 
difference between the groups, the relationship of which to performance 
on a syllogistic reasoning task is rather obscure, was in their willing­
ness to adopt an unacceptable view of the truth-value of an A statement 
when the class referred to in the subject term is empty: PR subjects
were significantly more likely to say that such a statement was false.
So far as the original purpose to be served by the experimental 
part of this research is concerned, undoubtedly the most important single 
discovery has been the greater tendency of PR subjects to misunderstand 
the universal affirmative in the sense of assuming that a statement of 
this type implies the truth of its converse. The prevalence of such a 
mistake amongst undergraduates in general has been referred to by previous 
writers including, as we have seen, Wilkins (1928) and Chapman and Chapman 
(1959). Such novelty as may be claimed for the present research consists 
in the establishment of such a mistake by means of a task of a kind relat­
ively far removed from the syllogistic reasoning in which it plays so 
important a role, and in establishing it as a fairly stable, and distingu­
ishing, characteristic of the thought-processes of a group of undergrad­
uates, selected for their superior ability and attainment, who were notably 
weaker on the two forms of the Valentine Reasoning Tests, Section B,than 
another group of undergraduates of comparable ability.
It is natural, if not exactly inevitable or even necessarily 
legitimate, to ask about a research finding what its practical signific­
ance is. In the present case it might be argued that even the rather 
informal kind of syllogistic reasoning to be found in Section B of the 
Valentine test plays a relatively minor role in our normal thinking and 
that discoveries about the source of errors in such thinking are accord­
ingly of little importance. Whether or not the premiss of this argument 
is true (personally, I do not believe that it is), the conclusion does 
not follow, for statements of the universal affirmative type clearly do 
play an important role in any thinking which attempts to use or to estab­
lish generalisations - whether or not in the context of deductive reason­
ing. Since higher level thinking is characteristically of this kind, we 
might expect to find embedded in its products occasional mistakes which 
may be attributed to the tendency, which we have seen to exist even among 
subjects of the highest intelligence, to assume that a universal affirm­
ative implies the truth of its converse. And in fact, in the space of 
a couple of weeks, when this possibility was in my mind, I came across
some instances which I now present.
Eysenck (1958> P* 239) suggests that the fallacy in question 
’underlies all projective techniques’. Just as it would he a mistake to 
infer that all those who buy Jaguar cars are sporting young men from the 
fact (if it were a fact) that all sporting young men buy Jaguar cars, so, 
Eysenck says, it has been the mistake of the supporters of the projective 
test as a way of measuring personality to infer, for example, that all 
persons who make use of colour in their interpretations of Rorschach ink­
blots are strongly emotional from the (alleged) fact that all strongly 
emotional persons make use of colour in their interpretations. Even if 
the premiss were true, the conclusion would not follow: 'there are many
other reasons which might cause a person to be particularly conscious of 
the colour of the blot, and which might lead to quite different views of 
the subject's personality if they were taken into account.' It is unnec­
essary, presumably, to insist on the importance of avoiding a fallacy 
which, if Eysenck is right, may lie at the basis of a vast body of psycho­
logical research and practice.
My second example is one in which the author is not so explicit 
in his identification of the fallacy. Commenting on the failure of at­
tempts to base items intended to test intelligince on developmental studies 
such as Gesell's Guilford (1967) remarks:
Perhaps it was the overemphasis upon the criterion of correlation of 
intelligence with age that was misleading, giving rise to the conclusion 
that any test that has a greater probability of being passed as age in­
creases is therefore a measure of intelligence. Human attributes other 
than intelligence also increase with age; hence the correlation of a 
test item with age is no sure criterion of its being a measure of mental 
ability. (p. 11)
Clearly the error of which Guilford is speaking is of assuming that all 
test items more frequently passed by older than by younger children are 
satisfactory measures of intelligence simply because all satisfactory 
measures of intelligence are items which are more frequently passed by 
older than by younger children (there being other human attributes which 
increase with age). The error is precisely the 'converse error' referred 
to above.
My third example is also from Guilford (1967) though in this 
case rather more interpretation is called for on my part. According to 
Guilford (ibid., p. 2) Galton (than whom few are likely to be more intell* 
igent) regarded tests of sensory capacity as satisfactory measures of
mental capacity partly because of the influence of the British empiricist 
school with its emphasis on the senses as the ’gateway of the mind’ and 
partly because of what he believed to be the very poor sensory functioning 
of idiots. It seems to be the implication of the empiricist position 
that intelligence depends on the adequacy of the gateway to one’s mind - 
so that only persons with sensory equipment of a high order can be persons 
of high intelligence. Similarly, the implication of the observation 
about idiots seems to be that their low intelligence is a product of their 
poor sensory functioning. In both cases the implication seems to be that 
good vision, hearing, etc., are a necessary condition of high intelligence 
(’all persons of high intelligence are persons with good vision, etc.'). 
Within the kind of limits suggested by the Helen Keller case, for example, 
this is a proposition to which we might still assent - at least if intell­
igence is taken to mean effective intelligence (Hebb's 'intelligence B').
On the other hand, Galton's use of tests of sensory acuity etc., could be 
regarded as an adequate means of measuring intelligence only if satisfact­
ory vision, etc., were also a sufficient condition of high intelligence 
(so that all persons with good vision, etc., were persons of high intell­
igence). To this converse of the earlier proposition we should be very
1
much less likely to assent, even with qualifications.
The foregoing examples seem to suggest that the fallacy of illic­
itly converting an A (or Ah) proposition may have been responsible for a 
great deal of wasted time and effort on the part of persons whose time and 
efforts are potentially of the greatest value. The practical importance 
of avoiding such errors appears to raise two further questions: first,
how is it that persons of the highest intelligence should be prone to this 
particular error; and secondly, what steps, if any, can be taken to pre-
1 It may be appropriate, in passing, to mention an instance from the 
history of psychology which relates, not to the universal affirmative but 
to the F type of statement, itself equivalent to the converse of an A pro­
position and also, as we have seen, liable to be illicitly 'converted'.
The quotation is from Woodworth and Sheehan (1965y p. 116):
"Titchener had admitted or rather insisted that only well-trained 
introspective observers could be trusted. But Watson pointed an accusing 
finger at the imageless thought controversy and other recent examples of 
divergent results obtained in different laboratories by presumably well- 
trained introspectionists."
It may be, of course, that Titchener also thought that all well-trained 
introspectionists were trustworthy - though the acrimony with which the 
debate within the structuralist camp was carried on makes one doubt it.
In any case, to his position as stated by Woodworth and Sheehan Watson's 
objection is clearly irrelevant: either Watson or the authors represent­
ing him seem to assume that 'Only X's are Y's' implies the truth of its 
converse.
vent or to remedy this state of affairs?
Two approaches to the first of these questions appear to be 
possible, at least in principle: (a) one might attempt to identify the
characteristics of this type of statement, or the characteristics of human 
thought in general - or, of course, both - which make the mistake in quest­
ion an easy one to commit; or (b) one might study subjects of high in­
telligence who show themselves prone to this mistake (in experimental 
conditions, of course) in the hope of discovering what it is about their 
particular capacities and habits of thought that renders them especially 
'at risk' so far as this particular fallacy is concerned.
The latter of these approaches must assume, obviously enough, 
that there is some identifiable quality of the fallacy-prone which disting­
uishes them from the others; the former would presumably account for 
individual differences in this respect in terms of factors which are either 
random or, for other reasons and for all practical purposes, unidentifi­
able. Certainly it is difficult to know where to begin to look for the 
crucial factors in individual cases: there is no apparent connexion, for
example, between this particular failing and emotional preoccupations of 
the kind that Freudians have adduced to account for other cognitive dis­
abilities; and although (small) gaps in one's education might appear to 
hold out more promise as a causative factor, the fact that hardly anyone 
who does not take a course in logic is taught the relevant lesson formally 
makes it seem unlikely that the operative differences in educational 
experiences could ever be discovered.
As regards the characteristics of the A type of statement which 
might make it particularly easy to 'convert' A statements illicitly 
Chapman and Chapman (1959) suggest, as we saw, that their subjects had 
encountered deductive reasoning mainly in the context of mathematics where, 
they say, the converse of a true universal affirmative is generally, as a 
matter of fact or definition, also true. Consequently, in the abstract 
kind of syllogistic reasoning task the Chapmans' subjects were asked to 
complete, it was rather natural to assume that the converse of an A pro­
position was also true.
The difficulty is that we want an explanation which will account 
for this assumption in contexts where the thinker is unlikely to regard 
his activity as falling within the sphere of 'deductive reasoning' - at
least of the kind involved in mathematics. It certainly cannot be argued 
that the converse of any universal affirmative is usually true: When I
asked a class of 41 undergraduates to write down on a slip of paper two A 
statements which they believed to be certainly true, they produced, in all, 
61 different statements meeting this condition. Of only 5 of these could 
it be said with certainty that their converses were also true - one or two 
others being doubtful in this respect.
In an earlier chapter we saw that Woodworth (1935) attributed 
this fallacy to the fact that an A proposition is more 'like* its converse 
than it is like any other proposition. If this were the correct explan­
ation, subjects who are prone to the fallacy would be people who fail to 
make the necessary discrimination between 'All S is P' and 'All P is S'. 
Naturally, a question then arises as to why some highly intelligent people 
fail to make the discrimination: the explanation does not carry us very
far forward, though it does, at least, suggest a relevant piece of research, 
into the question whether people who fail to make this discrimination also 
fail to make others of a more or less similar kind.
One learns to make discriminations. If an explanation in these 
terms were correct, then one might hope to correct a proneness to the 
fallacy by suitable training. The same would not be so obviously true 
if the correct explanation proved to be a 'Gestaltist' alternative of the 
kind mentioned in my original discussion of the Woodworth position. On 
this view, the crucial factor might be a search for symmetry, an A propos­
ition being asymmetrical in the sense that it states a one-way relationship 
between the classes of objects represented by its terms. To assume that 
the converse of the proposition is also true is to assume that the relat­
ionship is two-way and in that sense symmetrical (in logical terms, is a 
relation of equivalence rather than implication). We are again left with 
the question as to why the 'commitment' to symmetry should be stronger in 
some individuals than in others of comparable ability. It would likewise 
be open to the researcher to try to find some support for the hypothesis 
by establishing some more or less general commitment of this kind amongst 
the individuals concerned. The difference, as already noted, would be in 
the prospects of prevention or cure by training.
It would certainly be the assumption of teachers of logic and 
writers of books intended to help people to think more clearly (e.g., 
Thouless, 1945> Stebbing, 1959, and, more recently, Ruby, 1969) that it
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is possible to eliminate, or at least reduce, susceptibility to the 
'converse error' - and others - by means of appropriate instruction.
(On this point see also Peel, 1967, p. 187.) It is true that Elton 
(1965) found no significant improvement in performance on the Valentine 
test, Section B, which could be attributed to attendance at an introductory 
course in logic between two attempts at the test but it is open to one to 
suspect that the rather diffuse lessons generally to be learnt on such a 
course might fail to have an effect when a concentrated effort to instil 
such limited points as the invalidity of 'converting' an A proposition 
would succeed.
The uncomfortable truth is that rather little research has been 
done into ways in which relatively specific logical acquisitions of this 
kind are made. Nor do we know, for example, what conditions of education 
- formal and informal - are conducive to the development of sensitivity 
to the relevant kind of logical mistake. Although the extensive, and 
highly ingenious, studies of logical reasoning by Piaget and other workers 
at Geneva (Piaget, 1950, Inhelder and Piaget, 1958 and 1964, for example) 
might be expected to contribute enormously to our understanding in this 
respect, there is little evidence in their writings of a concern with 
either inter- or intra-individual differences - or, therefore, with their 
causes. (On the shortcomings of the Geneva work in this respect see 
Hunt, 1961, p. 257 and pp. 297 f. and Flavell, 1963, p. 440.)
More that is relevant to the specific points at issue in this 
thesis is, perhaps, to be expected from the work of Bruner and his col­
leagues at Harvard (Bruner, Olver, et al., 1966). Bruner describes the 
the development of his own interests from 'studies of individual differ­
ences in cognitive operations' (cp. his classic book with Goodnow and 
Austin, 1956), through a study of 'intervention and change in cognitive 
functioning' to his present concern with the main lines of cognitive 
growth. In this he admits a debt to Inhelder and Piaget and, to date, 
many of the papers published by this group bear a strong resemblance, in 
points of focus, to those which have appeared from Geneva. At the same 
time, there is some evidence that the Harvard researchers may owe some­
thing to the development of Bruner's own research interests, as well as to 
the traditional American concern with individual differences and the 
application of psychology to education, in their greater interest in the 
environment end of the organism-environment interaction which both groups 
regard as/^undamental continuing factor in cognitive development.
Something more directly relevant to the present inquiry is to 
be found in the study of children’s thinking by Donaldson (1963)- Donald­
son worked with two groups of children of intermediate ability which she 
interviewed twice at an interval of two years, the younger group at ages 
10 and 12, the older at ages 12 and 14. Her results underline the extent 
of individual differences in the sphere of deductive reasoning both in 
respect of an understanding of what it means to say that one thing follows 
from another and in respect of the further ability to tell when this con­
dition obtains in the case of a simple syllogism or sorites. More intens­
ive work along these lines, covering a wider range of ages and abilities, 
using 'syllogistic' materials presented in less verbal forms, focussing.on 
the finer details of the reasoning process (in particular, on the under­
standing of the kinds of statements which play a role in such reasoning), 
and attempting to relate differences within and between individuals to 
antecedent conditions and present capacities,seems to be necessary for a 
fully informed answer to the question: 'Why do highly intelligent indiv­
iduals commit 'converse' - and, of course, other similar - errors?'
CHAPTER FIVE
THE NEGATIVE PARTICLE AND ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY
Summary In this chapter I report an attempt to establish whether my 
two groups differed in the extent to which they had difficulty with the 
negative particle, an element of fundamental importance for reasoning in 
general and for the criterion Valentine test in particular, and one which 
Wason (1959, 1961) has shown to present difficulties for undergraduate 
subjects in general. Subjects were also asked to complete the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory, primarily with a view to explaining any difference 
found between the groups on the negatives task in terms of their scores 
on this test. Even in the absence of any such difference it was anticip­
ated that the results from the two sources could be used to assess the 
validity of the underlying hypotheses about a relationship between diffic­
ulty with the negative particle and one or other of the two dimensions of 
personality measured by the E.P.I. The outcome of the first part of the 
experiment proved to be rather equivocal, there being some, rather tenuous, 
evidence of a difference between the groups in cases where a single negat­
ive component was involved. There was no significant difference between 
the groups in either of the aspects of personality measured, and only the 
slightest evidence of a relationship between difficulties with negatives 
and emotionality.
5.1 Introduction The purpose to be served by the 5TS task was, of 
course, the discovery of any difference which existed between the GR and 
PR groups in their understanding of various types of statement involved in 
syllogistic reasoning in general and in the criterion Valentine test in 
particular. One of the five types of statement was the universal negative, 
a type of statement, it was suggested in the light of the 5TS results, 
which is probably not really suited to the card-turning task since the cor­
rect response in this case is identical with the response favoured by any 
tendency towards 'matching'. In any case, I had decided in advance that 
the negative particle is so ubiquitous and important a part of reasoning 
(and, indeed, of language in general) that it would be useful to investig­
ate the possibility that this part of speech, outside the context of any 
particular form of statement, presented greater difficulties for the PR 
group than for their GR counterparts. The means for such an investigation 
had already been provided by Wason (1959» 1961).
It is presumably unnecessary to labour the point that a differ­
ence between the groups in this respect would be highly relevant to the 
present investigation: it is not only that negative particles occur,
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explicitly or otherwise, throughout the Valentine test, Section B, and 
indeed in deductive reasoning generally: two of the four types of state­
ment recognised in the Aristotelian logic are negative in 'quality' and 
almost all modem systems of logic incorporate the negation sign as one of 
their two undefined constants, the exceptions to this rule being systems 
employing a single constant, such as the 'stroke' and 'dagger' functions, 
in which the negative is actually implicit. The notion of falsity, 
which, as Wason remarks, is the semantic equivalent of the (syntactical) 
negative particle - it is always possible to indicate the falsity of a 
statement by asserting its negation, in most cases simply by inserting the 
negative particle in the original statement - can also be seen to occupy 
a fundamental place in the area of deductive reasoning if it is recalled 
that an invalid argument is commonly defined as one in which the conclusion 
may be false even if the premises are true.
In his search for an explanation of the difficulties apparently 
presented by information set out in negative terms, Wason (1959, 1963), 
supported by some research by Eifermann (1961), has suggested that it may, 
in part, be due to the emotional response which negatives sometimes seem 
to elicit. In 5.4 I shall discuss this possibility at greater length and 
explain how I hoped to relate it to aspects of personality measured by the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory.
5.2 The negatives task: materials, -procedure and sub.iects In his
1961 paper Wason describes two kinds of task in which difficulties with 
the negative particle appeared to reveal themselves for undergraduate 
subjects. In the first, the 'Verification task', subjects were presented 
with a series of statements, such as '2 is an even number', '3 is not an 
odd number', and so on, and asked to indicate the truth or falsity of a 
statement by pressing one or other of two buttons. There were four types 
of statement in all, true affirmative, true negative, false affirmative 
and. false negative. Following the above procedure the latency of response 
for the different types of statement was measured with a high degree of 
accuracy by means of the familiar reaction-time apparatus, latencies for 
affirmative statements being significantly shorter than for negative ones.
In the 'Construction task' similar statements were used, except 
that the place where the number appeared in the verification task was left 
blank and the subject asked to say a number which would make the statement 
true or false, depending on the instruction given by the experimenter.
In this case the error component in the timing must he supposed to have 
been rather large in relation to the fairly short latencies involved:
Wason used a stop-watch which was started as the incomplete sentence, 
typed on a strip of paper, was placed before the subject, and stopped as 
soon as the latter responded. From my own experience of using this sys­
tem of measurement it seems to me that some degree of inaccuracy is in­
evitable, given the probable fluctuations in the experimenter's attention 
and the difficulty of avoiding either an anticipation of the subject's 
response or a time-lag after it. In general, in this task there are two 
reaction times involved, the subject’s (which one is trying to measure) 
and the experimenter's (which is part of the measuring process), and it 
seems highly probable that the notorious variability of the former is com­
pounded by the variability of the latter.
In view of these problems of measurement it is a rather striking 
fact that in Wason's research a better differentiation was obtained, be­
tween the four types of statement used, in the construction task than in 
the other one. In particular, it was possible for Wason to show, by means 
of an analysis of variance, not only that the latencies for the negative 
statements were longer than those for the affirmative statements but also 
that those for false statements were longer than those for true statements. 
It was because of this better differentiation between statement-types (or 
conditions, as I shall henceforward, more accurately, call them) that I 
decided to use the construction task despite the apparent difficulties of 
measurement.
Following Wason, four forms of incomplete statement were used:
' .... is an even number', ' .... is an odd number', ' .... is not an even 
number', and ' .... is not an odd number'. These were reproduced on sep­
arate strips of paper, six of each for each subject. The following in­
structions were read out, care being taken to ensure that they were under­
stood:
Instructions In this part of the experiment I shall ask you to 
complete sentences of four different kinds so as to make them true or 
false. Here are the four kinds of sentence. (Here an instance of each 
was presented and read out to the subject.) At the beginning of each you 
will see a space. Your task is to complete the sentence by writing a 
number from 2 to 9 in the space. It doesn't matter which number you use 
and it will be in order to use the same numbers as often as you like.
Sometimes your task will be to complete the sentence 
so that it is true, sometimes you will be asked to make it false. I shall
tell you which before I lay the incomplete sentence before you.
As before (in the 5TS experiment) I shall note the time it 
takes you to complete the task in each case, but once again the important 
thing is to get the answer right. The time you take is of interest only 
because it indicates the relative difficulty of the different kinds of 
task. So please do not sacrifice accuracy to speed.
There is one minor respect in which my procedure obviously diff­
ered from Wason's: my subjects were asked to write down their responses
and not simply to speak them. From an administrative point of view this 
change had various things to recommend it: in conducting the experiment
I was freed of the need either to keep a record of responses myself or to 
judge the correctness of the response as it was produced, a situation in
which I could concentrate on the correct operation of the stop-watch;
and it was possible, before the experiment itself, to arrange the forms 
of statement, on their twenty-four strips of paper, in the order in which 
they were to be presented to any particular subject, once again making it 
easier to give my full attention to an essential part of the experimenter's 
task, the issuing of the appropriate instruction, to make the statement 
true or, of course, to make it false.
The order in which the four different incomplete statements were
presented was combined with the two different instructions to produce an
order for the four 'conditions' (true-affirmative, true-negative, etc.) 
which was different for each of the members within a group, the conditions
appearing once in each block of four trials in a systematically varied
arrangement. The arrangements for timing were as in the Wason experiment, 
the stop-watch being started as the strip of paper was placed before the 
subject and stopped as soon as he had written his response. In the case 
which Eifermann mentions where a subject changes his response I followed 
her procedure in counting only the first response - if only because the 
stop-watch had generally been stopped before the subject moved to make his 
second response.
The subjects for this experiment were the same 22 pairs as for 
the >5TS task, the present one having been completed at the end of a session 
lasting roughly an hour in which subjects had filled in Form A of the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory as well as taking part in the 5TS experiment.
5.3 Results (a) Errors Like Wason I found that on the whole my
subjects seldom made mistakes. The incidence of errors on all six trials
of each of the four conditions is given in Table.5.1.
TABLE 5.1
INCIDENCE OF ERRORS IN THE FOUR CONDITIONS IN THE NEGATIVES TASK (ALL 
SIX TRIALS TOGETHER: N = 132 FOR EACH GROUP)
C o n d i t i o n s
True
Affirm.
True
Neg.
False
Affirm.
False
Neg. All
GR group — 5 4 15 24
PR group 1 2 8 17 28
Both 1 7 12 32 52
As measured by the number of errors made in each, the order of 
difficulty of the four conditions is the same for my PR group, and for 
both groups taken together, as for Wason's groups and different, therefore, 
as we shall see, from the order as measured by latency of response (which 
is the order, in terms of errors, for my GR group). As compared with 
Wason's groups mine made, on average over all conditions, fewer mistakes, 
the mean number of errors per subject per trial being .54 for Wason's 
subjects and .20 for my own. If the two sets of subjects are assumed to 
be of comparable ability in respect of this task, one might expect the 
drop in errors for the Glasgow groups to be accompanied by an increase in 
the time taken. In actual fact, a comparison of the geometilcal response 
times of Wason's subjects and my own seems to confirm that this occurred. 
The longer latencies cannot, however, with certainty be attributed simply 
to a greater exercise of care on my subjects' parts because it must also,
I think, be assumed to be due, to some extent, at least, to the fact that 
my subjects were required to write their responses whereas Wason's spoke 
theirs. In any case, the most important point to be taken from this 
aspect of my subjects' performance appears to be that they made few enough 
errors to make it possible to regard the latency of their responses as a 
satisfactory index of the relative difficulty of the four conditions for 
the different groups of subjects.
(b) Latencies of response: within groups Figure
5.1 presents the geometric mean response times of the two groups for the 
four conditions. I have chosen this form to facilitate comparison with 
Wason's results, Wason having calculated the geometrical mean, instead of 
the more usual arithmetic mean, because of the marked positive skew which,
as is usual with response times, at least when they are short, character­
ises the distributions of values in the present experiment. I shall 
revert to the arithmetic mean at other points in this section because the 
skewness of these distributions is of relatively little importance for the 
type of statistic to be used.
FIGURE! 5.1
GEOMETRIC M E M  RESPONSE TIMES OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE FOUR CONDITIONS
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As noted in the previous paragraph but one, the mean latencies 
of response for my two groups are, on the whole, rather longer than those 
reported by Wason - though only slightly so in the case of the GR group.
In both my groups - as well as in his, with one minor exception - the mean 
response times for the four conditions over the six trials are consistently 
in the order, from shortest to longest, true affirmative, false affirmat­
ive, - true negative and false negative. Needless to say, this order is 
confirmed when response times are averaged (arithmetically) over the six 
trials for each subject and comparisons made between conditions. A 
Friedmann two-way analysis of variance on these data, within each group, 
gives X r values of 52.9 and 51.9 for GR and PR groups respectively (p in 
both cases being less than .001). When the differences between the con­
ditions within each group were tested, the order given above was confirmed, 
the differences between successive conditions being significant even on
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the low-powered Sign Test, with p in no case greater than .016. Similarly, 
when the times for the two false conditions were averaged and compared with 
those for the two true conditions, and the times for the two negative con­
ditions with those for the affirmative conditions, the mean latency for 
the first member of each of these pairs was significantly longer than that 
for the second. Table 5.2 presents the relevant data.
TABLE 5.2
SIGN TEST DATA BEARING ON THE RELATIVE DIFFICULTY 
OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS (WITHIN GROUPS)
No. of cases (out of 22)
in which the second term P
of the comparison had a (Sign Test,
shorter mean latency two-tailed)
GR group PR group GR PR
T+ versus F+ 4 1 .004 < .001
T- versus F- 5 3 .016 < .001
T+ versus T- 0 1 < .001 <.001
F+ versus F- 0 1 < .001 <.001
F+ versus T- 3 5 .001 .016
True versus False 4 1 .004 <.001
Affirm, versus Neg. 0 1 < .001 <.001
The above results confirm those reported by Wason and, in partic­
ular, his finding, as against Eifermann's, that the false affirmative is 
significantly easier than the true negative. (Eifermann, 1961, found no 
significant difference between them.) Needless to say, they also confirm 
the adequacy of the task, and the method of measuring the time taken to 
respond, as a means of differentiating between the four conditions.
Having shown, by the above means, that the order of difficulty 
of the four conditions was highly consistent from subject to subject within 
a group, it seemed natural to ask whether the order of speed of response of 
subjects within each group was consistent from condition to condition - in 
other words, whether the subjects who took the shortest time to respond to 
one condition also took the shortest time to respond to the other condit­
ions. The question is one of consistency in speed of responding from con­
dition to condition. Table 5*5 presents the relevant Spearman rhos, based 
on the mean response times of subjects over six trials for each of the four 
conditions, the rhos being corrected, where necessary, for ties (Hays, 
1963).
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TABLE 5.3
WITHIN-GROUP RANK CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSE TIMES 
OVER SIX TRIALS ACROSS THE FOUR CONDITIONS
C o n d i t i o n s
t+/t- t+/f+ t+/f- t-/f+ t-/f- f+/f-
GR group .64 .86 .55 .73 .61 .58
PR group .46 .79 .32 .35 .71 .30
It will be apparent that, on the whole, the GR group was more 
consistent in their speed of response to the four conditions, at least 
when response times are averaged over six trials. The consistency of 
the PR group is at its greatest when the ’quality1 of the condition 
(affirmative or negative) is held constant.
(c) Latencies of response: between groups It may have
seemed odd that I have not followed Wason in using analysis of variance 
techniques in the evaluation of the results presented under (b). It may 
seem even stranger that recourse is not to made this, most powerful, stat­
istical instrument in the present section, where an attempt is made to 
sort out, not only the effect of ’quality' versus truth-value, but also 
the effect of sorting subjects according to performance on the Valentine 
reasoning test: one of the more complicated analysis of variance models
might appear to offer the best hope of finding an answer to the question 
with which the first part of this chapter is primarily concerned, whether, 
regardless of their truth-value, statements incorporating a negative part­
icle present more difficulty for PR subjects than their GR counterparts.
It has to be admitted that, in modelling this part of my research 
on Wason's, I had assumed that a, slightly more complex, analysis of vari­
ance than the one he used would be the appropriate instrument of statist­
ical analysis. There proved, however, to be an aspect of my results 
which appeared to me to rule out such a course of action. According to 
Hays (1963) there are three conditions which have to be met before an 
analysis of variance can be used with complete conficence: the distrib­
utions of scores have to be normal, the variance of different samples has 
to be homogeneous and the observations have to be independent. Wason was 
able to meet the first two conditions by means of a linear transformation 
of his scores. Clearly the same procedure would have been open to me and,
in any case, the work of Box (1953)> for example, has cast some doubt on 
the extent to which the F test is sensitive to, at least moderate, violat­
ions of these first two conditions. On the importance of the third con­
dition Hays lays much heavier emphasis. In particular, he expresses 
serious reservations about the use of analysis of variance procedures with 
experimental designs in which subjects act as their own controls - as, of 
course, they do, as between conditions, in the negatives task. (Table 5.3 
underlines the extent to which the observations across conditions in the 
present experiment are not independent.)
It is true that Hays does not seek to exclude the use of analysis 
of variance in the case of any experiment in which subjects act as their 
own controls, but there is an aspect of my own results which make it in­
evitable that, in employing an analysis of variance in connexion with them, 
I should be violating the principle of independence of observations to a 
much greater extent than Wason and, therefore, I suspect, beyond the limits 
of the permissible. Wason1s analysis was based on the reciprocals of his 
subjects' response times on the sixth trial, on the grounds that 'in the 
final phases of practice, performance would have become stable and ... 
errors would be at a minimum' (1961, p. 136). In other words, Wason's 
analysis is based on those observations which he believes to represent 
most validly the differences between the conditions. For convenience of 
comparison I have reproduced the curves of Fig. 5.1 in Fig. 5.2, juxtapos­
ing the mean response times of the two groups on each of the four condit­
ions. I think it will be clear from these that, whatever may be the case 
for comparisons between conditions within groups, comparisons between 
groups within conditions cannot validly be based on performances on the 
sixth trial.
As it happens, differences between groups are at their most
favourable, to the hypothesis that the PR group experiences more difficulty
with negative particles than the GR group, on the sixth trial: in both
at
negative conditions the differences are just about as large as/any point in 
the six trials, and the differences in both affirmative conditions just 
about as small as at any point. Unfortunately, only in the T+ case could 
the sixth trial be said, in any sense, to represent adequately the perform­
ances of the groups as a whole: in the fifth trials in both negative con­
ditions the geometrical mean latencies of the two groups are virtually the 
same (3.26 and 3.27, 4.64 and 4.68) while, on the F+ condition, the differ­
ence between the groups is at its greatest on this trial. There is, so
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FIGURE 5 .2
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f a r  a s  I  k n o w ,  n o  r e p u t a b l e  w a y  o f  d i s c o u n t i n g  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a s  e n t i r e ­
l y  u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e n ,  t h o u g h  t h e s e  a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  
' f i n a l  p h a s e s  o f  p r a c t i c e '  s o  f a r  a s  t h i s  e x p e r i m e n t  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  I  c a n  
n o t  s e r i o u s l y  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e s  o f  m y  s u b j e c t s  h a v e  b e c o m e  s t a b l e .
I t  w a s  t h e  a p p a r e n t  n e e d  t o  b a s e  a n y  c o m p a r i s o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  
t w o  g r o u p s  o n  t h e  r e s p o n s e  t i m e s  f o r  a l l  s i x  t r i a l s  w h i c h  a p p e a r e d  t o  m e  
t o  r u l e  o u t  t h e  u s e  o f  o r t h o d o x  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  t e c i i n i q u e s  i n  c o n ­
n e x i o n  w i t h  m y  r e s u l t s .  M y  s u b j e c t s  a r e  ' t h e i r  o w n  c o n t r o l s ' ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
n o t  o n l y  a c r o s s  c o n d i t i o n s  b u t  a l s o  a c r o s s  t r i a l s :  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  o n
w h i c h  a n  a n a l y s i s  w o u l d  b e  b a s e d  w o u l d  c l e a r l y  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  t o  a  v e r y  m a r k e d  d e g r e e .  I  h a v e  d e p e n d e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  
w h a t  f o l l o w s ,  o n  t h e  n o n - p a r a m e t r i c  s t a t i s t i c s  a l r e a d y  u s e d  e x t e n s i v e l y  
i n  t h i s  t h e s i s .
T h e  a r i t h m e t i c  m e a n  r e s p o n s e  t i m e s  f o r  t h e  t w o  g r o u p s  ( t a k i n g  
a l l  s i x  t r i a l s  t o g e t h e r )  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  5 * 4 ,  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  r e l e v ­
a n t  v a l u e s  f o r  p  o n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  W i l c o x o n  o i g n e d  R a n k s  t e s t .
I t  w i l l  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  g r o u p s  f a i l  t o  r e a c h  
s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  o n  a  t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t ,  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  f a l s e  a f f i r m ­
a t i v e  c o n d i t i o n .  T h e  r e s u l t  i s  a n  e n t i r e l y  u n e x p e c t e d  o n e  ,  n o t  o n l y  i n
t e r m s  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  h y p o t h e s i s ,  t h a t  t h e  P R  g r o u p  w o u l d  e x p e r i e n c e  m o r e  
d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h e  n e g a t i v e  p a r t i c l e  t h a n  t h e  G R  g r o u p ,  b u t  a l s o ,  I  t h i n k ,
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in view of the apparently greater separation of the two groups on the 
false negative condition, as presented in the curves of Figure 5.2. (it 
is true that the F+ condition is the only one on which the PR mean response 
time is longer on every trial; on the other hand, one might, perhaps, 
have expected the rather large differences between the groups on the other 
five trials of the F- condition to offset the effect of the one trial on 
which there is virtually no difference between them.)
TABLE 5.4
ARITHMETIC MEAN RESPONSE TIMES (IN SECONDS) OF THE TWO GROUPS 
ON THE FOUR CONDITIONS (N = 132 IN EACH GROUP)
Conditions
T+ T- F+ F-
GR group 2.1 3.5 2.5 5.9
PR group 2.3 4.1 3.1 6.4
Difference 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.5
Wilcoxon T 96.5 69.5 60.0 109.0
N ranks 22 22 22 22
P
(two-tailed)
N.S. N.S. <.05 N.S.
Although it is generally unwise to comment on differences which 
fail to reach significance, I think it is possible to make some sense of 
the results presented in Table 5*4 if noteis taken of the fact that the 
T values for the two middle conditions are of roughly the same order of 
magnitude while the values for the two outside conditions are very much 
larger. With T significant if it is equal to,or less than, 66, it will 
be apparent that the difference between the groups just fails to reach 
significance on the T- condition but does not even approach significance 
on T+ and F-. Now the middle conditions are alike in the sense that they 
both incorporate a single negative component - the (syntactic) negative 
particle in the one case and the (semantic) notion of falsity in the other 
- and it may not be entirely fanciful to suggest that it is in the presence 
of this condition that the two groups show a difference of response on the 
negatives task. This hypothesis is supported by the finding of a differ­
ence between the groups, significant at the 2 percent level on the Wil- 
coxon test, (two-tailed, T = 55, N ranks =22) when an average is found 
for response times on the two conditions taken together. There is no 
other combination of conditions which produces a significant difference 
between the groups - and, in particular, of course, the true versus false
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and the affirmative versus negative comparisons do not.
The situation is clearly being seen through a glass darkly.
The darkness of the glass is partly due to the use of statistical tech­
niques of no very great power and partly, I think, to the large error 
component in the measures to which these statistics are applied. The 
altogether tentative conclusion that there may be a difference between the 
groups in the ease with which they cope with conditions involving a single 
negative component, while it makes some sense, would obviously have made 
better sense if an even more significant difference had existed between 
them in the ease wi^T^feey coped with the condition in which there are two 
negative components (whereas, in fact, the T value is highest in this 
case). An explanation which might briefly suggest itself is that the 
effect of the double negative is to cancel itself out and so be tantamount 
to no negative at all (so that the T+ and F- conditions would be, as it 
were, operationally equivalent). Unfortunately, such an interpretation 
is inconsistent with the fact that the mean latencies for the true affirm­
ative condition are shortest and those for the false negative condition 
longest. It also conflicts with Wason's finding (1961) that few subjects 
seemed to have adopted a’dseoding' procedure for dealing with the false 
negative condition, whereby a negative in the incomplete sentence was 
simply ignored if the preceding instruction was to make the statement 
false.
It would probably be pointless to speculate about the psycho­
logical processes which might account for the failure of the double-negat­
ive condition to confirm the difference between the groups apparently 
existing in the conditions where a single negative component is present.
It is not only that this difference is itself somewhat problematic; an 
inspection of the response times of the two groups in the false-negative 
case (see Appendix H) suggests that the measure of difficulty is in this 
case a highly unstable one and, therefore, perhaps likely to obscure any 
difference which exists between the groups with respect to this condition. 
To obtain a crude index of the stability of the response-time measure, in 
this condition as compared with the false-affirmative condition, where a 
significant difference between the groups was obtained, I calculated the 
difference between the shortest and the longest response-times for each 
subject over the six trials. To allow for the overall difference in the 
magnitude of the response times in the two conditions I then noted the 
number of subjects in each group for whom this difference (the range, of
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course) was greater than their shortest response time and also, in such 
cases, by how much the one exceeded the other. In the GR group there 
were 18 (out of 22) cases in the F- condition and 6 in the F+ condition 
in which the range did exceed the shortest resonse time of the relevant 
subject. Of the latter 6 cases there were only 2 in which the range was 
as much as twice as great as the shortest response time, while in the F- 
condition there were 13 such cases - with the range in eight of them being 
approximately 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9(twice), and 20 times as great. The sit­
uation is very similar for the PR group: 17 subjects in the F- condition
and 9 in the F+ condition had a range which was greater than their short­
est response times. Of these, 14 and 2, respectively, had ranges exceed­
ing their shortest times by as much as twice, and of the former there were 
10 cases in which the ratio was 3» 4 (thrice), 5, 6, 7, 9, 12 and 14 to 1.
In view of such wide discrepancies between the response times of 
individual subjects over the six trials on the false-negative condition it 
would, I think, be rather unwise to come to any settled conclusion about 
the existence or non-existence of a difference between the groups on this 
condition. A fortiori it would, as I have suggested, be rather pointless 
to try to envisage the psychological processes which might produce a signi­
ficant difference between the groups in the single-negative conditions and 
not in the double-negative condition. Future research along these lines 
will have to try to achieve a more stable measure of the difficulty of 
these conditions or, if that should prove to be impossible, discover why 
the response times, in the false-negative condition in particular, are so 
variable. If, with a more stable measure, there still proved to be a 
significant difference between GR and PR groups on the single-negative 
conditions but not on the double-negative one, or if it proved impossible 
to eliminate the large fluctuations in speed of response in the F- case, 
it would clearly be essential to discover the psychological processes in­
volved in responding to this task and, for this, as Wason says, it would 
be most helpful if a technique could be developed in which the relevant 
processes were ’externalised1.
5.4 The negative task, emotionality and extraversion In trying to 
account for the difficulties presented by a task incorporating the negative 
particle Wason (1959) suggested that part of the explanation might be 
found in the evocation of an emotional response by this part of speech.
He quotes some of his subjects as saying, for example, '"Not’ gave me a 
sort of tremor half-way through," "I don’t like 'not' - it's a horrid
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word," and, "The capital letters of 'not' (used in Wason's experiment) 
always frighten one."
The point was taken up by Eifermann (1961) who took advantage of 
the fact that in the Hebrew language there are two negative particles,
'lo' and 'eyno1, the former of which is used in all contexts in which the 
English word 'not' is used while the latter is not used to express prohib­
itions. As Wason has pointed out (1961), the use of the English word 
'not' is likely to be encountered by a child first in the context of pro­
hibitions. The connexion between this fact and the emotional response 
apparently sometimes elicited by 'not' might be thought to be as follows. 
Part of the effect on a child of being told not to do something is likely 
to be an unpleasant emotional response. The scolding tone of the adult 
or the blow which he administers is an unconditioned stimulus producing 
such a response via the autonomic nervous system. Through the familiar 
process of generalisation, the conditioned emotional response which event­
ually develops may come to be made, in reduced form, whenever the negative 
particle, which looms so large in prohibitions, is encountered, and, in 
particular, when it is encountered in tasks such as the one described in 
this chapter. (The fact that 'not' continues to be used to prohibit 
certain kinds of behaviour would help to maintain the conditioned response.) 
It seemed possible to test the hypothesis,which I have elaborated in the 
foregoing, in the case of Hebrew-speaking subjects, by comparing the speed 
of response of subjects who completed a negatives task in which 'eyno' was 
the negative particle employed,with the speed of subjects for whom the 
statements of the task were couched in terms of 'lo'.
In the event Eifermann found that the response times of the 'lo' 
group were significantly longer in what Wason calls the 'verification' 
task - but not in the construction task. If this is taken as tentative^ 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that difficulties with the English 
word 'not' are partly to be attributed to the unpleasant emotional response 
which it elicits, then, as Eifermann suggests, we should expect greater 
difficulties (longer response times) in the case of subjects whose emotion­
al responses are greater. She suggests an experiment in which a group of
1 Tentative not only because of the inconsistency of her results from 
the two kinds of task but also because, as Eifermann says (p. 268), the 
connotative difference between 'lo' and 'eyno' is different also in the 
sense that 'the information contained in a 'lo' sentence may be more 
easily categorized as belonging to a particular context, since 'eyno' does 
not appear in prohibitive contexts'.
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'emotional' subjects would be compared with a group of 'non-emotional' 
subjects in respect of their response times in a negatives task. I think 
the opposite approach would also be possible: the emotionality of sub­
jects with longer response times on a negatives task could be measured and 
compared with the emotionality of subjects with shorter times. It was 
partly because of the expectation that my PR group would prove to have a 
significantly longer mean response time on the negative conditions of the 
construction task that I decided, in advance, to measure their emotionality 
by means of the N scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory.
At the same time, it seemed to me arguable that difficulties 
with negatives, as measured by speed of response, would be related, not, 
or not only, to the emotionality (or 'neuroticism') of subjects but to 
their degree of introversion. The reasons for this view are to be found 
in Eysenck's account of the socialisation process (1964, for example), 
coupled with his contention that introverts condition more easily and 
permanently than extraverts (ibid.). The relevant part of Eysenck's view 
of the process of socialising a child has already been sketched, in the 
last paragraph but one, where, it was suggested, the parent attempts, con­
sciously or unconsciously, to eliminate undesirable kinds of behaviour by 
associating it with consequences which are unpleasant - in the first place, 
usually, punishment or scolding but, in the long run, at least, simply 
with the unpleasant emotional reaction in the child which accompanies the 
harsh words or deeds. The paradigm, Eysenck suggests, is classical con­
ditioning and its effectiveness is to be seen, not only in the adequately 
socialised individual with his well-developed conscience (the continuing 
activity, or activation, of his autonomic nervous system) but also in the 
neurotic in whom an emotional response has become attached, by accident 
or by generalisation, to an inappropriate situation, object or action.
Differences in the extent to which people are adequately social­
ised are to be explained, on this theory, sometimes in terms of the thor­
oughness with which the original conditioning process has been carried out, 
sometimes in terms of the person's position on the extravert-introvert con­
tinuum. Because, in general, introverts, with their low levels of inhib­
ition, condition more readily than extraverts, given the same amount of 
socialisation the former are likely to be better socialised than the lat­
ter: their emotional responses to prohibited behaviours, to prohibilions
themselves or to the words and gestures used in prohibitions are likely to 
be stronger. To the extent that difficulties with negatives are due to
the role they play in prohibitions, then, one might expect a group of 
introverted subjects to have more difficulty (make slower responses) in a 
negatives task than a group of extraverts. Similarly, if a group of 
subjects with-ia significantly greater mean response time in a negatives 
task proved to be also significantly more introverted than another group 
of subjects, one might infer that the latter fact provided at least a 
partial explanation of the former.
The Eysenck Personality Inventory, with its scale for extravers­
ion as well as for emotionality or 'neuroticism', appeared to be eminently 
suitable as an easily administered and brief measure of these aspects of 
the personalities of my subjects. If they turned out to be significantly 
different in their speed of response to the negative statements in the 
construction task, at least a partial explanation might be forthcoming in 
their different degrees either of extraversion or emotionality. If there 
was no significant difference between them on the negatives task but one on 
the E or N scales of the E.P.I., this would obviously still be an interest­
ing result, although with no obvious explanation (related to no prior 
hypothesis). Finally, in the absence of significant differences between 
my groups in either respect, it would still be possible to look for a 
relationship between degree of extraversion or emotionality, on the one 
hand, and speed of response to the negative condition on the other: evid­
ence bearing on Eifermann's hypothesis and my own would still be available, 
though, of course, not via my two groups as originally constituted.
5.5 The Eysenck Personality Inventory : general aspects The Eysenck
Personality Inventory is too well known for it to be necessary for me to 
say very much about it. An improved version of the Maudsley Personality 
Inventory, it incorporates a Lie Scale, for the detection of 'faking', as 
well as the E (extraversion) and N (neuroticism) scales already referred 
to. The choice of these two dimensions for inclusion in the inventory 
reflects the Eysencks' belief (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1964) that these two 
factors 'contribute more to a description of personality than any other set 
of two factors outside the cognitive field', a belief based on extensive 
factor analytic studies in the field of personality description.
The Inventory itself is available in two Forms, A and B, in each 
of which there are 57 questions, 24 for each of the E and N scales and 9 
for the Lie scale. Subjects are required to choose between 'Yes' and 'No'
1 ^vans (1964) found a significant negative correlation between N and 
performance on the Valentine test as a whole (i.e., both Sections).
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in answering the items, the intermediate 'Don't know' or '?', sometimes 
included in such inventories, having been omitted in order to combat the 
'response set' of answering a large number of questions in this non-commit- 
al fashion. One curious feature of the Inventory, in my view, is that 
all the items in the N scale are keyed in the same direction - so that a 
'Yes' answer to such an item always scores a point towards the N scale 
total. Since the tendency to answer all or most of the questions in an 
inventory in the affirmative - to 'acquiesce' - is a well-established 
characteristic, distinguishable from neuroticism (Vernon, 1965), it is 
strange that this aspect of the E.P.I. has remained unchanged. The 
Eysencks say, in the Manual, p. 13, that the acquiescence response set has 
been investigated 'rather intensely' in relation to the M.P.I. and the 
E.P.I. and has been found to play a 'very small and unimportant role only'. 
With the M.P.I. study (Eysenck, 1962) Vernon, at least, is not satisfied 
and the Eysencks do go on to admit that acquiescence 'is not completely 
absent, however, and may require to be borne in mind with certain groups 
of subjects'. In the absence of further guidance in the matter, it may 
be necessary to bear it in mind in connexion with my own groups of sub­
jects.
Test-retest reliabilities for two rather small groups of sub­
jects, over periods of a year (N=92) and nine months (N=27) are given in 
the Manual. They range from .80 for the E scale, Form B, to .94 for the 
same scale,both Forms together. Intercorrelations between the two Forms, 
completed in a single session,and based on the answers of 2000 normal 
subjects, are given as .76 and .81 for the E and N scales respectively. 
Validity data in the manual is somewhat general in character, the reader 
being referred to other publications for evidence that the results of the 
tests 'fit in with predictions made from a more general theory' and that 
'individuals who impress others as showing introverted or extraverted 
behaviour patterns, or as being stable or unstable in their everyday behav­
iour, answer the E.P.I. in a corresponding manner'. Norms are provided 
for 22 different categories of person, one of which is students (N = 347 
of whom 158 were male), in the form of means and standard deviations. 
Eysenck believes that one Form of the Inventory may be sufficient 'for 
experimental studies', though the two Forms make it possible to retest 
after experimental treatment 'without interference from memory factors'. 
These last two points have a, somewhat indirect, bearing on some points I 
shall be making in connexion with my own use of the Inventory.
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5.6 Eysenck Personality Inventory: administration and results
Subjects are instructed to work quickly through the Inventory, giving as 
their answer to a question their first thoughts on the subject. Apart 
from its other advantages, this instruction means that one Form of the 
Inventory can be filled in in a very short time. My subjects completed 
Form A during the first experimental session, after the 5TS task and before 
the negatives task, a subsidiary purpose to be served by this arrange ment 
being to give subjects a brief rest between the two more taxing tasks.
They completed Form B 12 to 18 months later, in their second experimental 
session, the subsidiary purpose to be served On this occasion being, as 
already mentioned in connexion with the 4TS task, the reduction of trans­
fer effects from the A type of statement (which preceded it) to the F type 
(which followed).
responses to Form B in view of the fact that Form A was scored and its 
results explained at the end of the experimental session. Thus subjects 
might be expected to remember, on the second occasion, the kind of aspect 
being measured and also, of course, the existence of the L scale. A 
priori one could not be certain how much effect this knowledge was likely 
to have: subjects had, of course, no detailed knowledge of the Inventory
or, therefore, of the items which would belong to the different scales, 
and they had relatively little reason to try to improve upon their appar­
ent personalities, even if they had known how to achieve this, since the 
purpose of the testing was carefully explained and, I think, generally 
accepted.
Looking at the results from the two Forms themselves for evid­
ence of an effect gives no unequivocal answer to the question of the com­
parability of the results. On the one hand, as Table 5.5 shows, there 
was a noticeable drop in L scale scores on Form B and the product-moment 
correlations between the two Forms are only .51 and .31 for the E and N 
scales respectively in the case of the GR group. On the other hand, the 
corresponding values for the PR group are .70, a result which seems alto­
gether satisfactory in view of the fact, noted in the previous section, 
that the intercorrelations between the two scales when the two Forms were 
completed, by the standardisation samples, in a single session, are report­
ed in the Manual as .76 and .81 respectively. Finally, an increase in 
E scale scores for both groups which might naturally be interpreted as a 
sign that my subjects had succeeded in shifting their scores in the direct-
It is not altogeth w much weight can be placed on my subjects’
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ion of greater extraversion actually reflects fairly accurately the diff­
erence in the means of the student standardisation sample: the standard­
isation sample’s mean increased by 2.34 from A to B, the means of my GR 
and PR groups by 2.47 and 1.67 respectively. The same applies in the case 
of the N scale means (where the standardisation sample’s means were 10.00 
on A and 11.04 on B). In the case of the N scale, however, there is a 
discrepancy between the change one might expect from the norms and the 
change which actually occurred: whereas the standardisation sample's
standard deviation fell from 5.01 to 4.82 from A to B, the corresponding 
values for both my groups show an increase. If this discrepancy calls 
for an explanation, however, I think it is more likely to be found in the 
immediate context in which my subjects completed Form B than in any effect 
of the scoring and discussion of Form A. The later Form, as already 
mentioned, was completed at the end of the long series of trials on the A 
type of statement in the 4TS task, in the course of which some subjects 
had met with notable success and others with equally notable failure.
It is perhaps not entirely fanciful to suppose that the differences in 
emotional response visibly evoked by such different degrees of success 
might be reflected in the answers to a scale designed to test emotional 
stability.
TABLE 5.5
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS ON THE EYSENCK PERSONALITY 
INVENTORY, FORMS A AND B (N = 21* FOR BOTH GROUPS)
Form A Form B Forms A + B
E N L E N L E N L
GR group
Mean
S.D.
11.09
3.49
11.90
3.22
1.86
1.42
12.76 12.71 
3.11 4.57
0.19 23.85 24.61 
5.74 6.33
2.05
PR group
Mean
S.D.
9.67
3.88
13.38
3.06
2.48
1.47
12.14 14.86 
2.66 3.98
0.38 21.81
6.09
28.24
6.09
2.86
Mean diff. +1.42 -1.48 --0.62 +0.62 -2.15 --0.19 +2.04 -3.63 --0.81
* I have not included the scores of the pair of subjects, the PR member 
of which was not able to attend for the second experimental session.
The question of the admissibility of the Form B results is, in 
any case, largely an academic one, of more interest, perhaps,to the student 
of the E.P.I. than relevant to the questions at issue in this part of the
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present thesis. The truth is that, while the differences between the 
groups on the E and N scales are in the expected direction in both Forms, 
none of them is large enough to be significant even on the parametric jt 
test, which it seemed appropriate to use with scores on an Inventory pre­
sumably constructed so as to give a normal distribution of scores. This 
means that any difference which may be thought to exist between the groups 
in the amount of difficulty experienced with negatives cannot be explained 
in terms of a difference between them in degree of extraversion or emot­
ionality, at least as measured by the Eysenck*Personality Inventory.
In so far as differences in strength of emotional reactions are tied to 
such differences in personality these too must be rejected as sources of 
differences between the groups with respect to negatives. And finally, of 
course, any other, less specific, relationship between logical reasoning 
ability, as measured by Section B of the Valentine tests, on the one hand, 
and extraversion or emotionality on the other must also be discounted.
The last point to be looked at in connexion with the E.P.I. 
results concerns any direct evidence of a relationship between difficulties 
with negatives and scores on the E and N scales, it being possible that 
such a relationship exists even if it does not account for the differences 
between the GR and PR groups. To investigate the possibility I calcul­
ated rank correlations, corrected for ties, between the E and N scores 
of all subjects (both Forms together) and mean latencies over the six 
trials on the four conditions of the negatives task. These are presented 
in Table 5.6.
TABLE 5.6
RANK CORRELATIONS BETWEEN E AND N SCORES OF ALL SUBJECTS (FORMS A AND B)
AND MEAN RESPONSE TIMES ON THE FOUR CONDITIONS OF THE NEGATIVES TASK
Conditions
T+ T- F+ F-
Extraversion .03 .10 .01 .08
Neuroticism .18
C\J• .27 .00
There is, of course, a difficulty about establishing the signi­
ficance of a rho coefficient - especially in the case where some ranks are 
tied (Hays, 1963, p. 646). In view of the sample size, however, it may 
seem legitimate to adopt the jt test procedure described by Hays. In that
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case the only correlation in the above Table which is large enough to 
reach significance is that between the latency of response to the T- con­
dition and neuroticism. If this can be taken to mean that there is a 
(not very pronounced) tendency for more emotional subjects to take longer 
to respond to this negative condition than less emotional subjects, it may 
be regarded as tentative evidence in support of Eifermann's hypothesis as 
described in section 5.4. The fact that the relationship is not a strong­
er one may be attributed to the operation of other factors in determining 
speed of response in this task - and, of course, both Eifermann and Wason 
have insisted that the hypothesised emotional component in responses to 
the negative particle is only one possible source of the difficulties 
people have with this part of speech. The evidence for a relationship 
between emotionality and speed of response to the negative conditions of 
the construction task would have been stronger, of course, if there had 
also been a significant correlation between scores on the N scale and the 
false-negative condition. On the other hand, I have already remarked on 
the instability of the response-time measure in this case.
Two things remain to be said. The first is that there has been 
no evidence at all to support my attempt to relate latency of response in 
the negatives task, via the different conditionability of subjects, to 
differences in extraversion. The other is that a more direct measure of 
emotionality, coupled with a better measure of difficulty with negatives, 
might be expected to produce a clearer test of the role of emotional 
responses in a subject's attempts to deal with information couched in 
negative terms.
5.7 oummary In the present chapter I have described attempts to est­
ablish whether there was a difference between the GR and PR groups in 
respect of difficulties experienced with the negative particle (a funda­
mental factor in syllogistic reasoning) and in degree of extraversion or 
emotionality, as measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory.
Though the Wason1construction task' employed for the first of 
these purposes proved adequate to discriminate between the four conditions 
within groups and to confirm the findings of Wason in this respect, the 
result of the comparison between groups, within conditions, was something 
of a surprise and, it was suggested, might be partly due to the instability 
of the response-time measure of difficulty, especially in the false-negat­
ive condition. If this were the case, then the complete absence of any
m.
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significant difference between the groups in respect of the condition just 
mentioned might not be thought to represent a fatal obstacle to the con­
clusion that there was a significant difference between the groups, not 
specifically in respect of the speed with which they responded to state­
ments involving the negative particle but, more generally, in conditions 
where they were required to cope either with the negative particle or with 
its counterpart at the semantic level, the notion of falsity. At best,
however, such a conclusion must continue to be regarded as somewhat prob­
lematic: although the differences between the groups on the false affirm­
ative condition by itself, and on the false affirmative and true negative
conditions taken together, were significant (respectively at the 5 and 2
per cent levels on a two-tailed test), the difference on the negative con­
dition by itself just failed to reach significance.
Differences between the groups in degree of extraversion and 
emotionality were looked for primarily as an explanation of any significant 
difference which might be found between them in respect of the negative 
particle, the connexion between the two being supposed to be via the emot­
ional response to this part of speech reported by some of Wason's subjects 
and tentatively and indirectly confirmed by Eifermann. It was considered 
that such a response might be related either, as Eifermann had suggested, 
to degree of emotionality or, as the present writer argued, to degree of 
extraversion via the early exposure of individuals to the use of the negat­
ive particle as a prominent part of prohibitions. In the event there 
were significant differences between the groups in neither of these re­
spects, as measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory, so that any 
difference which existed between the groups in respect of the negative 
particle (or of the negative components of a task) could not be attributed 
to this source. At the same time, a small, but significant, relationship 
was shown to exist between speed of response to the true negative condition 
of the construction task and scores on the N scale of the E.P.I., provid­
ing some tentative evidence in support of the Eifermann hypothesis.
CHAPTER SIX
REVIEW, DISCUSSION AND PROSPECT
The purpose of the research described in this thesis was to 
discover some of the factors responsible for failure in a syllogistic 
reasoning task such as the one represented by the Valentine Reasoning 
Tests, Section B. To this end a review was made of the literature bear­
ing on the sources of error in reasoning of this kind, there being 
virtually nothing specifically on the question of individual differences. 
The most widely accepted theories about the factors producing errors in 
syllogistic reasoning were found to be (l) that the 'atmosphere' of the 
premises influences the subject's choice of conclusion (in the traditional 
multiple-choice type of syllogism test) and (2) that syllogisms couched 
in terms of 'emotionally significant' material are less likely to be 
evaluated correctly than syllogisms whose content is 'emotionally neutral'. 
Other possibilities suggested in the literature were (3) that syllogisms 
with conclusions which are judged to be true are likely to be thought to 
be valid and syllogisms with conclusions judged to be false invalid and 
(4) that errors might be due to a failure to understand the nature of the 
task or to abide by its terms if these were understood in the first 
place. It had also been noted (5) that there is a tendency for subjects 
to misunderstand some of the types of statement involved in syllogistic 
reasoning, in particular the universal affirmative (which is understood 
to imply the truth of its converse) and the particular affirmative and 
negative (the 'some' being interpreted as meaning 'not all').
Although these five sources of error were supposed to be char­
acteristic of the (usually) undergraduate population at large, each could 
obviously be made to generate a hypothesis about the source of individual 
differences on the general assumption that some subjects are more prone 
to the relevant effect than others. However, the reality of the effect 
had, of course, to have been established and it was argued that in the 
case of the first two this was not so. The 'atmosphere effect' does 
draw attention to, and offer an explanation of, a pattern in the choice 
of erroneous conclusions but it cannot be thought to explain (and I think 
it was not originally intended to explain) why erroneous conclusions are 
preferred to correct ones. On the contrary, properly understood, it is
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all to the good to be influenced by 'atmosphere' for the 'secondary 
hypotheses' in terms of which it is applied to syllogistic arguments by 
Sells are two of the 'rules of the syllogism', as he himself recognises.
To be guided by these in one's choice of conclusions is clearly better 
than to be guided by none - although not, of course, as good as being 
guided by all, including, in particular, those relating to the 'distrib­
ution' of the terms.
Papers purporting to establish emotionally significant content 
as a factor reported researches in which at least one other important 
variable had not been controlled. Of these variables one was the 
relationship between the truth-value of the conclusion and the validity 
or invalidity of the argument, the factor mentioned under (3) above. A 
study such as Thistlethwaite's which compares the performance of a pre­
judiced group on a set of arguments touching on their prejudices with the 
performance of an unprejudiced group on the same material is liable to 
founder on the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of any emotional
components of prejudice from the effect of the different views about the
truth-values of the conclusions of the arguments in which the difference 
between being prejudiced and unprejudiced at least partly expresses 
itself - it having been established by Wilkins and by Janis and Frick 
that an argument tends to be judged valid if its conclusion is true and
invalid if its conclusion is false even in circumstances where emotion
cannot seriously be thought to play a part.
There was evidence, from an inspection of the responses of the 
poor and good reasoners to the two Forms of Section B of the Valentine 
test, that they might differ in respect of their susceptibility to the 
last three of the five effects listed above. There were large differ­
ences between the groups on those items where the argument was valid and 
the conclusion judged by another, comparable, group of undergraduates to 
be false. In other arguments where the two groups differed substantially 
in their degree of success, PR subjects showed a greater tendency to 
offer as a reason for rejecting an argument the falsity of one of the 
premises (showing that they did not understand or - more likely, in view 
of their success with other items - did not consistently adhere to the 
terms of the task), or appeared to suppose that 'Only X's are Y's' implies 
the truth of its converse, the mirror-image of the confusion about the 
meaning of the universal affirmative referred to above.
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It was in this last area that the efforts of the experimental 
part of the research reported in this thesis were concentrated. Having 
selected two groups of subjects, matched one to one on a composite measure 
of academic attainment and ability but differing widely in respect of 
their scores on the two Forms of Section B of the Valentine Reasoning 
Tests, I tried to establish first of all whether they differed in the 
adequacy with which they grasped the meaning of five types of statement, 
three of them playing prominent roles in the items of the criterion tests 
and two playing smaller parts but incorporating the logically important 
connectives 'if ... then' and 'either ... or'. These were the universal 
affirmative in categorical and hypothetical form (A and Ah respectively), 
the universal negative (e ), a universal-disjunctive (Ad) and the 'Only X's 
are Y's' form of statement (f ).
The assumption on which the 'five types of statement' (5TS) exper­
iment was based was that differences in performance on Wason's 'card- 
turning' task, as applied to the five types of statement in question, 
would indicate differences in the extent to which GR and PR subjects 
understand these types of statement. Since PR subjects did significantly 
less well on the A and F types but not on Ad, E or (with one exception)
Ah, the inference would appear to be that PR subjects understand the A 
and F types (but not the others) less well than their GR counterparts.
Such an inference seems to be supported by the results of the later, 4TS, 
experiment where the differences between the groups, in slightly different 
circumstances, proved to be highly significant, not only in A and F but 
also, and as one should expect, on the other form of the universal dis­
junctive Ah, and where the groups differed in their proneness to the 'con­
verse' error, an error which admits of only one interpretation, namely, 
that the subject who commits it misunderstands the statement concerned 
(in the 4TS experiment the universal affirmative) in the sense that he 
assumes that the relationship said to exist between its terms is a recip­
rocal, and not simply a one-way, one. On the reasonable assumption that 
a similar difference between the groups could be established in their 
proneness to commit the converse error in the case of F statements, it 
seems as if one may conclude that a difference has been shown to exist 
between the groups which is of considerable explanatory value in respect 
of their performances on the Valentine test, and, by implication, of their 
deductive reasoning ability in general - for we have noted that the illicit 
'conversion' of the -universal affirmative would render a subject liable to 
some of the fallacies which Wilkins found undergraduates had most diffic­
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ulty in detecting and which were most effective in discriminating between 
those who scored high and those who scored low in her syllogism test. 
Equally, at a more specific level, we have seen that this mistake, and its 
counterpart in the case of F, would account for some failures in the crit­
erion Valentine test.
It is, however, necessary to admit that the above interpretation 
of the differences between the groups on the 5TS (and the corresponding 
part of the 4TS) task, though in my view the most plausible, is not an 
inescapable one. This is true, I think, even of the connexion between 
the significant differences in the number of converse errors made and in 
success in recognising the cards which need to be turned over to establish 
the truth or falsity of an A statement: although, as I say, the latter
failure may very plausibly be attributed to the former, it is open to a 
critic to suggest that the difference between the groups on this statement 
type in the 5TS task would not have reached significant proportions in the 
absence of other predisposing factors. What some of these other factors 
may be became apparent in the discussion of various aspects of the respon­
ses to the 5TE task and it is the probable intervention of these factors 
which throws the strongest doubt on the alleged relationship between 
success on the 5TS task (and its 4TE counterpart) and adequacy of under­
standing of the statements involved.
Perhaps the most important single piece of evidence in this con­
nexion was drawn from the 1968 paper by Wason and Johnson-Laird where it 
was reported that subjects make fewer errors on the card-turning task when 
they are asked to deal with the universal affirmative in its disjunctive 
form than when dealing with the hypothetical (and, by implication of 
Wason's own results as well as those reported in this thesis, the cate­
gorical) equivalents. To insist that the first of these is not easier 
to understand than the other two is admittedly to set a subjective estim­
ate against what may appear to be an objective measure of difficulty, but 
this is a procedure which has characterised the development of objective 
measures of subjective phenomena since the beginning of psychology and it 
may be supported in this particular case by reference to Wason's own 
demonstrations of the difficulties presented by information in negative 
form - for the disjunctive equivalent of the universal affirmative is 
'Everything is either not X or it is Y' whereas the categorical and hypo­
thetical forms, with which we have become very familiar in the course of 
this thesis, are, 'All X's are Y's' (or, 'Every X is a Y') and 'If any-
thing is an. X it is also a Y ' .
As I have said, the implication of this case, that success on 
the card-turning task does not depend in any straightforward way on the 
intrinsic difficulty of the statement in question, is supported by the 
the results of the progressive analysis of errors in the 5TS task. Con­
sideration of the location (left or right hand half-set) and nature (com­
mission or omission) of the errors most frequently occurring in different 
statement-types suggested that the success with which subjects tackle the 
card-turning task with reference to any particular statement-type depends 
on the extent to which (a) the correct response approximates to a ’match­
ing response’ (in which the subject turns only the cards with named 
characters), (b) the correct response is the same in both half-sets, and 
(c) the grammatical form of the statement encourages the belief that it 
refers to both classes of cards mentioned and not simply to the first.
The operation of these factors, in addition to the one suggested 
by Wason's and Johnson-Laird's results referred to above - that success on 
a statement-tyjje depends on the extent to which the grammatical form of 
the statement alerts subjects to the difficulties of the task - makes it 
certain that the card-turning task cannot be used as a means of assessing 
the relative intrinsic difficulty of grammatically different types of 
statement. It does not, however, follow that differences in the success
with which individuals respond to the card-turning task as it relates to
any particular type of statement are not largely determined by differ­
ences in their grasp of the meaning of statements of that type: other­
wise, of course, the view of the results of the 5TS experiment which I 
have described as highly plausible would not be tenable. At the same 
time it clearly requires one to assume that there are no significant 
differences between individuals in respect of the four factors I have 
mentioned as affecting performance on the card-turning task or else that 
such differences as exist are closely associated with differences in under­
standing of the statement-type in question. In fact I have tried to show
that the second of these alternatives applies in the case of the signific­
ant difference which was found in the frequency with which GR and PR
groups made matching responses in statement-types where these are not
identical with the correct response (as they are in E): a subject who
supposes that 'All X's are Y's ' means or implies that all Y's are X's or 
that 'Only X's are Y's' means or implies that only Y's are X's would 
naturally express this view in a tendency to make matching responses.
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If these assumptions are not granted, however, the significant 
differences between the GR and PR groups on A and F statements in the 5TS 
task, and on these and Ah in the corresponding part of the 4TS task, 
would most naturally be taken to indicate differences bearing no explan­
atory relationship to success or failure in the syllogistic reasoning task, 
and the inescapable fact, established in the ’converse errors’ component 
of the 4TS task, that PR subjects are more likely to assume that a univers­
al affirmative implies the truth of its converse, would represent a rather 
fortuitous confirmation of a hypothesis about the sources of differences 
in syllogistic reasoning ability. On this view the differences between 
the groups in the 5TS experiment and its 4TS counterpart would simply be 
another way in which the differences between the two groups in their 
ability to cope with deductive reasoning tasks set out in predominantly 
verbal terms expresses itself and the fact that the differences occur in 
the cases they do and not in Ad and E, far from reflecting a highly signi­
ficant relationship between the statement-types involved, would simply be 
a function of the greater difficulties these statements present.
As I have said, this is not the view I myself take: I present
it because it suggests itself as a plausible alternative to my own view 
and because I have not as yet collected the kind of evidence which would 
be necessary to decide finally between the two. Whether or not we inter­
pret the differences between the groups on the 5TS task as reflecting
differences which could partly explain their differing degrees of success
siipply
on the Valentine test, Section B, or/as further evidence of the GR group's 
superior deductive reasoning ability, there have been aspects of the 
responses of the two categories of subject which have seemed to merit some 
attention even though their bearing on performance in the Valentine test 
seemed obscure from the first. These include the evidence of 'playing 
safe' on the part of the GR group in the 5TS task, the speedier progress 
which this^sliowed in the nine trials with the A statement-type in the 4T3 
task (with its incidental confirmation of the importance, for success in 
this task, of not assuming that a universal affirmative implies the truth 
of its converse) and the significantlygreater frequency with which the PR 
group took an unacceptable view of the truth-value of an A statement which 
refers to an empty class. Into this category too, though at the furthest 
remove from the central problem of this thesis, because not apparently 
related to the GR-PR dimension, comes the observation of the greater 
difficulty subjects had in recognising a card as an exception to a rule if 
it had the named character on its reverse side.
What has been said about the difficulty of being certain about 
the correct interpretation of responses to the card-turning task serves 
to illustrate the point that an experiment in psychology - and particular­
ly, of course, one employing fairly novel procedures - is likely to reveal 
unsuspected aspects of the task as well as reflecting the capacities of 
subjects: progress in assessing the latter is made by taking account of
the former, as was done, to some extent, in the evolution of the 4TS 
experiment from the earlier 5TS one. The same duality of outcome may be 
seen in the case of the ’negatives task' with which the first part of 
chapter 5 was concerned. Originally intended to establish whether PR 
subjects have more difficulty than GR subjects with negative particles the 
results seemed to suggest a difference between them with respect to a 
single negative component. whether the component were 'syntactical' (as 
in the need to deal with a statement couched in negative terms) or 'seman­
tic' (as in the condition where subjects were required to make a statement 
false). At the same time, the instability of response times in the con­
dition where both these components were involved made it impossible to be 
certain whether the confirmation naturally looked for in this quarter 
failed to materialise because the difference between the groups in respect 
of negative components is not a real one or because the measuring instru­
ment is defective: an aspect of the experimental situation which could
go unnoticed, or unremarked upon, as long as the experimenter's purpose 
was to make a comparison within groups across conditions becomes obtrus­
ive when the aim is to compare performance within conditions across groups.
As I have suggested in chapter 5, an attempt to achieve a more stable
not only
measure of the difficulty of the false-negative condition is important/for 
the kind of purposes served by the research reported in this thesis but 
also for the investigation of the Eifermann hypothesis of a relationship 
between emotionality and difficulties with negatives: as it is, the dis­
covery of a small but significant relationship between scores on the N 
scale of the E.P.I. and slowness of response to the true-negative condition
must be regarded as a somewhat problematic source of support for that
speed of
hypothesis in the absence of any relationship between N and/response to the 
false-negative condition.
The extraversion and neuroticism or emotionality of the GR and 
PR groups was assessed by means of the Eysenck Personality Inventory, 
primarily with a view to testing the hypothesis that a difference between 
the groups in the difficulty experienced with negatives might be explained 
in terms of a difference in one or other of these dimensions of personality.
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In fact, although PR subjects were on average more introvert and more 
emotional (’neurotic1) than their GR counterparts, as the relevant hypo­
theses predicted, neither difference was large enough to be significant 
on a two-tailed t_ test. Hence it seems likely that the difference in 
deductive reasoning ability on which this thesis has focussed is not 
related to a difference in these aspects of personality either directly, 
or indirectly, via the ubiquitous negative components of deductive reason­
ing tasks or via some other, unspecified,factor or factors.
An aspect of the outcomes of the various comparisons of the two 
groups made in the course of this thesis which should not go without 
comment in this concluding review is the extent of overlap between the 
groups, a striking concrete instance of which would be the performance, in 
the 5TS task, of the PR subject, LD, which excelled all others including 
the best of the GR subjects’ performances. Of course it would be naive 
to suppose that the 'GR' and 'PR' labels correspond to any clearcut divis­
ion of subjects into classes. It is not only that the instruments used 
to constitute the two groups are of imperfect reliability and validity 
but also that the basis of selection was such that while the average 
standing of the two kinds of subject on the criterion Valentine test was 
markedly different, the range of scores within each group was such that 
the lowest GR score exceeded the highest PR score by only one T-scale 
point. What was fairly constant from one pair of subjects to another 
was the gap between performance on the Valentine test, Section B, and the 
academic attainment and ability of the PR subject as measured in other 
ways. It ought not to come as a surprise, therefore, that some PR sub­
jects never made a converse error in the 4TS experiment and that some GR 
subjects did make mistakes of this kind. The conclusions drawn from 
any experiment in the biological or social sciences is likely to be stat­
istical in character: it is just that certain events or characteristics
occur so much more often in one set of conditions or in one kind of organ­
ism than they do in another that it is highly unlikely that there is only 
an accidental relationship between the difference in frequency of occur­
rence and the difference in condition or organism. Accordingly, the main 
conclusion supported by the experimental part of this thesis appears to 
be that when general academic attainment and ability is held relatively 
constant, different degrees of success on a deductive reasoning task are 
associated in subjects of high ability with different degrees of proneness 
to assume that the converse of a true universal affirmative is also true - 
and (probably) that the converse of a true F proposition is also true - and,
again with some probability, with different degrees of difficulty with 
the negative components of the kind of task in question.
The research reported in this thesis, like most researches, is 
incomplete in the sense that it leaves many questions unanswered, includ­
ing some which have been raised by the findings of the present study and 
one or two upon the answers to which rests a decision about the proper 
interpretation of the findings themselves. Into the last category, as 
we have seen, fall (a) the question whether the absence of any significant 
difference between GR and PR groups on the false-negative condition of the 
negatives task is attributable to the instability of the response-time 
measure of difficulty in this case or the absence of any real difference 
between the groups on this condition and (b) the question whether the GR 
and PR groups differed significantly in the success with which they 
responded to the A, Ah and F types of statement (but not to Ad and E) 
because of the meanings of the statements concerned and their roles in 
a syllogistic reasoning task or whether the difference is to be attrib­
uted simply to a difference between the groups in reasoning ability in 
general, together with the greater difficulties presented, specifically 
in connexion with the card-turning task, by the A, Ah and F types of 
statement. Answers to both questions depend, in turn, on the develop­
ment of appropriate measuring instruments, obviously, in the former case, 
a stable means of establishing the difficulty different individuals ex­
perience with the false-negative condition, less obviously, perhaps, in 
the latter case, a way of determining the amount of difficulty a subject 
has in understanding a particular type of statement (the non-existence of 
any obvious means of achieving this having prompted the use of the card- 
turning task in the first place). One other task, again of the most 
immediate relevance to the conclusions drawn in this thesis although un­
likely to present practical difficulties of the same dimension, is the 
investigation of the incidence of 'converse errors' in the F case and 
their relationship to success and failure in a syllogistic reasoning task.
Other matters, arising from the research reported in this 
thesis but not of such immediate relevance to the problem which it invest­
igates, concern the existence, and mode of operation of, a 'directional 
set' which hinders the recognition of exceptions to a rule in the card- 
turning task when the cards in question have the character first named on 
their 'reverse' sides, and the incidence and basis of the view that a 
universal affirmative which refers to an empty class is false.
182
The second of these questions touches on what I have described, 
at the end of chapter 4, as our ignorance about some of the fundamental 
components of the logical appraisal of arguments, in particular, in this 
case, the extent to which undergraduates (and others) possess an adequate 
vocabulary for this purpose. In discussing the fact that PR subjects 
were significantly more likely to say that an A statement referring to an 
empty class of cards is false I mentioned the possibility that they might 
mean by ’false' simply that there was something wrong with the statement 
or, more specifically, that it 'implied' something which was not the case 
(viz., that there were cards of the kind in question). An uncertainty 
about the appropriate use of the basic terms 'true' and 'false', 'valid' 
and 'invalid' is apparent also in some of the papers reviewed in the 
opening chapter of this thesis, for subjects were sometimes asked - for 
example, in the Thistlethwaite study (1950) - to indicate whether a con­
clusion followed from the premises (that is, whether the argument was 
valid or not) by circling a T (for 'true') or an F (for 'false'). Either 
the psychologist himself did not recognise the importance of not confusing 
the truth-value of the conclusion with the validity o otherwise of the 
argument or else he assumed that his subjects would not recognise it.
Closely connected with this issue is the distinction between the 
case in which a conclusion is established by means of an argument (the 
argument is valid and the premises are true) and the case where only the 
first of these conditions obtains. If we ask a group of undergraduates 
to say simply what is wrong with an argument (which is in fact invalid) 
what proportion of them will consider only the validity of the argument, 
what proportion both the validity and the truth of the premises, and what 
proportion only the truth of the premises? A fragment of evidence relat­
ing to this question is presented, in another connexion, in Appendix B 
(p. . ); research along these lines seems likely to shed light on two
of the factors which have been mentioned as sources of error in a syllog­
istic reasoning task, namely, a failure to adhere to the terms of the task 
(Henle, 1962, and Richter, 1957) and the tendency to be influenced in one's 
judgement of the validity of an argument by one's view of the truth or 
falsity of its conclusion.
I referred, in my discussion of the fact that some highly in­
telligent persons (and not just undergraduates I) seem to have been prone 
to the fallacy of supposing that a universal affirmative implies the truth 
of its converse, to the need for research into the conditions predisposing
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a person to make such a mistake, as well as into the development of 
individual differences of a fairly specific kind in this area in general. 
With the addition of this dimension to the one just considered one clearly 
has a programme of research of such proportions that the chief problem, 
apart from the acquisition of sufficient numbers of subjects prepared to 
submit themselves to this kind of task, is likely to be one of organis­
ation or, to put it more crudely, of knowing where to begin. It may be 
the chief virtue of this thesis, at least for the present writer, that it 
makes this particular problem of decision rather easier than it might 
otherwise be.
APPENDIX A
VALENTINE'S REASONING TESTS FOR HIGHER LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
Summary This appendix presents evidence bearing on the adequacy of 
Valentine's Reasoning Tests for Higher Levels of Intelligence, scores on 
Section B of this test, in the published form and in a form devised by 
the present writer, having been used as a basis for selecting subjects of 
widely differing degrees of deductive reasoning ability for the experi­
mental work described in the body of this thesis. A scrutiny of the 
test's items, suggested by the results of an item analysis using Anstey's 
d method, reveals that three of them are defective. Doubts are expressed 
about the way in which the guessing correction in Section B works, about 
the adequacy of the instructions in Section B and of the time allowed for 
the whole test, and about the convenience of the arrangements for scoring 
the test. The predictive validity of the test appears to be at least not 
greater than that of Terman's Concept Mastery Test, at any rate for the 
Glasgow undergraduate population sampled. The internal consistency of 
the test is remarkably high in view of the small number of items, but its 
alternative form reliability is much lower, there being evidence of a 
strong practice effect, at least over a period as short as a week. The 
students who had sat the Terman test as well as the Valentine were on the 
whole better disposed towards the latter, more of them regarding it as a 
good test of all-round intellectual ability and as a measure of an ability 
essential or desirable for the Honours course of their choice. The 
appendix concludes with the suggestion that while a technically adequate 
version of the Valentine test could probably :not serve as a satisfactory 
measure of general intelligence because of the degree of its dependence 
on the special ability to reason logically, and while it would, for the 
same reason, be unfair to some applicants for admission to university, it 
is a test without exact counterpart within the field of reasoning ability 
testing and one which would lend itself to development in a number of 
directions. It is admitted that if the defects of the test had been 
apparent before the selection of subjects for the experimental research 
reported in this thesis had been completed, it would have been advisable 
to make some allowance for them. As it was, the results of the experi­
ments described in the main part of this thesis make it clear that the two 
groups selected were genuinely different in the relevant respect.
A.1 Introduction The research described in this thesis was originally 
designed to serve two related purposes: (l) to identify undergraduates
of above average academic ability and attainment who have unusual diffi­
culty with a syllogistic reasoning task and, by comparing them with other 
students of comparable ability who have much more success with such tasks, 
to try to discover some of the sources of their difficulty; (2) to add 
to the resources currently available for the purpose of distinguishing the 
two types of student. The first, and primary, purpose was, of course, 
served by the experimental work described in the body of this thesis;
184
185
this appendix relates the, rather unexpected, outcome of my attempt to 
achieve the second.
For reasons set out in chapter 2 I came to believe that the best 
published measure of performance in the kind of syllogistic reasoning 
task I was interested in was Valentine's Reasoning Tests for Higher Levels 
of Intelligence (Valentine, 1954, 1961) and in particular the second, 
main, section of that test. It seemed to me that for many experimental
purposes - most obviously, of course, studies of the effects of 'remedial
2
measures' - this test, which I shall refer to as the VRT for short, was 
very much less useful than it might be because available in only one form. 
The way in which I intended to achieve the second of the aims described 
above was, therefore, by devising an alternative form of the test. The 
undertaking seemed to be likely to be a relatively easy one in view of the 
fact that reasoning tasks, and especially deductive reasoning tasks, have 
a logical 'form' which can be clothed in a number of different 'contents'. 
Providing certain precautions suggested by the Wilkins monograph (1928), 
reviewed at some length in chapter 1, were taken, it seemed reasonable to 
expect to be able to produce an alternative form unusually close in its 
parallel to the original.
If this intention had been fulfilled, this appendix would have 
been devoted to a discussion of the alternative form and to the present­
ation of evidence of its adequacy. In fact, although an alternative form 
3
was devised and tried out, as we shall see, on a sample of almost 320 
Glasgow undergraduates, the closer acquaintance with the VRT which the 
preparation of the relevant evidence entailed has led me to have serious 
doubts about the technical adequacy of the original. As dubious features 
of the original (Form V, as I came to call it) are embodied in the parallel 
form ('Form ¥'), I propose to refer to the latter only in the course of a 
discussion of the former. This discussion will show, I think, that the 
VRT as published needs to be altered, at least in some details.
The improvement which would be effected by the appropriate 
changes would be important, not only for the special experimental purposes 
mentioned above but also because the VRT was intended by its author as a
1 Reproduced, for convenience of reference, in Appendix B.
2 See the papers by Elton (1965) and Backhouse (1967). Backhouse also 
produced an alternative form of the VRT which has not been published.
3 Also in Appendix B.
186
test of general intellectual ability and, as such, as an instrument for 
selecting applicants for places in universities and training colleges.
It has been recommended by Elton (1965) for the assessment of students 
wishing to transfer from one university to another and, potentially more 
important, at least in this country, commended by Anstey (1966) as ’an 
extremely clever and promising test' of high-grade intelligence. Although 
I shall argue against these uses of the VRT, it seemed useful to take the 
opportunity which presented itself of adding to the data included in 
Valentine's own publications results from my own sample about the extent 
to which performance on the VRT is related (a) to academic attainment,
(b) to performance on another, more traditional, group test of intelligence 
intended for subjects of high ability, Terman's Concept Mastery Test 
(Terman, 1956) and (c) to performance on my alternative form. I shall 
also be able to report on the extent to which my own subjects regarded the 
Valentine test as an acceptable means of assessing all-round intellectual 
ability or of selecting applicants for university places and I shall con­
clude with some more general remarks about the plausibility of Valentine's 
claim that a test of reasoning ability of this kind could serve as a satis­
factory measure either of general intelligence or of 'scholastic aptitude1. 
Amongst the evidence adduced in support of a negative verdict will be the 
case of subjects such as the PR group whose poor performance on Section B 
of the VRT served as the starting-point for the research described in the 
main part of this thesis.
A.2 The Valentine Reasoning Tests: general description The VRT, as
I have mentioned, has two parts, Section A, which consists of four problems
which call for 'inductive reasoning', and Section B, which comprises twelve
problems in which the task is to evaluate arguments ('deductive reasoning'). 
Valentine (1954-) says the first, third and fourth problems of A require the 
subject to deal,respectively, with relations of time, space and number.
The second problem, it seems to me, involves the application of some of the 
principles of induction first formulated by Mill (1843). In Section B 
the subject has to say, of the conclusions of twelve arguments, whether 
they follow from the premises and, if they do not, to select from three (in 
the first case) or (in all other cases) four reasons offered the one which 
'gives the best reason why the conclusion does not follow from the premises'. 
In fact there are four conclusions which do follow from the premises and, 
therefore, eight which do not.
It will be clear from the above that the items of Section B are
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of the choice-response type. In Section A the third and fourth items are 
of the inventive-response variety: the subject simply says (in item 3)
whether D is nearer to A or to C or (in item 4) on what principles the 
father's money was distributed. The first and second items are somewhat 
unusual in the sense that the subject is asked to express his conclusion, 
about the murderer or about the source of the poison, by underlining, 
scoring out, or putting a question-mark against, various statements relat­
ing to his conclusion, according as he regards them as necessarily true, 
necessarily false, or else doubtful. Correctly applied, this system 
should express different conclusions via characteristically different 
patterns of response, although in scoring these items the response to each 
statement is treated as if it were independent of all the others.
Form ¥ was constructed along exactly similar lines. In Section 
A the problems were once again couched in terms of time, space and number 
relations, with item 2 involving something like the inductive methods of 
Mill. An attempt was made to retain the special features of the original 
problems, for example, the notion of a locus of points in the solution to 
item 3 and the double principle in item 4. The solutions to all problems 
except the first were, however, different from the corresponding V solut­
ions (as I think subjects would have assumed, particularly in view of the 
special instructions^ issued on the occasion of the second VET testing 
session). In Section B the 'logical form1 of the arguments and of the
reasons offered was exactly as it had been in the original form while the
2
content or subject-matter of the items was changed. To prevent subjects
simply recalling their responses in the form they had completed first and
thus spuriously inflating the correlation between scores on the two forms
(Anastasi, 1968, p. 80), I changed the order of the items apart from the
first, 5, by far the easiest, 11, and the last, double, item, 15A and B,
the most difficult. In all cases, moreover, the order in which the reas-
3
ons were presented was different in the two forms. One other precaution, 
suggested by the work of Wilkins (1928) and Janis and Frick (1943) discuss­
ed in chapter 1, was to try to equate the two forms with respect to the 
(perceived) truth-value of their conclusions.
1 See Appendix B.
2 I have to thank Mr Eric Toms of the Logic Department of Glasgow Uni­
versity for independent confirmation of the logical equivalence of the 
items of Section B in the two forms.
3 A comparison of the two forms and of the correct solutions to them 
(Appendix B) will make the extent of the differences clear.
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The Valentine test has a time limit of 55 minutes, subjects 
being warned after 20 minutes and advised to proceed to Section B.
A.3 Testing arrangements, means and standard deviations The members
of the entire Ordinary Psychology class at the University of Glasgow in
1967-8 took the two Forms of the Valentine on successive Fridays and
1
Terman’s Concept Mastery Test on the intervening Tuesday. For the 
Valentine tests the class was divided into two halves, those whose sur­
names began with the letters A to L doing Form ¥, and the other half Form 
V, first. The total number of students in the class was 325. Of these
322 sat the CMT, 320 Form ¥ and 318 Form V. Of the 158 who sat Form V 
first, the group in which we shall be primarily interested in subsequent 
sections, 31 were male Arts students, 76 female Arts, 38 male Science and 
13 female Science students. All distributions are set out in Appendix B; 
Table 1.1 presents means and standard deviations for various groups on the 
three tests.
TABLE A.1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIOUS GROUPS ON THE TWO FORMS OF 
THE VRT AND ON THE CONCEPT MASTERY TEST (CMT)
N Mean S.D.
A-L subjects 160 43.2 11.6
VRT Form V M-Y subjects 158 36.3 13.9
A-L subjects 161 39.1 12.1
VRT Form ¥ M-Y subjects 159 45.0 12.2
All subjects 322 104.2 27.4
CMT Arts subjects 218 108.1 26.7
Science subjects 104 96.2 29.0
It will be seen that the two Forms are reasonably close in terms 
of the above statistics - as indeed they are in terms of the underlying 
distributions (Appendix B) - although Form ¥ proved to be slightly easier - 
for reasons which remain obscure. The mean for my M-Y group is slightly 
higher than the value quoted by Valentine for undergraduates drawn from
1 Special thanks are due to Professor R. ¥. Pickford for permission to 
carry out this testing program, without which none of the research 
described in this thesis would have been possible.
189
a variety of English Universities, namely, 34.8. In the absence of a
better understanding of the factors which promote success in reasoning
tasks, especially of the Section B variety, this small difference may
perhaps be attributed to the fact that almost half of the Arts students
in my sample had taken a philosophy class in their degree and that 20 per
1
cent said that they had been helped by this in their answers to the VRT.
On the other hand, we have no comparable information about the students 
who made up Valentine’s sample and the difference is not a significant one.
I have given separate Arts and Science results for the CMT because of the 
large difference in favour of Arts students on this test, a difference 
which appears to be due to a bias in this test towards subjects with a 
particular kind of educational background and one, therefore, which I have 
had to take account of in the discussions of later sections of this chap­
ter and in the selection of subjects for the experimental studies described 
previously. There was a difference between faculties in the opposite 
direction in the case of the VRT and also a difference favouring men rather 
than women. Neither difference was significant, however, although the 
difference between male Science and female Arts students, the extreme cases, 
was significant.
A.4 Item difficulty and validity The Valentine does not lend itself
easily to item analysis inasmuch as only four of its items appear to be
of the usual pass-fail variety. It is true that Anstey’s 'E' indices
(Anstey, 1966, p. 103 f.) are supposed to deal with cases in which items
are not of this kind. However, the difficulty which has to be dealt with
in the VRT does not concern items which subjects have omitted or failed to
reach (as the E indices appear to do) but arises because of the different
degrees of success recognised in each item. This is most obvious in the
case of the four items of Section A where the possible range of scores is,
2
respectively, 0-6, 0-8, 0-4 and 0-5. It also holds for the eight items 
of Section B where the conclusion does not follow from the premises: a
subject scores 5 points for complete success, 0 for a correct verdict about 
the validity of the argument but without the correct reason, and -1 for a 
wrong verdict.
1 See responses to the questionnaire described in section A.7 and reprod­
uced in Appendix B.
2 It may look at first glance as if the items 1 and 2 are really composed 
of, respectively, six and eight items of the pass-fail variety. In fact 
this is not the true state of affairs for, as I have mentioned in A.2, the 
various items are not independent: a subject who concludes that Frogger 
was the murderer, for example, will produce a pattern of responses which 
reflects this fact and his score is really a function of two things, his 
ability to draw the correct conclusion and to 'express' it correctly.
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Valentine himself compared the success rates of the top and 
bottom thirds of his largest single standardisation sample, 92 male train­
ing college students. Instead of the more usual comparison between the 
proportions of each group passing the item, the special nature of the scor­
ing system just referred to must have obliged him to compare the total or 
average scores of the two groups on each item. He reports that all items 
had a satisfactory 'validity score1 on this criterion except 15A which, he 
says, was too difficult even for the ablest members of this group. In 
view of the small number of items in the test, and of the fact that it is 
intended for use in the selection of candidates for training college,'1 as 
well as university, places, it may be thought that this result of Valentine's 
own item analysis should have suggested at least a modification of the item 
in question. As for the relative difficulty of items, Valentine must 
again presumably have judged this, not by the proportion passing but by the 
percentage of possible score for each item actually achieved by the group 
(the method I adopt for Section A). The results of this part of Valentine's 
analysis seem to have justified the order in which the items are arranged 
at least to the extent that the last item in Section A and the last two or 
three items of Section B proved to be the most difficult.
I decided to attempt a different approach to the problem of item 
analysis, at least so far as Section B is concerned. Even in Section A it 
is clearly possible in principle to dichotomise responses to an item as 
correct or otherwise (pass or fail) but there can be no doubt that this 
produces .anomalies: on this criterion, for example, item 2 is the most
difficult because relatively few subjects score full marks on it; on the 
other hand, many subjects lose only 1, 2 or 3 points (out of a possible 8) 
and very few indeed score 0 - whereas 0 is a relatively common score on 
items 3 and 4. In Section B, on the other hand, the decision to treat 
the items as if they were pass-fail in character is a good deal more easily 
justified if only because, as we have seen, four of the items are in effect 
of this form anyway. The others can be so regarded if we cease to make a 
distinction between a correct verdict with a wrong reason and a wrong ver­
dict. In terms of the subject's response this approach ceases to regard 
the task as two part in character - first deciding whether the conclusion 
follows from the premises and then, if it does not, identifying the reason 
which best explains why it does not. Instead, items are treated as if 
they were of the familiar choice-response variety, the subject's choice 
being between 'Yes', 'No (i)', 'No (ii)', 'No (iii)' and, in all items 
except 5, ’No (iv)'. It is not a view which one readily accepts for it
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is a common enough experience that one suspects a flaw in an argument 
before one can say what it is: one feels that the distinction between
correctly judging of the validity of an argument and recognising a state­
ment of the fallacy, if any, it contains is one which should be preserved.
In a test construction,context, however, there is the difficulty, obviously 
felt by Valentine, of distinguishing between a subject who gets the correct 
answer by chance and the subject who genuinely does know that an argument 
is faulty but cannot identify the reason. It is a problem which exists, 
apparently in unmitigated form, in connexion with the four items where the 
conclusion does follow from the premises and in the next section I shall 
discuss ways of coping with the problem. In the meantime, it may be 
enough to support the decision to regard the items of Section B as if the 
subject did in every case choose between four or five alternatives from 
the outset by reference to the answers of subjects to item 35 in the quest­
ionnaire referred to above: only 21 per cent of Arts, and 28 per cent of
Science, subjects said that they never looked at the reasons before decid­
ing about the validity of the argument. To an unknown extent, therefore, 
it seems that the view I am taking of the items of Section B corresponds 
with the view taken by subjects and, amongst other things, this may explain 
why the items in which the conclusion does follow and where the chances of 
guessing the correct answer are in theory even turn out to be, on Valentine's 
analysis as well as on my own, as we shall see, to be at least as 'valid' 
as the items in which the chances of a correct guess are in theory much 
less.
A disadvantage of treating the items of Sections A and B differ­
ently is that it is not possible to compare them in respect of difficulty 
and validity. However, this is not, I think, a serious disadvantage, 
partly because it is obviously appropriate that items increase in diffi­
culty within each section and partly because the relationship between these 
two types of item and total score must be expected to favour the items of 
Section B,which contribute twice as much to the total.
Section A Table A. 2 presents the percentage of the maximum 
possible score actually obtained in the items of Section A by members of 
the M-Y and A-L groups and also the product-moment correlations between 
item score and total score. I have included data from both groups in 
this and other tables in the present section because of the unmistakable 
evidence they generally present of the effects of the A-L group's exposure 
to Form W.
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TABLE A.2
INDICES OF THE DIFFICULTY AND VALIDITY OF ITEMS IN SECTION A OF THE VRT
M-Y subjects* A-L subjects
Item: 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
Percentage of max.
possible score 79.0 67.2 61.4 40.7 87.5 71.3 50.9 45.7
actually obtained
Product-moment
correlation with 0.43 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.22 0.37 0.56 0.27
total score
* This group did Form V first
All r*s are significant. Their different sizes must to some 
extent reflect the different contributions the different items make to 
total score - item 2 most and item 3 least. If we take this into account, 
it seems especially safe to conclude that there is little difference be­
tween the items in respect of validity, a result which I find surprising 
in view of what appears to be the superiority of the third and fourth 
items. These are not only in the preferred inventive-response form but 
also call for an effort of concentration of the kind required for success 
in the items of Section B; the first and second items, in contrast, are 
relatively simple and the exact form in which the subject is asked to 
respond is, to my mind, rather dubious. As regards difficulty, the order 
in which they are presented appears to be the correct one. One curious 
aspect of the results for the two groups - curious in that it differs from 
all but one of the other 15 items of the test - is that the difficulty of 
item 3 seems to have been greater for the A-L group than for the M-Y group.
This may be thought to be a case of negative transfer, for the solution to
item 3 of Form W permits of a definite answer to the question about the 
distance of D from A and C whereas item 3 of the original Form does not.
The improvement on item 4 apparently produced by practice on Form W may be
1 As one subject remarked in response to item 11 in the questionnaire, 
there is something odd about having to say (in response to item 1) whether 
it must be true, or must be false, that Frogger could not have been the 
murderer, or that it may be true that he could have been. The objections 
in the case of item 2 are less serious and the point of asking for the 
particular kind of response in question is clearer in this case. On the 
other hand, a subject who assumes that there is only one poisoned food, and 
consistently expresses his conclusion that it must therefore be the fish or 
the cheese (but not both) in terms of the eight statements scores one point 
less than a subject who makes the more serious mistake of accepting that 
there may be more than one poisoned food but denying that the food which 
only one of the victims ate could be poisoned.
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explained mainly in terms of the number of subjects having time to attempt
it: there were only 18 members of the A-L group who showed no sign of
having made a beginning with this item (by leaving 'working', for example) 
as compared with 33 in the M-Y group. In other words, practice probably 
did not so much improve performance on item 4 specifically as, by speeding 
responses to earlier items, improve the circumstances in which item 4 was 
attempted.
Section B For Section B I have carried out a full-scale analysis 
according to Anstey's d method (Anstey, 1966, chap. 9). The full results 
are presented in Appendix B. Table A.3 presents d and D, together with 
the 'index of easiness', 1(e ). 1(e ) is a figure which attempts to allow
for the fact that not all those who do not attempt an item would necessar­
ily have got it wrong - or would necessarily have got it right. It is a
compromise between 100R/N (where R is the number of subjects who got the 
item right) and 100R/T (where T is the number who reached the item), the 
former tending to exaggerate the difficulty, and the latter the easiness, of 
an item which all subjects did not reach as compared with an item which 
every subject did reach. The formula for l(E) is: I (E) = 50(R/N + r/t ).
The index d is obtained by subtracting the mean score, for the test as a 
whole, of those who did not get the item right, m(w), from the mean score 
of those who did, m(R). D is found by dividing d by the square root of 
the unbiased estimate of the variance of the population, in the case of the 
M-Y and A-L groups in fact equivalent to the standard deviation, at least 
to two decimal places. D is a particularly useful index for present pur­
poses inasmuch as Anstey (ibid., p. 133) is able to distil his experience 
as a test constructor in terms of it, claiming that if D ^ 1 the item is 
highly satisfactory, if -f-<D<1 the item is satisfactory, if T<D<-f- the 
item is only fairly satisfactory, if i-<D<ir the item is dubious, and if 
D<-4- the item should be scrapped. (All of this on the assumption that 
the item is not unsatisfactory on other, perhaps logical, grounds.) It 
also makes it legitimate to compare the results for my two groups, for whom, 
as we have seen, the standard deviations differ.
It is apparent from Table A.3A that the order of difficulty of 
the items in Section B is less satisfactory than in Section-A. Jn partic­
ular, items 8 and 11 come too early and items 9 and 13 too late. It is 
also to be noted that the level of difficulty of the last two items (which, 
as we shall see, there are other grounds for regarding as unsatisfactory) 
falls short of the point at which it is as easy to choose the correct
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TABLE A. 3
l(E), d AND D FOR THE ITEMS OF VRT SECTION B 
A M-Y subjects (N=158)
Item: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15A 15B
i (e ) 91.1 60.1 62.0 58.9 74.1 63.3 58.2 65.2 73.4 29.8 18.3 18.9
d 17.3 13.5 8.3 9.0 16.3 15.6 17.8 13.0 16.2 13.1 12.1 12.3
D 1.24 0.97 0.59 0.64 1.17 1.11 1.28 0.93 1.16 0.94 0.86 0.88
B A-L subjects (N=160)
Item: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15A 15B
l(E) 98.8 76.6 60.8 76.9 91.3 72.5 74.4 79.4 83.6 32.7 29.0 36.1
d 16.1 9.7 7.0 12.1 9.4 11.8 12.2 12.2 11.1 11.9 10.2 10.1
D 1.39 0.83 0.60 1.04 0.81 1.02 1.05 1.05 0.95 1.02 0.88 0.87
answer by pure luck as it is by serious effort (Anstey, ibid., p.216).
With groups of lower ability - such as the applicants for places at uni­
versity and, especially, training college for which the test was intended - 
the outcome would presumably be rather worse. As between the groups,
practice on Form W produces gains in rates of success in all cases except 
item 7 where the rate actually falls. Gains on other items range from 
the substantial to the enormous with item 14 the only exception, the gain 
in this case being only 3 percent. The average level of difficulty of 
this section (and, as it happens, of Section A) appears to be on the low 
side and would be more so if items 15A and 15B were replaced by easier 
ones. On the other hand, the optimal level of difficulty depends on the 
purpose for which the test is to be used and a test which is to serve as 
a means of selecting candidates for places in a university - not to mention 
a training college - might be expected to be on the easy side for subjects 
who have actually passed into university.
Turning now to the validity of the items, Valentine's finding 
that the 'Yes' items, 6, 9, 12 and 13, are as valid as any, despite their 
apparently greater susceptibility to guessing, (Valentine, 1954, p. 27), is 
confirmed in my own analysis, at least so far as the critical M-Y group is 
concerned, the average D for these items being 1.06 as compared with 0.95 
for the other items. (For the A-L group the figures are 0.91 and 0.97
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respectively.) This result has already been referred to in this section, 
it being suggested that subjects may fail to decide on the validity of an 
argument before inspecting the various reasons why it may not follow and 
so reduce their chances of guessing right on items in which these would 
otherwise be 50 per cent. In terms of Anstey’s classification of items 
on the basis of their D values all except 7 and 8 are clearly satisfactory 
on the results for my M-Y group, 7 being doubtful also with the A-L sub­
jects.
The advantage of the full-scale d method of item analysis is that 
it focuses attention on some of the finer details of an item and, in partic­
ular, may provide evidence which supports doubts engendered by a lowish d, 
as well as drawing attention to items which might otherwise have passed 
without serious question. More specifically, Anstey suggests that items 
in which the mean score of subjects putting an erroneous response approach­
es the mean score for subjects putting the right answer call for further 
investigation. It is a little difficult to be sure how close the approach 
has to be before action is called for. Inspection of the full record of 
the item analysis of Section B for the M-Y group (Appendix B) suggests that 
item 7 may be such a case, for here five subjects with a mean score of 38.0 
(as compared with a m(R) of 39.3) have omitted to make a choice from 
amongst the reasons offered. Doubts about item 8 are also encouraged by 
the fact that the 24 subjects who thought the conclusion does follow from 
the premises have a mean only 4.3 below m(R)- as well as by the fact that 
two competent subjects omitted the item. Doubts are raised about 15A by 
the high means of subjects who chose ’No (i)' or who failed to choose a 
reason. Corroboration of all these points is to be found in the analysis 
of the responses of A-L subjects.
Having looked again closely at these three items I must confess 
to finding no logical fault with 8 and, in particular, no justification for 
the view that the argument is valid. The mistake is an interesting one, 
however, because it may be due to a kind of misunderstanding which has 
already been the subject of much comment in the main part of this thesis: 
the argument would be valid if - and, as reason (iv) points out, only if - 
’always' could legitimately be construed to include 'only' as well, that is 
to say, if the statement, ’All fools make this mistake' could be taken to 
mean that only fools do so - or that all those who make this mistake are 
fools. We have already noted (p. 145) that people of the highest ability 
are susceptible to this misunderstanding.
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Scrutiny of items 7 and 15A, on the other hand, produces a diff­
erent outcome and suggests that they must at least be altered. In the 
case of 7 the difficulty is that none of the reasons offered (including, of 
course, the 'correct' reason) is logically satisfactory. To be specific, 
reason (ii), the one supposed to be correct, is an argument incorporating 
a fallacy almost exactly comparable with the fallacy, which mars reason (iii). 
The fallacy is apparent if the reason is restated as follows: 'If some
ten-pound householders do not vote for Mr B (as the premises allow) and if 
all those who vote for Mr B are Whigs, it follows that some householders
are not Whigs.' In formal terms this is an example of the illicit process
of the major term and, oddly enough, it would elude someone who made the 
mistake referred to in the previous paragraph, for the conclusion would 
follow from the premises stated plus the^converse of the second one, 'All 
Whigs vote for Mr B.'. In point of faci/is the fallacy involved in the 
original argument (which would be valid if the converse of the second pre­
mise could be assumed to be true), and the present item would, therefore, 
appear to be a good example of a test constructor being hoist with his own 
petard! The item would escape criticism if one of the reasons simply 
pointed out that 'All who vote for Mr B. are ten-pound householders' does 
not imply that all ten-pound householders vote for Mr B - and that the 
conclusion follows from the premises only if the latter is assumed to be 
true.
The fault in item 15A (which it shares with 15B) is a different
one and less easily remedied. Before I attempt to set it out, it is per­
haps necessary to say a word in defence of a procedure which will have as 
its conclusion the suggestion that not only 15A, which showed up in the 
item analysis as somewhat doubtful, but also 15B, of which the same could 
not be said, needs to be altered to a marked degree. The point simply is, 
as Anstey remarks (ibid., p. 78), that technical adequacy, as indicated by 
the results of an item analysis, is a necessary, but not a sufficient con­
dition of an item's being retained unchanged in a test. 'If an item has 
a logical flaw or other real weakness,' he says, 'it should not be used, 
however favourable the evidence from item analysis. To be worth using, an 
item must be known to work well in practice, but it must also be sound and 
defensible against theoretical attack.' I shall try to show that this is 
not true of 15A and 15B in their present form.
The flaw in these items may be described as being logical in 
character or as consisting of a kind of 'catch'; in either case the test
197
constructor may, once again, have been an unwitting victim of his own in­
genuity. Throughout Section B the subject's task has been to say whether 
the conclusion of an argument follows from the premises. In 15A the
'conclusion' is of the form, 'It would be incorrect to conclude that '
and in 15B, 'It would be wrong to conclude that ....'. Obviously, both 
these 'conclusions' are themselves verdicts about conclusions - to the 
effect that the relevant conclusion does not follow from the premises - 
so that in effect the subject is being asked to accept or reject a verdict 
of the kind he has previously been asked to reach himself. Because this 
verdict is an unfavourable one, accepting it - saying 'Yes' in these items 
- is tantamount to saying 'No' ('the conclusion does not follow') on pre­
vious items and, of course, vice versa. The result is that many subjects, 
for the first time in the test, respond by underlining 'Yes' and then 
putting a cross against one of the reasons. (35 out of the 158 M-Y sub­
jects did this.) More important, perhaps - after all, the subjects just 
mentioned had got the answer wrong - other subjects may very possibly have 
underlined 'No' and then assumed that there was no need to look for a reas­
on, an assumption reinforced, as we shall see, by the character of the 
reasons themselves. It is not possible to be certain how many subjects 
fall into this second category because, of course, some of the 24 subjects 
who omitted to put a cross against any of the reasons may simply not have 
been able to decide amongst the alternatives.
There is an aspect of the alternatives of 15A and 15B which may 
suggest that even Valentine was not clear about the extent to which the 
task had been changed in these last items and which in any case makes 
these alternatives highly unsatisfactory. Supposing the subject's per­
spicacity to be of such an order that he recognises that in saying 'No, it 
does not follow that it would be incorrect to conclude that ... ', he 
would be saying that the conclusion does follow from the premises, and 
supposing that he also realises that a 'reason' in the present instance 
must therefore be something which shows that the conclusion does follow, 
then he should have no difficulty in selecting the correct alternative, 
for three of the four reasons offered claim to find a fault in the argument 
and only one even looks as if it proved the argument valid. Consequently, 
subjects who underline 'No' and choose one of the wrong alternatives may be 
suspected of meaning 'Yes, it would be incorrect ...'. Small wonder that 
Hallworth (1963) in his factor analysis of the test found that items 15A 
and 15B belonged in a class of their own - though he attributed their 
special position in the test to their being of a 'different order of diff­
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iculty' in the sense that they called for an ability to deal with 'more 
complicated' reasoning problems. I think I have said enough to suggest 
that Hallworth's remarks are true, if not quite in the sense presumably 
intended. In my view, these items must be changed, preferably by dropping 
the verdict-giving form of the 'conclusion', but at least in the respect 
that all the distracters at least appear to establish the validity of the 
argument. Undoubtedly the more radical change would make the test easier 
but there are other ways of increasing its difficulty - for esample, by 
making the arguments more complex or by refining the differences between 
the alternative reasons from which the subject has to choose.
A.5 Other specific points of criticism (a) The guessing correction in 
Section B I have already mentioned the scoring system in Section B, where 
5 points are awarded for a correct 'No' plus the appropriate reason, 2 
points for a correct 'Yes', 0 for a correct 'No' without the correct reason, 
and -1 for a wrong 'Yes' or 'No'. The last two scores represent a cor­
rection for guessing which, as Anstey remarks (ibid., p.23l), gives 'rough 
justice'. There are two respects in which the justice seems particularly 
rough as compared with guessing corrections in general. The first is 
that a double penalty for guessing operates in the case of 'No' items: if
a subjects guesses wrong, he scores -1 and if he guesses right (or, more 
strictly, is deemed to have guessed the right answer because he fails to 
identify the correct reason for his verdict) he scores 0. (On the other 
hand, while a wrong guess in a 'Yes' item scores -1, a correct guess scores 
2.) Secondly, there is an arbitrariness about the way in which the re­
sulting penalty points enter into the total score for the test. So long 
as a subject's score for Section B is not less than zero, all penalties 
are deducted from his total score. If, on the other hand, his Section B 
score is a minus quantity (it was actually as low as -6 for one of my sub­
jects), the points below zero are not deducted from his total score. The 
justification Valentine offers for this procedure is that 'marks are de­
ducted merely to discourage students from guessing' (1954, p. 33) • It is» 
however, the threat of deduction and the belief, on the part of subjects, 
that the threat will be carried out, not its actual execution, which dis­
courages guessing - if anything does. The question of how it should be 
carried out in detail must be decided on other grounds, and I can think of 
none which justifies the arbitrary procedure suggested by Valentine.
I do not, of course, dispute that there is a case for a guessing 
correction in this section of the VRT. If subjects obey the instructions
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and begin by choosing between 'Yes’ and 'No' and only later, and in the 
second instance, look for the reason, then the chances of guessing the 
correct answer at this stage - the only stage in the four 'Yes’ items - 
are obviously 50-50. I suppose it might further be argued that the double 
penalty in 'No* items is justified simply in terms of its practicality: 
in these items we have evidence of guessing (failure to choose the correct 
reason) which is not available in the case of the other type of item.
The weakness of this second point is, of course, that it implies that a 
correct 'No' can safely be regarded as the product of logical reasoning 
ability, as opposed to pure luck or intelligent guesswork, only if it is 
supported by other evidence (the ability to recognise a statement of the 
fallacy in question). What is true of a 'No' response, however, must 
surely be true of a 'Yes' response as well, so that a correct response in 
the latter case must be regarded as just as much or as little the product 
of guesswork as a correct response in the former. The implication of this 
clearly is that correct verdicts in the two kinds of case deserve to be 
treated in the same way: either a correct 'No' deserves to score 2 points
or a correct 'Yes' deserves to score none. Which of these alternatives 
we prefer will depend on how we evaluate the part played by guessing in 
this section of the VRT. If we think its role is a relatively minor one 
- as, perhaps, the high validity of the 'Yes' items would suggest - we 
should opt for the first; if we think its probable role a major one, as 
on paper it may be, we should prefer the second - or, arguably, the third, 
and more radical, alternative of dropping 'Yes' items altogether and giving 
nocredit for correct 'No's' unsupported by the correct reason.
Guessing corrections in general have been the source of a great
deal of controversy, it being a matter of uncertainty as to how fairly
they work. The preferences of Guilford (1965) and Anstey (ibid.) are
clearly for eliminating the need for such corrections by altering the
items in a test in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of success by
chance. Thus Anstey regards the choice-response type of item as the
least suitable for high-grade tests because it limits the difficulty of
items: if they are passed by fewer than 1/xth of the population for
which the test is intended (where x is the number of alternatives from
which the subject chooses) a subject is more likely to get the right answer
by chance than by reflection or skill - even assuming that all x altemat-
1
ives are equally plausible. The problem is obviously at its greatest
1 It may be apparent from the item analysis schedules (Appendix b ) that
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where the subject has to choose between only two alternatives, as we have 
seen he does in the 'Yes' items of Section B if he abides by the instruct­
ions. Such items Anstey regards as 'thoroughly objectionable' and in 
general he would prefer to see choice-response items replaced either by 
ones in which the subject has to supply the answer ('inventive-response' 
items) or where he is called to match items from one list with items on 
another ('matching-response' items) where the probability of chance success 
is greatly reduced.
It is, in fact, the former of these alternatives which Anstey 
seems to favour for the VRT which, he says, 'might have been even better 
if cast entirely in inventive-response form' (ibid., p. 231). My own 
view is that while this may be entirely feasible in the case of the two 
items of Section A which are not already of this form, there would be very
considerable difficulties in the case of Section B. The inventive-response
items which Anstey cites usually call for an answer which is a single word.
In such a case the scorer's task is a relatively easy one: he has only
to be able to distinguish the correct word from all others. Even in 
items 3 and 4 of the VRT, where subjects are required to write a phrase 
or a sentence, some problems arise about the equivalence of different 
phrases or sentences. In the case where a subject was asked to say what, 
if anything, was wrong with an argument, the difficulties involved in dis­
criminating right from wrong responses would, I think, be very much greater,
for the same point may not only be made in different words but also with
1
different degrees of explicitness.
In any case it is not clear how an inventive-response format could 
be made to cope with the case of valid arguments for here the subject would 
be required to find a way of restating an argument in terms not identical 
with those used in the original - and the problem of finding a compromise
this condition does not hold in the case of the VRT Section B: even if
we regard the subject's choice as being always between four or five alter­
natives, it seems that some of these have very little plausibility and so 
reduce the difficulty of the task facing the intelligent guesser. Valentine 
says that he devised the reasons himself; it would clearly have been better 
if they had been based on empirical evidence about the kind of reasons which 
students find plausible. I have myself made a tentative start with the 
collection of evidence of this kind in the exercise referred to in Appendix B . 
1 In Appendix B I have set out the explanations given by 45 members of the 
Ordinary Psychology class of the invalidity of one of the VRT items. I 
think it will be apparent from this that this type of item could be scored 
only by someone whose logical ability was at least as great as any of the 
subjects tested, for the variety of ways in which the same point can be 
made seems to be indefinitely large.
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between something which is too similar to the original and something which
is just not similar enough is one which it would be extremely difficult to
find an adequate way of explaining, in the first place, and of judging, in
the second. I have suggested that the ’Yes' items of the VRT may not be
as susceptible to distortion through guessing as they seem at first sight
- and as they would be if subjects obeyed instructions. If, in spite of
this, we were to regard them as the ’thoroughly objectiona ble’ type of
item in which the chances of success by guessing are 50 per cent, it might
not
seem desirable simply to eliminate them from the test. I do/mean that 
the task might continue to be represented as one in which the subject has 
to judge the validity of the argument and then, if it is invalid, choose 
the reason which best explains why it is so. Early investigations of 
syllogistic reasoning (for example, that of Morgan and Morton, 1944) did 
employ tests in which none of the syllogisms permitted one to draw a valid 
conclusion, but, like Henle and Michael (1956) I think it undesirable that 
a test should run counter in this way to the natural expectations of the 
subjects. Of course, given the form of these early tests, it was not 
possible to explain at the outset that all the items were in fact invalid: 
the subject's task was simply to say to say which, if any, of the conclus­
ions listed followed from the premises. In a task such as that presented 
in Oection B of the VRT, however, it would be perfectly possible to begin 
by saying that there was something wrong with all of the following argu­
ments and ask subjects to say which of the reasons offered appeared to them 
best to explain what this was. When the problem was presented in invent­
ive-response form - as the data from the preliminary study referred to in 
Appendix B will illustrate - this task proved to be a very difficult one 
for some subjects and revealed wide differences in the adequacy with which 
it was tackled. In choice-response form it should be possible to vary 
the difficulty of the task by increasing or reducing the differences be­
tween the various reasons offered.
Such an arrangement would have the apparent disadvantage that it 
would fail to involve what is presumably the primary ability of distinguish­
ing valid from invalid arguments. It might therefore be suggested that a 
superior solution to the problem of the 'Yes' type of item - if it is a 
problem - would be to devise a task which would play a similar role in 
this type of item to the role played by the 'reasons' of the Valentine test 
in cases where the conclusion does not follow from the premises. The 
nature of such a task may already be clear from the defective items 15A and 
15B, as well as from the discussion of the inventive-response alternative.
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It would consist of the identification of an adequate restatement of the 
original argument, and, once again, the level of difficulty of the task 
could be varied by making the alternatives from which subjects had to 
choose more or less similar.
The chief disadvantage of this second alternative - apart from 
the very considerable effort involved in producing a satisfactory version 
of it-would be likely to be its length. It seems probable - though the 
responses of some subjects to 15A and 15B might suggest otherwise - that 
the distinction between reasons which purported to show why a conclusion 
did not follow from the premises of an argument and reasons purporting to 
show that it did is one which subjects would find it easy to make. In 
that case, four or five reasons of each kind would have to be offered in 
order to reduce the chances of success by guessing to acceptable proport­
ions. On the other hand, the sheer effort involved in reading so many 
alternatives could be used to encourage subjects to begin by deciding 
whether the argument was valid or not if the two kinds of reason were pre­
sented in separate sets. In these circumstances, a subject who reached 
the right verdict could save himself considerable time and trouble by 
limiting his attention to the alternatives of the appropriate set.
In summary, then, the guessing correction as at present operated 
in the VRT Section B appears to be unacceptable for two reasons. If it 
seems necessary to deal with the case of valid arguments, where the chances 
of success by guessing are unacceptably high if the subject adheres to the 
procedure laid down in the instructions to Section B, at.least two poss­
ibilities suggest themselves. In view of the labour involved, and of the 
evidence that the items in question are not invalidated by their apparently 
objectiona ble form, it might be thought sufficient to modify the present 
arrangements with regard to the application of the guessing correction - 
in particular, by treating the penalties which accrue from it in a uniform 
way for all subjects and by awarding the same score for correct verdicts on 
invalid arguments as for valid ones - and to attempt to produce distracters 
of more equal plausibility.
(b) The adequacy of the instructions in Section B In his chap­
ter on high-grade tests of ability Anstey insists on the importance of 
adequate instructions. It has, in fact, become a commonplace of mental 
testing that a test should include, not only very explicit instructions, but 
also, as Anstey (ibid., p. 244) says, 'at least three worked examples of
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each type of item, including one that is fairly difficult’. On the first 
of these counts Section B seems to he reasonably adequate; on the second, 
on the other hand, it clearly is not. Valentine says (1954, p. 25) that 
'the first test of Section B was deliberately made very easy as a kind of 
practice test to ensure that the method is understood1. In other words, 
the function of item 5 is partly that which would normally be served by a 
worked example. Such an arrangement appears to me to be both undesirable 
in itself and also, in all probability, ineffective: undesirable because
a test comprising only 16 items can ill afford to have one of them devoted 
to a secondary purpose, and ineffective because a subject has no way of 
knowing if the response he makes to this item is the correct one, that is, 
if he has ’understood the method'.
In their answers to item 33 of the questionnaire only 9 per cent 
of subjects said that they had not found it easy to understand what they 
were supposed to do in Section B, while 30 per cent of Arts and 39 per 
cent of Science students said they found it very easy to understand this.
On the other hand, between a third and a half said, in answer to item 43, 
that they found the Form they did second easier and by far the commonest 
reason given for this was that they knew better what they were supposed to 
do. And, of course, the reality of this phenomenon is attested to by the 
generally large gains in score, on the original Form of the test, by sub­
jects who had previously done Form W.
It may, of course, be that a practice effect of this kind would 
survive the introduction of 'three worked examples'. There would also 
be the problem of explanations to subjects who could not see why the cor­
rect answer to an example was correct - though, of course, this would not 
be a problem peculiar to the VRT Section B. Finally, and probably most 
serious from a practical point of view, the introduction of worked examples 
would inevitably mean an increase in the time required for the administrat­
ion of the test. Nonetheless, the case for devising a better way of 
introducing the problems of Section B seems to me to be a very strong one.
1 As an example of the way in which this might be done one might cite 
the Hertzka and Guilford Logical Reasoning test where 'four carefully chosen 
practice items are provided, since this kind of exercise is new to most in­
dividuals' (Hertzka and Guilford, 1 9 5 5 ,  P « 1 ) .  The examples are accompanied 
by attempts to explain why one conclusion rather than another follows from 
the premises. Other helpful comments are included of which the following 
is perhaps the best example: 'Notice that a correct conclusion is derived
from both statements and from those statements only. A correct conclusion 
is not just a repetition of the contents of one of the statements. A cor­
rect conclusion is not based on other information than that supplied
by the given statements.'
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(c) The adequacy of the time allowed 26 M-Y subjects made no 
attempt to answer item 4 (did not even show ’working’), 9 made no attempt 
at 15A and 9 more no attempt at 15B. Since each of these items contrib­
utes 5 points towards the maximum possible score of 71, these figures must,
I think, be viewed with some concern - especially as the subjects concerned 
belonged to a highly selected group. In answer to items 2 9 -31 in the 
questionnaire 50 per cent of Arts and 30 per cent of Science subjects said 
they could have done better if they had had more time. Most of these said
they would have spent it on Both sections, the remainder being divided 
rather evenly between those who said they would have spent it on Section A 
and those who would have spent it on Section B. Valentine himself suggests 
that a Principal of a training college might find it advisable to extend 
the present time limit by 15 minutes with a group of candidates of below 
average ability. In my own view, an extension of this order would be 
desirable for all groups of subject. Indeed it is obviously only admin­
istrative convenience that requires the application of any time limit at 
all: other high grade tests, such as Terman's Concept Mastery Test and
the very different Advanced Matrices Test of Raven have none. It is 
perhaps of some significance that 48 per cent of Arts and 44 per cent of 
Science students said, in answer to item 32 of the questionnaire, that
the mere existence of a time limit interfered with their ability to con­
centrate on the task. Abolition of the time limit might eliminate this 
source of anxiety without noticeably increasing the time taken by the vast 
majority of candidates.
(d) Arrangements for scoring In its published version the VRT 
is difficult to score. Answers are written in the test booklet immed­
iately below the question itself and as there are never more than two 
items to a page, the use of an aid to scoring, such as a stencil, is im­
practicable. It is true that with so few items in the test as a whole an 
experienced scorer could probably memorise the correct responses as well 
as the scoring system, but the risk of scorer error in such a case is, I 
think, too obvious to need stressing. The existing arrangement is also, 
to my mind, a wasteful one: test booklets can be used only once. Both 
these problems could be dealt with, at least to some extent, by the intro­
duction of separate answer sheets.
It is true that Anstey (ibid., pp. 40-1) argues against the use 
of separate answer sheets on two grounds, first, that subjects may put 
their answers in the wrong places, and secondly, that they may mark the
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in ways
test bookletsywhich may affect - adversely or otherwise - the responses 
of later subjects unless they are discovered in the course of a laborious 
scrutiny of the booklets after each testing session. The second point 
is, of course, an important one: depending, perhaps, on circumstances,
it may be a foolish economy to attempt to carry out the necessary examin­
ation of test booklets rather than buying new ones for each testing. 
(Moreover, it may be argued that the mere fact that it is possible to re­
use the test booklets may tempt careless testers to do so without first 
ensuring that they are unmarked.) This last consideration apart, however, 
Anstey's second point is clearly an argument against the re-using of test 
booklets and only indirectly one which casts doubt on the advisability of 
separate answer sheets. As to his first point, which does refer to a 
disadvantage of separate answer sheets as such, I think it is of somewhat 
reduced importance in connexion with a test where there are only 16 items 
in all and only 12 in which the possibility of confusion between answers 
can seriously be said to exist. In favour of the use of separate answer 
sheets, on the other hand, is, of course, Anstey's insistence (p. 40) that 
a satisfactory test is one which it is easy to score reliably.
Accordingly, my subjects were provided with separate answer 
sheets, of which an example, for Form V, is reproduced in Appendix A.
It cannot be claimed that the scoring of Section A was thereby made easier 
or more reliable, but it was possible to score Section B with a minimum 
of effort using the three stencils which are also reproduced in Appendix A. 
(if the guessing correction were dropped, of course, the 'Wrongs' stencil 
would no longer be necessary, and if correct verdicts in invalid arguments 
were treated in the same way as in valid ones, as I have suggested they 
should, a separate 'Yes' stencil would also become redundant.)
A.6 The predictive validity and the reliability of the VRT
(a) Predictive validity This is the aspect of the test on 
which Valentine lays the heaviest emphasis - and with good reason, since 
its avowed purpose, as we have seen, is to act as a basis for selecting 
applicants for places in institutions of higher education and the results 
he presents are impressive. He is able to report, for example, (1961) 
that graduates with first class honours (N=40) score very significantly 
higher than those with second class honours (N=l15) and these in turn 
significantly higher than graduates with third class honours or pass 
degrees (N=22 and 50 respectively). Since most of my subjects have now 
graduated, I am able to produce comparable, though much smaller, figures
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for the University of Glasgow. One difference between my data and 
Valentine’s which may be worth referring to in passing is that his subjects 
had already graduated at the time of testing. Table A.4-A presents the 
means and the ranges of scores for five categories of student, those who 
obtained first, second or third class honours degrees in Arts or Science, 
those who obtained Ordinary (i.e. general) degrees and those whose perform­
ance at university was so poor as to lead to their suspension or consider­
ation for suspension. For purposes of comparison I present in Tables A.4B 
and A.4C the same statistics as they relate to performance on Terman's 
Concept Mastery Test and on the Higher Grade of the Scottish Certificate 
of Education, both of which might naturally be expected to provide some 
basis for predicting success at university. In all three tables I give 
results only for the M-Y group since it is, of course, only the members of 
this group whose performance on the VRT is strictly comparable with that 
of Valentine’s subjects. The N's vary a little from table to table because 
the relevant scores were not available for all subjects.
The Concept Mastery Test, Form T, (Terman, 1956) is a revised 
version of the test which its author used in his follow-up study of his 
gifted group at maturity (Terman and Oden, 1947), revised downwards, it 
should be said in passing, to make it suitable for testing the spouses of 
the gifted group. It is much more traditional in character than the VRT, 
consisting, as it does, of two Parts, Synonyms-Antonyms (115 items) and
Analogies (75 items), which appear to test mainly vocabulary and general
1
knowledge. I used it partly because of its historical interest, partly 
because of its traditional character, and partly because it presents prob­
lems of administration and scoring which are minimal: it is untimed and
scoring is by means of two stencils. Correlations with grade-point aver­
ages of .49 for Stanford University undergraduates and .37 for subjects at
the University of California Counselling Center suggest that its predictive
2
validity is about average. The same appears to be true of its reliability 
as measured by correlations between scores on the original Form A and Form 
T, the coefficients ranging from .86 to .94 for intervals between testing
1 It departs from tradition in using only these two types of item instead 
of the five or six types more commonly used. (Compare Army Alpha and its 
derivatives, Cattell's scales, the N.I.I.P. Group Test 35, etc.) This 
reflects Terman's frequently expressed conviction that it is in the sphere 
of abstract reasoning that excellence of the relevant kind reveals itself 
most clearly and that abstract thinking depends on the number and variety 
of concepts at a subject's disposal and his ability to see relationships 
between them - together with the assumption that these things are closely 
related to size of vocabulary and amount of general knowledge.
2 See Guilford, 1965, p. 103.
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ranging from one day to twelve years.
No comparable data is, of course, available about the reliability 
and validity of performance on the Higher Grade of the Scottish Certificate 
of Education as an index of academic potential. On the other hand, this 
way of assessing probable performance at University has the advantage, as 
compared with any published intelligence test, that it is actually used in 
the selection of applicants for places at Scottish universities. This 
implies, of course, a high degree of confidence in its predictive validity 
and also, one assumes, in its reliability. And since Valentine presents 
his test explicitly as a way of remedying the defects inherent in the Eng­
lish counterpart of this Scottish system of selection, it is clearly of 
some interest to have data in which the two can be directly compared.
The Scottish Universities take into account, not only the number of passes 
obtained on the Higher Grade but also the grade of the pass, there being 
three grades, A, B and C. I decided to consider only the passes obtained 
in a subject’s fifth year at school, there being too many imponderables 
about passes obtained in the sixth year. (See footnote 3 on p. 42 above.) 
I obtained an S.C.E. ’score’ by awarding 3» 2, and 1 points for passes on 
grade A, B and C respectively, a rather crude procedure which has since 
been adopted by Nisbet and Napier (1970) in their study of student success 
and failure at university. Distributions of the resulting scores are to 
be found in Appendix B, Arts and Science students, of course, being treated 
separately.
TABLE A.4
MEANS AND RANGES OF SUBJECTS WITH VARIOUS OUTCOMES AT UNIVERSITY 
ON THE VRT, CMT AND SCE (M-Y SUBJECTS ONLY)
A. VRT
1 st 2nd 3rd
Class Class Class Ord­ Sus­
Hons. Hons. Hons. inary pended
N 1 10 1 69 12
Mean (64) 41.5 (13) 32.7 ‘34.2
Range - 23-64 - 5-65 17-55
N 2 8 2 28 3
Mean 50.5 51.6 39.5 38.0 27.3
Range 42-59 13-70 20-59 19-68 13-37
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B. CMT
Arts
Science
Arts
Science
1 st 2nd 3rd
Class Class Class Ord­ Sus­
Hons. Hons. Hons. inary pended
N 1 10 1 69 12
Mean (164) 129.2 (117) 104.1 97.0
Range - 91-157 - 62-174 36-159
N 2 9 2 27 3
Mean 107.0 96.6 76.5 95.5 77.0
Range 100-114 52-132 32-121 36-152 62-95
C. SCE
N 1 9 1 67 10
Mean (10) 6.0 (8) 6.7 6.5
Range - 2-12 - 0-13 1-10
N 2 9 2 26 3
Mean 15.0 8.3 10.0 7.9 6.7
Range - 2-20 7-13 2-12 6-7
I have given ranges rather than standard deviations because so 
many of the samples are too small for the latter statistic to have any 
meaning. Indeed, it will be apparent that little significance of any 
kind can be attached to the results for any of the groups except the 
Ordinary graduates in both faculties and, with diminishing confidence, 
Second Class Honours graduates in Arts and Science and suspended students 
in Arts. Within the limits set by the size of the samples, then, there 
does appear to be a difference in both faculties between the VRT scores of 
students who gained second class honours and those who graduated with an 
Ordinary degree. Although the Scottish Ordinary degree is supposed to be 
different from, rather than inferior to,an Honours degree, I think it 
would be widely accepted that the quality of students who graduate with 
the former is generally lower than the quality of graduates who obtain a 
second class honours degree. To this extent, then, the above result sup­
ports Valentine’s claim to have devised a test which discriminates within 
the student population. Moreover, it seems to be superior to the CMT in 
this respect, so far as Science students are concerned, and to SCE in both 
faculties. It may be pointed out, on the other hand, that it fails (as 
the SCE results also do) to find any difference between Arts students who 
graduated with an Ordinary degree and those who were suspended - whereas 
the CMT does appear to have found a difference. Perhaps rather little
significance should be attached to this aspect of the results, not only in
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view of the sample sizes but also because of the heterogeneous nature of 
the factors which seem to be responsible for a student's doing badly enough 
to come up for consideration for suspension.
Evidence bearing on the predictive validity of the VRT drawn 
from other sources is less favourable. Product-moment correlations 
between SCE scores and VRT results on the one hand and SCE and CMT on the 
other proved to be as follows: Arts, .32 and .25, Science, .45 and .50.
Moreover, when the 15 subjects who went on to graduate with an Honours 
degree in psychology were ranked in terms of the numbers of answers in 
their Finals papers which were agreed by three markers to be first, upper 
second, lower second, third class or fail and these ranks compared with 
their rankings on VRT, CMT and first year psychology class examinations, 
the reulting Spearman's rho's, corrected for tied ranks (Hays, 1963) were, 
respectively, .74, .85 and .83.
The evidence is, of course, far from conclusive. The higher 
correlation between CMT and SCE results for Science students is offset by 
a lower correlation for Arts students, and the Honours class sample is 
small and the results, therefore, of doubtful reliability. On the other
hand, one may perhaps draw the restricted conclusion that the VRT on this
showing at least does not appear to be superior to the CMT or to class
exam results in its ability to predict outcomes at the Honours level,
ouch a result is clearly no cause for self-congratulation so far as a 
defender of the VRT is concerned, not only because of the notorious un­
reliability of class examinations (correlations between results on the two 
examinations in any academic year are generally of the order of .5) but
also because of the doubtful nature of the CMT, especially as a measure of
ability for Science students - as we shall see in the next section.
(b) Reliability The VRT must surely be one of the shortest
tests, in terms of number of items, currently available. It is surpris­
ing, therefore, to find Valentine claiming a split-half reliability co­
efficient as high as .83, equivalent, he says, to a value well in excess
1 The CMT is singled out for criticism by Anstey, not only because of 
the 'thoroughly objectionable' character of its first part (where the 
chances of success by guessing are even) but also because of its dependence, 
at least in some of its items, on abstruse and specialised knowledge.
The test is not mentioned by name. Anstey (ibid., p.219) simply refers 
to a discussion of 'a test of high grade intelligence of high repute' by 
Heim in New Society for 7th February, 1963. However, the two items quoted 
are 108 in Part I and 66 in Part II of the CMT. They are not untypical.
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of .9 'in an unselected population1. Backhouse (1967), in a study of the 
effect of mathematics teaching on reasoning ability as measured by the VRT, 
reports a split-half reliability of only .75* I estimated the internal 
consistency of the test by other means, viz., the 'alpha coefficient' 
(Runnally, 1970), a statistic found by applying one of the Kuder-Richardson 
formulas. This index of internal consistency reliability, which can be 
shown to be equal to the mean of all split-half coefficients resulting 
from different splittings of the test (Cronbach, 1950, gives a lower 
value than the ordinary split-half coefficient unless the test is a highly 
homogeneous one - which, in view of its two Sections, the VRT cannot really 
be said to be. In the event, however, the value of the alpha coefficient 
proved to be .96 for the original form of the Valentine test (M-Y subjects) 
and .94 for Form ¥ (A-L subjects).
These results are important, not simply for themselves but for 
the basis they provide for a comparison between the reliability of the test 
measured in this way and its alternative form reliability, for the former 
represents a maximum value for the test's reliability (Nunnally, p. 552) 
compared with which the latter indicates the extent to which performance on 
the test is affected by changes in content, from form to form, and by the 
exact time in a subject's life at which the test is taken. Backhouse, in 
the paper referred to above, found an alternative form reliability of .75, 
which is close to the split-half coefficient we have seen he found for the 
original form of the test and identical with the corresponding value for 
his alternative form. In my own study the correlation between scores on 
the two forms, averaged over A-L and M-Y groups, was .61. a very much lower 
figure, obviously, than the alpha coefficients reported in the previous 
paragraph.
The discrepancy between Backhouse's results and my own may, of 
course, be due to differences in the adequacy of the alternative forms or 
to differences in the populations sampled: Backhouse's sixth formers
would doubless be a somewhat more heterogeneous group than my undergrad­
uates and the resulting correlation might be expected to be higher in his 
case. Of more significance, probably, is the difference in the interval 
elapsing between the completion of the two forms, for whereas my subjects 
could be expected to show a strong practice effect after only a week, the 
same would not be true of Backhouse's subjects, for almost two years 
elapsed between the first and second testing sessions in their case.
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The significance, for the experimenter, of the low altemative- 
form reliability of the VRT over short periods will be apparent: if one
cannot in any case expect a close relationship between scores on two forms 
of the test taken over such intervals of time, then it will be difficult 
to attribute changes in the scores unequivocally to the effect of any 
experimental treatment which may have intervened between the two testings. 
Clearly an attempt must be made to increase the altemative-form reliabil­
ity of this test - in the first instance, I think, by improving the in­
structions and by relaxing the time limit, both of these measures which 
should help to reduce the initial differences between individuals which 
practice presumably effects most.
A.7 'Face1 validity It is clearly of great social importance for a 
test which is used to select applicants for places at a university to look 
as if it is a good way of doing this. The success or failure of an ap­
plication is too serious a matter for the person's concerned for it to be 
tolerable that any considerable proportion of those who fail should be 
able to attribute their failure, with any real degree of plausibility, to 
the inadequacy of the instrument used for selection purposes. I therefore 
thought it useful to canvass opinions on this aspect of the VRT - and, for 
purposes of comparison, the CMT - amongst students who had taken the test. 
This was achieved by means of the questionnaires already referred to on 
several occasions in this chapter. These were issued on the third testing 
session and collected either at that time or at the next meeting of the 
class. Altogether 300 of the students in question responded to some or, 
usually, all of the 50 items in the questionnaire. It will be apparent, 
from previous references to it that its purposes were diverse, and one 
important one will be apparent only at a later point in this thesis. It 
is reproduced in full, together with the distribution of responses to each 
item in Appendix A.
So far as the face validity of the VRT is concerned, subjects 
were asked to say whether they thought (l) that the VRT was a good test 
of all-round intellectual ability; (2) if they intended to take an Hon­
ours degree, that the VRT tested an ability which is essential or desirable 
for success in the Honours subject of their choosing; (3) that it would 
be fair to use the VRT as the sole criterion for admission to the Arts 
faculty of a university; (4) that it would be fair to use it as the sole 
criterion for admission to the Science faculty; (5) that it would be fair 
to use it as the sole criterion for admission to the Honours course, if any,
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they hoped to follow. The same questions were asked about the CMT and 
about the VRT and CMT in compination. Students were also asked whether 
they thought (6) that scores on 'tests of this sort1 - i.e., VRT and CMT - 
ought to be taken into consideration as well as SCE results in selecting 
applicants for places at university or (7) as well as results in pre-Honours 
class exams in selecting applicants for places in an Honours course. They 
were asked to say (9) what, if anything, was wrong with the VRT and CMT as 
tests of all-round intellectual ability and finally, because I think this 
aspect of a test is an important one, (10) whether they found the CMT more 
or less enjoyable to do than the VRT.
As already mentioned, the details of the distributions of re­
sponses to these, and other, items are presented in Appendix B. I have 
considered the views of students from the two faculties separately, but 
not the views of students of the two sexes, mainly because it is hardly con­
ceivable that different tests should be used for male and female applicants 
for university places but quite conceivable, at least in Scotland, that 
different tests should be used by different faculties. An inspection of 
the responses of men and women on the first five issues listed above shows, 
as one might perhaps expect, that men were slightly more favourably dis­
posed towards the VRT than women and that the opposite was true of the CMT. 
The significance of this point is that the proportion of Arts women in the 
Ordinary Psychology class was higher than in the faculty as a whole. To 
some small extent, therefore, the attitudes towards the two tests reported 
below will show an unrepresentatively pro-CMT, anti-VRT bias on the Arts 
side.
Bearing this point in mind, then, the responses to the relevant 
items of the questionnaire can be summarised as follows. While only 30% 
of Science, and 35% of Arts, students thought the CMT a good test of all­
round intellectual ability, the corresponding figures for the VRT were 49% 
and 39%. Science students clearly felt that the CMT would add nothing to 
the VRT in this respect; on the other hand, 60% of Arts students thought 
the two tests combined would make a good test of all-round intellectual 
ability. Of those students who hoped to take an Honours degree (N=63 for 
Arts and 36 for Science) 28% of Arts and 50% of Science students thought 
the VRT tested an ability essential to success in the Honours subject of 
their choice, 57% and 40% thought the ability in question was desirable 
but not essential, and 7% and 6% thought it neither. The corresponding 
figures for CMT are: Arts, 15%, 68% and 12%; Science, 14%, 49% and 34%.
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Students of both faculties were overwhelmingly against the use of either 
test, separately or in combination, as the sole criterion for admission to 
either faculty, though there is strong support for the consideration of 
results of tests ’of this kind' as well as passes on SCE, GCE, etc. Much 
the same is true of their use in selecting applicants for admission to an 
Honours course, with the exception that enthusiasm for their use in an 
auxiliary role is somewhat reduced. On the question what was wrong with 
the tests as measures of all-round intellectual ability the answers were 
mainly along the lines one might expect: that both were too narrow, that
VRT favoured students with experience in, or a penchant towards, logic or 
mathematics, and that CMT favoured those with a classical education or with 
a. large vocabulary or a large store of general information. 6O/0 of Arts 
students found the CMT more enjoyable than the VRT while 22°/o found it less, 
the corresponding figures for Science students being 28^ > and 51?°. This 
result shows the familiar, and, in view of the contents of the CMT, perhaps 
natural, pro-VRT, anti-CMT stance of the Science students as well as the 
ability, amongst Arts students, to distinguish the palatability of the CMT 
from its apparent validity. The Arts view is the one I should have expect­
ed, for the intellectual effort called for in the VRT is, in my view, very 
much greater. (Hence Valentine's insistence on the importance of good 
motivation sitting his test.)
Quite generally, despite the overall superiority of the 'face 
validity' of the VRT when compared with the CMT, it is clear that it would 
be quite unacceptable to the vast majority of students of either faculty 
as the sole criterion for admission either to University or to an Honours 
class. On the other hand, 'tests of this kind' would be acceptable in 
an auxiliary role by most students of both faculties for both purposes and, 
despite his strictures on GCE results and headmasters' reports as bases for 
selection, Valentine does not appear to have intended his test for use in 
any more exclusive way.
A.8 Review and discussion On the whole the picture painted of the VRT
in this chapter has clearly not been a favourable one. It has been shown 
to have three defective items out of sixteen, an unsatisfactory arrangement 
for dealing with guessing, inadequate instructions, too stringent a time 
limit and a layout which makes the scoring of the test unduly arduous.
Its altemative-form reliability, as measured over a period of a week, is 
low in relation to its internal consistency, and although it discriminates 
rather well within the undergraduate population, it does not obviously do
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this better than 'the CMT, a test whose deficiencies have been the subject 
of comment by Heim and Anstey. All in all the implication appears to be 
that the VRT is in need of fairly extensive revision, preferably, of course, 
based on extended empirical research into the effects of various modificat­
ions to its contents, its scoring system and its time limit. However, the 
effort involved in such an enterprise would clearly be justified only if 
the idea of the test, as opposed to its present concrete manifestation, is 
judged to be a good one. It is to the examination of this question that 
the remainder of this section is devoted.
The usefulness of the VRT can be discussed with outcomes of three 
different degrees of generality in mind: it can be discussed as a means
of measuring either (a) ’academic potential' or (b) general intellectual 
ability or (c) inductive and deductive reasoning ability. The three are 
obviously related: reasoning ability is clearly at least a part of gen­
eral intellectual ability, just as the latter is clearly at least part of 
what is required for hcademic success. Obviously, however, one might 
regard the VRT as a good way of assessing reasoning ability but not as a 
good test of all-round ability or, of course, as a good test of the latter 
but not as a satisfactory way of selecting candidates for places in an 
institute of higher education - or, indeed, vice versa. The view I shall 
take is that, in the absence of very definite empirical evidence to the 
contrary, the VRT is likely, on general theoretical grounds, to be more 
effective - to possess greater 'predictive validity' - the less general of 
these three purposes it is used to serve.
Valentine clearly regards his test as a satisfactory way of
measuring general intellectual ability, 'g', and academic potential. He
explains that he confined its contents to reasoning tasks on the ground
that, according to Vernon (1950), 'reasoning ability is largely dependent 
1
on g'. On the other hand, all the evidence Valentine produces in support
of the validity of his test bears on its relationship with measures of
1 Unless I am mistaken, the view Vernon takes in the pages referred to 
by Valentine is the converse of the one he needs to justify the use of a 
reasoning test as a measure of g. Vernon says (p. 55): 'A small reas­
oning or logic group factor could be isolated from specialised tests, but 
it would be unlikely to add anything to measures of g, v and n in the pre­
diction of the reasoning ability desirable among secondary pupils or col­
lege students'. I take this to mean that a good measure of g, v and n 
will also be a good test of the kind of reasoning desirable among the sub­
jects in question - and not the reverse.
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academic success. However, it is certainly the view of Vernon, in the 
hook to which Valentine refers, that success in school or college depends, 
not simply on g hut on some other factor which Alexander (1955) called X.
As this extra factor is supposed to involve 'industriousness and interest' 
it can, I think, be argued with some plausibility that a test such as the 
VRT is unlikely to he as good a test of academic potential as, say, a test 
such as CMT, even if it is a good test of g. This is because 'industri­
ousness and interest' seems likely to reveal itself pre-eminently in a 
person's intellectual acquisitions, meaning by this not only the range of 
relatively specific skills which he acquires but also, of course, his 
vocabulary, general knowledge, and so on, things which, we have seen, the 
CMT taps, though not, apparently, very satisfactorily. The attractiveness 
of the VRT, on the other hand, is at least partly due to its relative 
independence of the effects of different kinds and degrees of education. 
Success on it appears to depend on the possession of one or two rather 
general skills which most children are not taught, or not taught formally, 
at school, namely, of course, the reasoning skills of drawing the appro­
priate inferences from a set of facts and of being able to tell whether a 
conclusion may legitimately be drawn from certain premises.
Ultimately, of course, a judgement as to the adequacy of the VRT, 
either as a means of selecting candidates for places at university or 
training college or as a measure of general intellectual ability, must 
rest on empirical evidence of the kind offered, in a modest form, in sect­
ion 1.6. Since no test is perfect as an instrument for selection pur­
poses, there will always be individuals who end up on the wrong side of the 
line dividing those who are selected from those who are rejected, so that 
it is in general no objection to a test to point to individuals whose per­
formance on the relevant criterion (class of Honours, for example) is much 
better (or worse) than their performance on the test would lead one to 
expect. Exceptions to this rule, I think, would be cases where there are 
independent grounds for believing that the results of the test accurately 
reflect the subjects' standing on the abilities measured by the test, for 
this casts doubt on the alleged theoretical relationship between score on 
the test and performance on the criterion.
1 This is not, of course, an uncommon procedure in this area of psycho­
logical testing. On the contrary, tests of intelligence have so often 
been 'validated' in this way that it has sometimes been suggested (Anastasi, 
1968) that they should simply be referred to as tests of scholastic apti­
tude.
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The body of this thesis took as its focus the case of subjects
whose performance on Section B of the two forms of the VRT - a section
which, as we have seen, contributes two- thirds to the total score - was 
markedly lower than their academic attainment and ability measured in 
other ways, the whole trend of the results of the experiments described 
in that part being to confirm their relative weakness in the general area 
of reasoning. One of these subjects (i. McA. in Appendix E) whose score 
on Section B of the VRT was a little below the average of the Ordinary 
Psychology class as a whole has since graduated with first class honours 
in chemistry. Another PR subject (J.S.), whose Section B score was some­
what lower than I. McA.'s, graduated with a good second class honours 
degree in classics at the end of his Junior Honours year, instead of one 
year later, as he would be expected to do. Interestingly enough, Valentine 
himself may have come across a case of this kind, for in his Handbook to 
the test he refers to a graduate with first class honours in history who 
scored 9 on the VRT as a whole. Valentine (1954, p. 20, footnote) 
accounts for this case in terms of a 'general carelessness and indiffer­
ence', citing, as evidence, the subject's failure to follow the instruct­
ions in item 2. Of course, he may be right about this, in which case the 
subject's score would not represent his true standing on the ability meas­
ured by the VRT and so would not count against the assumptions of that
test; on the other hand, it is surely exceedingly rare for a person
willingly to lose face if he could easily avoid doing so.
There are more general grounds for suspecting that a test which 
depends as heavily as Valentine's apparently does on something which is 
most naturally described as logical reasoning ability may be less than 
adequate as a means of assessing general intellectual ability or, insofar 
as the one depends on the other, academic potential. According to Guil­
ford (1969) logical reasoning or, as he would prefer to call it, since in 
most tests with a heavy loading on this factor the subject is not asked to 
reason himself but to judge the validity of an argument presented, logical 
evaluation, was recognised as a special ability as long ago as 1958 when 
Thurstone published the first results of his factorial studies of human 
ability and has been repeatedly confirmed by factor analysts since that 
time. And whatever his doubts about some of the factors identified by 
Guilford and his colleagues Vernon (1950) seems to be prepared to accept 
logical reasoning as at least a minor group factor - to the extent of 
finding a place for it in his diagram of factors in psychological tests 
(ibid., p. 83).
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Valentine himself expresses doubts about the effects of logic 
instruction on scores in Section B, going so far as to say that he thinks 
it ’probable that a training in symbolic logic or in the detection of 
syllogistic fallacies might have an appreciable effect on scores' in that 
section (1954, p.25). The fact that Elton's results (1965) seem to sug­
gest that this is not the case (a sixteen week college course on elementary 
logic seemed to have no effect on scores in Section B) cannot, I think, be 
regarded as sufficient rebuttal of the view I have been taking: differ­
ences in logical reasoning ability of the kind required for success in 
the relevant section of the VRT do not seem to be produced by differences 
in formal education - although, as I have occasion to remark in a later 
chapter, the truth is that very little is known about the way in which 
sensitivity to the logical aspects of a thought product develop.
What I have been suggesting is that there are grounds for doubt­
ing the theoretical basis of the claim that performance on a test of in­
ductive and deductive reasoning in which the latter element is predominant 
could be adequate as a test either of general intellectual ability or, 
therefore, of academic potential: in the latter context it seems highly
likely that such a test will be unfair to some subjects, not simply because 
of the inherent limitations of any selection instrument but because the 
ability on which it depends is not evenly distributed over all subjects of 
comparable general ability. The limitations on the test's use which this 
view implies do not apply, of course, to its use as a means of assessing 
inductive and, especially, deductive reasoning. It is true that there 
are other tests of these abilities (the Critical Thinking Appraisal of 
Watson and Glaser (1964), for example, though in the light of Ennis's 
review (1962) it appears to have serious faults of its own) but none of 
them appear to test the same critical aspects of deductive reasoning abil­
ity as the VRT Section B. The traditional syllogism test, of which Hertzka 
and Guilford's Logical Reasoning test (1955) is a recent example, does not 
require the subject to identify the weakness in an argument and frequently 
this is the most difficult part of the task, just as it is the best evid­
ence that the fallacy is understood. It is for its potential as a research 
instrument in this area that I regard the Valentine test as worthy of the 
effort involved in a revision and, of course, in the development of an 
alternative form.
A final word ought, perhaps, to be said about the implications of
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the criticisms I have made of the VRT as it exists at present for the 
research described in the main part of this thesis. It might be said 
that a structure is only as strong as the foundations on which it rests 
and that as the division of subjects into 'poor reasoners' and ’good reas- 
oners', which is fundamental to that research, was based on performance on 
the faulty Section B of the VRT, attempts to discover the factors which 
are responsible for this kind of difference could scarcely hope to meet 
with success. To this I think it is enough to reply, first, that the 
defects of the Valentine test became known to me only after the selection 
of subjects had been made and, indeed, the experimentation carried out - 
so that mine was not a decision to use an admittedly imperfect instrument 
for the purpose in hand; secondly, and perhaps more important, while the 
defects of the test might very reasonably have been held to explain a 
failure to find any differences of a relevant kind between the groups con­
stituted by reference to performance on the VRT Section B, they are of 
relatively little importance when, as we have seen, the evidence of the 
experiments constantly confirms the existence of a difference of the kind 
assumed and when it is possible to establish meaningful relationships 
between this difference and other differences experimentally established 
(in particular between a relatively poor performance on the VRT Section B 
and proneness to the 'converse error'). It has not, of course, been the 
contention of this appendix that the VRT as a whole or Section B in part­
icular is worthless either as a means of distinguishing those with high, 
from those with low, academic potential or as a way of separating those 
with good from those with 'poor' logical reasoning ability: it is simply
that it could clearly be better. Perhaps if I had recognised its defic­
iencies before using it as a basis for selection, I might have obtained a 
clearer cut result by disregarding performances on items 7, 15A and 15B.
To admit this, however, is obviously not to admit to any doubts as to the 
general validity of the VRT Section B as a measure of logical reasoning 
ability.
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Section B at once without waiting.
The tests should be attempted in the order given, as in each series the 
harder tests come towards the end. But do not spend too long on any 
one test. Pass on to the next and return to the previous test later if 
you have time.
/~iT TT7TTD A NTT* T JfY V T * T HPT'* EDINBURGH - - TW EEDDALE COURT
U L I V L K  A N D  B O Y D  L I D .  l o n d o n  - - 3 9 A w e l b e c k  s t r e e t ,  w . i
The unauthorised reproduction of this Test in any way, whether for sale or not, constitutes a breach of the Copyright Act 
Copyright 1 9 5 4  T h i r d  I m p r e s s io n  1 964
SECTION A
John Huggins was found shot dead in Church Street at 1.45 p.m. 
He had two known enemies, Bill Frogger and Jack Toper. The doctor says 
it could not have been suicide and that Huggins died between 12.30 p.m. 
and 1 p.m. the same day.
Frogger was seen running from Church Street by two reliable witnesses 
at 1.10 p.m. ; Toper was seen by two reliable witnesses two miles from 
Church Street at 1.10 p.m.; and Frogger was seen by two other reliable 
witnesses in a public house i j  miles away from Church Street at 12.30 p.m. 
Neither Frogger nor Toper had any means of transport except their own legs. 
The maximum speed of running for each was 1 mile in 8 minutes.
Assuming that none but the two named could have committed the murder, 
underline what must be true in the following statements, cross out what must 
be false, and put a question mark [T| by those which may or may not be true.
Frogger (a) was the murderer . . . .
(b) could have been the murderer
(c) could not be the murderer
Toper (a) was the murderer . . . .
(b) could have been the murderer
(c) could not be the murderer
At a dinner Mr A had soup, fish and cheese
Mr B had soup and fish but no cheese 
Mr C had fish and cheese, but no soup
Nothing else was eaten or drunk. Later Mr A and Mr C developed food 
poisoning. (We have no report yet about Mr B.)
Assuming that the cause of the poisoning was in the dinner mentioned, 
underline those of the following statements which are certainly true, cross out 
those which must be false, and put a question mark |T| by those which may 
or may not be true.
There was
(i) poison in the s o u p ....................................
(ii) poison in the cheese . . . . . . .
(iii) no poison in the f i s h ..............................
(iv) poison in the soup and the fish . . . .
(v) no poison in the fish or the cheese . . .
(vi) poison either in the fish or in the cheese .
(vii) poison in the soup, the fish and the cheese
(viii) poison in the fish and the cheese . . .
3- There are four towns, A, B, C, and D. A is the same distance from
B that B is from C, and C is half that distance from A.
D is the same distance from C that C is from A.
Is A nearer to C or to D, or the same distance from each ?
Diagrams may be used.
A man left his money to his five sons as follows : find the scheme 
or principles on which he divided the money, the individual personalities 
not being considered.
To A, aged 35, with 2 children, and income of £400, he left £500
To B, aged 40, with 3 children, and income of £500, he left £700
To C, aged 45, with 1 child, and income of £400, he left £600
To D, aged 35, with 2 children, and income of £600, he left £500
To E, aged 30, with no children, and income of £300, he left £200
(H alf marks*will be awarded fo r  a partia l solution of this problem, i.e. i f  only one principle 
or rule is discovered. For the fu ll solution precise figures must be given.)
SECTION B
Examine the following arguments and state whether they are sound or not. 
You must assume first that the given premisses (i.e. the statements underlined) 
are true. The problem is, in each case, this : granted that these assumptions 
are true, is the other statement necessarily true ? If you think the argument 
is sound, underline “ Yes ” and cross out “ No ” ; if the argument is unsound, 
cross out “ Yes ” and underline “ No
If you say the argument is unsound, show which of the sentences, (i to iii 
or iv) given below that argument, gives the best reason why the conclusion 
does not follow from the given premisses. Mark your selected reason with a X  
in the blanks provided.
You are advised first to decide for yourself whether the argument is 
sound or not, before examining the reasons given below it. If the argument 
is sound it is obviously useless to examine the reasons which follow it.
Remember that you must assume that the underlined statements are true.
N o t e .—Marks will be deducted for wrong answers, so that mere guessing 
is penalized.
“ All successful authors are industrious. John Smith is an industrious 
author. Therefore he is or will be a successful author.”
• i
(i) It is not true that all successful authors are very industrious.
(ii) The fact that all successful authors are industrious does not imply
that all industrious authors are successful.
(iii) Some successful authors are both industrious and clever.
“ Everyone is either well informed of the facts or already convinced
on the subject ; no one can be at the same time both already convinced on 
the subject and amenable to argument ; hence it follows that only those who 
are well informed of the facts can be amenable to argument.”
(i) This conclusion is the converse of the true one, for those who are
well informed of the facts will be sure of their ground and so will 
not be amenable to argument.
(ii) A man may be convinced on the subject, yet if a good argument is
ably put before him, he may alter his opinion.
(iii) There is no reason why everyone should be either well informed of
the facts or already convinced on the subject ; there may be people 
who have never heard of the subject at all.
(iv) The first premiss is not clear, for some may be both well informed
of the facts and already convinced on the subject, and according 
to the second premiss, these will not be amenable to argument.
(i)   («)   (iii)   (iv)
“ None but Whigs vote for Mr B. All who vote for Mr B. are 
ten-pound householders. Therefore none but Whigs are ten-pound house­
holders.”
(i) Only Whigs vote for Mr B., yet all Whigs need not do this, so that
there may be Whigs who are not ten-pound householders.
(ii) All those who vote for Mr B. are both Whigs and ten-pound house­
holders, yet there may be ten-pound householders who do not vote 
for him, and hence need not be Whigs.
(iii) Even if none but ten-pound householders vote for Mr B., that is not
to say that some of the ten-pound householders do not vote for 
.his opponent, and hence are not Whigs.
(iv) There may be voters who are not Whigs, yet who vote for Mr B. on
personal rather than on political grounds, and these will also be 
ten-pound householders.
No. (i)   (ii) . . ............  (iii)   (iv)
8. “ If you argue on a subject which you do not understand, you will
prove yourself a fool ; for this is a mistake fools always make.”
(i) The statement is not sufficient to define “ a fool ” . Only one character­
istic is given, and a man may not be a fool only because he makes 
this mistake, but for other reasons too.
(ii) This argument is unsound, because a wise man may be able to argue
on a subject which he does not understand without giving himself 
away, while a fool could not.
(iii) It is not logical to conclude that a man is a fool because he acts like
one in this one particular instance.
(iv) Although fools always make this mistake, it is not stated that all
who make this mistake are fools, so that others who are not fools 
may do so too.
No. (i) .... ............ ( i i ) .......... ....... (iii) ......... ....... (iv) , .: ..X .......
9. “ All the students are either industrious or intelligent. Either industry
or intelligence will ensure success in the examination. So all the students 
will pass the examination.”
(i) This conclusion is incorrect, for a student may fail in the examination
through misfortune ; for instance, he may feel unwell when the 
examination takes place.
(ii) A student may be industrious or intelligent, yet may be disqualified
in the examination for bad conduct, e.g. copying from other 
candidates.
(iii) Either industry or intelligence alone is surely insufficient for a success.
A combination of the two is needed.
(iv) If a student is neither industrious nor very intelligent he may pass
if by good fortune he is asked questions bearing on the little 
knowledge he has.
Yes. l/- ©  ... .. (») ...... ii) ......  (iv) ......
“ This pamphlet contains seditious doctrines. The spread of seditious
doctrines is dangerous to the State. Therefore this pamphlet must be 
suppressed.”
(i) It is not stated that everything dangerous to the State must be
suppressed, so in the premisses given there is no reason for the 
suppression of the pamphlet ; and in any case it is not stated that 
the pamphlet would spread seditious doctrine.
(ii) The spread of seditious doctrines is not always dangerous to the
State, for if the State is stable seditious doctrines will not affect it.
(iii) The conclusion is incorrect, for the doctrines in the pamphlet may
only appear to be seditious in the opinion of some people. Others 
may not consider them so.
(iv) To suppress the pamphlet may not of itself avert the danger. The
doctrines expressed in it can still be spread verbally by their 
originators, so other measures may also be necessary.
No. ( i )  M   (ii) (iii) .................. (iv)
“ If all the accused were innocent, some at least would have been 
acquitted. We may infer then, that none were innocent, since none have 
been acquitted.”
(i) The innocent are often condemned to suffer for the guilty. Con­
demnation is no proof of guilt.
(ii) The guilt of some may have placed all in a bad light, so that none
would be acquitted.
(iii) If only some of the innocent would be acquitted in any case, then
some were not acquitted when they ought to have been.
(iv) We are only told that some of the accused would be acquitted if all
were innocent. The number innocent may have been less than all, 
and so insufficient to secure any acquittals.
N o. (i) .......... ....... ( i i ) .......... ....... (iii) ......... ........ (iv) X .......
“ No schoolboy can be expected to understand Constitutional
History, and none but schoolboys can be expected to remember dates ;
so that no one can be expected both to remember dates and to understand 
Constitutional History.”
(i) We cannot assume that this conclusion is true. College students may
easily do both, for they are sufficiently developed intellectually to 
understand Constitutional History, while they are not old enough 
to have forgotten the dates they learned at school.
(ii) One cannot say that no schoolboy can be expected to understand
Constitutional History. A boy who is intelligent and well taught 
may easily do so.
(iii) Schoolboys should not be expected to remember dates exactly, for
this is an unsound method of teaching History, so that the whole 
argument is invalidated.
(iv) The premisses are incomplete. No mention is made of schoolgirls, 
who are able to remember dates as well as boys.
Yes. ^  (i) ............  («) ............  (hi) ............  (iv) ............
(<No soldiers should be brought into the field who are not well
qualified to perform their part ; none but veterans are well qualified to perform
their part ; therefore, none but veterans should be brought into the field.”
(i) If only veterans were brought into the field, young soldiers would
never have a chance to learn, and when the veterans died there 
would be no one to replace them. The conclusion is, therefore, 
unsound.
(ii) Soldiers could not become veterans without going into the field as
recruits, so the whole argument is false.
(iii) It is a misstatement to say that none but veterans are well qualified
to perform their part, since young soldiers make up for their lack 
of experience by their enthusiasm.
(ivj Veterans may not be well qualified to perform their part for they 
may be too old, in which case the conclusion is invalid.
^  (i) ........ ...  (ii) ............  (iii) ............  (iv) ............/
*4- “ None but those who are contented with their lot in life can justly
be considered happy. But the truly wise man will always make himself 
contented with his lot in life, and, therefore, it follows that he may justly 
be considered happy.”
(i) A wise man can force himself to be contented with his lot in life, but
the very fact of this compulsion will prevent his being truly happy.
(ii) Those who are not content with their lot in life are often happy, for
there is often more happiness in striving to attain one’s desire than 
in the actual attainment.
(iii) The fact that only those who are contented with their lot in life can
justly be considered happy, does not imply that all those who are 
contented with their lot are of necessity happy.
(iv) The conclusion may be true or n o t; it will depend on the standard of
happiness. Content and happiness are not the same thing.
Y jls.
“ In Tutland only Conservatives—and not all of them—are 
Protectionists (i.e. against Free Trade) ; only Liberals—and not all of 
them—are Home Rulers : but both parties (Conservatives and Liberals) 
contain supporters of Women’s Franchise.”
It may be assumed tha t:
1. no Liberal is a Conservative;
2. all who are not Protectionists are Free Traders;
3. all who do not support Home Rule are Unionists.
This is all that is known about the views of the Tutlanders.
Hence with only this information
(A) it would be incorrect to conclude that only the Unionists are
Protectionists;
(B) it would be wrong to conclude that both Unionists and Free Traders
are to be found among the supporters of Women’s Franchise.
(Note that there are two problems here. You have first to decide whether 
conclusion (A) is right or wrong ; and if wrong, which of the reasons under 
(A) opposite, best applies. Then you have to decide whether conclusion (B) is 
right or wrong ; and if wrong, which of the reasons under (B) opposite, best 
applies.)
N o. (i) .................  (ii)   (iii)  ^ ........  (iv)
(A) (i) Unionists need not be Conservatives; they may be Liberals, so that 
although Conservatives are Protectionists, Unionists need not be.
(ii) In the given premisses, Unionists are only found in the Liberal
Party which contains no Protectionists. Thus Unionists cannot be 
Protectionists.
(iii) Only the Liberals are Home Rulers. Therefore all the Conservatives
must be Unionists. As only Conservatives are Protectionists, 
it follows that only Unionists are Protectionists.
(iv) The questions of Unionism and of Protection are entirely independent
of each other. Thus no conclusion can be drawn as to whether 
believers in Protection are also believers in Unionism.
l^ s : it would be incorrect.
N o : it would not be incorrect, ( i ) ......... .......  ( i i ) ......... ....... ( i i i ) . . .X ..... •• ( iv ) ................
(B) (i) The Liberals who support Women’s Franchise may be those who 
are Home Rulers, and the Conservatives just those who are 
Protectionists. Thus there may be neither Free Traders nor 
Unionists among the supporters of Women’s Franchise.
(ii) Since all Liberals are Free Traders and all Conservatives are
Unionists, then there must be both Unionists and Free Traders 
among those who support Women’s Franchise.
(iii) The Liberals who support Women’s Franchise may be all Free
Traders, and the Conservatives who support Women’s Franchise 
may be those who are not Protectionists, so that these supporters 
may all be Free Traders.
(iv) The question of Women’s Franchise is one which is not affected by
considerations of Unionism or Free Trade, so these considerations 
are irrelevant.
Y jls: it would be wrong.
N o : it would not be wrong, ( i ) ..... —  (U) x ...... (iii) ..— .......  ( iv ) ..................
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REASONING TESTS
SECTION A.
Smith and Jones both intended to put their names down 
for the annual Hill Race* This involved being present in 
person to sign their names on a sheet of paper posted on a 
notice board in the village hall at Cairncry (where the race 
began and finished) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on the 13th 
April.
All we know about their movements is as follows: at
3 p.m. on the 13th April Smith was striding up and down 
impatiently at his sister*s house in Dalgleish, 180 miles 
from Cairncry. At that very moment Jones was changing a 
wheel on his car at the roadside at a point 40 miles from 
Cairncry. Road transport is the fastest means of travel to 
and from Cairncry and, owing to the character of the roads in 
that region, the highest possible average speed between any 
two points within a 200-mile radius of Cairncry is 35 m.p.h.
Granted only that Smith and Jones had both intended to 
sign the sheet at Cairncry between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on the 
13th April, under (l) in the answer booklet, underline those 
statements which must be true, cross out those which must be 
false and put a question-mark (?) against those which may or 
may not be true.
Suppose that a car will fail to start if and only if 
there is no petrol in the tank or if the petrol pump is 
broken or if the starter motor is jammed.
Mr. Z's car will not start although he has just filled 
the tank with petrol. Under (2) in the answer booklet under­
line those statements which, on the above supposition, Mr. Z 
can safely assume to be true, cross out those he can assume to 
be false and put a question-mark against those about which he 
cannot be sure.
A, B, C and D are four towns. D is the same distance 
from A as from B, The distance between A and C is likewise 
the same as the distance between B and C. And the distance 
between A and C is only half the distance between A and B.
Is D the same distance from A and B as C is or farther away 
or nearer?
Diagrams may be used. These, together with your answer, 
should be written under (3) in the answer booklet.
A man has five children with varying educational records*
By an outstanding coincidence they are all taking up their first 
posts at the same time, but with rather different starting salaries. 
Determine those principles the operation of which accounts for the 
differences in starting salary, given that all the relevant factors 
are included in the information about the man*s children.
Ann attended a secondary school for 3 years, and had no further 
full-time education. Her starting salary is £450.
Bruce attended a secondary school for 6 years and a University 
for 4 years. His starting salary is £750.
Colin attended a secondary school for 5 years and had no further 
full-time education. His starting salary is £450.
Dora attended a secondary school for 4 years and a Commercial
College for 3 years. Her starting salary is £600.
Emma attended a secondary school for 5 years and a University
for 5 years. Her starting salary is £700.
(Half marks will be awarded for a partial solution of this problem.
i.e.. if only one principle or rule is discovered. For a full 
solution precise figures must be given).
Write your answer under (4) in the answer booklet.
SECTION B.
Examine the following arguments and state whether they are sound 
or not. You must assume first that the given premises (i.e. the state­
ments underlined) are true. The problem is, in each case, this: 
granted that these statements are true, is the other statement (the con­
clusion of the argument) necessarily true? If you think the argument 
is sound, underline "Yes’1 in the answer booklet and cross out "No"; 
if the argument is unsound, cross out "Yes” and underline "No".
If you say the argument is unsound, show which of the sentences,
(i to iii or iv) given below that argukeiit, gives the best reason why 
the conclusion does not follow from the given premisses. Mark your 
selected reason with a X in the blanks provided in the answer booklet.
You are advised first to decide for yourself whether the argument 
is sound or not, before examining the reasons given below it. If the 
argument is sound it is obviously useless to examine the reasons which 
follow it.
REMEMBER THAT YOU MUST ASSUME THAT THE UNDERLINED STATEMENTS 
ARE TRUE.
NOTE:- Marks will be deducted for wrong answers, so that 
mere guessing is penalized.
5. “Every wise leader is a good listener. Mr. Jones is a
good listener. Therefore he is or will be a wise leader1'.
(i) Some wise leaders are both good listeners and firm of purpose.
(ii) It is not true that every wise leader is a good listener.
(iii) The fact that every wise leader is a good listener does not 
imply that every good listener is a wise leader.
6. "Only people who are interested in ma.ior snorting events are
admirers of Mr. C. All Mr. C's admirers are -people who en.ioy 
strenuous physical exercise. Hence only people who are interest­
ed in major sporting events are people who enjoy strenuous physical 
exercise".
(i) Even if it is only people who enjoy strenuous physical 
exercise who admire Mr. C. that is not to say that some 
people who enjoy such exercise are not among his support­
ers and therefore not interested in major sporting events.
(ii) Only people interested in major sporting events are admir­
ers of Mr. C, yet all people with this interest need not 
be his admirers, so there may be people interested in 
major sporting events who do not enjoy strenuous physical 
exercise.
(iii) All Mr. C fs admirers are interested in major sporting events 
and also enjoy strenuous physical exercise, yet there may 
be people who enjoy such exercise but who are not admirers 
of Mr. C. and who therefore need not be interested in major 
sporting events*
(iv) There may be people who are not interested in major sporting 
events and who nonetheless admire Mr. C for reasons uncon­
nected with sport, and these will also be people who enjoy 
strenuous physical exercise.
ltEvervone is either already engaged in active military service 
6r else donvinced that w6 shall shortly win this war. No one can 
be at the same time convinced that we shall shortly win this war 
and in need of some boost to his morale. Therefore only those 
already engaged in active military service are in need of a boost 
to their morale"*
(i) The first premiss is not clear, for some may be both already 
engaged in active military service and convinced that we 
shall shortly win this war, and according to the second 
premiss these will not require a boost to their morale.
(ii). This conclusion is the reverse of the correct one, for
those who are already engaged in active military service 
will know how the war is going and so will not need to have 
their morale boosted.
(iii) It may be time that everyone is either already engaged in 
active military service or convinced that we shall shortly 
win this war: there is always in any country a minority
who are pacifists or who doubt the competence of those 
responsible for the conduct of the war.
(iv) A person may be convinced that we shall shortly win the war 
and still need, in moments of depression, a boost to his 
morale.
"This candidate is a pacifist. Anyone who advances the
cause of peace is contributing to international understanding.
Therefore this candidate should be elected".
(i) Electing the candidate may not in fact be a contribution 
to international understanding. His ability to persuade 
people of the desirability of peace may be very limited, 
so that some other means to this end may be necessary as 
well.
(ii) It is not stated that everyone who contributes to inter­
national understanding should be elected, so there is 
nothing in the premisses which justifies the election of 
the candidate in question; and in any case it is not 
stated that the candidate does advance the cause of peace.
(iii) The conclusion is incorrect, for the candidate may appear 
to be a pacifist only in our typically aggressive society - 
in other societies he might even be thought a warmonger.
(iv) Advancing the cause of peace is not always contributing to 
international understanding for there are occasions on 
which the former can be achieved only at the expense of the 
latter.
"All the prisoners are either emotionally unstable or 
mentally defective* Either emotional instability or mental 
defect makes a person ill-equipped to cope with the stresses 
of modern life. So all the prisoners are ill-equipped to cope 
with the stresses of modern life".
(i) A prisoner may be emotionally unstable or mentally defective 
and still manage to cope, given the constant support of some 
sother person - for example his wife,
(ii) This conclusion is incorrect, for a prisoner may be adequately 
equipped to deal with the stresses of modern life in some 
other way - he may draw compensating strength from his religion, 
for example.
(iii) Even if a prisoner is neither emotionally unstable nor men­
tally defective he may still not be adequately equipped for 
modern life if he is b o m  into a particularly difficult 
segment of it.
(iv) Surely neither emotional instability nor mental defect by 
itself is enough to unfit a man to cope with modern life; 
a combination of the two is required.
"If you drive a car without first ensuring that it is in 
satisfactory mechanical order, you will reveal your inexperience 
as a driver for inexperienced drivers are always guilty of this 
oversight".
(i) Although inexperienced drivers always fail to ensure that 
their car is in satisfactory mechanical order before driving 
it, it is not stated in the argument that all who are guilty 
of this oversight are inexperienced drivers, so that others 
who do not lack driving experience may be guilty of this 
oversight too.
(ii) No satisfactory explanation of what is meant by inexperienced1 
is given. A person may be judged to lack experience as a 
driver not only because he is guilty of the kind of oversight 
mentioned but because of other things he does as well.
(iii) It is not logical to conclude that a person lacks experience 
as a driver because he behaves in one respect as if he does.
(iv) This argument is invalid, because an experienced driver may 
be able to cope with the consequences of mechanical defects 
in his car when an inexperienced one would not.
"If everyone in this room had felt it too warm, surely 
someone would have complained... Since no one did complain, we 
we may conclude that no one felt it too warm".
(i) Perhaps everyone felt that if the others could suffer in 
silence he could too and this is why no one complained*
(ii) If only one person would have complained in any case, then 
some did not complain when they had reason to do so.
(iii) People in a group are often too self-conscious to complain.
The fact that a person does not complain does not show that 
he is not uncomfortable.
(iv) We are told only that someone would have complained if every­
one had felt it too warm. Perhaps not everyone felt it too 
warm, and that is why no one complained.
"No teacher should be put in charge of a difficult class unless 
he can be relied upon to keep it under control. Only male teachers 
with some experience of such classes come into this category.
Therefore only such teachers should be put in charge of a difficult
class".
(i). All teachers who have had some experience of difficult classes 
must at one time have been teachers without such experience, 
so the whole argument is false.
If only male teachers with some experience of difficult
classes were put in charge of such classes, other male 
teachers would never have a chance to gain experience of 
these classes, and when their seniors retired there would 
be no one to replace them. The conclusion is, therefore, 
unsound*
Teachers with experience of difficult classes may not be 
able to keep them under control, for they may go into the 
classroom overwhelmed by their knowledge of the difficulties 
that await them. In that case the conclusion is invalid.
It is. aomistake to think that only teachers with some 
experience of difficult classes can be relied upon to keep 
them under control, for inexperienced teachers possess the 
resilience of youth and so are better fitted to respond to 
the demands of a difficult classroom situation.
"Only those who are free from any taint of self-interest can 
be entrusted with the role of judge. Those who take to heart 
the teachings of the great religious and spiritual leaders of 
mankind lose all trace of self-interest. Hence such people can 
be entrusted with the role of judge."
(i) The conclusion may or may not be true - it will depend on 
what we expect from a judge. Justice is not the same 
thing as disinterest.
(ii) A person who is proccupied with religious and spiritual
doctrines is frequently too little interested in everyday 
affairs to make a good judge of these things.
(iii) Those who are occasionally subject to a temptation to 
further their own interests at the expense of others 
will understand the motives of the men they are called 
upon to judge better than those who are never subject 
to such temptations.
(iv) The fact that only those who are free from any hint of 
self-interest can be entrusted with the role of judge 
does not imply that all those who have this quality can 
be entrusted with the role in question.
do
(iii)
(iv)
"No gourmet can be expected to enjoy Cottar's Curd and only 
a gourmet can be expected to en.ioy Camembert. So no one can be 
expected, to enjoy both Cottar's Curd and Camembert".
(i) The premisses are not complete. No mention is made of 
professional buyers in the dairy-fcroduce industry who 
enjoy a good Camembert as much as gourmets do*
(ii) It is a mistake to say that no gourmet can be expected to
enjoy Cottar's Curd. A genuine gourmet recognises that
even the humbler foods have a place in the whole range 
of cookery.
(iii) We cannot assume that this conclusion is true. There
are people who enjoy Cottar's Curd because of the senti­
mental associations it has and on the other hand enjoy 
Camembert simply for its taste.
(iv) The gourmet's liking for Camembert is not genuine but
simply a reflection of his responsiveness to prevailing 
fashions - so that the whole argument is invalidated.
"In Abasiland only the elderly - and not all of them - are wise 
and only the young - and not all of them - are healthy. However, 
both the elderly and the young include some individuals who are 
happy.
It may be assumed that as far as Abasiland is concerned:
(1) all who are not wise are lacking experience of the 
world.
(2) all who are not healthy are physically weak.
On the basis of this information alone
(a ) it would be incorrect to conclude that in Abasiland 
only those who are physically weak are wise;
(b ) it would be wrong to conclude thatin Abasiland both 
the physically weak and those lacking in experience 
of the world include some individuals who are happy.
(Note that there are two problems here. You have first to 
decide whether conclusion (a ) is right or wrong; and if wrong, 
which of the reasons under (a ) below best applies. Then you 
have to decide whether conclusion (b ) is right or wrong; and if 
wrong, which of the reasons under (b ) below best applies).
(A) (i) In the given premisses the physically weak are found
only among the young, none of whom are wise. Thus 
the physically weak cannot be wise.
(ii) Only the young are healthy. Therefore, all the elderly 
must be physically weak. As only the elderly are wise, 
it follows that only the physically weak are wise.
(iii) The question whether a person is physically weak is 
entirely separate from the question whether he is wise. 
Thus no conclusion can be drawn as to whether the wise 
are also physically weak.
(iv) The physically weak need not be elderly; they may be 
young, so that although the elderly are wise, the physi­
cally weak need not be.
(B) (i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Since all young people in Abasiland are lacking 
experience of the world and all elderly people are 
physically weak, there must be both the physically 
weak and persons lacking experience of the world 
amongst those who are happy.
The question of happiness is not one which is affected 
by a person's being physically weak or lacking in 
experience of the world, so these considerations are 
irrelevant.
The young who are happy may be these who are healthy, 
and the elderly who are happy may be these who are 
wise. Thus there may be neither persons lacking in 
experience in the world not persons who are physically 
weak amongst those who are happy.
The young who are happy may all be lacking in experience 
and the elderly who are happy may be those who are not 
wise, so that those who are happy may all be lacking in 
experience.
REASONING TESTS
for Higher Lev/els of Intelligence 
FORM W
Answer Booklet
Name 
Sev
O ass
Do not op en  tV\e T e s t  B o o k le t until you are bold to do s o .
Please note the identification number in the top right hand corner 
of this booklet. You will be able to identify your score on the 
test, when it is given, only by reference to this number.
SECTION A.
1. Smith (a) signed his name before Jones.
(b) could have signed his name before Jones.
(c) could not have signed his name before Jones.
Jones (a) signed his name before Smith.
(b) could have signed his name before Smith.
(c) could not have signed his name before Smith.
2. (i) the petrol pump is broken.
(ii) the starter motor is jammed.
(iii) it can’t be that there is no petrol in the tank.
(iv) the petrol pump is broken and the starter motor 
is jammed*
(v) either the petrol pump is broken or the starter 
motor is jammed.
(vi) if the starter motor is jammed then the petrol 
pump is not broken.
(vii) if the petrol pump is not broken then the starter 
motor is jammed.
(viii) neither the petrol pump nor the starter motor is 
responsible for the failure.
3.
4.
SECTION B.
5. No a ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
6. y/ s Ha ( i ) .... ( i i ).... (iii)
7. Yes / ( i ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
8. Y/s No d ) .... (ii) (iii)
9. Yes N<5 ( i ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
10. Y/s No (i) .X.. ( i i ).... (iii)
11. Yj£ No ( i ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
12. Yes T&6 ( i ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
13. Y/s No ( i ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
14. Yes / ( i ) .... (ii) .... (iii)
15A. Y/s\ it would be incorrect
X . .
.^.. (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
.... (iv)
No: it would not be incorrect
(i)   (ii) .^£.. (iii) .....  (iv)
15B. it would be wrong
No: it would not be wrong
(i) (ii) ..... (iii)   (iv)
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(d) VALENTINE REASONING TESTS. SECTION B (FORM W) SCORING STENCIL 1
Ensure that ’Section B' is visible 
in this window:
vMim WaWA Wa
I111IP wm
A ’pair’ is an underlined ’No' with a cross in the window to the right 
along the line. For each pair put a tick in the window at the right 
hand end of the line.
Number of pairs: x 5 =
A 'single' is an underlined 'No' without an accompanying cross. 
Number of singles:
VALENTINE REASONING TESTS. SECTION B (FORM W) SCORING STENCIL 2
Ensure that 'Section B' is visible 
in this window:
Wherever the 'Yes' in the window is underlined, place a tick in the 
other window at the end of the line.
Number of Yeses underlined: x 2 =
1031
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VALENTINE REASONING TESTS. SECTION B (FORM W) SCORING STENCIL 3
WRONGS
Ensure that 'Section B ’ is visible
in this window:
Number of Yeses underlined: 
Number of Noes underlined:
Total:
1063
41
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(e) Distributions of scores on the two forms of the Valentine test 
(M-Y and A-L groups separately) and on the Concept Mastery Test and the 
Scottish Certificate of Education (Arts and Science students separately).
Valentine, Form V
M-Y A-L
70-71 1 1
65-69 2 2
60-64 5 10
55-59 8 15
50-54 11 23
45-49 15 24
40-44 32 24
35-39 17 20
30-34 10 24
25-29 19 7
20-24 17 6
15-19 13 4
10-14 6
5-9 2
158 160
Valentine, Form ¥
A-L M-Y
70-71 1
65-69 1 5
60-64 4 13
55-59 12 17
50-54 17 27
45-49 22 23
40-44 25 23
35-39 21 17
30-34 23 12
25-29 17 14
20-24 10 3
15-19 6 3
10-14 1 1
5-9 2
161 159
Concent Mastery Test
Arts Science
170-9 2
160-9 3 1
150-9 7 2
140-9 21 2
130-9 14 5
120-9 25 12
110-9 28 11
100-9 31 14
90-9 36 17
80-9 19 10
70-9 18 15
60-9 8 5
50-9 3 4
40-9 1 4
30-9 2
218
2
104
S.C.E. Mean S.D.
Arts 7.20 3.18
Science 8.03 3.87
S.C.E. ’scores1
Arts Science
20 1
19 0
18 1
17 0
16 2
15 3 4
14 3 0
13 4 4
12 10 7
11 7 2
10 18 7
9 27 7
8 20 13
7 35 12
6 20 6
5 18 14
4 12 3
3 11 6
2 10 5
1 1
0 6
205 94
Notes As explained in the text, (l) the M-Y group did the V form of 
the VRT first, the A-L group the ¥ form; (2) S.C.E. 'scores' were 
obtained by awarding 3 points for an A pass, 2 for a B and 1 for a C, 
subjects with a score of 0 having had no passes on the Higher grade 
in their fifth year at secondary school.
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(f) Special instructions sheet used in the second VRT testing session, 
reproduced here because of its possible bearing on the extent to which 
subjects were likely to base their answers to the second Form which they 
attempted on their memories of their answers to the first. The instruct­
ions, in the form of a letter, were on the subjects’ desks on their 
arrival in the examination hall.
Department of Psychology, 
10th November 1967.
Dear Class Member,
As you will see, the third test in the series looks very much like 
the first - except for the colour of the paper it is printed onl In 
fact it is what psychologists call an alternative form of the same test 
- i.e., it is supposed to be a test of the same difficulty and of the 
same kind of difficulty as the first. The aim is to have a test which 
is as similar as possible to the first without being so like it that 
you can do the second by remembering your answers to the first. In 
fact in nearly every case an answer which was right in the first test 
you sat will be wrong in the second. So this is as much a test of 
intelligence and perseverance as the first was. Any test or examination 
can only sample the knowledge or ability it is intended to measure, and 
the two forms of the test, with an interval of a week between, ought to 
be a much better measure of the qualities concerned than a single form 
could be.
The questionnaire which you will find on your desk is intended to 
give you an opportunity to voice your opinions on the tests you have 
sat, and also to provide us with information about your attitude towards 
the tests and your way of tackling them. This information will be of 
great value in our attempts to understand what these tests measure and 
also how they are likely to be viewed by the people who sit them. If 
you would like to use the blank reverse sides of the questionnaire itself 
to make additional comments, I should be glad if you would do so.
If you have arrived early you may be able to answer all but the
last 7 or 8 questions before you begin today's test. Equally, if you
finish the test early you may be able to complete the questionnaire before 
the 55 minutes are up. If you can manage, would you please do this and 
leave the completed questionnaire, together with the test and answer 
booklets, on your desk when you leave the hall. If you do not have time 
to complete the questionnaire today, would you please bring it, completed,
to the next meeting of the class - on Monday - when I shall arrange to
have them collected.
Finally, I would like to say how impressed I have been by the 
punctuality and good nature of the class as a whole. I hope you have 
found the experience of sitting these tests interesting and enjoyable, 
and that you will say so - in the answers you give to the last question 
in the questionnaire - if you did notl
Yours sincerely,
Ian G. Wallace
Note It is perhaps as well to say that very few indeed of the class did
attempt to complete the questionnaire in time which they might otherwise
have spent on the test. ^
\ i
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(g) The questionnaire. The percentages given down the right-hand side 
refer the numbers who actually replied to that question. 202 Arts and 
98 Science students returned questionnaires. The average number of 
omissions for the two groups was just over 2 and just under 2. These 
were spread fairly evenly over all items with the following exceptions: 
for Arts students, items 12, 27 and 28 produced 8, 8 and 19 omissions; 
for Science students, item 28 also produced an unusually large number of 
omission, viz., 10. It will be apparent that the Science percentages 
generally approximate fairly closely to the actual numbers of students 
giving that reply and that a similar approximation for Arts students may 
be obtained by doubling the percentage figure. For the terms in which 
the questionnaire was introduced see the instructions sheet reproduced in 
(f) above.
VALENTINE1S REASONING TESTS AND TEBMAN’S 
CONCEPT MASTERY TEST: A QUESTIONNAIRE
Put a tick in the appropriate box: Arts Scier
i %
1 Name
2 Sex Male 28 70
Female 72 30
3 Age 17 years 4 2
18 " 17 18
19 " 36 23
20 " 32 38
21 " 5 13
21+ " 10 6
4 Is your native language English Yes
No
Bilingual
5 Faculty Arts 67°/°
Science 33%
6 Which year at University is this for you? 1 st 17 4
2nd 43 33
3rd 39 41
4th 1 20
5th or more - 2
7 Name of your Adviser of Studies
8 Do you think the Concept Mastery Test (c m t) is Yes 35 30
a good test of all-round intellectual ability? No 51 60
Don’t know 14 10
9 If not, why not?
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Arts Science
% *
10 Do you think Valentine's Reasoning Tests (VRT) are Yes 39 49
a good test of all-round intellectual ability? No 43 35
Don' t know 18 16
11 If not, what is wrong with them in your opinion?
12 Do you think CMT and VRT together constitute a Yes 60 48
good test of all-round intellectual ability? No 18 33
Don1t know 22 19
13 If not, why not?
14 Do you hope to take an Honours degree? Yes 31 36
No 59 56
Don' t know 9 8
15 If so, in what subject?
Answering Yes to 14
16 Do you think the CMT tests an ability which is 
essential or desirable for success in the
Honours subject, if any, you hope to take?' Essential 15 14
Desirable but not essential 68 49
Neither 12 34
Don't know 5 3
Answering Yes to 14
17 Do you think the VRT tests an ability which is
essential or desirable for success in the
Honours subject, of any, you hope to take? Essential 28 50
Desirable but not essential 57 40
Neither 7 6
Don't know 8 3
18 Are you good at spotting weaknesses in Very good 3 2
another person's arguments? Quite good 59 69
Not very good 36 23
Hopeless 2 2
Don't know 2 3
19 Do you think some people are much better Yes 89 86
than you at spotting such weaknesses? No 4 3
Don't know 7 11
20 Have you attended any classes in logic? Yes, at school _ 1
Yes, at University 26 8
No 74 91
21 Have you recently read any books on logic Yes 11 6
in your spare time? No 88 91
Not sure 1 3
22 If so, can you remember the author(s) and/or titles?
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23
24
25
Are you taking the Ordinary Logic 
(General Philosophy) or Ordinary 
Moral Philosophy class this year?
Have you taken the Ordinary Logic 
or Ordinary Moral Philosophy class 
in a previous year?
Logic
Moral Philosophy 
Neither
Logic
Moral Philosophy 
Neither
Are you currently taking, or have you Logic
previously taken, the Higher class in Moral Philosophy 
either of these subjects? Neither
26 If..you are taking, or have taken, any 
of these philosophy classes, do you 
think you were helped by them in your 
answers to VRT?
Yes
No
Don't know 
Doesn't apply
27 If you have studied logic, in your spare Yes
time or in a class at school or University, No
were you able to use what you learned in Don't know 
the course of that study to help you Doesn't apply 
with Section B of VRT?
Arts Science
$ %
20
29
6
45
14
9
3
74
2
1
97
5
5
1
88
28 In particular did you use any of the following:
(a)
(b) 
(o)
Substitution of symbols for terms 
Ruler's circles or Venn diagrams
Translation of sentences with 'only' 
into sentences without 'only'
(d) Conversion, obversion, etc., of propositions
(e) None of these
(f) Doesn't apply (haven't studied logic)
1
1
5
1
13
79
3
10
5
82
29 Do you think you could have done better on VRT if Yes 51 32
you had had more time? No 42 57
Don't know 8 10
30 If so, how much longer would you have liked to have?
31 Would this have been spent on: Section A 13 5
Section B 12 7
Both 31 22
Doesn't apply 44 66
32 Did the mere existence of a time limit interfere Yes 48 44
with your ability to concentrate on the task? No 52 56
33 Did you find it easy to understand what you Very easy 30 39
were supposed to do in VRT Section B? Quite easy 60 53
Not easy 10 8
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Arts Science
fo <fo
54 Although you are warned in the instructions Often 5 3
to VRT Section B that guessing will he Occasionally 53 41
penalised, did you find yourself obliged Never 45 55
to guess if you weren’t to leave a blank?
35 In the instructions to VRT Section B it advises you to 
look at the reasons given below the argument only
36
37
38
39
40
from the premises. Bid you in fact Always 2 2
find it helpful to look at these Often 8 12
reasons before you decided one way Occasionally 69 57
or the other? Never 21 29
Did you find the CMT more or less More enjoyable 60 28
enjoyable to do than the VRT? Less enjoyable 22 51
About the same 17 21
Do you think it would be fair CMT alone: fair 5 6
to use the tests you sat as unfair 90 76
the sole criterion for admiss­ Don't know 5 18
ion to the Arts faculty of a 
University? VRT alone: fair 3 4
unfair 94 76
Don1t know 4 20
CMT and VRT together: fair 13 16
unfair 75 62
Don't know 12 22
Do you think it would be fair CMT alone: fair — -
to use the tests you sat as unfair 82 96
the sole criterion for admiss­ Don't know 18 4
ion to the Science faculty of 
a University? VRT alone: fair 5 7
unfair 73 88
Don't know 22 5
CMT and VRT together: fair 5 6
unfair 72 85
Don't know 23 9
Would it improve the present system Arts: Yes 68 58
if results on tests of this sort No 19 18
were taken into consideration in Don't know 13 24
the selection of candidates for ad­
mission to the two Faculties as Science: Yes 45 62
well as passes in the S.C.E., G.C.E.' No 21 29
etc.? Don't know 34 9
Do you think it would be fair CMT alone: Fair 3 —
to use these tests as the sole Unfair 87 80
criterion in the selection of Depends on Hons, course 7 17
candidates for admission to an Don't know 5 3
Honours course?
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Arts Science
% *
VRT alone : Fair 1 _
Unfair 86 72
Depends on Hons. course 9 23
Don 1t know 4 5
CMT and VRT together : Fair 2 3
Unfair 76 65
Depends on Hons. course 16 24
Don ' t know 6 8
41 In the selection of applicants for 
admission to an Honours course, do
you think results on such tests
ought to be taken into account in Yes 51 49
addition to marks in the relevant No 32 36
class below Honours level? Don1t know 17 14
42 Which form of the VRT did you do first?
Form V (white booklet) 52 52
Form W (pink and blue booklets) 48 48
43 (a) If you did Form V first which Form Form V 6 14
did you find easier? Form ¥ 52 41
About the same 44 43
(b) If you did Form ¥ first which Form Form V 35 47
did you find easier? Form ¥ 14 20
About the same 51 33
44 If you did find one easier can you suggest why this 
was so?
45 Did you find one of the Forms Form V 8 11
more interesting than the other? Form ¥ 9 7
About the same 83 82
46 If so, can you suggest why?
47 Do you think that your performance on any of the tests 
was adversely affected by purely temporary circum­
stances? Specify the tes involved.
(a) below par physically (e.g., heavy cold)
(b) unable to concentrate because of emotional upset
(c) customary examination nerves
(d) other (specify if possible)
(e) none
48 Did you feel that you did one of the tests Yes, CMT 
better than the others? Yes, VET Form V
Yes, VRT Form ¥
No
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Arts Science
49 Did you feel you did one of the tests 
worse than the others?
Yes, CMT 
Yes, VRT Form V 
Yes, VRT Form ¥ 
No
50 You will be told your scores on the three tests as 
soon as marking is completed, and there will be an 
opportunity to discuss the tests and the answers 
given to this questionnaire in class and in private. 
Taking this into account, would you say that the 
time you have spent on this project was:
Note The results given in this Appendix are those which appear to have 
the most direct bearing on the issues arising in Appendix A. Other 
results, with reference to the GR and PR groups are presented in Appendix E.
(a) profitably spent? Yes
No
Don't know
(b) enjoyably spent? Yes
No
Don't know
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(h) Scores and ranks on the VRT, Form V, CMT and Ordinary Class exams 
of the 15 Honours Psychology students in the original class of 320.
Sub­ Honours Valentine Concept Mastery Class Exam
jects 'Score' Rank Score z Rank Score _z Rank Score Rank
MB 35 15 41 -0.19 12* 107 -0.04 10 137 5*
MC 45 9 41 -0.19 12* 97 -0.41 14 132 9
RC 49 8 48 +0.40 10 132 +0.47 6 114 14
RG 83 1 43 -0.02 11 171 +2.35 1 141 4
CG 41 10 64 +1.78 2 109 +0.03 9 137 5*
RMcC* 61 6 43 +0.48 9 115 +0.64 5 154 2
AMcM 73 2 31 -0.38 14 140 +1.19 4 131 10
DM* 62 5 52 +0.75 5 87 -0.31 12 128 11*
JP 34 16 44 +0.55 7* 119 +0.40 7 117 13
DS 68 4 64 +1.99 1 157 +1.83 2 155 1
MS 50 7 51 +1.05 3 144 +1.34 3 145 3
CS 40 11* 50 +0.98 4 116 +0.29 8 135 7*
RS* 38 14 44 +0.55 7* 85 -0.38 13 108 15
TS* 72 3 46 +0.69 6 94 -0.07 11 128 11*
JT 40 11* 
* Science students
26 -0.74 15 91 -0.64 15 135 7*
Note The ranks were based on z scores in the cases of the VRT and CMT 
to take account of two distorting factors: (l) the fact that A-L sub­
jects (including DM) did the VRT Form V after exposure to Form W and (2) 
the fact that the CMT clearly favoured Arts students. The z scores are 
therefore based on the means and standard deviations of the M-Y and A-L 
groups in the original Ordinary class in the case of the VRT and of the 
Arts and Science groups in the case of the CMT. The Honours 'scores' 
were found by awarding the following numbers of points for answers (N=20) 
agreed by three examiners to be of the relevant class: 1st class, 5;
upper 2nd, 3; lower 2nd, 2; 3rd class, 1; fail, 0. The class exam 
scores are the sum of percentage scores on two class exams at the Ordin­
ary level.
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(i) a. Types of statement in the VET Section B. In some cases,
which I have marked with an asterisk, the grammatical form of the state­
ment is far removed from what I give as its logical form. In the case
of item 10 it seems that any attempt at a translation would likely mis­
lead rather than illuminate the situation. I give the item numbers and 
the statements in the order in which they appear in each.
5 All X's are Y's 
A is a Y 
A is an X
6 Everyone is either an X or a Y 
No one is both a Y and a Z 
Only X's are Z's
7 Only X’s are Y's 
All Y's are Z's 
Only X's are Z's.
8 If p then q 
All X's are Y's
9 All A's are either X's or Y's 
All A's which are X's or Y's 
are Z's*
All A's are Z's
10 Unclassifiable
11 If all X's are Y's then some 
X's at least are Z's 
No X's are Z's 
No X's are Y's
In summary; The universal affirmative occurs, in one form or another 
12 times. This includes two 'universal-disjunctives'.
The 'Only X's are Y's' type of statement occurs 10 times. 
The universal negative occurs 7 times.
There are two, very different hypotheticals.
The particular affirmative occurs five times, though only 
once in a straight forward form.
b. The exact form in which the conclusions of 13 items in the
two forms of the VRT were presented to students who were asked to say
whether they were true or false. The sheet used, with the instructions,
is reproduced overleaf.
12 No X's are Y's 
Only X's are Z's
No one is both an X and a Z
13 No X's are Y's 
Only Z's are Y's 
Only Z's are Y's
14 Only X's are Y's 
All Z's are X's*
All Z's are Y's*
15A Only X's (but not all X's)
B are Y's
Only Z's (but not all Z's) 
are A's
Some X's are B's*
Some Z's are B's*
No Z's are X's 
All non-Y's are C's 
All non-A's are D's 
Only D's are Y 's 
Some D's are B's* and 
some C's are B's*
(i) b.(contd.)
The following are statements appearing as the conclusions of 
arguments in Valentine's Reasoning Tests. Because an important factor 
in determining whether a person reasons correctly or not is the truth 
or falsity of the conclusions of the arguments he is considering, it is 
very important to know whether the following statements appear to most 
students (for whom Valentine's test is intended) to he true or not.
Look at each of the statements carefully and try to decide 
whether it is true or false. In some cases you may not be able to make 
up your mind one way or the other. In such cases just write a question- 
mark in the left-hand margin. If you think the statement is definitely 
true or definitely false, write T or F respectively. If you think it 
is probably true or probably false, write T? or F? respectively.
1 Only those who are well informed of the facts are amenable to 
argument.
2 Only Whigs are ten-pound householders.
3 Arguing on a subject one does not understand proves one to be a fool.
4 Seditious pamphlets must be suppressed.
5 No one can be expected to remember dates and understand constitut­
ional history.
6 Only veteran soldiers should be brought into the field of battle.
7 A truly wise man may justly be considered happy.
8 Only people who are interested in major sporting events enjoy 
strenuous physical exercise.
9 Only those already engaged in active military service need a boost 
to their morale.
10 Overlooking the need to ensure that your car is in satisfactory
mechanical order proves you to be an inexperienced driver.
11 Only male teachers with some experience of difficult classes should 
be put in charge of a difficult class.
12 People who take to heart the teachings of the great religious and 
spiritual teachers of mankind can be entrusted with the role of 
judge.
13 No one can be expected to enjoy both Cottar's Curd and Camembert.
(j) Results of the d method item analysis of VRT Section B. 
158 M-Y sub.jects
Item R m(R) E m(E)
o"ao U m(u) W m(w) d D
5 144 37.7 14 20.4 
putting Yes 
10 21.3 
putting No(i)
2 27.0 
putting No(iii) 
1 12.0 
putting No(-)
1 6.0
14 20.4 17.3 1.24
6 95 41.5 58 28.3 
putting No(i) 
10 30.2 
putting No(ii)
9 28.9 
putting No(iii) 
9 21.1 
putting No(iv) 
28 30.0 
putting No(-)
2 24.0
5 24.6 63 28.0 13.5 0.97
7 98 39.3 60 31.0 
putting Yes 
16 28.0 
putting No(i) 
19 34.0 
putting No(iii) 
18 30.1 
putting No(iv)
2 18.0 
putting No(-)
5 38.0
60 31.0 8.3 0.59
8 93 39.8 63 30.6 
putting Yes 
24 35.5 
putting No(i) 
12 28.0 
putting No(ii) 
15 22.9 
putting No(iii) 
9 33.4 
putting No(-)
3 32.3
2 38.5 65 30.8 9.0 0.64
9 117 40.5 40 23.1 
putting No(i) 
23 22.9 
putting No(ii) 
3 26.0 
putting No(iii) 
13 23.0
1 47.0 41 23.7 16.3 1.07
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Item R m(R) E m(E) o O U m(u) W m(w) d D
9 putting No(iv) 
1 22.0
10 100 41.9 58 26.3 
putting Yes 
36 26.8 
putting No(ii) 
3 13.7 
putting No(iii) 
3 25.6 
putting No(iv) 
16 27.4
58 26.3 15.6 1.11
11 92 43.6 65 25.8 
putting Yes 
38 28.4 
putting No(i) 
13 21.9 
putting No(ii) 
3 23.3 
putting No(iii) 
10 21.3 
putting No(-)
1 29.0
1 25.0 66 25.8 17.8 1.28
12 103 40.7 53 27.3 
putting No(i) 
29 28.4 
putting No(ii) 
9 14.9 
putting No(iii) 
1 25.0 
putting No(iv) 
13 35.1 
putting No(-)
1 6.0
2 38.5 55 27.7 13.0 0.93
13 116 40.4 41 23.9 
putting No(i) 
12 27.1 
putting No(ii) 
20 23.2 
putting No(iii) 
3 17.7 
putting No(iv) 
3 28.0 
putting No(-)
3 18.3
1 37.0 42 24.2 16.2 1.16
14 47 45.3 108 31.9 
putting Yes 
81 34.7 
putting No(i) 
8 23.3 
putting No(ii) 
3 14.7 
putting No(iv) 
16 25.7
2 39.5 1 51.0 111 32.2 13.1 0.94
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Item R m(R) E m(E) 0 m(o) U m(u) W m(w) d D
1 5A 28 46.1 120 54.3 
putting Yes 
104 33.7 
putting No(i) 
8 43.8 
putting No(ii) 
1 22.0 
putting No(iv) 
2 14.0 
putting No(-)
5 41.0
1 51.0 9 28.1 130 34.0 12.1 0.86
1 5B 28 46.3 112,-: 35.2 
putting Yes 
35 36.1 
putting No(i) 
10 29.7 
putting No(iii) 
8 31.8 
putting No(iv) 
38 37.6 
putting No(-) 
21 33.0
18 27.0 130 34.0 12.3 0.88
160 A-L subjects
5 158 43.6 2 27.5 
(both put Yes)
2 27.5 16.1 1.39
6 121 45.7 35 36.3 
putting No(i)
9 34.0 
putting No(ii) 
5 38.8 
putting No(iii) 
2 47.5 
putting No(iv) 
19 35.6
4 32.8 39 36.0 9.7 0.83
7 97 46.1 62 39.0 
putting Yes 
15 35.2 
putting No(i) 
30 40.8 
putting No(iii) 
12 39.7 
putting No(iv) 
2 38.0 
putting No(-)
3 37.3
1 43.0 63 39.1 7.0 0.60
8 125 46.2 37 34.1 
putting Yes 
16 30.5
37 34.1 12.1 1.04
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Item R m(R) E m(E)
oo U m(u) W m(w) d D
8 putting No(i)
9 39.9 
putting No(ii) 
5 28.0 
putting No(iii) 
7 39.0
9 146 44.2 14 34.8 
putting No(i)
8 56.9 
putting No(ii) 
2 39.0 
putting No(iii) 
4 28.5
14 34.8 9.4 0.8,1
10 116 46.6 44 34.8 
putting Yes 
34 34.9 
putting No(i)
4 40.0 
putting No(iv)
5 28.4 
putting No(-)
1 41.0
44 34.8 11.8 1.02
11 119 46.5 41 34.3 
putting Yes 
27 36.6 
putting No(i)
3 23.0 
putting No(ii) 
1 26.0 
putting No(iii) 
9 32.1 
putting No(-)
1 33.0
41 34.3 12.2 1.05
12 127 45.9 32 33.7 
putting No(i) 
25 33.9 
putting No(ii)
2 40.5 
putting No(iii)
2 26.0 
putting No(iv)
3 32.7
1 33.0 33 33.7 12.2 1.05
13 133 45.2 25 33.2 
putting No(i) 
15 32.7 
putting No(ii) 
10 34.1
2 44.5 27 34.1 11.1 0.95
14 52 51.4 106 39.4 
putting Yes 
94 40.1 
putting No(i) 
9 34.4
2 43.5 108 39.5 11.9 1.02
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Item R m(R) E m(E) 0 m(o) U m(u) W m(w) d D
14 putting No(iv) 
3 32,0
15A 46 50.6 111 40.8 
putting Yes 
92 39.5 
putting No(i)
9 49.6 
putting No(ii)
2 41.5 
putting No(iv)
3 45.3 
putting No(-)
5 44.6
1 33.0 2 25.0 114 40.4 10.2 0.88
15B 57 50.4 97 40.5 
putting Yes
27 43.2 
putting No(i)
12 42.1
putting No(iii)
11 38.8 
putting No(iv)
28 39.2 
putting No(-)
19 37.5
6 26.5 103 40.3 10.1 0.87
The categories of response used in the above analysis are as
follows
R correct responses
E cases where a subject puts an answer but a wrong one
0 cases where a subject puts no answer to this item but
does put an answer to a later item
U .cases where a subject puts no answer to this item or
to any later item 
¥ = E + 0 + U
d = m(R) - m(w)
D = g, where cr is the root of the unbiased estimate of the variance 
of the population.
L
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(k) Inventive-response answers of 45 subjects to item 7 of the VRT 
Section B (the item for which none of the reasons given in the published 
version of the test makes the essential point). These are reproduced
here to illustrate the difficulties which would face the marker if we 
were to follow Anstey's suggestion that the VRT 'might have been even 
better if cast entirely in inventive-response form'.
The original purpose of the exercise was to obtain empirical 
evidence about the kind of flaw undergraduate subjects are most prone to 
see in an argument and, to this end, these members of an Ordinary Psycho­
logy class were told that there was 'something wrong' with the six invalid 
arguments of the VRT Section B and asked to say what that something is.
In the following list I have placed first the 17 responses which include 
the essential point - that the conclusion would follow only if the second 
premise meant or implied that all ten-pound householders (hence forth 
'TPH's') vote for Mr. B. Next come 6 problematic cases of which the 
first 4 probably do contain the important point. Of the remainder, the 
first 15 make the rather lame comment that the conclusion does not follow 
from the premises while the other 7 are, in my view, unacceptable for a 
variety of other reasons.
'Only Whigs vote for Mr. B. All who vote for Mr. B. are ten- 
pound householders. Therefore only Whigs are ten-pound householders.'
1 There may be Whigs who don't vote for Mr. B. and also TPH's who don't 
vote for Mr. B.
2 Some Whigs might not vote at all, or might vote for someone else.
The fact that anyone who does vote for him is a Whig doesn't exclude other 
Whigs who don't vote. The same argument holds for TPH's - as with Whig 
statements it isn't reversible.
3 All who vote for Mr. B. are TPH's does not mean that everyone who is
a TPH votes for Mr. B. Therefore last statement illogical. It is
possible for people other than Whigs to be TPH's.
4 Only Whigs who are TPH's vote for Mr. B. but it says nothing about 
every single TPH voting for Mr. B. - there may be TPH's who don't vote 
for Mr. B. and all the Whigs may not vote for him. Thus those who are 
not TPH's don't vote for Mr. B. and since every Whig does not necessarily 
vote for Mr. B, all Whigs are not nece.... Necessary cond. to vote for 
Mr. B. - TPH. Also Whig necessary condition. No logical conclusion 
that only Whigs the TPH's since some Whigs and some TPH's may not vote 
for Mr. B.
5 Only Whigs vote for Mr. B. yes, but there may be TPH's who do not vote
Mr. B. and are not Whigs. It may be just a coincidence that all who vote
for Mir. B. are TPH's.
6 Some TPH's may not vote for Mr. B. (i.e., may not vote at all) and it
is therefore impossible to say only Whigs are TPH's.
7 TPH's don't necessarily vote for Mir. B. Therefore cannot assume they 
are all Whigs.
8 The argument does not say that all TPH's vote for Mr. B. The only
conclusion could be that all Whigs who vote for Mr. B. are TPH's.
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9 The fact that all who vote for Mr. B are TPH’s does not necessarily 
imply that there are not any TPH's who vote, say, for Mr. A. or Mr. C. 
who may not be Whig candidates.
10 Would have to read only those who vote etc. to make sense.
11 Other people than Whigs could be TPH's - instead of all in second 
sentence 'only those who' should be used.
12 But not all TPH's vote for Mr. B.
13 Not only Whigs are TPH's but others can be this as well as they do 
not have to vote for Mr. B.
14 Definition of Whig ^  TPH or even if all Whigs were TPH’s, it would 
not mean that this was exclusively their prerogative to be TPH's, i.e., 
there may be other TPH's who do not vote for Mr. B.
15 Some TPH's may not vote for Mr. B. Therefore there may be some who 
are not Whigs. Also not all Whigs necessarily vote for Mr. B.
16 There may be others who do not vote for Mr. B. who are TPH's.
17 The argument does not state that all TPH's vote for Mr. B. There 
might be some TPH's who are not Whigs that do not vote for Mr. B.
18 Being a Whig does not stipulate being a TPH, i.e., there may have been 
some TPH's who voted otherwise.
19 liie statement implies that only Whigs are TPH's. Whereas it should 
say that only Whigs who are TPH's vote for Mr. B. as there are many other 
categories of TPH's.
20 There could be some TPH's who abstained from voting, or who were not 
in the electoral area. These people need not necessarily be Whigs.
This statement is a generalisation based on the evidence of one incident.
21 The last sentence does not follow, as there could be Tories who are 
TPH's, even although they do not vote for Mr. B.
22 Conclusion implies 'Whigs only vote for Mr. B.', not 'only Whigs' 
which implies only Whigs out of all political parties, for example, and 
not out of all voters.
23 Theiemay be some Whigs who don't vote and there may be some TPH's who 
don't vote. Therefore it is not necessary that those who vote for Mr. B. 
are either Whigs or TPH's.
24 All TPH's are not necessarily Whigs.
25 It is possible for people other than Whigs to be TPH's.
26 There will be TPH's who are not Whigs. Therefore it is wrong to make
sweeping generalisations such as have been made here.
27 There may be people who are not Whigs and yet are TPH's.
28 There are many TPH's who are not Whigs.
29 The Whigs who vote for Mr. B. are TPH's. This does not mean that
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only Whigs are TPH’s, non-Whigs may be TPH's.
30 The conclusion is stating a general principle taken from only one 
premise.
31 TPH’s may be a larger group than Whigs. Whigs only part of TPH's. 
Therefore it is not only Whigs who are TPH's.
32 Some Whigs may not vote for Mr. B. Some TPH's may not vote for Mr. B.
(All this scored out.) Therefore there are some TPH's who aren't Whigs.
33 Not only Whigs that are TPH's.
34 Only Whigs vote for Mr. B. and these are TPH's, but there will be
others who, although they qualify as TPH's, will not be Whigs.
35 Non sequitur.
36 Whigs are not necessarily only people who are TPH's. This would be
better if one said 'all Whigs etc.' and not 'only Whigs'.
37 There could be others who are TPH's but not Whigs.
38 Does not make sense to assume that only Whigs are TPH's. There are 
most likely others in this category.
39 oince all who vote for Mr. B. are TPH's and they are only Whigs - it 
doesn't follow logically that the whole number of Whigs (as opposed to 
those who vote for Mr. B.) are TPH's.
40 'Whigs' in conclusion should be 'Whigs who vote for Mr. B.' There 
are Whigs who do not vote for Mr. B. and some of these are probably not
TPH's.
41 The last statement should be changed to 'all the Whigs who vote for 
Mr. B. are TPH's'.
42 Would make better sense if it said 'all Whigs are TPH's'.
43 Conclusion should be 'All Whigs are TPH's'. There could be others
who are not Whigs, but are TPH's.
44 Doesn't necessarily follow that only Whigs vote for Mr. B. and because 
if someone votes for Mr. B. and is a TPH he still might not be a Whig.
Who knows who votes for who anyway?
45 Only those who are also TPH's will vote for Mr. B. This need not be
all Whigs.
APPENDIX C
GLOSSARY OF LOGICAL TERMS USED IN THIS THESIS
In the traditional Aristotelian logic all simple statements - 
i.e., all statements which are not combinations of other statements - are 
assumed to involve a subject-term and a predicate-term. The sub.iect-term 
of a proposition is the one which refers to the class of things spoken 
about in that proposition, the predicate-term refers to the class of 
things to which the subject class stands in a certain relation of inclusion 
or exclusion, a relation which is expressed with the help of the remaining 
component of an Aristotelian proposition, the copula.
A proposition or statement is said to have a certain quality - 
affirmative or negative - and a certain quantity - universal or particular. 
The intersection of these two dichotomies produces four types of statement, 
the universal affirmative (A), the universal negative (e ), the particular 
affirmative (i), and the particular negative (O). In their most charact­
eristic English forms these are, respectively:
A All X ’s are Y's.
E No X's are Y's.
I Some X's are Y's.
0 Some X's are not Y's.
From the truth of a proposition of one of these kinds an immediate
inference can sometimes be made about the truth of another proposition.
The simplest case would be where the truth of a particular proposition is
inferred from the truth of the corresponding universal. A more complic­
ated case is where a proposition is converted, i.e., where the statement toj. x miw ■ .!■■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■' j rGVSJzsGci
be inferred from it has the order of the subject and predicate terms/without 
any compensating change in the copula. Thus, if no X's are Y's, then one 
may legitimately immediately infer that no Y's are X's. On the other hand, 
conversions of A and 0 propositions are illicit: 'All Y's are X's' may
not be inferred from 'All X's are Y's' nor 'Some Y's are not X's' from 
'Some X's are not Y's'.
Mediate inferences recognised in the Aristotelian logic include the 
syllogism and the sorites. In a valid syllogism there are three propos­
itions and three terms, two propositions (with all three terms represented) 
being premises and the remaining one the conclusion. The subject-term is 
called the minor term of the syllogism and represented by the letter 'S'; 
the predicate terms of the conclusion (the major term) is represented by 
'P '; the remaining term of the syllogism, which must appear in both pre­
mises but does not appear in the conclusion,is called the middle term ('M '). 
The premise in which the major term appears is the major premise and con­
ventionally written first, followed, of course, by the premise with the 
minor term (the'minor premise'). An example of a valid syllogism would 
thus be:
All M is P 
All S is M 
Therefore all S is P.
The example is a syllogism in Barbara, one of a number of mnemonic 
words used to refer to a syllogism of a certain figure and mood. The 
figure of a syllogism is the arrangement of terms when the premises are set 
out in the conventional order, a syllogism in Barbara being in the first of
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the four figures recognised, the middle term in others being in the 
predicate position in both premises (second figure), the subject 
position in both (third figure) or in predicate position in the major 
premise and subject position in the minor (fourth figure ). The mood 
of a syllogism is a matter of the quality and quantity of the component 
propositions, stated in the conventional order. Thus a syllogism in 
Barbara is in the AAA mood.
A sorites is a conflation of two or more syllogisms 'in which 
only the final conclusion is stated and the premises are so arranged that 
any two successive premises contain a common term',(Stebbing, 1952, p.70).
There are certain 'rules of the syllogism1 which make it poss­
ible to determine whether the conclusion follows from the premises. The 
least obvious of these concern the distribution of terms in premises and 
conclusion. The subject-terms of universal, and the predicate-terms of 
negative propositions are distributed (i.e., concern all the members of 
the classes they refer to), all other terms being undistributed. The 
relevant rules of the syllogism state (l) that the middle term must be 
distributed in at least one premise, (2) that the major term must be dis­
tribute in its (major) premise if it is distributed in the conclusion, 
and (3) that the minor term must be distributed in its (minor) premise if 
it is distributed in the conclusion. A person who affirms the conclus­
ion of a syllogism when one or other of these rules or conditions is not 
met is guilty of committing, respectively, the fallacy of the undistrib­
uted middle term, the fallacy of illicit process of the major term, or 
the fallacy of illicit process of the minor term.
These are all examples of formal fallacies, fallacies, that is, 
'which could be detected solely by a knowledge of formal logic' (Sinclair, 
1951, p. 85). The ability to detect material fallacies, on the other 
hand, depends on such extra-logical factors as a knowledge of the context 
of which the argument is a part ('begging the question', for example) or 
of the different meanings which one of the terms used in the argument may 
have ('equivocation', for example).
APPENDIX D
MATERIALS RELATING TO THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE
(a) Chapman and Chapman’s Table showing the percentage of their subjects 
choosing an A, E, I or 0 conclusion - or none of these (n ) - as following 
from different pairs of premises in syllogisms of different figures 
(Chapman and Chapman, 1959, p.
Item Prem­ Fig­ Item Prem­ Fig­
No. ises ure A E I 0 N No. ises ure A E I 0 N
12 AA II 83 6 3 1 7 5 II IV 2 3 68 13 15
17 AA II 82 5 3 1 9 20 II III 1 5 63 5 26
59 AA II 77 5 6 1 10 51 II III 4 5 64 5 23
4 AE I 3 81 3 5 8 7 10 III 1 6 13 48 31
23 AE III 1 85 0 5 8 34 10 IV 2 5 11 60 22
41 AE I 1 82 3 6 7 48 10 I 2 6 10 55 27
8 AI II 3 7 75 7 8 22 01 I 1 4 14 59 21
15 AI IV 3 3 80 6 8 33 01 III 1 7 15 52 24
46 AI IV 10 2 74 6 7 44 01 IV 1 5 11 55 27
13 IA I 5 5 78 8 5 29 EE IV 1 57 4 3 36
19 IA II 5 11 68 7 9 36 EE II 3 59 5 5 28
42 IA I 3 4 83 4 7 40 EE III 2 47 4 7 40
11 AO III 2 7 14 61 16 30 E0 I 3 24 10 32 32
24 AO I 1 2 13 76 8 35 E0 II 1 26 9 32 32
52 AO IV 4 4 10 74 11 47 E0 III 5 25 6 21 44
25 OA II 0 7 12 64 16 2 0E IV 2 28 12 24 34
32 OA IV 3 4 11 70 12 27 0E I 3 39 5 19 34
43 OA I 1 6 7 78 8 50 0E III 3 41 7 19 30
9 IE I 1 62 6 13 18 3 00 III 0 8 10 50 31
26 IE III 2 59 5 16 19 14 00 IV 0 5 11 60 24
49 IE IV 2 48 6 24 20 45 00 II 1 8 11 45 35
(b) The relationship between the validity of the E (’emotionally signi­
ficant’) and nE ('emotionally neutral') arguments in Lefford’s study and 
the truth or falsity of the corresponding conclusions. The conclusions 
are listed on the next page with the validity (v) or invalidity (i) of 
the corresponding arguments immediately to the right. To the right again 
are the views of three judges (myself and two young American women who 
were not aware of the issue involved) as to whether Lefford's American 
subjects in 1941 would have regarded these conclusions as definitely true 
(t), probably true (T?), definitely false (f), probably false (F?). Two 
other categories were also used: N ('neither') to refer to conclusions
of which it does not appear to make sense to say that they are true or 
false, and CT ('can't tell') for conclusions about which the judge felt 
completely unsure. The question at issue is, of course, whether the nE 
conclusions are more often true when the corresponding argument is valid 
and false when it is invalid than in the case of E conclusions.
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nE conclusions IW DS AN
1 All members of the North End Club will vote on V N CT F
2
Election Day.
All geometrical figures which are plane figures I F F F
3
are triangles.
All automobile accidents should be avoided if V T T T
4
possible.
This person is not a college graduate. I N N N
5 This plane figure, which has three sides and V T T T
6
three included angles, is a triangle. 
The weather will change. I N N CT
7 The laws of science can never be established as V CT F? F?
8
absolute, completely definite, and final.
All collegiate football players are members of I F F F
9
Phi Beta Kappa.
All good scientists should be masters of the laws V T T T
10
of logic and scientific method. 
All good men are wise. I CT F? T?
11 Logic is a branch of mathematics. V CT T CT
12 Being a vegetarian is the best indication of I F F CT
13
good health.
Da Vinci's paintings obeyed the laws of V T? T T
14
perspective.
The S.S. America has been constructed of mater­ I F CT CT
15
ials which are lighter than water. 
Philosophers are fallible. V T T T
16 All fish must be whales. I F F F
17 No members of the library committee are members V CT CT CT
18
of the finance committee.
Some forms of plant-life are fish I F F F
19 Spiders are not insects. V T F F
20 Auto mobiles will not come into greater demand. I F F F
E conclusions 
1 War is an experience ennobling to men to the V F F? F?
2
most exalted degree.
The Teachers' Union is a subversive Communist I F? CT T?
3
organisation.
The German Jews are justifiably repressed by all V F CT F?
4
measures.
The Soviet government does not want peace. I T? CT T?
5 The rearmament measures in which we are engaged V F? CT T?
6
are wrong.
This country is not going to war. I CT CT F
7 Marriages between peoples of different races, as V CT T? T?
8
between Negroes and Whites or Jew and Aryan, are 
bad and undesirable.
The European war is opposed to our national I CT T T
9
prosperity and welfare.
The poor and unemployed should not be allowed to V F F F?
10
survive.
All trade unionists are communists. I F? CT T?
11 War should be shunned at all costs. V F? F F
12 A consequence of communism is, in effect, the I T? T? T
13
enslavement of the working man. 
Birth control should be prohibited. V CT T? T
14 The Russian government is really acting in the I CT T? T
best interests of the Russian people.
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Lefford's E conclusions (contd.) 
15 Wars are much to be desired. V F F F
16 All C.I.O. leaders are agents for Communism. I F? CT T?
17 The existence of God is not real. V F? CT F
18 Some dictators are without personal ambition. I F? F? F
19 No peace settlement can be a lasting one. V F F? F?
20 The annexation of Austria was not rightful. I T T T
(c) The conclusions of Thistlethwaite's 'anti-Negro' arguments.
The validity or otherwise of the corresponding arguments is once again 
shown at the right hand side. The purpose to be served in this case 
is illustrative only: Thistlethwaite says that he chose conclusions
which would conflict with a correct view of the related arguments in 
subjects with anti-Negro sentiments.
1 Negroes are best fitted for skilled work or for positions of V 
responsibility.
2 The plight of the Negroes is the fault of bigots or of Fascists. V
3 Negroes who are educated whould be admitted to the better V 
hotels and apartments.
4 Negroes are not the equals of whites in intelligence. I
5 The Negro is by nature lazy and superstitious. I
6 Negroes should feel no hesitation about dating white girls who V 
like them.
7 Radical agitators are responsible for the talk about putting I 
Negroes on the same level as Whites.
8 If Negroes should be prevented from having too much contact with I 
Whites then it is best to keep Negroes in their own districts
and schools.
9 If peaceful industrial relations are desirable, then it is a I 
mistake to have Negroes for foreman and leaders over Whites.
10 The Negroid group does not represent an advanced and mature race. I
11 Negroes should be assisted as much as possible in improving V 
their social and economic status.
12 No Negro should submit to social conventions without thinking V 
for himself.
APPENDIX E
PRELIMINARY DATA RELATING TO THE PR AND GR GROUPS
(a) AAA and VRT, Section B, T-scale scores and Class Exam percentage 
marks. The AAA scores, as explained in the text, were based on perform­
ance on Section A of the VRT, on the CMT (adjusted to allow for the anti- 
Science bias) and on the Higher grade of the S.C.E. weighted in the pro­
portions 1 : 3 : 4. T-scale scores were calculated to facilitate the 
selection of subjects for PR and GR groups. In the following table sub­
jects are set out in 'pairs’.
P__R g r o u. P
Sub­ VRT Diff­ Class Exams
ject AAA B erence 1 st 2nd
JA 58 39 -19 63 56
EA 63 41 -22 71 62
NB 59 46 -13 50 62
AB 67 49 -18 48 44
NC 52 40 -12 68 59
MC 57 45 -12 71 49
LD 65 47 -18 57 54
GD 53 56 -17 36 41
EF 50 37 -13 63 41
IG 69 45 -24 72 69
MH 61 39 -22 46 52
JH 59 48 -11 54 42
JJ 63 45 -18 73 66
RJ 59 43 -16 60 57
EL 65 45 -20 72 51
IMcA 66 49 -17 72 71
BMcC 56 44 -12 63 52
HM 61 41 -20 — —
IR 51 29 -22 65 53
JS 70 46 -24 78 65
PW 55 43 -12 60 55
RW 59 39 -20 38 42
G__R K J. O-.P. P
Sub­ VRT Diff­ Class Exams
ject AAA B erence 1 st 2nd
JH 58 61 +3 58 50
RM 60 58 -2 48 48
HMcL 62 64 +2 42 50
AMcD 68 69 +1 56 64
JW 50 52 +2 44 56
KH 56 57 +1 72 72
EW 62 67 +5 52 38
JW 56 59 +3 43 40
DJ 55 56 +1 56 48
BP 68 62 -6 68 62
MA 61 61 0 64 62
RW 57 58 +1 46 44
MO 60 59 -1 51 52
MC 57 58 +1 56 40
GC 64 60 -4 — —
WP 66 68 +2 63 65
EMcL 54 54 0 58 57
RH 66 63 67 42
RC 51 54 +3 59 55
JC 64 65 +1 36 48
RD 54 55 +1 52 55
MG 58 60 +2 50 36
(b) Responses of the two groups to some items in the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire is reproduced in full in Appendix B and I have simply 
indicated the various items by means of their number and a shorthand 
version of their contents.
Item Item
No. PR GR No. PR GR
2. Sex: Male 8 11 3. Age: 18 4 7
Female 13 10 19 7 6
5. Faculty: Arts 17 17 20 9 5
Science 4 4 21 - 2
21 + 1 1
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Item
No. PR GR
6. Year of study: 1st 2 3
2nd 11 11
3rd 8 6
4th - 1
10. VRT good test? Yes 10 4
No 9 12
D.K. 2 5
14. Honours? Yes 12 15
• No 8 6
D.K. 1 -
18. Good at spotting Very 1 —
fallacies? Quite 8 15
Not very 11 4
Hopeless 1 1
D.K. - 1
19. Others better? Yes 18 17
No 1 -
D.K. 2 3
Other - 1
20. Logic classes? School
University 7 6
Neither 14 15
21. Read logic books? Yes 2 3
No 18 18
? 1 -
27. Logic of use? Yes 4 4
No 2 1
D.K. 1 -
Doesn't apply 13 16
No answer 1 -
28. Logic aids? Symbols 4 1
Venn 2 1
Conversion/obversion 1 1
Only 3 2
None 3 1
Doesn’t apply 12 16
29. More time? Yes 17 6
No 3 14
D.K. 1 1
30. How much? A few mins. 2
10 mins. 2 -
10-15 mins. 1 -
15 mins. 8 4
30 mins. 3 -
60 mins. 1 -
Not sure 2 -
Item
No. PR
31. Spent on? Section A 3
Section B 5
Both 9
32. Time limit upset Yes 13
No 8
33. Task clear? Very 6
Quite 11
No 4
34. Guess? Often 3
Occasionally 11
Never 7
35. Reasons first Always 2
Often 2
Occasionally 13
Never 4
36. CMT more/less More 14
enjoyable? Less 2
Same 5
43. One Form easier? Yes 13
No 8
Second Form? Yes 13
No 3
Form W, second 3
Form V, second 7
Form W, first 3
Form V, first -
44. Task clearer/practice 7
Less nervous 2
Others (inc. novelty) 4(
None given 1
47. Special disability 9
48.
mentioned
One test better? CMT 13
VRT 4
No 4
D.K. -
49. One test worse? CMT 3
VRT 12
No 6
D.K. —
GR
2
3
1
8
13
8
12
1
13
8
2
1 1
8
12
6
3
1 1
10
1 1
2
7 
2
2
8
) 1 (1) 
1
9
6
7
7
1
7 
4
8 
2
APPENDIX F
MATERIALS AND RAW DATA RELATING TO THE 5TS EXPERIMENT
(a) Statements and diagrammatic card arrays. Those used in the fifth 
series are reproduced in the text. Accordingly, only the first four 
arrays for each statement-type are given below.
Ah(l) R t M p 3 2 7 8
If a card has a capital letter on one side it always has 
an odd number on the other.
Ah (2) + A D A e R t m
If a card has a cross on one side it always has a small 
letter on the other.
Ah (3) o < / 5 S e  3 5 7 9
If a card has a Greek letter on one side it always has 
an even number on the other.
Ah (4) + >□ A  □ £ p t ex.
If a card has a square on one side it always has a Greek 
letter on the other.
Ad(l) □ <} + + a e K t
Every card has a cross on one side or else a capital 
letter on the other.
Ad (2) A W T E 8 2 3 4
Every card has a vowel on one side or else an even number 
on the other.
Ad (3) c < a  c b A O O  +
Every card has a Greek letter on one side or else a square 
on the other.
Ad (4) P A  G X A □  A  A
Every card has a consonant on one side or else a triangle 
on the other.
A(l) K t R d 2 3 4 5
All the cards with a capital letter on one side have an 
even number of the other.
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A (2) A A A d i n t R T
All the cards with a triangle on one side have a capital 
letter on the other.
A ( 3 ) ‘* /6 a m 7 8 4 2
All the cards with a Greek letter on one side have an even 
number on the other.
A (4) /> "fr b c< 0 > + □ O
All the cards with a Greek letter on one side have a square 
on the other.
E(l) a < * y 6 b 7 3 2 4
No cards with a Greek letter on one side have an odd number 
on the other.
E (2) o < t m e Q  + A O
No cards with a Roman letter on one side have a square 
on the other.
E (3)
E (4)
F (2)
No cards with an even number on one side have a triangle 
on the other.
□ o o  + k s e t
No cards with a square on one side have a consonant on 
the other.
F (1) r M m
Only cards with a small letter on one side have an even 
number on the other.
Only cards with a cross on one side have a capital letter 
on the other.
F (3) 3 6 8 2 + q a a
Only cards with an even number on one side have a square 
on the other.
F (4) A A O + a e i z
Only cards with a triangle on one side have a vowel on 
the other.
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(b) Response times on successive trials of the 5TS task, totals and 
ranks. The times are given in tenths of a second to avoid the need 
for the decimal point. Subjects will be given in their pairs in the 
order in which they are listed in Appendix E, and this will hold good 
for all the results presented in the Appendices from this point on.
Thus the subject numbers will always refer to the same pair of subjects.
Sub­
GR 
T r
group 
i a 1 s
Ah statements
PR 
T r
group 
i a 1 s
ject 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 471 208 327 249 316 1571 597 185 277 439 224 1722
2 312 142 123 73 319 969 119 162 256 159 143 839
3 229 90 128 62 73 582 421 199 320 464 811 2215
4 109 84 193 148 119 653 97 69 73 86 78 403
5 124 104 79 85 111 503 177 90 85 99 73 524
6 168 155 401 151 107 982 251 216 331 172 234 1204
7 236 155 173 113 165 842 1508 189 197 182 265 2341
8 328 468 398 542 150 1886 225 100 171 196 122 814
9 153 104 81 158 102 598 114 125 462 84 98 883
10 293 516 288 243 398 1738 467 197 116 178 270 1228
11 86 142 144 130 232 734 133 140 157 107 97 634
12 117 285 152 193 92 839 75 65 105 74 94 413
13 136 422 326 128 90 1102 163 194 245 150 90 842
14 116 133 87 170 100 606 432 222 226 194 201 1275
15 45 31 35 25 37 173 79 68 86 67 140 440
16 154 119 144 116 148 681 207 217 157 183 114 878
17 615 292 487 213 323 1930 239 209 215 135 159 957
18 115 60 64 65 50 354 92 120 111 102 99 524
19 683 362 748 575 462 2770 323 389 281 173 153 1319
20 157 115 76 66 90 504 419 268 159 190 189 1225
21 376 699 399 221 95 1790 269 492 536 164 169 1630
22 329 140 147 94 125
Ad
835 97 
statements
135 57 64 129 482
1 480 585 281 270 404 2020 494 187 150 163 192 1186
2 510 191 134 144 277 1256 177 162 195 239 191 964
3 150 167 177 88 80 662 422 576 1013 265 725 3001
4 152 135 113 130 108 638 254 152 169 68 132 775
5 84 186 110 81 143 604 439 178 147 144 135 1043
6 442 405 527 129 82 1585 473 235 335 222 599 1864
7 180 151 109 145 139 724 828 327 134 482 172 1943
8 348 806 365 186 386 2091 217 121 125 253 129 845
9 546 141 164 442 130 1423 170 186 140 130 177 803
10 395 246 258 198 176 1273 954 184 259 190 308 1895
11 158 270 142 143 170 883 146 148 378 245 205 1122
12 132 229 223 127 168 879 189 242 174 163 183 951
13 130 229 251 122 126 858 226 225 186 182 154 973
14 185 100 93 130 144 652 377 251 215 303 315 1461
15 65 45 39 49 37 235 98 79 210 113 136 636
16 281 561 190 233 127 1392 418 384 346 171 110 1429
17 272 391 214 324 214 1415 370 231 422 308 294 1625
18 162 162 110 112 77 623 452 210 70 82 95 909
19 486 449 893 269 349 2446 395 385 167 428 210 1585
20 75 216 181 190 194 856 464 161 144 412 326 1507
21 402 465 379 339 368 1953 373 357 463 203 341 1737
22 579 184 145 98 189 1195 152 158 110 108 230 758
Sul
je<
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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rn
T r i a 1 s T r i a 1 s
1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5 Total
A statements
389 394 277 292 319 1671 352 403 177 671 148 1751
134 167 203 262 249 812 188 172 142 167 112 781
144 110 124 89 50 517 430 469 441 778 449 2567
107 78 84 155 94 518 73 103 119 59 74 428
266 78 185 81 87 697 142 76 111 127 107 563
438 98 156 91 94 877 305 224 207 281 348 1363
318 179 186 197 186 1066 846 443 404 517 187 2397
217 876 367 315 241 2016 131 159 95 122 105 612
107 77 105 160 120 569 223 143 102 120 218 806
355 557 244 299 235 1690 211 87 172 187 113 770
196 67 210 118 198 789 170 118 167 87 158 700
97 75 154 158 117 601 59 67 145 71 126 468
120 87 132 74 85 498 184 229 165 157 128 863
79 207 119 62 98 565 181 135 139 150 185 790
41 33 33 39 28 174 113 59 108 65 125 470
193 269 152 139 146 899 143 225 141 176 194 879
534 388 387 348 202 1859 141 151 109 159 175 735
55 39 68 49 58 269 88 131 88 82 92 481
449 828 472 512 496 2757 705 377 355 381 120 1938
65 108 86 78 101 438 291 527 154 86 154 1212
316 227 211 198 160 1112 338 225 508 191 134 1396
124 115 83 104 98 524 79 96 84 86 89 434
E statements
210 352 354 470 103 1489
277 324 166 241 135 1143
194 179 94 215 114 796
142 152 89 87 107 577
84 107 61 71 140 463
168 139 97 102 184 690
232 199 192 117 197 937
442 480 348 233 315 1818
105 155 63 85 82 490
193 313 180 292 183 1161
368 217 191 127 266 1169
100 279 97 116 166 758
105 188 130 147 75 645
97 109 159 173 95 633
47 91 48 41 43 270
292 214 130 148 102 886
669 368 313 269 614 2233
107 68 72 75 75 397
505 557 285 443 249 2039
296 119 100 81 205 801
406 221 129 192 158 1106
170 176 134 201 132 813
321 230 173 205 183 1112
154 138 129 129 100 650
264 905 517 449 325 2464
95 113 57 152 111 528
217 109 70 85 145 626
158 144 267 217 191 977
574 254 715 192 255 1190
134 136 127 163 127 687
217 232 182 112 196 939
417 182 117 153 126 995
271 150 135 249 273 1078
113 281 105 131 244 874
319 201 198 154 138 1020
195 205 196 241 367 1204
212 102 70 110 107 601
297 188 336 122 190 1133
227 255 115 312 127 1036
149 182 209 141 134 815
310 348 440 265 118 1481
150 126 110 106 118 610
211 337 221 171 160 1100
200 132 45 69 108 554
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GR group PR group
Sub­ T r i a 1 s T r i a 1 s
ject 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5 Total
F statements
1 829 330 378 350 258 2145 517 502 252 342 301 1914
2 693 331 170 287 109 1590 325 257 141 225 195 1143
3 334 313 175 98 370 1290 287 689 879 1667 225 3747
4 181 143 90 127 94 635 247 87 72 103 155 664
5 168 159 57 109 129 622 154 118 63 83 106 524
6 225 164 119 104 122 734 239 187 214 213 383 1236
7 312 293 194 223 165 1187 780 462 304 248 283 2077
8 522 695 296 389 483 2383 275 175 185 139 215 989
9 100 81 158 110 128 577 203 114 114 100 120 651
10 665 362 359 335 180 1901 689 215 83 101 106 1194
11 297 405 204 323 532 1761 144 130 158 97 110 639
12 181 164 233 186 204 968 98 95 96 187 744 1220
13 215 405 247 207 147 1221 246 386 253 293 220 1398
14 123 71 115 204 130 643 160 201 282 135 414 1192
15 32 35 38 25 56 186 90 125 122 72 132 541
16 194 154 194 198 150 890 247 638 337 185 222 1629
17 902 344 591 355 770 2962 467 97 265 169 390 1388
18 111 87 73 82 128 481 164 160 119 168 129 740
19 715 572 912 259 503 2961 202 219 339 399 146 1305
20 184 117 194 154 122 771 330 295 217 284 235 1361
21 337 290 303 210 239 1379 515 233 343 368 271 1730
22 490 142 107 148 125 1012 105 130 69 75 89 468
(c) Number of trials in which subjects made the appropriate responses 
to all eight cards. Since there were five trials for each statement- 
type, subjects scoring 5 made a completely correct response to that 
statement type. (Cp. Tables 3*5 and 3*4.)
Statement Type Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E F
1 4 1 1 4 1 4 5 4 4 3
2 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 3 0
3 0 4 0 4 1 1 2 0 1 0
4 3 5 3 4 5 0 4 0 4 0
5 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 0 5 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0
7 0 5 1 4 0 5 5 5 4 4
8 0 4 1 4 2 0 5 0 4 0
9 0 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 4 2 5 3 0 1 0 0 1
11 0 ■5 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 0
12 0 4 0 3 2 0 2 0 1 1
13 1 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0
14 1 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 4 1
16 4 5 4 3 4 1 0 0 2 0
17 0 5 0 4 0 0 4 0 5 0
18 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 0
19 0 5 3 5 3 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0
22 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
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(d) 'Method 3' scores over five trials for the five statement-types, 
intergroup differences and difference ranks.
GR group PR group
Statement Type Statement Type
Sub-
ject Ah Ad A E P Ah Ad A E P
1 19 12 16 19 13 19 20 18 19 16
2 11 8 11 12 9 13 18 10 18 10
3 11 19 13 18 13 16 13 12 14 13
4 18 20 18 19 20 10 18 11 19 8
5 8 3 10 17 7 10 20 10 20 10
6 2 3 1 2 3 9 10 9 19 9
7 15 20 16 19 13 20 20 20 18 18
8 11 16 15 17 13 14 20 15 19 10
9 14 16 12 19 11 10 0 10 8 9
10 15 18 15 20 18 3 5 9 13 10
11 13 20 15 17 11 10 6 10 18 9
12 10 16 12 17 17 15 11 15 16 16
13 16 20 14 19 15 10 10 11 17 12
14 15 18 13 18 10 7 5 6 7 4
15 15 10 15 14 5 12 12 12 18 12
16 19 20 19 18 16 15 10 14 16 10
17 15 20 15 19 12 10 19 10 20 9
18 15 15 15 20 13 15 10 15 20 10
19 13 20 18 20 16 14 8 7 14 5
20 15 5 15 14 14 15 16 15 15 9
21 8 4 9 17 8 6 13 5 12 3
22 15 20 15 20 15 12 0 13 13 6
Intergroup Differences Difference Ranks
Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E F
1 0 -8 -2 0 -3 9 4 1* 7*
2 -2 -10 +1 -6 -1 5 12 1* 13* 1*
3 -5 +6 +1 +4 0 14* 7 1* 12*
4 +8 +2 +7 0 +12 1 4* 2* 13* 1* 21
5 -2 -17 0 -2 -3 5 20 2* 9* 7*
6 -7 -7 -8 -17 -6 18 8 17 21 15
7 -5 0 -4 +1 -5 14* 9* 5 12
8 -3 -4 0 -2 +3 8* 4 2* 9* 7*
9 +4 +16 +2 +11 +2 11* 19 4 19* 3*
10 +12 +13 +6 +7 +8 21 16* 14 17* 18
11 +3 +14 +5 -1 +2 8* 18 12 5 3*
12 -5 +5 -3 +1 +1 14* 5* 7 5 1*
13 +6 +10 +3 +2 +3 17 12 7 9* 7*
14 +8 +13 +7 +11 +6 19* 16* 15* 19* 15
15 +3 -2 +3 -4 -7 8* 2* 7 12* 17
16 +4 +10 +5 +2 +6 11* 12 12 9* 15
17 +5 +1 +5 -1 +3 14* 1 12 5 7*
18 0 +5 0 0 +3 1* 3* *-2 7*
19 -1 +12 +11 +6 +11 3 15 18 15* 20
20 0 -11 0 -1 +5 1* 14 2* 5 12
21 +2 -9 +4 +5 +5 5 10 9* 14 12
22 +3 +20 +2 +7 +9 8* 21 4 12* 19
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(e) 'Method. 4' scores over five trials for the five statement-types, 
intergroup differences and difference ranks.
GR group PR group
Statement Type Statement Type
Sub-
ject Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E F
1 3 16 10 3 16 2 0 4 2 9
2 15 24 18 14 18 14 2 18 3 19
3 16 1 15 4 15 9 13 14 11 15
4 2 0 3 1 0 12 3 18 3 22
5 20 27 19 5 18 20 0 20 0 20
6 20 22 23 21 19 17 17 18 1 19
7 7 0 6 2 15 0 0 0 4 4
8 16 8 10 6 11 14 0 11 2 23
9 13 9 17 1 16 17 40 20 24 21
10 8 2 9 0 3 23 24 15 13 14
11 16 0 11 3 19 20 26 20 3 22
12 19 8 16 5 9 12 19 11 7 7
13 10 0 13 2 12 20 18 18 6 18
14 12 4 14 4 20 19 18 18 17 28
15 11 18 11 12 31 13 16 16 3 15
16 4 0 1 2 8 5 18 9 6 22
17 7 0 9 3 16 20 1 20 0 23
18 12 8 11 0 17 12 22 11 0 20
19 10 0 5 0 8 14 21 19 10 29
20 12 26 11 11 12 12 8 11 9 22
21 17 27 19 3 17 20 12 23 11 19
22 12 0 11 0 8 16 32 13 12 22
IntererouD differences Difference Ranks
Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E F
1 -1 +16 +6 +1 +7 4 11 15 3 114
2 -1 +22 0 +11 -1 4 164 17 3
3 -7 -12 +1 -7 0 154- 7 4 13 14
4 +18 -3 -15 -2 -22 21 3 21 54 22
5 0 +27 -1 +5 -2 19 3 12 5
6 -3 +5 +5 +20 0 84- 4 114 21 14
7 -7 0 +6 -2 +11 154- 15 54 154
8 -2 +8 -1 +4 -12 64 5 4 10 17
9 +4 -31 -3 -23 -5 11t 20 7 22 9
10 +15 -22 -6 -13 -11 20 164 15 194 154
11 +4 -26 -9 0 -3 114- 18 18 14 74
12 -7 -11 +5 -2 +2 1 54 6 11-4 54 5
13 +10 -18 -5 -4 -6 18 13 114- 10 10
14 +7 -14 -4 -13 -8 154 84 84 194 13
15 +2 +2 -5 +9 +16 64 2 114 15 20
16 +1 -18 -8 -4 -14 4 13 17 10 184
17 +13 -1 -11 +3 -7 19 1 19 8 114
18 0 -14 0 0 -3 14 84 14 1— 1 2 74
19 +4 -21 -14 -10 -21 114 15 20 16 21
20 0 +18 0 +2 -10 14 13 14 54 14
21 +3 +15 -4 -8 -2 84 10 84 14 5
22 +4 -32 -2 -12 -14 114- 2 6 18 184
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(f) 'Method 3' scores over five trials on the two half-sets separately. 
I have not tested the significance of the intergroup differences where 
they appeared, on inspection, to be very small. Difference ranks for 
such cases are not given.
Left hand half-set 
GR group PR group
Statement Type Statement Type
Sub-
ject Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E F
1 10 6 10 10 6 10 10 10 10 7
2 8 4 7 6 6 10 8 9 10 6
3 8 10 10 10 6 10 6 9 10 4
4 10 10 10 9 10 10 9 10 10 1
5 7 1 9 8 0 10 10 10 10 0
6 1 1 0 0 2 8 5 8 10 4
7 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 8 10
8 10 8 10 9 7 9 10 10 10 5
9 10 8 10 9 5 9 0 10 8 0
10 10 9 10 10 8 2 3 4 6 5
11 10 10 10 ■ 10 9 10 3 10 9 0
12 8 8 10 10 9 10 6 10 10 9
13 9 10 10 10 5 10 5 10 8 4
U 10 8 10 10 0 4 2 3 4 1
15 10 5 10 9 0 10 6 9 8 3
16 10 10 9 8 8 10 5 9 8 3
17 10 10 9 10 5 9 9 8 10 3
18 10 7 10 10 5 10 5 10 10 0
19 9 10 10 10 8 10 3 6 7 1
20 10 3 10 9 8 10 8 10 10 5
21 8 2 9 9 2 6 6 5 5 2
22 10 10 10 10 5 8 0 8 7 1
Intergroup Differences Difference Ranks
1 0 -4 0 0 -1 9 6
2 -2 -4 -2 -4 0 9 2*
3 -2 +4 +1 0 +2 9 9*
4 0 +1 0 -1 +9 2 21*
5 -3 -9 -1 -2 0 20 2*
6 -7 -4 -8 -10 -2 9 9*
7 0 0 0 +2 -5 17*
8 +1 -2 0 -1 +2 5 9*
9 +1 +8 0 +1 +5 19 17*
10 +8 +6 +6 +4 +3 15* 12*
11 0 +7 0 +1 +9 17* 21*
12 -2 +2 0 0 0 5 2*
13 -1 +5 0 +2 +1 13 6
14 +6 +6 +7 +6 -1 15* 6
15 0 -1 + 1 +1 -3 2 12*
16 0 +5 0 0 +5 13 17*
17 +1 +1 +1 0 +2 2 9*
18 0 +2 0 0 +5 5 17*
19 -1 +7 +4 +3 +7 17* 20
20 0 -5 0 +1 +3 13 14*
21 +2 +4 +4 +4 0 9 ?—2
22 +2 +10 +2 +3 +4 21 14*
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Right hand half-set 
GR group PR group
Statement Type Statement Type
Sub­
ject Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E
1 9 6 6 9 7 9 10 8 9
2 3 4 4 6 3 3 10 1 8
3 3 9 3 8 7 6 7 3 4
4 8 10 8 10 10 0 9 1 9
5 1 2 1 9 7 0 10 0 10
6 1 2 1 2 1 1 5 1 9
7 5 10 6 9 8 10 10 10 10
8 1 8 5 8 6 5 10 5 9
9 4 8 2 10 6 1 0 0 0
10 5 9 5 10 10 1 2 5 7
11 3 10 5 7 2 0 3 0 9
12 2 8 2 7 8 5 5 5 6
13 7 10 4 9 10 0 5 1 9
14 5 10 3 8 10 3 3 3 3
15 5 5 5 5 5 2 6 3 10
16 9 10 10 10 8 5 5 5 8
17 5 10 6 9 7 1 10 2 10
18 5 8 5 10 7 5 5 5 10
19 4 10 8 10 8 4 5 1 7
20 5 2 5 5 6 5 8 5 5
21 0 2 0 8 6 0 7 0 7
22 5 10 5 10 10 4 0 5 6
Intergroup Differences Difference Rani
1
2
0
0
-4
-6
-2
+3
0
-2
-2
-1 34
11
154-
11
14
3
4
-3
+8
+2
+1
0
+7
+4
+1
-2
+3
12
21
64
4 204
5 +1 -8 +1 -1 -3 74
*C\J 94
6 0 -3 0 -7 -4 34 9 44
7 -5 0 -4 -1 0 19 1-4 164
8 -4 -2 0 -1 +1 164" 64 44
9 +3 +8 +2 +10 -3 12
*CM 11
10 +4 +7 0 +3 +5 1 &4 18 44
11 +3 +7 +5 -2 -7 12 18 184
12 +3 +3 -3 +1 +1 12 9 14
13 +7 +5 +3 0 +2 20 13 14
14 +2 +7 0 -5 +7 9 18 44
15 +3 -1 +2 -5 -4 12 4 11
16 +4 +5 +5 +2 +1 164 13 184
17 +4 0 +4 -1 +1 164" 14 1 &4
18 0 +3 0 0 -2 34 9 44
19 0 +5 +7 +3 +4 34 13 204
20 0 -6 0 0 +1 3-4 154 44
21 0 -1 0 +1 +5 34- 4 44
22 +1 +10 0 +4 +5 74- 22 44
F
9
4
9
7
10
5
8
5
9
5
9
7
8
3
9
7
6
10
4
4
1
5
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(g) 'Method 4' scores over five trials on the two half-sets separately. 
I have not tested the significance of intergroup differences where they 
appeared, on inspection, to be very small. Difference ranks for such 
cases are not given.
Left hand half-set 
GR group PR group
Statement Type Statement Type
Sub-
ject Ah Ad A E F Ah Ad A E F
1 0 8 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 7
2 2 12 6 7 6 0 2 1 0 8
3 2 0 0 0 5 0 7 1 1 13
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 15
5 3 13 1 3 15 0 0 0 0 20
6 9 11 12 12 8 2 8 3 0 13
7 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 4 0
8 0 4 0 2 3 2 0 0 0 12
9 0 5 0 1 9 1 20 0 4 20
10 0 1 0 0 3 9 10 8 7 6
11 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 0 1 20
12 4 4 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 1
13 3 0 0 0 12 0 9 0 4 14
14 0 4 0 0 20 9 9 8 7 16
15 0 9 0 1 20 0 8 2 3 13
16 0 0 1 2 4 0 9 2 3 15
17 0 0 1 0 12 2 1 4 0 16
18 0 6 0 0 12 0 11 0 0 20
19 1 0 0 0 4 0 11 6 4 17
20 0 12 0 2 4 0 4 0 0 11
21 2 12 1 1 12 5 6 7 7 8
22 0 0 0 0 8 3 16 2 5 11
Intergroup Differences Difference Ranks
1 0 +8 0 0 +3 11* 4
2 +2 +10 +5 +7 -2 16 1*
3 +2 -7 -1 -1 -8 10 13*
4 0 -2 0 +1 -15 3 20
5 +3 +13 +1 +3 -5 18* 9*
6 +7 +3 +9 +12 -5 4 9*
7 0 0 0 -4 +12 18
8 -2 +4 0 +2 -9 5* 15
9 -1 -15 0 -3 -11 20 1 6*
10 -9 >9 -8 -7 -3 14 4
11 0 -13 0 -1 -18 18* 21
12 +4 -4 0 0 0 5*
13 +3 -9 0 -4 -2 14 1*
14 -9 -5 -8 -7 +4 7* 7
15 0 +1 -2 +2 +7 1* 11*
16 0 -9 -1 -1 -11 14 16*
17 -2 -1 -3 0 -4 1* 7
18 0 -5 0 0 -8 7* 13*
19 +1 -11 -6 -4 -13 17 19
20 0 +8 0 -2 -7 11* 11*
21 -3 +6 -6 -6 +4 9 7
22 -3 -16 -2 -5 -3 21 4
Sul
je<
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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Right hand half-set
GR group 
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
3 8 10 3 6
13 12 12 7 12
14 1 15 4 7
2 0 3 0 0
17 14 18 2 3
11 11 11 9 11
7 0 6 2 3
16 4 10 4 8
13 4 17 0 7
8 1 9 0 0
16 0 11 3 17
15 4 16 5 8
7 0 13 2 0
12 0 14 4 0
11 9 11 11 11
4 0 0 0 4
7 0 8 3 4
12 2 11 0 5
9 0 5 0 4
12 14 11 9 8
15 15 18 2 5
12 0 11 0 0
Intergroup Differences
Ah Ad A E F
+1 +8 +6 +1 +4
-1 +12 -5 +4 +1
+5 -5 +2 -6 +5
-18 -1 -15 -3 -7
-3 +14 -2 +2 +3
-4 +2 -4 +8 +5
+7 0 +6 +1 +4
+4 +4 -1 +2 -3
-3 -16 -3 -20 +6
-6 -13 +2 -6 -8
-4 -13 -9 +1 +15
+3 -7 +5 -2 +2
-13 -9 -5 0 -4
+2 -9 +4 -6 -12
-2 +1 -3 +11 +9
-1 -9 -7 -3 -3
-11 0 -8 +3 -3
0 -9 0 0 +5
-5 -10 -8 -6 -8
0 +10 0 0 -3
0 +9 +2 -2 -6
-1 -16 0 -7 -11
PR group 
Statement Type
Ah Ad A E F
2 0 4 2 2
14 0 17 3 11
9 6 13 10 2
20 1 18 3 7
20 0 20 0 0
15 9 15 1 6
0 0 0 0 4
12 0 11 2 11
16 20 20 20 1
14 14 7 6 8
20 13 20 2 2
12 11 11 7 6
20 9 18 2 4
10 9 10 10 12
13 8 14 0 2
5 9 7 3 7
18 0 16 0 7
12 11 11 0 0
14 10 13 6 12
12 4 11 9 11
15 6 16 4 11
13 16 11 7 11
Difference Ranks
Ah Ad A E F
44 9 154-
44 17 13
154 7 54
21 34 21
10 20 54
13 5 10jf
18 1— 1 2 154
13 6 3
10 2li 84
17 1&4 54
13 1&4 20
10 8 13
20 12 13
74 12 104
74 34
44 12 17
19 1* 184
12
154 154 1&4
14 154 14
14 12 54
44 214 14
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(h) Errors of commission and errors of omission in the right hand 
half-sets of Ah and A and the left hand half-set of F.
Errors of Commission
GR group PR group Differences Ranks
Sub-
ject Ah A F Ah A F Ah A F Ah A F
1 3 7 10 0 2 5 +3 +5 +5 6 144 104
2 2 3 3 6 6 6 -4 -3 -3 10 8 64
3 4 4 4 0 2 8 +4 +2 -4 10 6 ©4
4 0 0 0 8 7 10 -8 -7 -10 194 194 184
5 5 8 9 8 8 12 -3 0 -3 6 24 64
6 4 5 5 8 9 12 -4 -4 -7 10 11 14
7 7 6 12 0 0 0 +7 +6 +12 164 174 21
8 8 4 1 2 0 12 +6 +4 -11 134- 11 20
9 1 6 4 8 9 12 -7 -3 -8 1 64 8 15
10 6 6 3 4 1 2 +2 +5 +1 3t 144 5
11 4 0 2 8 9 12 -4 -9 -10 10 21 184
12 7 5 0 0 0 0 +7 +5 0 164 144
13 0 2 12 8 9 12 -8 -7 0 194 194 24
14 2 3 12 6 8 12 -4 -5 0 10 144 24
15 0 0 12 7 4 6 -7 -4 +6 1 67 11 124
16 0 0 2 3 6 11 -3 -6 -9 6' 174 164
17 7 6 12 8 6 12 -1 0 0 14 24 24
18 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 0 14 24 24
19 8 5 4 2 4 10 +6 +1 -6 134 5 124
20 0 0 2 0 0 11 0 0 -9 14 24 164
21 6 8 9 4 5 5 +2 +3 +4 34 8 ©4
22 0 0 2 1 0 7 -1 0 -5 14 104
Sub­
ject Ah A F Ah
Errors
A
of
F
Omission 
Ah A F Ah A F
1 0 3 0 2 2 2 -2 +1 -2 94 104 ©4
2 11 9 3 8 11 2 +3 -2 +1 12 14 34
3 10 11 1 9 11 5 +1 0 -4 7 44 154
4 2 3 0 12 11 5 -10 -8 -5 194 184 18
5 12 10 6 12 12 8 0 -2 -2 34 14 ©4
6 7 6 3 7 6 1 0 0 +2 34 44 ©7
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 44
©48 8 6 2 10 11 0 -2 -5 +2 17
9 12 11 5 8 11 8 +4 0 -3 134 44 13
10 2 3 0 10 6 4 -8 -3 -4 18 16 154
11 12 11 0 12 11 8 0 0 -8 34 44 204
12 8 11 1 12 11 1 -4 0 0 134 44 14
13 7 11 0 12 9 2 -5 +2 -2 154 14 ©4
14 10 11 8 4 2 4 +6 +9 +4 17 164 154
15 11 11 8 6 10 7 +5 +1 +1 154 64 34
16 4 0 2 2 1 4 +2 -1 -2 94 64 
144
©4
17 0 2 0 10 10 4 -10 -8 -4 194 154
18 12 11 0 12 11 8 0 0 -8 34 44 204
19 1 0 0 12 9 7 -11 -9 -7 21 164 19
20 12 11 2 12 11 0 0 0 +2 34 44 ©4
21 9 10 3 11 11 3 -2 -1 0 94 ©7 14
22 12 11 6 12 11 4 0 0 +2 ©4
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(i) Success (+) or failure (-) on each of the four types of card in 
a statement-type, cards with named characters in the left hand half-set, 
other cards in the left hand half-set, cards with named characters in 
the right hand half-set, and other cards in the right hand half-set.
GR group
Ah Ad A
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3
1 hhh  ++-+ ++++ -HH+ ++++
2 i + i i + i i + ++— ■HH—+++-
3 ----------H—+ ++— HH— +++-
4 -HH— +-H— ++++ ++-H- ++++
5 -+— ++— ++— -+— -++—
7 + + - + + + - + H —+ -H— h H - H
8 ++— ++---- ++-+ H ---- ++—
9 + + + - - H H - H + - H + - H —
1 0 + + — + + - + + + - + + + - + H H H
11 + + — H H - + -H — + + ---- + + + -
1 2 + + — + + ---- —I— (- - + ---- H + -
1 3 H H — + ~ H H H H H H — H H —
1 4 + + ---- + -H H H + - + + + - + H -
1 5 + + + - H H — H H - ■ H H - H H -
16 H H H H H H -H -+ - + + + + + + + +
1 7 + + - + + + - + -H—+ + + - + + + - +
18 H H — H H — H H - H + - H H -
19 + ------- + + - + + + - + + + - + H - +
2 0 H H — +++- + + + - + + + - ++H—
21 --- + + — H — H — + + —
2 2 - H H - + + + - -H -+ - H H - +++-
A E
4 5 1 2 3
1 +++- ++++ ++++ ++++ +++-
2 — +- +H-- — +- + 1 + 1 -H -+ +
3 ++-+ + + + - + + — + + + + +-H -+
4
5
+ + + +  
+ + —
+ + + +  
—H —
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
— H - f  
—H -H
6 --- --- --- -- + --h-
7 ++-+ ++++ +++- ++++ ++ -H -
8 +++— ++++ -+— ++++ ++++
9 +++- ++— ++++ ++++ -+++
10 ++-+ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++
11 +++— +++- ++++ ++++ ++++
12 ++— +++- ++— +++- ++++
13 +++- +++- ++++ ++++ + + -H -
14
15
+++-
+++-
++—  
+++- + 
+  
1 
+ 
1 
1 
+ 
1 ++++
+ -H —
+ + -H - 
++—+
16 — H -+ ++++ +-++ ++++ -+ -H -
17
18
— H -+  
+++-
++-+
+++-
++++
++++
++++
+ -H -+
+++-
-H -+ +
19
20
+ -H -+
-H H —
++++
+ -H - -
++++
-+-+
++++
++-+
+ + -H -
++-+
21 ++— + + — ++- -+++ ++ -H -
22 +++- +++- ++++ ++++ + + -H -
—1— 1- - + - + 1 + 1 + - + - + + + + + + + - + + + - + + + - +
- + - + - + - + 1 + 1 +
+1+1 --- +11+ + + + - + + + -
+ + + + + + - + + + + + + + + + -H -+ + + + — + + — + + + -
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + + - -H -+ +
--- 1 + 1 + --- — + - --- +H----- + + — + + —
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + -H---- h -H— \- + + - +
l l i l I I 1 1 + + + + + + + + + + — + + - + + H —T T T T 1 1 1 1
- + - + + + + + + + + + 1 + 1 + -H -H - + + + - + + — + + —
+ + -H - + + + + + + + + + - + - + + + + + + — + -H -+ + + —
+ -H -+ + + + + + + + + + -H -+ +-H -+ -H H — + + + - + + + -
--------- + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + — +H----- + -H —
t i l l + + + + + + + + 1 1 i 1 ( 111 + + —— + + + - -H H —TT 1""T TTT'I t t  I t
+ + + + ++ -H - + + + + — + + + + + + -H----- + + + - + + + -
I + I + —+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - + + + + - -HH— + H —
+-HH- ++ -H - + + + + —H -+ + + + + + + -H - -H H + H H H -
+ + + + + -H -+ + + + + + + + + -H -+ + + + - + - H H - -H —+
I + I + + + - + + + + + — + + + + + + + + + - + + + - + + + -
++ -H - + + + + + + + + + + + + +-H -+ + + - + + + H - + + —(-
+ ------- — + - --- —H - - - + — + + + - + H — H H -
--- —+ —+ --- - + - + --- - + — + + — + + —
+ + + + + + + + ++-H - + + + + + + + + + -H — + -H — -H H —
F
4 5 1 2 3 4 5
H H + -H + -+-+— —h-1— — H — H H — H -+
— 1—+ 
+ -H H  
H H
++-+
+ H +
+ -H +
+ + -H
+ H -+
- + - +
-H H H
+ + - +  
—H H  
H H
+ + - +  
—1— + 
H H +
++— 1- 
—H —
+ H H
- + - + + + + + — + + --------- — + + -------+ — + +
--------- --------- --------- --------- - + + - --------- _ + —
+ -H H + + + + —H — —H — —H H H H - + + +
-H H H H H + + ------- + + — H H + + H - — + +
+ + + + -H H + ----- H - — + + + -H — H + - - + —
+ + + + + H -+ H H —H H + + H - - + H + + + +
++-H
H H H
+ + —  
+ H +
+ + —  
H— H
—H —
+ -H H
+ + —  
++-+
+H— 1- 
+ + - +
H—b—— 
H H
++++ H —1- —h-H- - - H - f - + + + H H — H H
H H H H ---- + + ---- + + — + + ——+ + — + +
+ + - + + + - - H — + - -------+ -------+ -------+ -------+
+ + + + H H + --------- + H + + + + + + + + + H H
+ + + +
H H
H + +
+ H -+
— H -  
—I----h
—H —  
—H —
- H H
H H
—H — 
—H H
H H
—H H
H H  
++— t-
+ + + +  
+ + —t- + 
1 
+ 
+ 
1 
I 
1 
+ ~ H —
+ - + +
H - + +  
H —+
-IH t t~ 
-+-+
++++ 
1 1 1 1T t T T
+ -H H ++++ --------- --------- - + + + — ++ —+ + +
++++ ++++ —H H H— H + - - H - +— H - + - + +
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
20
21
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
20
21
22
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PR ffTOUP
Ah Ad A
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
+ -H — HHHH h h h h HHHH -h -h h ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++---- ++++ + + + +
HHH— HH— HHHH HH----- ++— + + + + + —++ + + + + + —+ + + + -H - -H-+- + + — + + —
H H H - H-H— HHH— H H H - HHHH + ------- + + + + -H H H —H -+ — + - - + + - -H H — -HH—
HH— + + — HH— HH---- HH— - + - + + + + + -H--H- + -H -+ + + + + + H + - H + — + + —
H—h—— + + — HH— HH---- HH— + -H H + + + + -H -H - + + + + + + + + -H-— •H----- + + —
H— H— H H -H HH—— HH— --------- -+-+ —I— (- HH-H- —■+—t- + ------- -H-— + + —
HHHH -H-HH HHHH HHHH HHHH ++++ + + + + ii i iTTTT + -H H ++++ + -H H -H H + + + + +
H H H - H H H - H H H - H----H ++H— + + + + + + + + -t-H H -H H H -H H H + -H — + + + - + + + -
HH— HH— H— + HH---- HH— --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- + H — ++— -H-—
--------- —H—H --------- - H ---- --------- _ + — -H H H --------- — + - —H ~ —H H
HH— HH----- HH— HH— + + — --------- --------- - + - + - + - + - + - + H + — + + — + + —
H H H - H H H - H-H— H H H - H H H - -H H — --------- --------- -H H + + + + + -H H — -H H — -H H —
HH— + + — HH— HH— HH— —I— t- - + - + —1----h —1-—1- —1— t- + + — -H---- h + + —
+ — H H— H + — + --------- + ------- --------- - + - + -------+ - + - + --------- -------+ --------- + — +
HH— HH— HH----- + + — HHHH + -H H + + + + -H H + + + — H + ---- -H H H
H H H - H H H - H H -H H H -H -H ----h - + - + —I---- h —1—+ - + - + - + - + + — + -H— (- -HH—
H— H HH— HH— + + — -H----- + + + + —H H H ++H + + + + H -H + -H----- + + ---- — - H
H-H— H H H - + -H — -HH— H H H - H— I— H - + - + - + - + —-1— H - H - + + + - - H H - -HH—
H H H - HH—— -HH— + -H — H -H — ------ + - H + + - + - —H - - — + - - H — _ + — —H —
H -H — H H H - H-H— -HH— H-H— + + + + + + + + —1----h —+—+ -H H + - H H - - H H - -H H —
- H — HH— -+— _+— -+— +-+- +-++ + - + - ++++ H---- 1— - + — - + — _ + —
- + — H H — - H H - HHH- + -H — --- --- --- --- --------- - + + - - - H— + + + -
A
4 5 1
H H -H + -H -+ + + - +
- + — + + — ++—+■
++— + + — -H — +
+ + — + + — + -H H
H + — + + — + H + +
+ 1 1 + + + — •H —+
+ -H H + + + + + + + +
+ + + - - H H - -H —+
+ + — + + — + + —
— + - H (-—— -H-—
+ + ---- H + — H H —
H H — + + + - -H —+
+ + — + + — — H -
-------+ + + — + -------
-H ----- + —f - + -H H
-H —+ -H —+ ++H4-
+H — + + — H H H
+ -H — + -H — + + + +
H------- -H H — -H —+
H H — + -H — ++-+
- + ---- - + — 1 H 1 +
H H — + -H — —1---- h
E
2 3 4
HHH- +H-H- HHH
++-H- -H++ HH-H
++—+ 1 + 1 H — HH
HH+H HHH HH-H
-HHH -HHH HHHH
-HHH -HHH HH-H
— H+ HHHH HHHH
H+-H- HHH HHHH
++— HH— HH—
—H++ -H-H- -H -H
HHH- H-HH HH-H-
-H—H HH-H
H1i
HHH- HHH- HHHH
— + - H 1 H 1 H--------
HHH- HH-H HHHH
-HH+ -HHH HHH—
-HHH HH-H- H-H-H
++++ HHHH HHHH
— ++ -HHH HH-H
-H—+ HH-H HH-H
—H-H —HH -H -H
-H H - 1 H 1 H HH-H
5 1 2
HHH
HHHH
H-HH 
— HH
—1— H 
-+ + -
HHHH H-HH
H11H
HHHH --------H — HH
HHHH
HHHH
— HH 
—H —
— HH
HHHH HHHH HHHH
HHHH —H-H -H -H
--- ------hH — HH
—HHH --------H H--------
HHHH
HHHH
— HH 
HH-H
-----HH
HH-H
HHHH — HH —H--
H 1 H 1 --- -----H -
— HH — ++ — H -
H 1 H 1 ------I-H -HHH
HH-H- -H H - — HH
HHHH -----HH — HH
HH-H --------H --------H
HH-H -H -H 1 H 1 H
1 H 1 H --- ---
HH-H --------H --------H
F
3 4 5
-HHH HHHH HHHH
HH— -H H - HH-----
-HHH — HH -HHH
——HH --- -HHH
— HH — HH — HH
-H-H- —HH— -H H -
HH— HHHH HHHH
H1H1 -H -H -H H -
— HH — H - -----HH
HHHH --------H HH-H
— HH — HH — H -
H-HH HHH— HHHH
-HHH —HHH —H—
-----H - --- —HH—
— HH H-HH HHHH
-H H - --------H —H—
—H — --------H -H H -
— HH — HH — HH
-H -H --- --------H
1 H 1 H -H H - —1--
-H H - --- -H -----
1 H 1 H --------H --------H
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(j) Number of different patterns per statement-type. A 'pattern* is
the set of four pluses and/or minuses which characterises a subject's 
response to a statement-type on any one trial, as in (i) above.
GR group PR group
0 . Statement Type Statement Type
Sub-
ject Ah Ad A E F Total Ah Ad A E F Total
1 2 2 3 2 3 12 2 1 2 2 3 10
2 3 2 4 5 2 16 3 2 3 2 3 13
3 3 2 3 2 4 14 2 4 3 3 4 16
4 2 1 2 2 1 8 1 2 2 2 4 11
5 3 3 2 3 3 14 1 1 1 1 1 5
6 2 3 2 3 3 13 3 3 3 2 3 14
7 1 1 2 2 2 8 1 1 1 2 2 7
8 2 2 4 2 4 14 2 1 1 2 2 8
9 2 2 2 2 3 11 2 1 1 2 2 8
10 3 2 3 1 2 11 3 3 4 3 4 17
11 2 1 1 3 3 10 1 2 1 3 2 9
12 4 2 2 3 3 14 1 3 1 2 4 11
13 3 1 2 2 1 9 1 1 1 2 3 8
14 3 2 2 2 1 10 3 3 4 3 3 16
15 1 1 1 3 2 8 2 2 2 2 4 12
16 2 1 2 3 2 10 3 1 3 4 4 15
17 1 1 3 2 2 9 2 2 2 1 3 10
18 1 4 1 1 3 10 1 1 1 1 1 5
19 2 1 2 1 3 9 2 5 3 3 3 16
20 1 5 1 2 5 14 1 2 1 1 3 8
21 2 2 2 3 3 12 2 3 1 2 3 11
22 1 1 1 1 2 6 2 1 2 3 2 10
46 42 50 50 54 242 41 45 43 48 63 240
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(k) 'Agreement scores' for the A-Ah and A-F pairs of statements and 
differences within groups between pairs and between groups for each pair. 
Since the former are significant on the Sign Test, difference ranks are 
presented only for the latter.
GR group PR group Differences Ranks
1
A-Ah
17
A-F
11
A-Ah
19
A-F
5
Within 
GR PR
+6 +14
Between 
A-Ah A-F
-2 +6
A-Ah
9
A-F
11
2 9 12 17 6 -3 +11 -8 +6 2O5- 11
3 14 8 16 15 +6 +1 -2 -7 9 13
4 20 2 19 17 +18 +2 +1 -15 4 21
5 18 8 20 20 +10 0 -2 -12 9 1©J-
6 20 20 16 14 0 +2 +4 +6 4 11
7 19 11 20 2 +8 +18 -1 +9 4 16
8 14 6 17 14 +8 +3 -3 -8 14 14t
9 18 9 18 19 +9 -1 0 -10 1t 17
10 18 7 10 6 +11 +4 +8 +1 20J 1
11 18 6 20 19 +12 +1 -2 -13 9 20
12 16 9 20 7 +7 +13 -4 +2 7 2t
13 16 11 19 15 +5 +4 -3 -4 14 6
14 18 17 15 9 +1 +6 +3 +8 14 14t
15 20 18 16 14 +2 +2 +4 +4 17 6
16 18 5 13 10 +13 +3 +5 -5 19 9
17 16 9 14 13 +7 +1 +2 -4 9 6
18 20 10 20 10 +10 +10 0 0
19 15 4 13 8 +11 +5 +2 -4 9 6
20 20 9 20 13 +11 +7 0 -4 6
21 19 8 20 20 +11 0 -1 -12 4 17
22 19 10 17 12 +9 +5 +2 -2 9 2jr
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(l) 'Matching responses' in the four statement-types where these are 
not identical with the correct response. As explained in the text, the 
straightforward identification of such responses as ++—  in Ah and A,
  in Ad and — ++ in F is complicated by the fact that the minus can
represent an incomplete response. Some subjects have therefore ---
responses in Ad which are not in fact matching responses and have not, 
of course, been included in the following tabulation. The subjects 
concerned are 5, 6 and 21 in the GR group and 10, 14 and 19 in the PR 
group.
GR group PR group
„ . Statement Tvne Statement Tvne
Sub—   — Total
ject Ah Ad A F Total Ah Ad A F Total Diff. Rank
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 4?
2 1 0 1 0 2 3 0 3 1 7 -5 10
3 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 1 3 0 1±
4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 10 -10 18^ -
5 2 0 4 3 9 5 0 5 5 15 -6 12
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 0 6 -6 12
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 1
8 4 1 1 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 +7 14t
9 1 0 3 2 6 4 5 5 4 18 -12 21
10 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 +2 7
11 2 0 0 0 2 5 2 5 4 16 -14 22
12 2 1 3 0 6 0 2 0 0 2 +4 8
13 0 0 1 0 1 5 0 5 1 11 -10 18jr
14 1 0 2 5 8 0 0 1 0 1 +7 14t
15 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 3 2 11 -11 20
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 4t
17 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 1 9 -9 17
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 -5 10
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 -1 4t
20 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 +1 4t
21 4 0 4 1 9 1 0 0 0 1 +8 16
22 0 0 0 0 0
57
0 5 0 0 5
124
-5 10
APPENDIX G
RAW DATA RELATING TO THE 4TS TASK
(a) Scores on the two half-sets (L and R) on the four selections of Ah, 
Ad and F and on the first ten selections of A. In the 4TS experiment 
the GR member of pair 7 was unable to take part. Accordingly, the pairs 
in Appendix G are displaced one row upwards, as compared with Appendices 
F and H, from 7 onwards. In the F type of statement, moreover, the PR 
member of (the 4TS) pair 9 could not be persuaded to complete the task. 
There are, therefore, no results for this pair in the relevant places in 
the tables which follow. In the intergroup differences scores on the 
two half-sets, separately and together, are taken into account.
GR group PR group
Statement Type Statement Type
Ah Ad A F Ah Ad A F
SUB­
JECT L R L R L R L R L R L R L R L H
1 8 8 8 8 20 20 8 8 8 3 8 8 20 18 8 8
2 6 0 6 6 14 7 3 2 8 0 8 8 19 2 4 5
3 8 2 8 8 18 16 8 8 8 2 8 8 20 18 4 8
4 8 8 8 8 20 20 8 8 8 0 8 8 20 6 4 8
5 8 4 5 5 16 6 5 2 8 0 8 8 19 2 6 8
6 8 3 8 8 20 17 4 8 8 0 6 8 16 0 0 5
7 5 2 8 8 20 13 4 8 8 4 8 8 20 10 4 4
8 8 4 8 8 20 16 8 8 8 0 0 0 20 0 0 4
9
10
8
8
2
8
8
8
8
8
20
20
14
17 5 7
8
8
0
4
0
8
1
8
16
20
6
6 0 8
11 8 2 5 5 20 14 8 8 8 2 8 8 20 12 8 8
12 8 3 8 8 20 12 6 8 8 3 8 8 20 11 6 6
13 8 3 8 8 20 8 3 8 4 0 6 6 18 4 4 0
14 4 4 7 7 17 8 4 6 8 0 8 8 18 8 8 8
15 8 8 8 8 20 20 8 8 6 4 8 8 20 10 2 4
16 8 6 8 8 20 20 8 8 8 0 7 7 18 8 6 5
17 8 8 8 8 20 20 8 8 8 3 8 8 19 8 4 6
18 8 8 8 8 20 20 8 8 4 2 2 5 16 3 4 2
19 8 8 8 8 18 20 8 8 8 3 8 8 20 20 7 8
20 8 0 8 8 18 4 8 8 8 0 7 8 18 7 1 7
21 8 4 8 8 20 14 8 8 2 4 8 8 19 2 0 4
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Intergroup Differences
L+R
Ah
L R L+R
Ad
L R L+R
A
L . R L+R
F
L R
1 +5 0 +5 0 0 0 +2 0 +2 0 0 0
2 -2 -2 0 -4 -2 -2 0 -5 +5 -4 -1 -3
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -2 -2 +4 +4 0
4 +8 0 +8 0 0 0 +14 0 +14 +4 +4 0
5 +4 0 +4 -6 -3 -3 +1 -3 +4 -7 -1 -6
6 +3 0 +3 +2 +2 0 +21 +4 +17 +7 +4 +3
7 -5 -3 -2 0 0 0 +3 0 +3 +4 0 +4
8 +4 0 +4 +16 +8 +6 +16 0 +16 +12 +8 +4
9
10
+2
+4
0
0
+2
+4
+15
0
+8
0
+7
0
+12
+11
+4
0
+8
+11 +4 +5 -1
11 0 0 0 -6 -3 -3 +2 0 +2 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 +1 +2 0 +2
13 +7 +4 +3 +4 +2 +2 +6 +2 +4 +7 -1 +8
14 0 -4 +4 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -6 -4 -2
15 +6 +2 +4 0 0 0 +10 0 +10 +10 +6 +4
16 +6 0 +6 +2 + 1 +1 +14 +2 +12 +5 +2 +3
17 +5 0 +5 0 0 0 +13 +1 +12 +6 +4 +2
18 +10 +4 +6 +9 +6 +3 +21 +4 +17 +10 +4 +6
19 +5 0 +5 0 0 0 -2 -2 0 +1 +1 0
20 0 0 0 +1 +1 0 >3 0 -3 +8 +7 +1
21 +6 +6 0 0 0 0 +13 +1 +12 +12 +8 +4
1
2
124-
54
74
154
17
34
D iffe rence  Ranks
54 54 64 5 
154 15 134 20
5
11
1— 1 2
7
24
64 11
3 74 34 54 34 64 9 134 5 7 124 24
4 19 74 21 54 54 64 164 44 18 7 124 24
5 9 74 13 174 174 18 2 16 94 14 64 174
6 7 74 94 13 15 64 194
74
18 194 14
24
11
7 124 17 74 34 34 64 44 74 74 144
8 9 74 13 21 204 21 18 44 19 194 194 144
9
10
54
9
74
74
74
13
20
54
204
54
20
64
13
12
18
44
12
14 7 16 34
11 0.1*-2 74 34 174 174 18 5 44 5 1— 1 2 24 24
12 *-2 74 34 34 54 64 2 44 3 4 24 8
13 18 19 94 134 15 154 10 134 94 14 64 19
14 9-L<- 2 19 13 13 12 134 2 10 14 114 124 8
15 16 154 13 34 34 64
134
11 44 13 174 17 144
16 16 74 194 13 12 164 134 16 10 9 11
17 124 74 17 54 34 64 u 4 10 16 114 124 8
18 20 19 194 19 19 18 194 18 20 174 124 174
19 124 74 17 34 54 64 5 134 14 3 64 24
20 24 74 34 11 12 64 74 44 74 16 18 34
21 16 21 34 34 54 64 u 4 10 16 194 194 144
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(b) Scores on the four selections of F, both half-sets together and 
left-hand half-set separately, intergroup differences and difference 
ranks.
GR group PR group
L and R L only L and R L only
S e 1 e c t i o n s S e 1 e c t i o n s
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2
2 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1
3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1
5 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 2
6 2 2 4 4 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0
7 2 2 4 4 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
8 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
10 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
11 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2
12 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 1
13 2 3 3 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 , 2 2 2 2
15 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 1
16 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 1 1 2 2
17 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1
18 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0
19 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2
20 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0
21 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Intergroup Differences Difference Ranks
L and R Li only L and R I only
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13*
P-L*-2 2 *
2*
3 * 3 * 3 * 3 *
2 -2 -2 0 0 -1 -1 +1 0 14* 2 * 12 11* 0 3 *
3 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 7 * 8 8 8 12 11* 0 11
4 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 7 * 8 8 8 12 11* 0 11
5 -2 -2 -1 -2 0 0 0 -1 13* 14* 8 14* 3 * 3 * 3 * 11
6 +1 +1 +3 +2 0 0 +2 +2 7 * 8 18 14* 3 * 3 * li 18
7 0 0 +2 +2 -1 -1 +1 +1 2 * 2 * 13* 14* 12 11* 0 11
8 +3 +3 +4 +2 +2 +2 +2 +2 18 18* 20 14* 19 18* li 18
10 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +2 +1 li 8 8 8 12 11* li 11
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2* p_Li-2 2 * 2 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 *
12 0 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 +1 2 * 8 8 8 12 11* 0 11
13 +1 +2 +2 +2 -1 0 0 0 7t  14t  13t 14* 12 3 * 3 * 3 *
14 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 13* 1 42 8 8 12 11* 0 11
15 +3 +2 +2 +2 +2 +2 +1 +1 18 14* 13* 14* 19 18* 0 11
16 +2 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 8 8
2t
12 11* 3 * 3 *
17 +1 +1 +2 +2 +1 +1 +1 +1 If 8 13* 14t 12 11* 0 11
18 +2 +4 +3 +3 0 +2 +2 +2 13* 20 18 19j 3 * 18* li 18
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2* 2 * 2 * 2 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 *
20 +2 +2 +2 +2 +1 +2 +2 +2 13* 14* 13* 14* 12 18* li 18
21 +3 +3 +3 +3 +2 +2 +2 +2 18 18* 18 19* 19 18* li 18
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(c) ’Converse errors' in Ah, A and both statement-types together.
GR group PR group Differences Difference Ranks
Ah A Both Ah A Both Ah A Both Ah A Both
1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 -2 -2 9 7
2 1 2 3 2 5 7 -1 -3 -4 74 12 124
3 0 1— 1 2 1 — 1 2 1 0 1 -1 +14 +4 74 7 3
4 0 0 0 2 4 6 -2 -4 -6 154 144 15
5 0 8 8 2 4 6 -2 +4 +2 154 144 7
6 0 0 0 2 2 4 -2 -2 -4 154 9 124
7 2 0 2 0 0 0 +2 0 +2 154 7
8 0 0 0 2 10 12 -2 -10 -12 154 20 20
9 1 2 3 2 8 10 -1 -6 -7 74 17 164
10 2 1 3 1 2 3 +1 -1 0 74 44 1 — 1 2
11 2 1 3 0 0 0 +2 +1 +3 154 44 10
12 2 0 2 1 2 3 +1 -2 -1 74 9 44
13 0 0 0 2 7 9 -2 -7 -9 154 184 19
14 2 1 3 2 0 2 0 +1 +1 24 44 44
15 0 0 0 2 1 3 -2 -1 -3 154 44 10
16 0 0 0 2 3 5 -2 -3 -5 154 12 14
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 14 14
18 0 2 2 2 7 9 -2 -5 -7 154 16 164
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 14 14
20 1 1 2 1 4 5 0 -3 -3 24 12 10
21 0 0 0 1 7 8 -1 -7 -8 74 184 18
APPENDIX H
HAW DATA RELATING TO THE NEGATIVES TASK AND SCORES ON THE EPI
(a) Response times in tenths of a second on six successive trials on 
the four conditions, true affirmative (T+), true negative (T-), false 
affirmative (F+) and false negative (F-).
GR group True Affirmative PR group
Sub-
j e c t 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 6 1 4 2 0 1 9 3 6 2 2 1 3 1 8
2 1 8 2 7 2 3 2 0 2 2 2 6 4 6 1 2 1 7 13 1 6 15
3 1 6 1 8 1 4 2 3 1 2 15 1 6 1 4 1 4 1 6 1 6 1 5
4 2 4 2 9 1 5 1 8 2 0 21 2 3 1 7 1 7 1 4 1 5 13
5 3 7 31 2 2 2 7 2 3 2 6 1 3 1 9 1 8 19 1 8 1 5
6 15 21 21 2 7 2 2 1 8 3 0 2 8 2 2 2 2 2 6 1 8
7 8 1 2 1 5 3 3 1 5 13 1 8 1 5 2 3 15 1 3 1 4
8 17 11 1 3 1 6 2 4 16 3 8 2 2 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 4
9 2 5 1 4 2 0 2 0 5 8 12 3 2 3 5 2 5 2 5 3 7 1 4
1 0 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 7 2 2 1 4 2 0 1 9 1 8 2 8 1 9 2 0
11 1 6 1 5 11 1 3 1 6 1 3 2 0 2 6 21 2 0 2 2 1 6
1 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 5 13 2 2 2 3 2 0 1 3 2 2 9 1 8
1 3 4 0 3 2 4 2 2 8 2 4 3 3 2 2 21 1 8 2 0 1 8 1 7
1 4 12 1 4 12 1 8 12 1 8 2 5 2 4 2 5 2 3 2 6 1 5
1 5 2 3 21 1 5 1 5 1 5 4 2 3 5 2 5 2 8 2 6 2 6 2 3
1 6 2 5 3 5 4 0 4 5 4 4 2 4 2 3 1 9 3 4 3 7 2 5 1 6
1 7 1 6 1 3 1 5 1 8 1 8 17 3 4 3 4 2 5 2 0 21 2 5
1 8 2 0 1 7 1 4 1 4 1 7 15 51 9 7 4 7 3 7 3 6 5 0
1 9 2 2 1 3 21 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 8 1 7 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 3
2 0 13 1 3 1 6 1 7 15 13 1 8 3 8 5 4 3 4 2 8 3 3
21 15 1 4 1 6 1 6 1 6 11 1 8 13 1 7 2 8 1 5 2 6
2 2 3 3 2 9 3 9 3 8 31 2 5 2 7 1 4 2 0 2 7 1 8 1 7
True Negative
1 3 6 3 2 4 5 3 4 3 8 3 0 3 5 91 2 8 1 7 4 3 71
2 2 8 21 3 2 2 5 2 8 1 8 12 31 1 9 14 13 1 6
3 4 4 5 0 3 8 21 5 0 3 0 2 4 1 8 2 4 5 5 2 6 2 4
4 2 5 2 5 3 2 3 6 2 5 1 7 3 5 5 0 2 8 31 2 3 4 5
5 9 0 3 7 3 2 31 5 8 5 9 4 5 2 6 3 6 2 3 2 6 2 4
6 41 3 7 4 3 2 4 2 8 2 8 5 3 8 6 6 7 4 0 4 5 3 5
7 15 1 9 6 7 3 3 2 7 13 2 3 2 5 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 5
8 2 4 1 4 1 8 2 6 1 4 2 0 7 8 2 4 2 0 2 4 2 4 3 4
9 4 0 5 9 3 0 2 4 4 2 4 2 3 5 4 4 2 7 4 9 3 7 4 2
1 0 2 0 2 4 2 0 1 7 41 2 0 3 3 3 6 3 4 3 4 31 3 4
11 1 5 1 3 7 6 2 0 21 2 9 4 5 5 9 4 7 2 5 4 5 3 0
1 2 3 0 3 6 81 4 7 5 5 3 4 6 7 3 0 3 4 2 5 4 8 2 2
1 3 1 2 4 111 7 3 5 5 3 7 2 8 5 7 1 3 5 2 9 2 5 3 0 3 2
1 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 4 2 0 4 0 2 7 3 7 31 2 7 3 0
1 5 21 2 3 1 7 2 4 3 7 2 6 4 2 31 4 6 4 3 3 7 2 9
1 6 4 0 4 2 4 8 3 4 6 0 3 5 8 7 4 0 2 9 4 0 2 0 3 2
17 3 3 3 0 4 2 2 0 4 8 3 9 3 8 6 0 41 4 6 5 0 5 2
1 8 7 8 5 4 15 2 2 1 9 2 4 7 6 7 5 5 5 51 4 8 7 3
1 9 3 5 2 3 2 7 2 8 4 6 5 2 6 8 5 7 3 6 4 2 2 2 2 8
2 0 2 2 1 7 2 2 2 8 15 1 7 4 5 2 2 4 5 3 4 3 0 21
21 2 4 6 8 2 2 3 4 2 7 19 9 6 3 5 4 3 5 2 7 9 4 5
2 2 5 2 4 4 7 3 5 0 6 7 4 3 4 0 5 4 3 3 ' 5 0 3 3 181
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
293
GR group False Affirmative PR group
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
26 25 32 31 38 25 18 17 23 26 65 20
23 22 33 21 33 28 15 21 27 16 18 16
15 22 41 24 18 24 17 16 16 21 62 16
38 20 21 18 26 18 19 27 37 15 17 16
28 68 46 31 22 27 17 32 32 27 16 20
19 23 29 27 29 18 28 32 26 25 30 26
11 18 21 17 21 14 23 39 26 28 22 44
20 18 15 11 13 18 54 42 120 32 43 48
43 40 47 38 24 46 32 54 32 36 34 68
18 20 18 22 17 21 32 24 23 22 32 27
15 15 16 19 15 16 15 24 33 18 30 29
25 38 26 33 23 26 18 21 25 17 27 15
20 33 28 30 35 28 22 27 34 22 28 25
16 17 17 13 14 47 30 50 23 '39 39 65
28 22 15 18 19 28 29 28 37 29 29 26
25 33 36 38 42 33 45 37 29 32 21 23
17 17 17 22 13 23 54 44 35 21 27 23
20 17 17 19 20 15 63 54 55 70 52 45
27 19 22 45 23 30 38 16 26 16 15 15
13 18 18 17 19 12 18 23 35 19 44 20
19 23 14 17 19 22 37 51 45 30 60 41
35 60 45 37 35 26 21 
False Negative
31 23 30 30 21
40 102 57 74 50 36 37 65 34 44 28 46
37 22 33 52 63 52 38 15 57 64 18 37
241 47 32 134 45 30 52 24 22 46 40 33
74 74 160 39 125 15 95 257 23 17 23 75
569 62 62 199 159 87 25 20 27 27 32 70
39 24 27 22 21 25 40 81 52 35 106 358
44 18 181 121 30 27 50 28 47 43 36 36
33 58 44 15 29 22 62 33 34 28 60 25
50 377 74 78 62 59 48 51 46 239 82 35
26 14 20 17 21 21 115 32 35 45 32 34
43 16 17 20 19 23 32 41 29 28 34 42
70 46 33 42 38 32 22 37 47 50 60 25
54 90 120 66 72 114 103 66 48 115 44 29
48 15 20 18 29 15 45 45 56 62 47 67
52 26 25 25 82 68 60 45 77 56 40 66
56 62 205 41 40 50 91 137 46 92 67 28
24 25 17 44 41 100 134 65 63 37 88 36
40 65 33 20 15 21 66 130 100 99 42 63
22 69 47 29 35 40 96 39 157 128 122 223
20 22 21 24 24 15 20 15 23 57 23 42
29 24 18 50 388 41 49 38 98 71 124 72
60 64 59 78 82 49 304 287 55 139 35 35
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(h) Total response times over six trials on the four conditions separ­
ately and on the negative conditions (T- and F-) together and the conditions 
involving a single negative component (T- and F+) together.
GR group PR group
T+ T- F+ F- T-/F- T-/F+ T+ T- F+ F- T-/F- T-/F+
1 132 215 177 359 574 392 123 197 149 180 377 346
2 199 428 174 516 944 602 125 251 149 206 457 400
3 87 121 97 126 247 218 90 253 126 765 1018 379
4 86 114 124 145 259 238 102 180 144 201 381 324
5 97 116 95 201 317 211 116 308 158 405 713 466
6 111 211 166 242 453 377 159 287 204 423 710 491
7 136 152 160 259 411 312 105 226 123 241 467 349
8 149 237 238 700 937 475 91 171 148 217 388 319
9 84 176 96 138 314 272 117 391 156 855 1246 547
10 98 233 144 529 762 377 139 204 339 242 446 543
11 88 194 114 550 744 308 138 192 246 322 514 438
12 127 160 141 487 647 301 99 212 131 498 710 343
13 131 148 130 278 426 278 98 181 182 240 421 363
14 97 212 109 251 463 321 124 202 160 293 495 362
15 96 174 102 421 595 276 119 105 113 229 334 218
16 124 201 145 158 359 346 205 350 264 452 802 614
17 166 307 222 938 1245 529 132 285 169 250 535 454
18 111 142 116 119 261 258 168 234 256 501 735 490
19 195 329 238 392 721 567 318 378 339 500 878 717
20 213 259 207 454 713 466 146 326 167 672 998 493
21 125 283 171 261 544 454 154 248 187 461 709 435
22 97 212 108 194 406 320 163 228 178 344 572 406
Intergrouo Differences Difference Ranks
T+ T- F+ F- T-/F- T-/F+ T+ T- F+ F- T-/F- T-/F+
1 +9 +18 +28 +179 +197 +46 2 4 6 8 9 6
2 +74 +177 +25 +310 +487 +202 20 20 5 17 18 18
3 -3 -132 -29 -639 -771 -161 1 18 7 20 21 16
4 -16 -66 -20 -56 -121 -86 3 11-J" 4 5 5 105-
5 -19 -192 -63 -204 -396 -255 4 22 15 12 15 20
6 -48 -76 -38 -181 -257 -114 14 16 9 9 11 12
7 +31 -74 +37 +18 -56 -37 9 15 8 2 3 3
8 +58 +66 +90 +483 +549 +156 17 11^ 17 19 19 15
9 +33 -215 -60 -717 -932 -275 10jr 21 14 22 22 22
10 -41 +29 -195 +287 +316 -166 13 6 22 15 14 17
11 -50 +2 -132 +228 +230 -130 15 1 20 14 10 13
12 +28 -52 +10 -11 -63 -42 7 10 1 1 4 5
13 +33 -33 -52 +38 +5 -85 10J- 7 12 3 1 9
14 -27 +10 -51 -42 -32 -41 6 2 11 4 2 4
15 -23 +69 -11 +192 +259 +58 5 14 2 10 12 7
16 -81 -149 -119 -294 -443 -258 21 19 19 16 16 21
17 +34 +22 +53 +688 +710 +75 12 5 13 21 20 8
18 -57 -92 -140 -382 -474 -232 16 17 21 18 17 19
19 -123 -49 -101 -108 -157 -150 22 9 18 6 6 14
20 +67 -67 +40 -218 -285 -27 19 13 10 13 13 2
21 -29 +35 -16 -200 -165 +19 8 8 3 11 7 1
22 -66 -16 -70 -150 -166 -86 18 3 16 7 8 10^
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(c) Extraversion (e ), Neuroticism (n ) and Lie (l ) scale scores on the 
A and B Forms, separately and together, of the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory. There are no scores for pair 9 on the B Form and the inter­
group comparisons discussed in the text, as well as the rank correlations 
between the four conditions of the negatives task and E and N, are based 
on the remaining 21 pairs.
GR group PR group
Ea Eb E Na Nb N La Lt L Ea Eb E Na Nb N La Lb L
1 9 13 22 19 12 31 2 0 2 9 9 18 18 19 37 3 0 3
2 16 10 26 14 17 31 0 1 1 4 10 14 12 14 26 4 0 4
3 13 10 23 12 8 20 0 0 0 13 16 29 9 5 14 0 0 0
4 10 8 18 14 14 28 0 0 0 12 14 26 9 12 21 2 0 2
5 8 11 19 11 10 21 4 1 5 8 10 18 18 15 33 3 0 3
6 12 10 22 11 13 24 1 0 1 9 12 21 13 16 29 2 1 3
7 6 11 17 16 16 32 3 1 0 10 17 27 12 12 24 3 0 3
8 14 12 26 13 21 34 1 0 0 6 9 15 13 20 33 4 0 4
9 11 5 3 8 6 4
10 14 14 28 11 12 23 1 0 0 9 11 20 12 15 27 3 1 4
11 5 11 16 12 7 19 4 0 0 12 11 23 14 16 30 0 0 0
12 12 15 27 8 21 29 0 0 0 14 13 27 15 18 33 3 0 3
13 11 15 26 18 18 36 2 0 0 13 14 27 9 12 21 3 0 3
14 8 9 17 11 14 25 2 0 0 11 13 24 12 15 27 0 1 1
15 4 11 15 12 15 27 1 1 2 9 12 21 19 19 38 3 1 4
16 10 9 19 12 17 29 4 0 0 16 12 28 16 21 37 2 1 3
17 10 16 26 9 8 17 3 0 0 9 14 23 11 10 21 3 0 3
18 13 16 29 11 13 24 3 0 0 3 9 12 11 18 29 4 0 4
19 15 18 33 9 4 13 2 0 0 9 10 19 17 16 33 0 0 0
20 15 17 32 4 11 15 0 0 0 6 13 19 10 7 17 4 1 5
21 11 13 24 10 6 16 4 0 0 18 18 36 17 16 33 5 2 7
22 17 19 36 13 10 23 2 0 0 3 8 11 14 16 30 1 0 1
*233 268 501 250 267 517 39 4 43
KAOC\J 255 458 281
C\lKA 593 52 8 60
* The sums for Form A do not include the scores for the members of pair 9»
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(d) The ranks on which the spearman's rho correlations between E and N 
and the four 'negatives' conditions were based. The groups are given in 
the usual order (GR group first) but with the members of the ninth pair 
omitted since the GR member did hot do Form B of the EPI. Scores and 
response times are ranked from highest to lowest and from longest to 
shortest, respectively.
Sub­
ject E N T+ T- F+ F-
1G 234 12y 154- 20 14 20
2G 15 124 4 1 15 8
3G 21 35 40 37 40 41
4G 33 20 41 41 33 39
5G 294 32| 34 40 42 344
6G 234 27 2li 24 19 284
7G 354 11 11 16 64 4
8G 15 5 42 33 41 40
9G 1? 294 314 18 274 7
10G 37 36 39 29 35 6
11G 104 174 18 36 29 12
12G 15 4 17 38 31 24
13G 354 25 34 22 37 26
14G 384 22 36 34 39 17
15G 29? 174 214 27 26 38
16G 15 374 7 8 8 1
17G 54 27 274 39 34 42
18G 3 42 5 5 64 19
19G 4 40 2 12 9 14
20G 184 39 194 11 16 25
21G 14 294 34 22 38 36
1P 33 24 23 28 234 37
2P 40 24 194 14 234 33
3P 54 41 38 13 32 3
4P 15 32y 29 32 274 344
5P 33 8 26 7 21 18
6P 254 174 9 9 10 16
7P 1 02" 27 37 35 25 32
8P 3&4 8 25 2 22 2
9P 27 22 13 25 1JL 1 2 284
10P 21 1 4‘2 14 30 5 22
11P 104 8 30 22 30 11
12P 104 324 314 31 12 30
13P 184 22 214 26 20 23
H P 254 1 24 42 36 31
15P 1? 24 3 4 3 15
16P 21 324 194 10 17 27
17P 41 17t 6 17 4 9
18P 29? 8 1 3 14 10
19P 29? 31? 12 6 18 5
2 OP 14 8 10 15 11 13
21P 42 H t 8 19 13 21
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and the validity of the corresponding argument as a whole, and a 
equate grasp of, or adherence to, the 'logical task*.
In Chapter 2 the selection, on the basis of performanc 
Forms of Section B of Valentine's Reasoning Tests, of a (PR) gro 
'poor reasoners' and a (GR) group of 'good reasoners', matched o 
on a composite measure of their (superior) academic attainment a 
is described. Preliminary evidence relating to the difference 
the groups is considered and the materials and procedure in the 
'five, types of statement* (5T3), experiment described. This ex 
applies a form of Wason's 'card-turning task' to the three types 
ment occurring most frequently in the criterion Valentine test, : 
the universal affirmative in categorical form (a ), the universal 
(e ) and statements of the form, 'Only X's are Y's', and to two o 
incorporating logically important connectives, the universal aff: 
in hypothetical form (Ah) and a universal-disjunctive (Ad).
The assumption underlying the 5T3 experiment is that a 
ence between the groups in their grasp of any of the types of st< 
will be reflected in a difference in the success with which they 
the task with respect to that statement-type. Significant diff<
were found on A and F and on one aspect of the response to Ah, bi 
E or on Ad. A progressive analysis of responses to different s 
types suggests the operation of other, unsuspected, factors and ■ 
doubt on the validity of the use of the card-turning task as a m< 
the relative difficulty of different statement-types.
In the later (4To) experiment, incorporating modificat: 
the materials and procedure, it was possible to establish (l) the 
ence of the differences on A and F over a period of 12 to 18 moni 
the superiority of the GR group in learning to make the correct ]
Chapter 5 describes the use of \lason's 'construction ta 
investigate the possibility that PR subjects have significantly ir 
difficulty than their GR counterparts with the negative particle, 
important element in all reasoning. The outcome is somewhat equ 
there being a significant difference between the groups on the fa 
affirmative condition (which incorporates a single negative compo 
the 'semantic' notion of falsity) and when this condition is comb 
the true-negative, but not on the false-negative which includes b 
negative components. This last result, it is suggested, may be 
the conspicuous instability of the response-time measure of diffi 
in this case.
Chapter 5 also considers evidence (from scores on the E 
about the extraversion and emotionality of the two groups, it hav 
argued that differences in either of these dimensions of personal 
be partly responsible for difficulties with the negative particle 
though the differences are in the expected direction none is larg 
to be significant on a two-tailed test. A small but significant 
ation between scores on the N scale of the E.P.I. and latency of 
to the true-negative condition when both groups of subjects are t 
together lends, again in the absence of corroboration from the fa 
negative condition, rather uncertain support to the Eifermann hyp 
of a relationship between emotionality and slowness of response t 
ive statements.
• A concluding chapter reviews the outcomes of the above 
es, considers an alternative interpretation of the 5TS results an 
ates some possible points of departure for future research in thi
• • •
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